Public utility pricing and industrial decentralization in South Africa by Wallis, Joseph Lyall
C' 
PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING AND INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Dissertation 
submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY of Rhodes University 
by 
JOSEPH LYALL WALLIS 
December 1983 
i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would, firstly, like to express my deep gratitude to my supervisor, 
Prof. M.L. Truu for the encouragement, assistance and advice he 
gave me during the writing of this thesis. I am also indebted to 
Dr P.J.D. Du Toit; and Mr T. L • .Kenriedy- of the National Institute of 
Transport and Road Research for the helpful discussions on the 
practical aspects of transportation policy; to Mrs Corona Langhan 
and Mr Oak.ley West, Cartographer at the . Geography Department of 
Rhodes University, for the extremely competent way in which they 
assisted with the graphs and diagrams; and to Mrs Lalita Ranchhod 
who typed the thesis both efficiently and cheerfully. 
The financial assistance of the following bodies is gratefully acknowledged: 
(i) Human Needs, Resources and the Environment Section 
(Regional Development Programming), National Frograr.JIle 
for Environmental Sciences, Co-operative Scientific 
Programmes, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; 
(ii) the National Institute of Transport and Road Research, 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; and 
(iii) the Human Sciences Research Council. 
To my wife, Kim, I am deeply grateful for the- love and support she 
lias given during_the_ time of writing..this thesis. 
J. L. Wallis 
GRAHAMSTOWN 
December 1983 
ii 
CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
LIST OF TABLES AND DIAGRAMS 
INTRODUCTION 
1 • 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Background to the Thesis 
The Economic Characteristic s of Public Utilities 
Public Enterprises 
Welfare Economics 
Outline of the Thesis 
CHAPTER ONE: THE APPLICATION OF WELFARE THEORY 
TO PUBLIC ENTERPRISE PRICING 
1 : 1 
1 :2 
1 :3 
1 :4 
1 ." J
Introduction: Value Judgements and Normative 
Welfare Economics 
The Optimality of Marginal Cost Pric ing 
A Welfare Comparison of Alternative Pricing Policies 
Without an Interpersonal Comaprison of Utility 
The Extent to which Welfare Comparisons between 
Pricing Policies are Affectl'd by Relaxing Restrictive 
Assumptions 
1 : 3: 1 
1 :3:2 
1 :3:3 
Increasing Returns to Scale 
Externalities 
X-Inefficiency 
Second Best Theory and the Desirability of Piecemeal 
Optimization 
Conclusion: A Comparison between the Partial and 
General Equilibrium Rationale for 
Marginal Cost Pricing 
i 
ii 
1 
7 . 
./ 
~. 
7 
9 
11 
33 
33 
2:3 
iv 
Evalt.ation of Pricing Rules 
2:3:1 
2:3:2 
2:3:3 
2:3:4 
Public Enterprise Decision Taking and 
the Role, of Pricing Rules 
Public Enterprise Decision Rules as a 
Substitute for Competition 
Internalization of Externalities 
Public Enterprise P ricing and Investment 
Policy as an Instrument of Regional 
Policy 
CHAPTER THREE: T RANSPO HT 
3:1 
3:2 
3:3 
3:4 
3:5 
The Framework for Public Transportation Policy 
3:1 :1 
3:1 :2 
3:1 :3 
3:1 :4 
The Structural Characteristics of the 
Transport Sector 
Intermodal Competition 
The Production Process on the Railways 
Intermodal Co-ordination 
The Impact of Public Transport Enterprise Policies 
on Regional revelopment 
Administration of Tra.nsport Policy in South Africa 
The Tariff Policy of S.A. T. S. 
3:4:1 
3:4:2 
Freight Traffic 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Traffic Volume and Composition 
Tariff Policy with respect to 
Freight Traffic 
The Financial Performance cf 
Railwa.y Freight Services 
Passer:ger Traffic 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Trends in Traffic Volume and 
Composition 
The Structure of Passenger Fares 
Financial Performance of the 
Passenger Section 
Evaluation of S.A. T. S. Tariff Policy 
102 
'102 
108 
113 
116 
120 
120 
120 
123 
124 
~ 25 
131 
13? 
139 
14:; 
1 '· .. "T j 
164 
164 
166 
16e 
171 
3:6 
3:7 
3:8 
3:9 
v 
3:5 :1 Freight Tariff Policy 171 
3:5:1:1 The System of Hate Differentiation 17 1 
3:5:1:2 The Problem of Unremunerative Routes 175 
3:5:1:3 The Effect of Freight Tariff Policy 177 
3:5:2 
3:5:3 
on Industria.l Decer.tralization 
Passeng'er Traffic 
(a) 
(b) 
Main Line Traffic 
Suburban Traffic 
Conclllsion 
Conflicting Demands Upon S .A . T.S. Policy 
Historical R.eview of Freight Transport Policy in 
South Africa 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Monopoly Management and thB Promotion 
of Regional Development 
The Motor Transport Act of 1930 and the 
Regulation of Intermodal Competition 
Economic Growth and the Need for 
Deregulation, 1930-1977 
Current Situation 
The Role of X-Inefficiency and a Framework for 
Deregulation 
A Recommended and Investment Policy for a Public 
Transport Enterprise Operating in a Deregulated 
Transport Sector 
3:9:1 
3:9:2 
The Special Position of a Public Transport 
Enterprise Operating in a Deregulate d 
Transport Sector 
Adaptation of Optimal Pricing and Investment 
Rules 
3:9:2:1 
3:9:2:2 
3:9:2:3 
Negotiation of Rates 
The Concept of Attributable Cost 
Decision RulE,S for Investment 
Policy 
181 
182 
186 
188 
190 
1 91 
195 
199 
207 
207 
209 
21 0 
212 
219 
3:10 
3: 11 
vi 
Evaluation of "Competitive" Pricing and Investment 
Policy 
3:10:1 
3: 10:2 
3:10:3 
Investment Policy 
Rating Policy 
Industrial Decentralization 
221 
221 
224 
230 
Conclusion: Summary of Findings and Recommendations 232 
CHAPTER FOUR: ELECTRICITY 235 
4:1 
4:2 
4:3 
Introduction 
The Characteristics of Electricity Supply 
4:1 : 1 
4 :1 :2 
4: 1 :3 
The System of Generation and Transmission 
(a) Short Run Optimization 
(b) Long Run Optimization 
UncertaiEty and Reserve Plant Margins 
The System of Distribution 
The Demand for Electricity 
4:2:1 
4:2:2 
4:2:3 
The Determinants of Electricity Demand 
Sectoral Consumption Patterns 
Growth in the Demand for Electricity 
235 
235 
236 
238 
241 
245 
249 
249 
25 2 
253 
The Formulationof a Marginal Cost Based Tariff Structure 253 
4:3:1 
4:3:2 
4:3:3 
The Calculation of L ong Run Marginal Cos t 
(a) Energy Cost 
(b) Capacity Cost 
(c) 
(d) 
Consumer Cost 
Shadow Pricing 
254 
225 
260 
264 
264 
The Formulation of an Optimal Tariff Structure 266 
Adjustments to a Marginal Cost Based Tariff 
Structure 
(a) 
(b) 
Second Best Conside rations 
F inanc ial Targets 
268 
280 
281 
4:4 
4:5 
4:3:4 
vii 
Evaluation of a Marginal Cost Based Tariff 
Structure 
Page 
A Description and Evaluation of the Tariff Policy of 
the Electricity Supply Commission in South Africa 
286 
4:4:1 
4:4:2 
4:4:3 
Introduction: A Profile of Escom 
Escom's Tariff Policy 
28 6 
289 
239 4:4: 2: 1 
4:4:2:2 
4:4:2:3 
4:4:2:4 
The Constraint on Escom' s 
Tariff Policy 
Escom's Tariff Structure 
Administrative Aspects of 
Electricity Tariffs 
Cost Allocation 326 
Evaluation of Escom' s Tariff Policy 33 3 
4:4:3:1 
(a) 
(b) 
4:4:3:2 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
The Revenue Constraint 333 
The Justifiability of the Level cf 33::' 
Internal Financing Pursued by 
Escom 
The Adequacy of the System of 339 
Control Over Escom 
Evaluation of Escom' s Tariff 346 
Structure and Rate Making Principles 
The Equity Criterion 346 
The Efficiency Criterion 352 
The Equality Criterion 356 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
CHAPTER FIVE: WATER 
5 :1 Economic Features of Water Supply 
5:1 : 1 
5:1 :2 
5: 1 :3 
5:1 :4 
5:1 :5 
5:1 :6 
Water in Modern Society 
Water Resources 
Water Resource Development 
The Effect of Aridity on Public Water Supply 
Policy 
Special Characteristics of Water Supply 
Market Imperfections in Activities Related 
to Irrigation 
367 
367 
36'7 
369 
3'13 
375 
378 
5:2 
5:3 
5:4 
5:5 
5:6 
viii 
Water Provision in South Africa 
5 :2:1 
5:2:2 
5:2:3 
5:2:4 
Historical Background 
The Findings of the Viljoen Commission 
The Planning of Water Resource Development 
in South Africa 
The Administration of Water Resource 
Development in South Africa 
Water Price Policy in South Africa 
379 
379 
380 
354 
390 
5 :3:1 
5:3:2 
5:3:3 
The System of Subsidizaticn 390 
Water Rates on Government Irrigation Schemes 403 
Water Rates on Municipal and Industrial Water 406 
Schemes 
Evaluation of Existing Water Price Policy 
5 :4:1 
5:4:2 
5:4:3 
Government Irrigation Schemes 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Degree of Subsidization 
Structure of Water Rates 
Distributional Effects 
Municipal and Industrial Water Schemes 
The Impact on Industrial Decentralization 
Policy of the Water Pricing Policy for 
Industrial and Domestic Consumers 
The Implementation of Optimal Water Pricing Policies 
5:5 :1 
5:5:2 
Me tering Water Consumption 
The Problems with Marginal Cost Pricing 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
409 
40 9 
409 
413 
424 
426 
430 
435 
435 
444 
449 
CONCLUSION 
BIBLIOG RAPH Y 
Tables 
3:1 
3:2 
3:3 
3:4 
3:5 
3:6 
3:7 
3:8 
3:9 
3:10 
4:1 
4:2 
4:3 
ix 
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 
Operating Results of the S.A. Transport Services 
1977/78 to 1983/84 
Operating Results of the Different Transport Modes 
Provided by the S. A. Transport Services 
1977 /78 to 1 983/84 
Railways Revenue 1977/78 to 1981/82 
Contribution of Freight Traffic to Revenue Collected 
from Tariffs 1 977/78 to 1 981/82 
S.A. T. S. Goods Traffic 1977/78 to 1981/82 
Index of Tariff Scales at 225 Km in 1980-81 
Comparison of Rate Increases for High and Low-Rated 
Goods 1970-1980 
Percentage of Total Railway Revenue Contributed by 
Passenger Traffic 
Revenue Generated by Passer:ger Traffic, 1977/78 
to 1981/82 
Percentage Contribution of Main-Line and Suburban 
Revenue from Fares, 1977/78 to 1981/82 
Tariff Structure of Electricite'de Fr2.nce, 1976 
Percentage Load Factor in France, 1949-1972 
Escom: Operating Results, 1967 to 1982 
140 
141 
146 
147 
148 
153 
157 
164 
1S9 
278 
290 
Tables 
4:4 
4:5 
4:6 
4:7 
4:8 
4:9 
4-:10 
4:11 
4:12 
4:13 
4:14 
4:15 
4:16 
x 
Comparison between Average Selling Price and 
Average Cost of Electricity, 1967 to 1982 
International Comparison of Average Selling Price 
of Electricity 
Escom Costs and Revenue, 1967 to 1982 
Annual Percentage Rate of Increase in Interest 
Payments, 1 968 to 1 982 
Ratio of Inter€.st Credited t c Internal Funds to the 
Total Interest Charge, 1977 to 1982 
Interest Credited to Capital Development Fund 
Terminal Value of Unredeemed Portion of 
Redemption Fund with Different Proportions of 
Internal Financing 
Comparison be tween Charges Against Revenue 
Under Present Escom PoHcy and with Historical 
Cost Depreciation, 1977. t.o 1982 
Ratios Local to Foreign Loans, 1976 to 1981 
Trend in Capital Development Fund 1977 to 1982 
Adjusted Escom Surplus, 1977 to 1982 
The Effect of Deducting" Retained Profits" from 
Escom Costs 
Operating Statistics for Escom, 1982 
292 
292 
295 
297 
299 
303 
304 
30,! 
309 
311 
313 
Tables 
4:17 
4:18 
4:19 
4:20 
4:21 
4:22 
4:23 
4:24 
4:25 
4:26 
4:27 
5 :1 
5:2 
5 :3 
5:4 
xi 
Reserve Plant Margin Percentages, 1970 to 1982 
Escom Tariff Schedule, First Quarter 1983 
Escom Electricity Supply Account 
Escom Equity/Total Asset Ratios, 1967 to 1982 
ProjecteD. Kate of Increase of _EqIJity!Toal-AsSet 
Ratio, 1978 to 1985 
Escom Reserve Plant Margin, 1970 to 1982 
Energy Charges Expressed as a Percentage of Rand 
and o. F • S. Charge (First Quarter 1 983) 
Regional Differences in the Averag'e Selling Price 
of Electricity 
Regional Differences in Transmission Cost per kWh 
Operating Expenditure of Regional Undertakings in 
Cents per kWh in 1982 
Load Factors of Distribution Undertakings in 1982 
Summary of Cperating Costs and Revenue for 
Government Water Schemes, 1976/:7 to 1980/81 
Reyer.ue/Operating Cost Percentiles on Irrigation 
Schemes, 1980-81 
Price and Cost Data on Three Irrigation Schemes 
in South Africa 
Structure of Water Tariffs on Three Water Schemes 
316 
318 
327 
335 
j4· L~ 
357 
359 
362 
396 
400 
404 
405 
Tables 
5:5 
5:6 
5:7 
5:8 
5:9 
5:10 
xii 
Tariff Schedules on Three Water Schemes 
Comparison between the Conservation Incentives 
of Different Pricing Policies 
Average Cost per Morgen of Irrigated Land 
Cost Structure of Industrial Scheme 
Average Price of Water on Government Water 
Schemes in Regions A to H in 1980-81 
Cost of Water as a Percentage of the Market Value 
of Products 
421 
422 
425 
427 
Figures 
1 : 1 
1 :2 
1 :3 
1 :4 
1 :5 
1 :6 
2:2 
2:2 
2:3 
2:4 
2:5 
2:6 
2:7 
2:8 
xiii 
Pareto Optimality in a First Best Economy 
Community Indifference Curve 
A Welfare Comparison between Alternative Pricing 
Policies without an Interpersonal Comparison 
of Utility 
Increasing Returns to Scale 
Externalities ir Production 
"X-inefficiency" 
The Application of the Marginal Cost Pricing and 
Investment Rules 
The Effect of the Provision of Reserve Capacity on 
Cost Curves 
The Derivation of an "L" - Shaped Long Run Average 
Cost Curve 
The "Rees-Turvey" Model 
Peak Load Pricing 
The Application of the Optimal Investment Rule 
The Welfare Losses Incurred in Charging a Uniform 
Price 
The Effect of the Provision of Reserve Capacity on the 
Rees-Turvey Model 
19 
27 
29 
39 
44 
64 
67 
70 
73 
76 
7'"/ 
79 
Figure 
2:9 
2:10 
2:11 
2:12 
3:1 
3:2 
3:3 
3:4 
3:5 
3:6 
3:7 
3:8 
3:9 
3: 10 
3: 11 
xiv 
The Effect of Indivisibilities on the Optimal 
Application of the Pricing and Investment Rules 
The Effect of a Two Part Tariff on Consumer Choice 
Second Best Optimality 
Bilateral Monopoly 
Intermodal Co-ordination 
A Comparison of the Cost - Distance Relationship 
of Road and Rail Transport 
A "Decision Tree" for t~.e Intermodal Allocation of 
Freight Traffic 
81 
82 
94 
95 
127 
12~ 
The Effect of an Interregional Improvement in Transport 134 
S.A.T.S. Net Results for Services, 1981/82 142 
S • A • T . S. Total Tonnage Tra.nsport~,d by Rail, 1 971/72 
to 1980/81 
Shar€ of Total Freight Transport Market Supplied by 
Different Modes 
Market Share of Rail T ransport, 1977-73 tv 1981-82 
Operating Efficier.cy of Rail Freight Services 
1973/74 to 1980/81 
Sp~cific, Joint and Common Costs of Froviding l~ail 
Passenger and Freight Services 
Calculation of Common Costs for Rail Passer:ger and 
Freight Services 
150 
161 
217 
218 
Figures 
4:1 
4:2 
4:3 
4:4 
4:5 
4:6 
4:7 
4:8 
4:9 
4:10 
4: 11 
5 :1 
5:2 
xv 
Probability Distribution of Peak Demands in 
Standard Weather Conditions 
Distribution Network 
Energy Movements Along a Transmission Network 
The Effect of a Sustained Increment in Long Run 
Peak Demand on System Capacity Costs 
Recovery of Capacity Costs through Peak Period 
Tariff Differentiation 
The SRMC gel: Curve on a Stepped Function 
Typical Daily. Load Curve of B.n ElE·ctricity Underta~dng 
Escom: Average Selling Price of Elect~'icity Deflated 
by Production Price Index., 1960-1981 
Accumulated Amounts Charged to the Electricity Supply 
Account Under a System of Straight line Historical 
Depreciation and Under Escom' s P resent System 
(Assuming Iniital Investr-ler.t of R(OOO) 
The Effect of Escom' s Failure to Apply Peak Period 
Price Differentiation 
Escom Regional Undertaking Price Ratios, 1970 to 1983 
Cost Curves Typically Facing a Water Utility 
Organizational Structure of the Department of Water 
Affairs 
246 
259 
262 
267 
269 
273 
293 
303 
354 
361 
376 
Figures 
5:3 
5:4 
5:5 
5:6 
5:7 
5:8 
5:9 
5:10 
xvi 
Opera.ting Results on Government Irrigation Scheme 
1975-1976 to 1980-81 
Operating Results on Industrial and Domestic Schemes, 
1975-76 to 1980-81 
The Effect on Productive Efficiency of a Fla.t Rate 
Pricing Policy and the Imposition of Quotas 
The Effect of Fixed Factor Proportions on Water 
- Pricing Policy 
The Effect of V!ater Pricing Policy on Process 
Substitution where there are a. Limited Number of 
Irrigation Techniques 
The Change in Water Dema.nd Gver Time 
The Effect of Metering on the Time Path of Consumption 
The Effect of Indivisibilities on Water Pricing 
397 
402 
41 4 
417 
418 
437 
440 
443 
INTRODUCTION 
1 • BACKGROUND TO THE THESIS 
During the 1950' sand 1960' s it would appear that the explicit 
objectives of economic policy in South Africa were full employment 
and economic gTowth with some occasional emphasis on the pursuit of 
relative price stability. Other goals such as efficiency in resource 
allocation and the pursuit of an "acceptable·" ircome distribution were 
at best implicit and subordinate to these objectives. This is exem-
plified by the fact that a number of key prices which were controlled 
by the authorities such as the exchange r ate, interest rates and 
public utility tariffs were generally set at levels which were either 
over-or under-priced relative to factor .scarcitiee throughout this 
period. South Africa was certainly not unique in this respect since, 
as Balassa has pointed out, the policies fe·llowed in many countries 
" ••• generally reflected an inadequate appreciation of the sensitivity 
of economic agents to price signals." 1 Although such price-distorting 
policy measureE, applied may have contributed to the expansion of 
manufacturing industry during this period this v.as often at a cost. to 
the national economy in the form of inefficiencies in the allocation 
of resources. Furthermore such costs tended to a.ccumulate ' as the 
price distortions caused by public policy persisted over time. 
The underlying need to referm the system of incentives affecting 
the alloca.tion of rer,ources therefore grew steadily in impo:r.t",nce 
up till the 1970' s, whE.n it became critical because of the international 
uphe avals in energy prices, interest ratee, and exchange rates . It 
was dcriIlg this period that policymakers in many ccuntrieE. came 
to recognize that the resourc.e misa.llocation caused by distorted prices 
was not just a painful side-effect of economic growth but could actually 
1 . Balassa, B., Policy Reform in Developing Count:ties, Pergamnon 
Press, Oxford, 1 st ed., 1977, p. 8. 
2 
be a factor limiting future growth. For example, in a statistical 
analysis of the relationship betwe en price distortions and economic 
growth in 32 developil tg countries in the 1970 t s, the World Bank 
found that; 
" ••• those countries with the worst distortions experienced significantly 
lower domestic saving and lower output per unit of investment, thus 
" leading to slowe r growth. ,,~ 
In South Africa there also allFears to have occurred 2. recognition 
by policymakers of the consequences of resource misallocation fcr 
national ecc·nomic development as indicated by the movement towards 
morE' 11 market-orientated" measures which characterizes recent monetary 
excHange rate and industrie.l decentralization policy proposals. This is 
exemplified by the statement made by the P rime Minister in his "Carlton " 
address that the South African Gove r nment was comm itted tc the 
II general deregulation of tte ec enomy as evidenced by the reo-examination 
of price, rent and exchange control ". 
It i s against the backgrounc. of this general direction in economic 
policy that this thesis examines the present pricing policies followed 
by the suppliers of rail,transport electricity and water services in 
South Africa aEd indicate s tt.e direction in which they should be 
changed in order to ccntribute towards a more efficient allocation of 
res ources in the economy . Furthermore since a high priority has been 
attached by the GoYernIl'ent to a policy of encouraging industrial decentral-
ization, largely by means of a system of price incentiYes, this thesis will 
also exar,l ine the effect on this policy of both the existing and the recom-
mended pricing policies pertaining tc tt.ese service s . 
2. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
World Development Report 1983, Washington, July 1983, 
p. 57 . 
3 
2. THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF FUBLIC UTILITIES ' 
Rail, electricity and water service s are, in most caseo provided by 
so-called public utilities. The supply and demand cenditions for 
public utility services are disntinguished by a number of characteristics 
which affect and reflect the degree of State involvement in these 
sectors of tr.e economy. 
The production of public utility services is usually characterized by the 
existence of ec onomies of scale over the entire· output range of the 
market, the physical cennection of producer and ccnsumer and highly 
capital-intensive methods of production . As a result public utilities 
tend to be "natural monopolies" with a high proportion of their total 
costs consisting of eoverhead investment. 
The services provided by public utilities have a number of distinctive 
characteristics: 
(i) they are used on a continuos or repeated basis in a ,multiplicity 
of activities thrcughout the economy ; 
(ii) they are usually not consumed directly but are a primary inp llts 
in the direct production of other goods and services; 
(iii) they cannot be stored.; and 
(iv) t hey are frequeiltly reqdred at l evE-r,; which fluctuatE' on a 
more or less regula.r da,ily , seasonal or annual basis. 
As a result of characteristic s (i) and (ii), the demar:d for public utility 
services tends to be bOLh price and income inelastic a lthough the 
price elasti city of demand may rise over time a,s an increasing number 
of L.sers are able to adjust their stocks of durable goods in response 
te, price chz,nges. The typically low price elasticity of demand for 
public utility services may afford them the opportunity tc appropriate 
the cen,;umers' surplus of their clients through the practice of first 
and third degree price discrimination. 3 As a result of characteristics 
3, First degree price discrimiLation occ urs where a moncpolist can 
change different rates t o e ach individual consumer and third degree 
price discrimination occur~ where dIfferent rates are charged to 
different classes of consumer. 
4 
(iii) and (iv), public utilities have to pr.c'Yide iacilities of sufficient 
capacity to meet demand during peak periods. The peak capacity 
requirement per consumer can, however, be reduced as a public 
utility expands its services to a greater number of consumers and 
regions, as the total peak demand facing it is likely to be less than 
the sum of individual peaks since the peak periods of some groups 
of consumers may coincide with the off-peak periods of others. 
Thus there often exists an incentive for public utilities to supply their 
services on a national scale. Both railway and electricity utilities 
usually supply their services on a national grid whereas it is usually 
not possible for water to be supplied within a similar national network. 
The economic characteristics of public utilities often lead to extensive 
regulation of their activities by the State. In particular, the pricing 
and investment policies of public utitilies tend to be closely regulated, 
since an unregulated public utility can use its monopolistic power to 
"exploit" its clients either by restricting the volume its services or 
by appropriating their consumers ' surplus through price discrimination. 
Furthermore, pub~ic utilities are often obliged to obtain formal approval 
from the appropriate Governmental authority to offer a new service, 
or to extend, change or abandon an existing one. The institutional 
arrangements for regulating public utilities however, vary from country 
to country. In the United States public utilities are priv&tHly owned 
enterprises controlled by various utility commissions. In the Lnited 
Kingdom, however, such control has been traditionally effected through 
State ownership. In SOllth Africa the British model of a state - owned 
enterprise has been largely been adopted. The institutional . character 
istics of this type of enterprise now needs to be examined in more 
detail, since in the discussion of the theoretical principles underlying 
the pricing policies of public utilities in the first two chapters of 
this thesis, it will be assumed that public utilities are state-owned 
enterprises. 
3. PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND PRICE DETERMINATION 
A public enterprise is essentially a hybrid type of organization. As 
an enterprise it must produce and sell goods and services and it is 
5 
therefore subject to similar market and organizational pressures as 
those which typically face a large-scale, privately-owned firm. On 
the other hand, as a public organization it is owned and controlled 
by the Government or its agent and may therefore be subject to direct 
and indirect pressures from administrators, politicians and the public 
at large. Jones has summarized the effect of this dichotomy as 
follows: 
"As hybrids, public enterprises share characteristics of traditional 
government units and private business enterprises, with some being 
4 
closer to one pole than to the other". 
It has been argued, though, that public enterprises are not e ssentially 
different from large scale private enterprises which are subject to 
governn:ental and public pressures through legal regulation, taxes 
and subsidies, moral suasion and the demands of various interest 
groups. It is certainly true that the study of a large scale business 
organization can yield fruitful insights into the organizational 
problems affec ting a public enterprise and that the government may be 
able to attain the same objectives through the regulation of private 
enterprises as with the control of public enterprises. Public enterprises 
do, however, differ from large private organizations in the sense that 
they are subject to direct, or internal, rather than indirect government 
control. As Jones has put it: 
"Governments, of course, can influence private managers indirectly, 
or externally, by passing laws, imposing taxes, and jawboning but 
this is quite different from public enterprises where government has 
the power to hire or fire the manager. For a private manager, on the 
other hand, the discipline imposed by the capital market is typically 
the major determinant of his tenure". 5 
4. Jones,L. P. , Public Enterprise in Less Developed Countries, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, 
5. Ibid"pp. 2-3. 
6 
The distinctive nature of the direct form of control which governments 
exert over public enterprises can be seen in the way in which their 
pricing policies are determined. While it is true that the State often 
intervenes in the determination of prices for a number of goods and 
services produced by private enterprises in a western-type mixed 
economy, this intervention is usually of short duration and often 
concerned with merely setting the maximum and minimum levels for 
market-determined prices. In the case of state-owned utilities, though, 
pricing policy is controlled by the Government means of "rules" which 
determine the manner in which tariffs should be formulated, and/or 
by requiring the public enterprise to publish its tariffs in offidal 
schedules which can usually only be changed with the approval of an 
appropriate government authority. It can thus be seen that the process 
of price determination is not an independent function of the public 
enterprise management. In the case of public utilities, it is considered 
necessary for the State to directly control price determination in order 
to prevent these undertakings from using their monopolistic power to 
pursue potentially "exploitative" pricing practices. 
The main criteria which have been applied by governments in regulating 
the process of price determination by public enterprises haye been those 
of "fairness" (or equity) and "financial viability". They have usually 
been concerned that the tariff structure for public utility services 
should be "fair" in the sense that no group of consumers should be 
discriminated against by being charged more than the cost incurred in 
supplying them. Furthermore it has been considered important that 
the tariff structure should generate sufficient revenue to at least 
cover accounting costs and thereby ensure that the public utility remains 
financially viable without the need for State subsidization. However, 
these criteria of "fairness" al\d "financial viability" are often 
subordinated to the social objectives of the State where it is considered 
desirable for the utility to provide unremunerative services 0 
However, as Crew and Kleindorfer have noted: 
"In the operation of regulation and public enterprise economic principles 
have often been in the background of these activities. The principal 
consideration behirld regUlation and public enterprise has probably 
been the desire to avoid monopolistic exploitation (broadly defined) 
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rather than promote economic efficiency. ,,6 
Given that policymakers have recently become increasing by aware of the 
importance of resource allocation, a major part of this thesis will be 
concerned with examining how the present pricing policies of a number 
of public utilities may lead to resource misallocation and indic ating 
the direction in which they should be changed to improve allocative 
efficiency. To deriv" a theoretically sound concept of economic 
efficiency it is necessary to examine certain basic propositions of 
welfare ec onomic s. 
4. WELFARE ECONOlv'ICS 
According to Boulding the purpose of welfare economics is " ••• to set 
up standards of judgement by whicr. events and policies can be 
judged as 'economically desirable' , even thou£h on other grounds 
(political, national, ethical) they 'might be judged to be undesirable. ,,7 
It is thus a field of !;tudy which can yield a useful set of propositions 
to guide economic policies aimed at promoting greater efficiency il! 
resource allocation. It should be noted , though, that while, as 
Pigou has stated, the aim of public policy should be to "promote 
welfare,,8 welfare economics usually concerns itself only with one 
aspect; of general welfare, nornally, the economic aspect which is 
said to depend on "those things and services which the individual 
consumes or enjoys, and which could be exchanged for money, and 
the work done by each individual. ,,9 
6. Crew,M.A., and Kleindorfer,P.R., Public Utility Economics, 
Macmillan, London, 1979, p. 122. 
7. Boulding,K.E., "Welfare Economics" in Haley,B.F., ed., 
A Survey of Contemporary Economics, R.D.lrwin, Illinois, 
1952, p. 3. 
8. Pigou,A.C., The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan, 4th ed., 
London, 1970, p. 11. 
9. LHtle,I.M.D., A Critigue of Welfare Economics, 2nd eel., 
Oxford, 1957. 
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There are two basic traditions in welfare economics - the 
Pigovian and the Paretian. 1 0 Both approaches are aimed at defining 
the conditions under which an ideal or optimum allocation of resources 
may be attained. It can be shown that Pigou' s rule that the ideal 
allocation is a situation in which" ... each several sort of resource is 
allocated in such a way that the last unit of it in anyone use yields 
a physical product of the same money value as the last unit of it in 
any other use ,,11 is equivalent to the marginal conditions for Paretian 
optimality which will be discussed in the Chapter 1 .12 However, 
the two approaches differ in the sense that while the Pigovian one 
is based on the assumptions of " ••• measureable and interpersonal 
comparability of utility" 13 so that " ••• a total social utility function 
could be derived simply by adding the utilities of all individuals at 
each ccnfiguration of the economic universe,',,14 the Paretian approach 
can :on the other hand, .even · with the· limitation of ordinal nOI+-
addable utilities define an economic optimum" ••• as a sitt:ation in 
which nobody can mov,,· to a position which he prefers without 
moving somebody else to a position wl:ich is less preferred." 1 5 
It is largely because the Paretian concept of ordinal utility is less 
10. The forerunner of this approach was Pareto, V ., in Manuel 
d' econom.ie politigue, Paris, 1909. It was introduced into 
English -language economics mainly by Lerner,A.P., in 
"The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly 
Power" and Hicks, J .R. in "Foundations of Welfare Economics", 
EconDmic Journal, Dec., 1939. 
11. Pigou,A.C., '?E...cit., p. 33. 
12. See for example, Nath, S. K., A Reappraisal of Weflare 
Economics, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969, 
pp. 36-37. 
13 • Ibid" p. 35. 
14. Boulding,K.E., ~.cit., p. 11. 
1 5 • Ibid., p. 1 2 • 
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restrictive than the Pigovian concept of cardinal utility that the former 
approach dominated conventional welfare econimics to the extent that 
" ••• virtually the entire edifice of economic theory as we; known 
it today is built on Paretian premises. ,,16 The evaluation of public 
utility pricing policies in this thesis will be largely based on the 
propositions derived from the Earetian tradition in welfare economics. 
5. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
Ir Chapter One gene r al equilibrium analysis is used to examine whether 
the 2,doption of a marginal c ost pricing policy by a public enterprise 
would be consistent "lith the optimization of economic welfare. It will 
also be concurred with the question of wt:ether known and significant 
d e partures from the optimum conditiol',s completely invaIidate'the marginal 
cost pricing rule or whether this rule should be adjusted by means of 
a piecemeal optimization procedure,. 
Chapter Two will then use partial equilibrium analysis to establish 
how the marginal cost pricing rules can be applied to the formulati on 
of an optimal pricing and investment policy for a public enterprise 
and how this polic Y should be adjuste,d to deal with non-optimalities. 
The extent to which these optimal pricing rules can be used as 
instruments of decentralized control inducing public enterprises to 
pursue their objectives without ad hoc State int"rference in their 
decisionmaking will then be examined. 
Chapter Three examines the pricing policy of the South African Transport 
Services (~ .A. T. S.) which is inter alia, the utility responsible 
for the provision of rail services in Soutt Africa. The special 
characteristics of the supply and demand for rail services 
are initially discussed to provide the theoretical background against 
16. Winch, D .M., Analytical Welfare Economics, Penguin Modern 
Ec onomic s (1 971 ), pp. 1 99-200. 
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which the present pricing policy can be evaluated in terms of its 
effect on economic efficiency and industrial decentralization. A 
historical review of transport policy in South Africa will show that 
many of the problems associated witt_ the pricing policy of S. A. T . S . 
arise from it being required to pursue conflicting objectives. Finally 
a framework for deregulation will be proposed and the effect of 
deregulation on the pricing policy of S. A. T . S. evaluated. 
Chapter Four deals with the pricing policy of the Electricity Supply 
Commission (Escom). In the first part of this chapter the supply 
and demand characteristics of a.n electricity utility and the practical 
implementation of a tariff structure based on marginal cost principles 
are discussed in general terms. The recent financid performance and 
present tariff structure of Escom is then examined with this tariff 
structure being' evaluated in terms of criterial of equity, efficiency 
and regional equality. 
In Chapter Five the special characteristics of water supply are described 
and the present pricing policies with respect to both the water supplied 
for irrigation and for industrial and domestic purposes are evaluated 
in tE,rms of the effects on allocative efficiency and industrial decentral-
ization in South Africa. The practical problems associated with the 
application of optimal pricing principles tc the supply of water will then 
be discussed. 
The thesis will be concluded with a brief discussion of the differences 
and similarities between the existing and proposed pricing policies for 
rail, electricity and water in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE APPLICATION OF WELFARE THEORY TO PUBLIC ENTER-
PRISE PRICING 
INTRODUCTION: VALUE JUDGEMENTS AND NORMATIVE 
""ELF ARE ECONOMICS 
In this chapter the question will be examined whether it is possible 
to derive from the theory of welfare economics, rules which may 
be generally applied to public enterprise pricing. Unlike private 
enterprises which can, at least in principle, adopt pricing policies 
based on the goa.l of profit maximization, a public enterprise could 
be expected to set its prices to maximize net social benefit or welfare. 
The evaluation of alternative pricing policies and the c!etermination 
of an optimal public enterprise pricing policy therefore clearly fall 
within the field of applied welfare economics, since Mishan1 , for 
example, ha:;; defined welfare economics as "that branch of study 
which tries to forrr.ulate propositions by which we may rank on a scale 
of better or worse alternative situations open to the econorr.y". 
Welfare is, however, essentially an ethical term and any attempt to 
rank different economic states must be based on value jUdgements. 
Even the criteria derived from conventional Paretian welfare 
economics are based on implicit value judgements although it is 
usually claimed that these are "so widely acceptable", "general" 
or "minimal" that the welfare propositions base d on them may be 
considered quit" general, non-controversial or "more or less 
objective". Before one can examine whether Paretian welfare 
criteria [,.ay be applied in an evaluation of public utility pricing 
policies, it is necessary to consider whether the a priori approach 
1. Mishan,E.J., "A Reappraisal of the Principles of Resource 
Allocation", Economica, November 1957, p. 322. 
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of Faretian welfare economics is justifiable. In other words, should 
an economist make prescriptio:ls on the basis of norms established by 
widely accepted value judgements. 
2 In this context, Nath , for example, argues that it is a logically 
ir_valid procedure to adopt F'aretian value judgements as norms on 
the grounds of their purported wide acceptability. He bases this 
contenti.on on a statement by Popper that "it is i rr.possible to derive 
a sentence stating a norm or a decision or, say, a proposal for a 
3 policy from a sentence stating- a fact" • Furthermore, Nath suggests 
that the procedure of !!: priori welfare economics is "based on a 
confusion between decisions and recommendations or comments It. 4 
In a democratic society, decisions have to be based on value 
judg-ements whict. are at any moment widely acceptable to the 
designated political representatives of individual citizens. There 
is, however, no moral or logical necessity for policy-orientated 
comments and recommendations to ce based on propositions that a.re 
widely acceptable. In terms of this view, it is nece-ssary to make a 
distinction between the positive and normative aspects of applied 
economics. An economist is said to be qualified to use positive theory 
to predict the effncts of different policies. It is questionable, 
however, as to whether he is sirr.ilarly qualified to make a normative 
assessment of such predictions. According to one point of view the 
economist should limit his role to that of a "consultant" only. Mishan 
interprets this viewpoir.t as follows: 
2. Nath,S.K ., A Reappraisal of Welfare Economics, Routledge 
and Paul, London, 1969, p. 2, 
3, Popper,K.R., The Logic of Scientilic-Discov~n', London, 
Chapter 5, 195 9. 
4. Nath,S.K., op.cit., p. 129 
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"He is to confine himself to disclosing the 
implications of the policies being' mooted, 
and perhaps those also of alternative 
policies, so enabling political represen-
tatives of the people to select policies that 
are consistent with one anotr.er and that 5 
accord with the wishes of society at large". 
Nath, howE;ver, considers that, iL his role of commentator, an economist 
can make normative recommendations, but that he must 81so make his 
value jUdgements explicit and clearly state that they are based on his 
own predilections. In Nath' s o!,inion "there is no logical warrant 
for economists in ademocratic society to choose some value judgements 
and make them into bask norms in their professional evaluative 
work because they are widely accepta.ble • . Any proposed welfare 
criterion and ~ of welfare functions are no morE than personal 
opinions of the particular economists, which the public and the other 
economists rr,ay accept or reject dependiLg on how much moral appeal 
thOSE; criteria make to tt.em and quite irrespective of how widely 
6 these basic value judgements may be accepted". 
Mishan has perceived that this sort of argument atta.cks tte vE>ry 
fcundations of conventional welfare econor.dcs since fl ••• it carries 
with it the judger.lent that there is at present no rule or method by 
which we may judg-e of the relative efficiency of alternative forms 
of economic organization; indeed, that any conceivable set of 
production plans or any conceivable set of [rices 1>.0 matter how 
arbitrary, are - in our present state of knowledge - to be consi-· 
dered as good as any others. ,,7 He concedes ttat there is no role 
for .2- priori welfa.re economics in a society where decisions are 
5. Mishan, E.J., Welfare Economics: An Assessment , North 
Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1969, p. 14. 
6. Nath,S.K., op.cit., p. 129. 
7. Mishan,E.J., "A Reappraisal of the Principles of Resource 
Allecation", Economica, November 1957, p. 324. 
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reached on the basis of a majority rule voting procedure in the face 
of fixed individual rankings. Where, however, there are political 
institutions which provide a forum for informed debate "consistency 
of principle will be one of the guiding principles". 8 The search 
for consistency will tend to lead to the formulation of a common set 
of criteria which are applicable to a range of comparable economic 
issues: 
"Once these crite ria have been made expliC'it, economists can 
question certain economic decisions not merely by juxtaposing their 
implications with those of other decisions, but more directly by 
reference to these criteria themselves". 9 
~Iishar., therefore, rejects the view that the role of the economist 
is that of a consultant only. He suggests that it may be impracti-
cable for the economist to avoid making recommer.dations since 
where the economist presents the policy maker with a detailed list 
of all the economic implications of each of the several policy proposals 
under consideration, he "is almost sure to be asked to 'organize' 
the raw data, and to provide some me thod by which the large variety 
of consequences for each policy may be summarized, or weighted 
in some way, to enable the politician to compare them and reach a 
decision on the' best' policy to adopt".1 0 If the advising economist 
did this on the basis of his personal predilections, this would place 
rather arbitrary powers in his hands. Mis han suggests that the 
econonist should use in his normative evaluative work, a consistent 
set of criteria derived from what he terms the "virtual constitution" 
of the community. 
8. Mishan,E.J., op.cit., p. 20. 
9. IbiJ., p. 20. 
1 O. Ibid., p. 1 6. 
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This virtual constitution includes "the minin:al number of ethical 
provisions to which the commto.nity will unanimously subscribe 
irrespective of their present exigencies and material interests" • 11 
Mishan considers that only the following two ethical propositions 
can be ascribed to a virtual constitution for a western-type 
democratic society: 
" (i) 
(ii) 
that social welfare ris,;,s if there is a "Pareto 
improvement", if everyone is made e,s well off 
or better off, and 
that social welfare is increased if the distri-
bution of welfare is better in some sense." 1 2 
Mishan I S propositions fall clearly within the Paretian tradition of 
welfare economics. It is interesting to compare them with Pigou IS 
definition of a welfare improvement. Pigou contends, firstly, that 
" provided that the dividend accruing to the poer is not diminished, 
increases in the aggregate national dividend cf the community, unless 
they result frem coercing pecple tc work more thar:. they wish tc do 
cErry with them increases in economic welfare". 1 J As was explained 
in the previous section the cardinalist concept of a maximum 
"national dividend" . is ccmparable in a static sense to the ordinal 
Paretian concept of an optimum allocation of resources. Secondly 
Pigou proposes that: 
"Any cause whid, increases the absolute share 
of real income in the hands of the poor, provided 
that it does not lead to 2 . contraction in the size 
of the national dividend from any point of view '1 4 
will, in general, increase economic welfare 0" 
1 10 Ibid., p. 18. 
12. Ibij.., pp. 25-26. 
1 J. Pigou, A . C. , The Economics of Welfare ,4th ed., Macmillan, 
London, 1960, p.)( 
1 4. Ibid., p. 89. 
1 6 
This propositior. is based upon the "l&w of diminishing marginal 
utility" and implies that, since the marginal utility of money 
income of the rich will be .lo",er than that for the poor, a redistri-
bution of incoI''le from the rich to the poor will, ceteris paribus, 
lead to an improvement in welfare. The problem witt. this cardinalist 
approach is that it assumes that all individuals have identical utility 
functions for money income, so that with an equal income distribution 
all would have the same marginal utility of money. As Koutsoyiannis 
has pointed out: 
"This assumpti.on is toe strong. Individuals 
differ in their attitudes towards money. A rich 
person may have a utility for money function 
the lies far above the utility (for money) 
function of poorer individuals. In t!-.is ca.se a 
redistribution of income (towards more equality) 
might reduce total welfare. ,,1 5 
Mishar:. appears to have recognized this problem since he does not 
specify the nature of the income redistribution which will lead to 
an irr'provement in welfare although he concedes that "in western 
societies a 'better' distribt:tion invariably suggests a more 
equalitarian distribution of the material product, ,,16 
In order to examine the relevance of 1! priori welfare economics to 
this study, admittedly on its own terms, it has been decided to 
accept Iviishan' s argument that it is justifiable to derive norms from 
value judgements which are based on the virtual constitution of the 
community. By examining the necessary conditions for Pareto 
optimality and how they are affHc ted by introducing some of the 
complications which characterize the operation of public utilities 
within a market economy, it is hoped to establish a framework from 
which criteria can be derived for a piecemeal assessment of differer.t 
puolic utility pricing policies. 
15. Koutsoyiannis,A., Modern V.icroeconomics ,2nd ed., 
Macmillan, 1979, p. 525. 
16. Mishan,E.J., £t>.cit., p. 26. 
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1 :1 THE OPTIMALITY OF MARGINAL COST PRICING 
The starting point for any comparison between alternative public 
enterprise pricing policies and the formulation of an optimal public 
e nterprise pricing policy is the concept of marginal cost pricing 
(MCP). This section will therefore examine whether it is possible 
to derive from the basic propositions of welfare economics the 
cOllclusion that the adoption of a MCl" policy by a public enterprise 
will result in an in provement in welfare compared to a policy which 
results in prices being set above or below marginal costs. 17 
In order to make this welfare comparison, it will be assumed that the 
public e·nterprise operate s within what has been termed a "first best" 
18 
eC0nomy. In other words, although the public enterprise has the 
discretion to choose its own pricing policy, all other ",u·kets an, 
assumed perfectly competitive. The firms operating ir. these. other 
markets aim at maximizing their profits while every consumer is 
assumed to aim at maximizing his utility. It is also a.ssumed that there 
is perfect information and resource mobility, consumers t<.stes are 
independent, transitive and rational, production factors are homoge-
neous a.nd divisible while production fur.ctiol'.s are characterized by 
perfectly divisibility, unlimited factor substitutability, diminishing 
17. The marginal cost pricing rule is usually compared with the 
rule that prices should be set equal to average cost (A C) 0 
It is only at the minimum point of the AC function tt.at AC 
equals lVIC so that, at this point, tt.e application of either 
rule will result in the same price being Charged. At any 
other leve l of output the application of the average cost 
pricing rule will result in prices being set above or below 
marginal cost. 
18. See, for example Rees, R., Public Enterprise Economics 
Weidenfeld aEd Nicolson, London, 1978. 
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marginal productivities and constant returns to scale. Furthermore 
it is assumed that in such an economy there are no externalities in 
either productiop.. or ,?onsumption. 
If one accepts the Paretian value judgements that: 
(i) the welfare of society depends only on the welfare of the 
individuals comprising society; 
(ii) any non-economic causes affecting an individual's welfare 
can be ignored; 
(iii) an individual should be considered the best judge of his own 
welfare; and 
(iv) social welfare rises if anyone person is made better off 
provided that no one else is made worse off; 
then one can evaluate alternative pricing policies in terms of the 
extent to which they satisfy the various conditions for Pareto 
optimality. 
Figure 1.1 represents a "first best" economy where it is assumed 
for simplicity that the re are two homogeneous groups of consumers 
A a.nd B, who each own two production factors, labour (L) and 
capital (K), which are used to produce two commodities X and Y 
with X being produced by perfectly competitive firms and Y being 
produced by a public enterpri se . The public enterprise must choose 
between adopting a. MCP policy which would result in the economy 
moving to point M where OX1 of good X and OY1 of good Yare produced 
or a policy of setting its prices FY above marginal cost, in which case 
the economy will attain the output mix (OX20Y 2) at point N. 
It "an be seen tr.at both output mixes lie on the transformation curve 
TT'. This is a locus of all output combinations which satisfy the 
Paretian condition for an efficient allocation of factors between 
commodities that the marginal rates of technical substitution of L 
• for K in the production of X and Y be equal; or 
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FIGURE 1:1 Pareto Optimality in a First Best Economy 
or 
dQx dLx 
dQlc dKx 
MRTS x e,k 
= 
= 
20 
dQV?Ly 
dQy dKy 
MRTS 
(1 : 1 ) 
If this condition is satified then it can be shown that the slope of 
the transformation curve I which is termed the marginal rate of 
product transformation of X for Y (MRPTx,y) will be equal to the 
marginal cost ratio MCx/MCy19. The Paretian condition for 
1 9. Since each point dong TT' fulfills the condition that 
dQx dLx 
d(..!x dKx = 
dQV~dLV 
dQy dKy 
this can be rearranged as: 
dQyf.dL'y = 
dQx dLx 
( 1 : 1 ) 
Now since the marginal cost of producing X and Y 
(lviCx and MCy) can be expressed as 
lvICx = w or 
dQx/dLx 
and 
MCy = w or 
dQy/dLy 
lvICx = 
MCy = 
r 
dQx/dKx 
r 
dQy/dKy 
where wand r are the prices of labour and capita.l respec-
tively it follows that: 
MCx 
lvICy = (1 :2) 
21 
technical efficier.cy in (2:1) will be satisfied if a public enterprise 
operates in a first best economy and if it is assumed that the 
public enterprise minimizes costs by choosing that ir.put combination 
where MRTSI, Yk = wlr, where wand r are the prices of capital and 
labour respectively, since in the perfectly competitive factor markets 
it will face the same factor prices as the other perfectly coteJpetitive 
producers who will only be able to survive if they minimi"e costs by 
equating their marginal rate s of technical substitution with the factor 
price ratio, w Ir. As a result the marginal technical rate of substi-
tution for the public enterprise will equal that of tl:e perfectly 
competitive firms and the Paretian condition for technical efficiency 
will be attained at both M and N. 
In figure 1:1 the conventional Edgeworth - Bowley exchange box 
diagrams OX1MYl and OX2NY2 can be drawr. to determine the 
Paretian efficient allocation of the respective output mixes between 
cor.sumers A and B. In both exchange boxes, point C represents the 
origin for the indifference rr.ap e; of consumer A while points M and N 
represents the respective origins for the indifference maps of 
consurrer B. The exchange COI'tract curves OM and ON each represent 
loci of output combinations at which A's and B' s respective marginal 
rates of ~:ubstitution of X and Yare equalized. 
or 
dUa!d\.Lax 
dUa/dQay 
= 
= 
dlJ!?L~9~!. 
dUb/dQby 
lVJ D c ' b l fl .... ,X, Y 
(1 : 3) 
These e xchange contract curves satisfy H.e Paretian condition for 
an efficient distribution of commodities between consumers since 
each point along these curves indicates the maximurr: utility 
attainable for one consumer, given the utility l evel of the other 
consumer" Regardless of whether the public enterprise sets its 
price above or equal to marginal cost, a point on either the exchange 
contract curve OM or eN will be attained since all consumers 
maximize their utility by equating tr.eir marginal :~ates of substitution 
with the price ratio, and, if the public enterprise operates in a first 
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best economy, all consumers will face the same product price ratios, 
so that t1:eir marginal rates of substitution will be equalized, or; 
= Px/Py (1 :4) 
It can thus be seen that the attainment of the two lower order 
conditions for Pareto optinJality will be independent of the pricing 
policy adopted by the public enterprise. The alternative pricing 
policies can only be compared by considering the extent to which 
they satisfy the top order condition for a Pareto optimal allocation 
of factors between commodities which requires that the MRPT between 
any two commoditi(, ,, be equal tc the MRS between the same two goods: 
MRPTx,y = a MRSx,y = (1 : 5) 
This top level condition for Pareto-optimality will be attained 
w he!'e the rate at which goods can be tra.nsformed into another is 
equal tc the rate at which consumers are willing to exchange a 
good for another. For example, if l-.iI<Sx, y is in the ratio of one 
to one and MRPTx, y is in the ratio one to two, producers can 
reduce prodUction of x by one unit and mal,e two more of y. Of 
these, only one y is needed to compensate consumers for the loss 
of x. The other is available to malte everyone better off. Thus, in 
principle, a rearrane;ement of production C2,n increase welfare when 
MR::, does not equal Ml,{Fr. 
In a first test e conomy, if E. perfectly competitive firm is to survive 
it enust ~€!t its price equal to marginal ccst so that 
Px = tvICX. 
The survival of a public enterprise is, ho;vever, guaranteed and it 
has the discretion to choose its pricing policy. If it chooses a 
pricing policy which results in prices being set above maT'ginal 
cost, or 
Py > MCy 
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it follows that: 
Px < MCx 
Py MCy 
so that the Paretian condition for allocative efficiency will not be 
attained, that is: 
b MRSx,y = Px 
Py 
< MCx = MR}' Tx,y 
MCy 
If, however, the public enterprise adopts a marginal cost pricing 
policy then: 
l'y = l'vlCX 
and 
Px Me" 
Py MCy 
so that allocative efficiency will be attained: 
MJ(Sx~y = MJ(Sx?y = Px 
Py 
= MCx = MRPTx,y 
MCy 
(1 :6) 
In figure 1:1 the community indifference curve, 20 IM represents a 
locus of all the output corr.binations for which the equalized margiLal 
------ -----
20. The problems associated with the construction of a community 
ir.difference curve were first raised by ::'citovsky, T., in 
his article "A Heconsideration of the Theory of Tariffs", 
Ueview of Economic Studies , IX, 1942, pp. 89-110, and 
later e laborated on by ::;amuelson, P.A., in his article 
":::iocial Indifference Curves" in the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, February 1958, pp. 1-22. 
• 
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marginal rates of substitution for the two consumers have the same 
value as at point Q!vl on the exchange contract curve OM where the 
marginal rates of su'bstitution are equal to the price ratio px/pym 
which results when the public enterprise adopts a marginal cost 
pricing policy, i.e. 
a b MRSx,y = MRSx,y = Fx 
pym 
It can be seen that this indifferer.ce curve is tangential to the 
transformatior.. curve, TT I, at point M which indicates that the 
adoption of a marginal cost pricing policy satisfies the condition 
for Paretian allocative efficiency in (2:6). The community 
indifference curve IN represents a locus of all output mixes where 
tt.e equali~ed MHS I S are eqt:al to their value at point Qn where 
MR:;'x~y' =. MRSx,b.y = px/pyn. The fact that 11\ is not tangen-
tial to the transformation curve indicates that Paretian allocative 
efficiency will not be attained when the public enterprise adopts a 
pricing policy which does not result in price being equal to marginal 
cost" 
The tangency between the community indifference curve 1M and the 
transformation curve, TT I, at point !vI is, however, ser.sitive to 
changes in the distribution of income if the relative prderence for 
good X anc Y differ at the margin for consumers A anc D. A 
redistribution of income will change the value of the equali7ed 
n'.arginal rates of substitution and result in a new community 
ir,differ<!Ilce curve which will intersect 1M at point M. Point Iv! will 
thus no longer represer.t a.n allocatively efficient output combination. 
The Pareto optirr,ality of any point on the transformation curve can 
thus unly be established ir.. terms of a given distribution of income. 
If the point of welfare maximization is to be determined then an 
interpe rsonal ccmparison of utility must l:e made. It must be assumed 
that a Bergson welfare function of the form 
W = W(Ua, Vb) (1 :7) 
exists. 
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This encompasses all the Paretian value judgements anci presupposes 
that an ethical valuation of the relative merit or wor.thiness of the 
individuals concerned can be made. This Bergsonian value judgement 
has been described by Baumol21 as the "social judgemect par 
excellence". The Bergson welfare criterion is more complete than 
the dual welfare criteria included in a "virtual constitution" since it 
assumes that society can rank any possitle distribution of utility 
between individuals and can therefore judge whether a particular 
economic situation has a higher level of welfare tr.an another situation 
eVC' I. though it may not be a Pareto or distributional improvement in 
welfare. 
The Bergson welfare function can be represer:ted in commodity space 
if one accepts the Paretian value judgement that a:c. individual is the 
best judge of his own welfare v/hich is not affected by non-economic 
causes so that 
and 
It follows Hen that the welfare function 
W ; W(Ua, Vb) 
can be expressed as 
b b (Q x,Q y) 
It follc·ws that using the "function of a function rule" 
W ; V(Qx,Qy) 
and Wo ; V(Qx, Qy) 
--------- --
(1 :8) 
(1 :9) 
21. Baumol, W.J., Welfare Economics and the Theory of the 
State, London, G.Bel! & Sons, 1965. 
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(1 :9) is OI .e of a set of non-interesting comn-unity indifference 
curves determir.ed after a social value judgement has been rrade 
as to the optimal distribution of utility between consumers. 22 
One such community indifference curve is shown in Figure 1 :2. The 
rate of change of this cor.cmunity indifference curve in output space 
is termed the community margJnal rate of substitt:.tion of X for Y 
(CMRSx,y) that is 
dW dUx 
dW dWy 
Clv.RSx,y 
Combining (1:10) with (1 :6) we get 
CMR::,x,y 
(1:10) 
lviRPTx,y (1:11) 
which brings tcget[.er all the necessary and sufficient conditior.s 
f or the maxirriza.ticn of social welfare. This "optimum optimorurr_" 
is depicted at ~'oint E in Figure 1:2 where the transformation curve 
is tangential to the cOrlmunity indifference curve Woo At E the 
social and individual utility levels are all maximized simultaneously. 
Now if a public enterprise adopts a ~~CP policy the economy may 
attain a point on the transformation. curve where the output rr.ix is 
different from that. exis·ting at. the position where the 
------.-.---
b M~Sx,y == !\.1R,PTx,y (1:11) 
22. Graaff,J., de V., has shown that a Bergsonian community 
indifference curve represents tbe inner limit of a set 
of Scitovsky community indiffere nce curves in Theoretical 
Welfare Economics , Cambridge University P ress, 1957, 
p. 49. 
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If the MCl' pricing policy is to be consistent with welfare maximi-
zatiop.. ir.. a first best economy, it is necessary to assume that it is 
possible to redistricute income tt.rough lump sum taxatior: so that 
the marginal conditions for optimality are not violated. In this case 
the distribution of income can be adjusted to the level eonsiste"t 
with the optimal output mix at point E. Marginal cost pricing by a 
public enterprise is therefore a necessary but not a sufficient 
csmdition for welfare ma.ximization. P-ny other pricing policy, however, 
will not result in the optimal output combination. and income d.iotribution 
being simultaneously obtained . 
It can be concludec'. that marginal cost pricin!; will be optimal if: 
(i) Public enterprises operate within a first best economy; 
(ii) J. welfare function which contains an explicit interpersonal 
compa l-ioon of utility exists; 
(iii) l-(etiistribution of income through lump sum taxation is 
feaf,ible. 
The;:ext section will examine whether it is possible to make a welfare 
comparison t>etvleen alternative public enterpri;ie policies without 
fT.aking an interpe rsc-nal comparison of welfare. In other words, 
eve n if one cannot definitely say that welfare is maximized at an 
output mix such as point Nf in Figure 1:1, the question that still 
remains is whether one can say that an improveme nt in welfare 
occurs when the economy moves from point N to M as a result of 
the public enterprise adopting a marginal cost pricing policy. 
1:2 A WELFARE COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE PRICING 
POLICIES WITHOUT AN INTERPERSONAL COMPARISON 
OF UTILITY 
Figure 1:3 indicates how the criteria e mbodied in Mishan I s concept 
of a "virtual constitution" can be used to make a welfare comparison 
• 
between a marginal cost pricing policy which results in the economy 
attaining the output mix at point N and a policy of changing a price 
above marginal cost which results in the point N on the transfor-
mation curve TT I being' reached. 
y 
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30 
A simple welfare comparison between these two points based on 
1-'areto principles is not possible since the distribution of income 
at point M will be different from N. This can be explained if it is 
assumed that the public enterprise producing good Y is generally 
more capital intensive than the competitive firms producing good X. 
In order to move from N to M on TT' a reallocation of factors from 
N to M must take place which will alter both the factor price ratios 
obtained in factor markets and the pattern of factor rewards in the 
economy. This redistribution of income will result in some house-
holds being better of while others are worse off so that it is not 
possible to state that M repre sents a welfare improvement over N 
without making some judgement about the respective distributions 
of inccme at these respective P9ints. 
The hypothetical compensation technique developed by Kaldor23 
and Hicks24 can be used to determine whether M represents a 
higher level of welfare than N without having to make an inter-
personal comparison of utility. Point qn on ON represents a 
hypothetical distribution of the output mix at N between cor s umers 
A and B, such that it also represents the same diEtribution of 
utility between the two individuals as point Qm on the exchange 
contract curve Ow.. A community indifference curve In' can be 
generated to pass below the point M indicating that, beginning with 
the distribution of utility associated with Qm a nd qn, society will 
be at a lower level of social welf~.re with the N as opposed to the 
M output combination. The adoption of a marginal cost pricing 
policy which would r esult in a move from N to M can thus be seen 
to lead to a clear improvement in welfare in terms of the Kaldor-
Hicks compensation criterion. 
, 
23. Kaldor,N., "Welfare Propositions in Economics", E.J., 
1939. 
24. Hicks,J.R., "The valuation of S ocial income", Economica, 
1940. 
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However, as Scitovsky25 demonstrated, the Kaldor-Hicks te st i s 
negated once the economy moves to a neVi position and is then 
compared with the old position. In Figure 1:3 the point qm on 
the exchange contract curve OM represents the same distribution 
of utility between the two consumers as the point Qn on the curve 
ON. The community indifference curve Im I can be generated tc 
pass through M and below N indicating that when the Scitovsky 
reverse test is applied, point N represents a welfare improvement 
over point M. It should be noted again that M only represents a 
point of tangency between the transformation curve and the 
community indifference curve Im, associated with the Qm distribution, 
and that if the hypothetical qm distribution of M is employed in order 
to make it Pareto comparable with N tt.e tangency characteristic 
. of M is destroyed. 
Little 26 has suggested a possible solt:.tion to this problem by 
proposing a dual welfare criterion similar to that included by Mishan 
in his "virtual constitution". If the distribution of utility at Qm and 
qn are considered to be distributionally superior to the distributions 
at qm and Qn then it can be demonstrated that a movement from N to 
M will result in an unambiguous improvement in welfare. This 
follows from the fact that while Qm is Pareto superior to qn which 
is distributionally superior to Qn (Qm pqn dQn) and although Qn is 
Pareto superior to qm, qm is considered to be distributionally 
inferior to Qm (Qnpqrrxl." W[Il .' Thus only M is superior according 
to both the efficiency and distributional components of the dual 
welfiE,re criterion. 
25. Scitovsky, T ., "A note on Welfare Propositions in Economics", 
R.E.S., 1941. 
26. Little, I.M.0. , A Critique of Welfare Economics ,2nd ed., 
O.V.P., 1950 0 
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An implication of this analysis is that unless the distribution of 
income associated with the top level optimum, whicr. would be 
reached if a marginal cosf pricing policy is successfully implemented 
m is favoured above all other distributions, then it cannot be claimed 
that such a policy would result in an unambiguous improvement in 
welfare. As Mishan has stated: 
"Far from an optimum allocation of resources 
representing some kind of ideal output separable 
from an independent of interpersonal comparisons 
of welfare, a particular output retains its optimum 
characteristics only if we commit ourselves to the 
particular welfare distribution associated with it. ,,27 
There are many situations, however, where there is a trade-off 
between equality and efficiency28, in which case the propositions 
of welfare economics can offer no clear-cut indication of which 
situation is unambiguously better or worse. In this thesis it will 
be examined whether such a trade-off exists between efficient public 
enterprise pricing policies and the impact of such policies on the 
regional distribution of income. It would seem that in cases where 
this trade-off exists, the economist can do no more than indicate the 
costs in t e rms of equity of an efficie nt policy and vice versa, 
r e cognizing that the final choice must be based on political value-
judge ment s • 
27. Mishan,E.J., op.cit., p . 70. 
28. Okun, A., has examined the implications of this trade-off 
in a democratic society within the context of the Rawlsi-an 
Theory of Justice in Equality and Efficiency: The Big 
Tradeoff , The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1975 . 
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1:3 THE EXTENT TO WHICH WELFARE COMPARISONS 
BETWEEN PRICING POLICIES ARE AFFECTED BY 
RELAXING RESTRICTIVE ASSUMPTIONS 
Having defined the conditions under which the adoption of a marginal 
cost pricing policy by a public enterprise is likely to result in an 
unambiguous improvement in welfare, it is now necessary to examine 
the extent to which the optimality of requiring public enterprises to 
follow a marginal cost pricing rule will be invalidated if a number 
of the assumptions which define a first best economy are relaxed. 
This is not an exhaustive study of all the imperfections which could 
possibly occur in a market economy, but rather a discussion of some 
of the departures from the conditions for Pareto optimality which are 
particularly likely to affect the activities related to the public 
enterprise sector. 
1 : 3: 1 INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE 
Public enterprises often experience increasing returns to scale 
over the entire output range in the markets where they operate. 
This is even more likely to be the case in a country like South Africa 
where the size of the market for their goods or services is relatively 
small, say, compared to the United States. 
Now, the existence of increasing returns to scale is incQmpatible 
with perfect competition and may cause a natural monopoly to come 
into being. 29 Figure 1:4 illustrates why this may occur. The 
consequence of increasing returns to scale is tha t the long run 
average cost curve (LAC) falls as output increases. As a result 
29. See, for example, Howe,K.M. and Rasmussen,E.F., 
Public Utility Economics and Finance , Prentice-Hall, 
New York, 1982, p . 19. 
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MC 
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the long run marginal cost (LRMC) curve lies below it over the 
entire output range. The condition for profit maximization in a 
perfectly competitive market is that all firms set their MC equal 
to the respective market prices o In an industry where there are 
increasing returns to scale this will lead to individual firms 
incurring perpetual losses and closing down until eventually a 
natural monopoly will emerge. Since a rr.onopolist will maximize 
profits by restricting output to the point where marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost and charging a price above marginal cost, 
this will lead to a deviation from the conditions required for 
Pareto optimality. 
The chief E·ccnomic justification for the nationalization of natural 
monopolies is that social welfare will be improved by requiring 
these public utilities to set their prices according to optimizing 
welfare criteria. If none of the other assumptions underlying 
the welfare maximization model have been violated and if distribfI-
tional consideration are ignored, this will normally involve 
public utilities setting their prices equal to marginal cost. As can 
be seen from Figure 1 :4, however, this will still leave them with 
the problem of financing their resulting losses. Hotelling30 
suggested that rr.arginal cost pricing would be optimal even where a 
public iltility incurred perpetual losses, if these losses were 
financed by ra:ising lump sum taxes. It has, however, generally 
been accepted that there aTe no feasible taxes available to the 
government which are of a truly lump sum charactero Any feasible 
tax is thus likely to distort the conditions for Pareto optimality. 
This is obviously true of indirect taxes which result in the price 
ratio facing consumers being different from that facing firms so that: 
MR ' A ~x,y = 
B MRSx, Y Px 
= Py I- MCx MCy = MRPTx,y 
30. H.Hotelling "The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of 
Ta~tion and of Railway and Utility Rates," Economica., 1938. 
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Less obviously, it is also the case with an income tax which distorts 
the Pareto optimal rate of substitutioc between work and leisure. 31 
It is therefore clear that a marginal cost pricing policy may not be 
consistent with a Pareto optimal general equilibrium being attained 
in the economy as a whole. Furthermore a deficit financed by 
taxation may result in a redistribution of income frore the taxpayer 
to the user of the services of the public enterprise. Such a redis-
tribution is likely to ignore considerations of equity and may thus 
be r egarded as arbitrary in nature. In the previous section it was 
shown that even where a new pricing policy reoved the economy to a 
position which represented a potential Pareto improvement in 
efficiency, if it did not also involve a distributional improvement, 
then it could not be concluded that there is an increase in welfare. 
It follows that the adoption of a rcarginal cost pricing rule by a 
public enterprise does not unambiguously raise the welfare level in 
terms of criteria pertaining to either efficiency or equality. 
1 :3:2 EXTERNALITIES 
In asserting that Fareto optimality will be attained when public 
utilities adopt a marginal cost pricing rule and all other markets 
are perfectly competitive, it has been implicitly assumed that all 
benefits and costs of producers and consumers are reflected in 
market prices, and that there is no divergence between private 
and social costs and benefits. However, for a long time, 
ecocomists have recognized that externalities arising out of inter-
dependencies between production and utility functions may cause 
a perfectly competitive economy to depart from the conditions for 
Pareto optimality. 
31. Huggles, N. , "Recent developrcents in the theory of Marginal 
Cost Pricing", Review of Economic Studies, 1950-1. 
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During the 1950's and 1960s a great deal of the discussion on 
externalities focussed on their definition and classification. 32 
The definitions proposed concentrated largely on the element of 
interdependence among utility or production functions. This 
interdependence may give rise to externalities between different 
producers, different consumers and between producers and 
consumers. In particular the provi~ion of public utility services 
may result in externalities since they affect a broad range of 
activities and may be interdependent with the activities of a 
number of other producers and consumers. 
Buchanan and Stubblebine33 have defined an externality to be present 
in the relationship between two individuals, A and B, if at least one 
of the utility functions takes the form: 
A 
= U (a1,a2, •••• ,an,bk) (1: 12) 
where a1 , a2, •••• , an represents the actitivies of individual A and 
bk represents the single activity of indivic.ual e which affects the 
utility of individual A. A marginal externality exists when, 
(1 :13) 
--------------------
32. The main contributions in this area were by Meade, J.E., 
"External Economies and Diseconomies in " Competitive' 
Situation", ~conomic Journal, Vol. 62., March 1952, 
Scitovsky, T., "Two Conc epts of External Economies", 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 62., April, 1954, 
Buchanan,J., and Stubblebine,W., "Externality", Economica, 
Vol. 29., Noyember, 1962 and Whinston,A., ~ 
Coordination in Decentralized Systems , Carnegie Institute 
of Technology, June, 1 962. 
33. Ibid., p. 372. 
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Buchanan and Stubblubine have defined a marginal externality to be 
" ••• Pareto-relevant when the extent of the activity may be modified 
in such a wa.,y that the externally alfected party, A can be made better 
off without the acting party, B being made worse off,,34. In particula r, 
when B maximizes his utility an externality will be "Pareto-relevant" 
if the partial d.erivative of A's utility function with respect to his 
own activities is not equal to zero since in this situation there can 
still be some gains from trade between individuals A and B. Figure 
1:5 illustrates the nature of the externalities which arise between t w o 
producers using congested facilities. It should be noted that essentially 
the same analysis will apply in the case of consumption externalities. 
For the purposes of this example, it is assumed that highway facilities 
along with other r esources are used in the production of X and Y . 
The production of these goods is thus considered as a process which 
is only completed when the goods are finally delive red to consumers. 
In the initial positior. at point E, highway facilities are used to such 
and extent by both X and Y, that congestion and transport delays 
result. It follows that altough the marginal rate of technical substi-
tution between highway facilities and other resources is the same at 
point E, this may not necessarily be an optimal allocation of resources, 
since the r eduction in the use of highway facilities by X will increase 
the productivity of highway facilities for Y. The produc€'rs of good 
X move from point E to F along isoquant Xl as they exactly compen-
sate for the loss in output resulting from reducing their use of 
highways by increasing their use of alternative forms of non-conge<,ted 
output. The inc r ease in the productivity of highway facilities for the 
producers of Y is depicted by n.e inward shift of their set of isoquants 
to the Oy origin. The isoquant for the output of Y1 units of Y is now 
show ned by the dashed line Yl '. At point F, the production of Y will 
be a t Y2', a highe r level than before. At the same time there will 
34. Ibid., p. 374. 
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have been no change in X production. The efficiency of production 
has therefore been increased by the resource exchange. 
It should be pointed out that interdependence is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for a marginal externality to affect the 
conditions for Pareto optimality. As Pigou has explained: 
" •••• the essence of the matter is that one 
person A, in the course of rendering some 
service, for which payment is made, to a 
second person B, incidentally also renders 
services or disservice to other persons 
(not producers of like services), of such a 
sort that payment cannot be exacted from 
the benefited parties or compensation 
enforced on behalf of the in ·ured arties. "35 
Italic s . . mine • 
It follows that a second necessary condition for an externality to 
exist is that due to institutional and/or technological reasons, A 
and B cannot enter into trade regarding activity bk. 
The main impact of externalities on the pattern of resource allocation 
is that they may cause a divergence between private and social costs 
and benefits. Thus if the price of a public utility service is not 
equal to its marginal social benefit (lvISB) or t he marginal cost 
incured by the utility does not fully reflect marginal social cost 
(MSC) ther. the strict application of the marginal cost pricing rule 
by the public utility will no longer be consistent with the conditions 
for Pareto optimality. In fact the condition for- socially optimal 
production becomes: 
= 
B MRSx, Y = MSBx 
MSBy 
= lvIRPTx, Y 
35. .hgou, A. C ., op. cit., p. 84. 
= lvISCx 
lvISCy 
(1:14) 
41 
Pigou recommended that a system of taxes and subsidies should be 
imposed by the State to ensure that relative prices satisfied these 
conditions for f'areto optimality. Buchanan and Stubblebine, 36 
however, have argued that" •••• full Pareto equilibrium can never 
be attained via the imposition of unilaterally imposed taxes and 
subsidies !.lntil all marginal externalities are eliminated". Nath37, 
on the other hand, has defended the logic of the Pigovian solution 
by showing that a tax-subsidy system will bring about equilibrium 
provided that" ••• 0 the marginal rate of subsidy (tax) at any point is 
always equal to the value of the rr.arginal externality for that point". 
If the validity of t--' ath I s argument is accepted, then the irr,plications 
for a public enterprise are that, if externalities only arise in its 
activities, then it should adjust its price above or below marginal 
cost to reflect the marginal effects of externality. 
There are, however, a number of technical problems associated with 
38 this Pigovian price adjustment. Coase has suggested that t:::te 
magnitude of the external effect of a giver. act depends not only on the 
decision of the actcr but also on the activity patterns of the persons 
affectEd. If, for exalEple, the smoke caused by a power station 
results in local residents havin5' to pay higher laundry costs, the more 
people who live within the vicinity of the power station, the more 
serious will be the E·xternality problem , Thus a rule which states that 
a public enterprise should adjust its prices upwards by an arr.ount 
equal to the cost of the disadvantages its activities imposE' on others 
is likely to be neither unambiguous nor obviously just o 
36. Buchanan,J., and Stubblebine,W., op.cit., p. 383. 
37. Nath,S.K., op.cit., p. 71. 
38. Coase,R.H., "The Problem of Social Cost", Journal of Law 
and Economics. October, 1960. 
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Davis and Whinston39 have distinguished between "separable" and 
"non-separable" externalities and have shown that no determinate 
equilibrium can be attained when externalities are non-separable. 
If, for examplE' , the activity level of actor A affects the welfare 
of B and vice versa, then in the case of separable externalities, 
the utility functions of the two actors will take the form, 
VA = f(a) + g(b) and VB = b(b) + j(a) (1:15) 
and in the case of no".-separable externalities 
VA = f(a,b) and VB g(b,a). (1:16) 
If externalities are separable then B' s decision will have no effect 
on A's optimal decision as to his own activity since B' s activity 
will affect the total welfare of A but not the marginal yield to A of 
A's own activity. 
On the other hand, if externalities are not separable then A's decisions 
may affect B' s activity level which in turn will change A's former 
behaviour, and so on, with the result that no determinate equilibrium 
will be attained since the utility functions of both actors will be 
ccntinually changing, In this situation it will not be possible to 
specify the appropriate level of corrective price adjustment for a 
public enterprise. Baumol, however, has pointE·d out: 
", 0" in defence of the conventional Pigouvian 
position that his policy recommendations were 
formulated in terms of a setting of pure 
competition. Here the external effect of the 
decisions of anyone firm on anyone else is 
by definition negligible . Just as in a 
39. Davis,O. and Whinston,A., "Externalities, Welfare, and 
the Theory of Games", Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 70, June, 1962. 
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competitive industry firm A's output decision 
does not directly influence that of firm B, it 
will similarly produce no indirect effect on 
B's decisions through any externalities which 
it may impose. ,,40 
In general, therefore, it can be seen that externalities disturb the 
conditions for Pareto optimality in a perfectly competitive economy. 
Although, in theory, corrective price adjustments may take account 
of the effects of externalities, the determination of an optimal general 
equilibrium solution clearly becomes more difficult as the effect of 
externalities becomes more widespread throughout the economy. 
1:3:3 x - INEFFICIENCY 
In defining the conditions for the optirr.ality of a marginal cost 
pricing policy by a public enterprise in a fir~t best economy it is 
necessary to explicitly include the assumption that public er.terprise 
minimizes costs. This assumption does not r.eed to be rr.ade in the 
case of perfectly competitive firms since if these firms are to 
survive in a perfectly competitive market they have to minimize costs. 
In the case of a public enterprise, however, its survival is normally 
guaranteed by the state and it is possible that inputs can be used 
with varying degrees of effectiveness within the enterprise. When 
an input is not used effectively, the difference between the actual out-
put and the maximum output attributable to that input iE a measure of 
the degree , of what LeibE·nstein 41 terms "X-inefficiency". This is 
illustrated in Figure 1 :6(a). Vo represents the value of the minimum 
inputs needed to produce a given output Qo while the actual inputs 
used is designated by Va. The ratio of the difference between the 
two over the actual expenditure, (Va-Vo/Va) is a measure of 
X-inefficiency. 
40. Baumol,W.J., op.cit., p.32. 
41. Leibenstein,H., The General Theory of X-Efficiency and 
Economic Underdevelopment , Oxford University Press, 1978. 
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The effect of X-inefficiency in the public enterprise on the economy 
as a whole is illustrated in Figure 1 :6(b). The transformation 
curve TT' is shifted inwards. Now, the marginal cost pricing rule 
for public enterprise is derived from the Pareto optimality conditicns 
for allocative efficiency. However, allocative efficiency is a top 
le-vel condition for Pareto optimality and will not be attained when 
the lower level condition of technical efficiency is not obtained. 
The theoretical basis for marginal cost pricing as a necessary 
condition for optimality is thus further undermined by the existence 
of X-inefficiency since as Leibenstein says "allocative efficiency 
42 depends on X-efficiency and not the other way round ','. 
The question still arises, though, as to whether a comparison can be 
made between marginal cost pricing and an alternative pricing rule 
if X-inefficiency exists in both cases. It might be possible to do 
this where neither pricing policy will have any effect on the degree 
of X-inefficiency within a public enterprise. However, it ha.s been 
suggested by Rees 43 that a policy of pricing above marginal cost to 
meet an exogenously determined profit target may place pressure on 
a public enterprise to contain X-inefficiency, particularly if tight 
control over the pu blic enterprise prevents it from using its mono-
polistic power to raise prices to pass on its inefficie21cy to consumers. 
In subsequent chapters the problem of X-inefficiency will be addressed 
as the effects of alternative pricing policies on particular public 
utilities in South Africa are analysed. 
42. Ibid., p. 159. 
43. R. Rees, IJublic Enterprise Economics , Weidenfeld and 
Nic olson, 1978. 
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1:4 SECOND BEST THEORY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF 
PIECElYIEAL OPTLI'vlIZATION 
In section 1:3 it was found that a number of the conditions which define 
a first best eCGnomy are restrictive in the ser.se that, if they are 
relaxed, marginal cost pricing may no longer be a necessary 
condition for attainir_g the highest possible level of social welfare. 
For a long time it was considered that despite the fact that public 
enterprise prices have to be set within an environment in which there 
are numerous departures from the conditions of a first best economy, 
they should still be set ec;ual to marginal cost since it was implicitly 
believed that the greater the number of the various necessary conditions 
which could be satisfied in an economy, the nearer the system would 
be to a social optimum. In their seminal article on the theory of the 
"second best", Lipsey and Lancaster established the proposition 
that: 
" given that one of the Paretian optimum 
conditions cannot be fulfilled ,then an optimum 
situation can be acr.ieved only by departing 
from all the other Paretian conditions". 44 
The optimum situation finally attained is termed "second best" because 
it is achieved subject to a constraint which, by definition, prevents 
the attainment of a conventioEal P aretian optimum. 
To illustrate the effect of this, suppose the economy contains n 
commodities, and one wishes to determine the optimal ratio of price 
to marginal cost for commodity i, ki, taking the price/marginal 
cost ratios, kj, of the other n-l commodities as given. Furthermore, 
let k represent the least and K the greatest of these fixed ratios, 
44. Lipsey, R. G., and Lancaster, K., "The General Theory of 
Second Best", R.E.S., (1956-7), p. 11. 
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45 k',· . . h As Green has shown, is a weighted sum of the fixed ratlOs WIt 
the weight wij attached to kj being positive if commodities i and j 
are substitutes and negative if they are complements. If it is 
assumed that k is not less than unity the following conclusior,s can 
be derived about the optimal price ratio, ki, in a second best 
economy: 
(a) ki will be greater than k if j~i wij(kj-k) is positive. This 
will occur where the positive terms arising from indirect 
(b) 
taxes or monopolistic pricing on substitutes are greater 
in magnitu.de than the r.egative terms which result from the 
prices of complements being set above their marginal costs. 
In this case, the optimal pricing policy of a public enterprise 
will result in prices being set above marginal cost. It nay 
therefore be possible that the adoption by the public enterprise 
of a pricing policy other than marginal cost pricing may 
actually lead to an improvement in welfare. 
ki will be less than k if .:f... wij(kj-k) is negative. This may 
J=I 
occur if taxes or monopolistic pricing are heavily concentrated 
on goods complementary to the public enterprise 0 In this case, 
an optimal pricing policy for the public enterprise will actually 
rest:.lt in prices being set below marginal cost. 
It can thus be seen that, in a second best economy, an.l! priori 
evaluation of alternative public enterprise policies in terms of general 
welfare propositions is not possible. Furthermore optimal pricing 
policies can only be formulated for a particular public enterprise 
taking into account the non-optimalities affecting the markets related 
to that enterprise. It foll ows that no general rule can be derived for 
optimal public enterprise pricing in a second best economy. As 
Graaff has noted~ 
45. Green, H. A.J., "The social optimum in the presence of 
monopoly and taxati on", R. E. S., October, 1 961 • 
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''It seems fairly clear- that th-e condition - -_ 
which have to be r.let before it is correct 
(from a welfare viewpoint) to set prices equal 
to marginal cost are so restrictive that 
they are unlikely to be satisfied in pra",tice. ,,46 
The question still remains, however, as to whether it is valid under 
second best conditions tu base public enterprise prices on marginal 
cost, adjusting them, where necessary, in a piecemeal manner to 
take account of non-optimalities. This approach has been favoured 
by Turvey who contends that: 
" •••• there is a presumption in favour of 
marginal cost pricing in most economies 
with a fairly freely functioning price 
mechanism •••• the right policy is to 
pursue marginal cost pricing •••• 
subject to I corrections I made only 
for those non-optimalities which are 
known to have a significant effect on the 
demand or cost structures of (the public 
enterprise)" • 47 
Turvey distinguishes between three types of non-optimalities: 
(i) Deviations from optimal conditions which are known and 
significant but which should be corrected by policies 
falling beyond the scope of a public enterprise pricing 
'p'0licy: For example, even if a public enterprise does 
not consider the distribution of income and wealth to be 
acceptable it should not attempt to correct this through 
its policies unless authorized by the government to 
subsidize a particular group of consumers . Otherwise 
it should act as if the existing distributinn of income 
and wealth were accHptable . It is interesting to compare 
46. Graaff,J. ,de V. op.cit., p. 154. 
47. Turvey, R., Op timal Pricing and Investment in Electricity 
Supply, Allen & Unwin, London, 1968, p. 87. 
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this approach with tt.e proposal by Graaff "that the only 
price a public enterprise or nationalized industry can be 
expected to set is what we may as well call a just price -
a price which is set with some regard for its effect on the 
distribution of ,,'ealth as well as for its effect on the 
allocation of resources" • 48 
Graaff argues that the task of the economist" is to 
provide the positive knowledge, not to recommend the 
level at which price should be set. ,,49 However, if a 
public enterprise is not required to take account of 
the distributional effects of its policies, as Turvey 
has suggested, then it may be valid, even in terms of 
Graaff's analysis, for an economist to indicate to a 
public er.terprise the effect on resource allocation of 
various pricing policies based on marginal cost. 
(ii) Non-optimalities which are ~ither unknown or which have a 
trivial i!!!p'ac:!.~.n th.'" demand and cost structure of the public 
~terprise: For example, if the price of shaving cream was 
substantially above marginal cost with the result that the 
use of elect,ri::: razors is larger than it would be in a 
first best situation, it would be ridiculous to suggest 
ad;usting the price of electriCity to compensate for this. 
On the other hand, although income taxation may have a 
significant impact 0"" the supply of labour, the implications 
of thi s non-optimality for electricity, would be unknowable 
so that prices could not be adjusted for it. 
(iii) Non-optimalitie5 which are known, sigI'.ificar,t and which can 
be corrected by adjJ§.!ing the pricing..P.£licy of a public 
enterprise: For example, it will generally be more optimal 
to set prices above rr.arginal cost where 
------------------
48. Graaff, J., de V., p" 1 55 • 
49. Ibid" p. 155. 
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(a) important close substitutes sell at significantly above 
marginal cost or generate large external economies; 
(b) products in whose production the service of the public 
enterprise constitutes a major input ~;ell at significantly 
below marginal cost or involve large external 
diseconomies; 
(c:) important close complements sell at significantly below 
marginal cost or generate large external diseconomies; and 
(d) major inputs of the public enterprise are bought at 
significantly below :narginal cost or involve large 
external diseconomies. 
'Where non-optimalities of this nature are unalterable, a piecemeal 
adjustment to marginal cost pricing in the f-orm of mark-ups or 
mark-do,,'- ns on marginal cost is conside red to ce desirable by 
Turvey. 
The in plication of the analyses of the second best problem by economists 
such as Bohm50 and McManus51 , however, is that this type of piecemeal 
approach is invalid since public enterprise prices should only be 
derived from general equilibrium 1T0dels which take market distortic·ns 
into acccunt as additional constraints. 
Davis and Whinston 52, in turn, reject the Bohm-McManus approa,ch on 
the grounds that it will " •••• in general, require that the policy maker 
(or his analyst) know the solution to the grand maximization problem 
50. Bohm,P., "On the Theory of 'Second Best "',Review of 
Economic Studies, July, 1967, 
51. McManus,M., "Comments on the General Theory of Second 
Best", Review of Economic Studies, (1 958-9), pp. 209-224. 
52. Davis, O. and Whinston, A., "P iecemeal Policy in the Theory 
of the Second Best", Rev-iew of Economic Studies, p. 325. 
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before the values of the policy instruments' (taxes or subsidies 
in the case of Bohm and prices for McManus) can be determined". 
It is difficult to argue that one can have .!.!: priori knowledge of the 
solutlon to a general equilibrium problem without having to construct 
it. Construction, however, implies a knowledge of the utility functions 
of all individuals and tbe production functions of all firms in the economy. 
It must be accepted that this is an unreasonable informational requirement 
and that "real policy makers cannot reasonably hope to ever have an 
exact prior knowledge of the solution in advance cf the design and 
selection of measures for policy. ,,53 The piecemE,al apprc.ach to policy 
suggested by Turvey quite clearly does not have such stringent inform-
ational rec;uirements. 
Davis and I"hinston take the position that the central purpose cf the 
tr.eory of the second best is to establish when and under what 
conditions does the existence of irr:pe'rfections in other al'eas c.f the 
economy cause it to be undeEirable to design policies for the achieve-
ments of the Pareto conditions in the area of immediate concern. 
Although a theory of second best inherently involves the construction 
of a ~implified general equilibrium model, Da.yis and Whinston argue 
that the rr;cdel is not constructed to provide real policieE but rather 
to answer the que stion of whether a particular piecemeal policy is 
justified. It is therefore relevant to the evaluation of any public utility 
pricir,g policy since such policie~, must nec€'ssarily be piecemeal in 
nature because they are designed to maximize welfare in a particular 
sector, of the economy, taking U'.e conditions in all other sectors as 
given 0 
In particular, it would seem tha.t the piecemeal approach to the 
formulation of a.n optimal rricing policy, proposed by Turvey is 
justifiable. Such an approach, however, can only talee place 
53. Ibid., p. 326. 
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within a partial equilibrium framework, The functions of partial 
and general equilibrium analysis in the application of welfare economics 
to public enterprise pricing will be examined in the next section. 
1:5 CONCLUSIOI'\: A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PARTIAL 
AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM RATIONALE FOR MARGINAL 
COST PRICING 
While the basic propositions of Paretian welfare economics can be 
incorporated into a general equilibrium analysis to establish the 
conditions under which marginal cost pricing is optirral and will 
lead to a welfare improvement if it is adopted in the place of 
another pricing policy, a partial equilibrium approach is more useful 
to deriYe the pricing rules which a public enterprise should apply to 
dad with the various complications of a Eecond best ecor.omy. In 
other words, general equilibrium analysis is the mOEt appropriate 
tool for the i!ostification of marginal cost pricir.g or any modification 
of this policy. As Rees has said: 
"The basis eccnomists have for' advocating 
marginal cost pricing is that provided by the 
necessary conditions for a Pareto optin,um 
in a first best economy, These conditions 
are de rived from a general equilibrium 
analysis, as should be any other sets of 
conditions which try to deal with the inade-
quacies of the first best model, ,,54 
Partial equilibrium analysis, on the other hand, appe"·.rs to be the 
most appropriate tool for the applicatior. of marginal cost pricing 
principles to particular public enterprise~ operating in particular 
n arkets. Turvey thus unashamedly adopts a partial equilibrium 
analysis to extend a.nd modify the margina.l cost principle tc ceal 
'''ith a number of the problems typically facing public ent erprises, 
justifying his approach as fe·llows: 
'.,--' 
54. R.Rees, op.cit., p. 46. 
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"Much of the discussion of optimal pricing 
by public enterprises which is to be found 
in the literature is couched in terms of 
general equilibrium analysis. Despite its 
intellectual elegance this approach will 
not do here. We are concerned to derive 
rules for the behaviour of one, or a group of 
public enterprises which will maximize the 
Social Benefit of their activities less tr.eir 
Social Costs, given the environment i1'. which 
they work, so the rules can only cover things 
under their control. Furthermore, if the 
rules an, to be of any use they must not 
require the public enterprise to know things 
which it is in practice impossible for them to 
ascertain. The analysis •••• tl-.erefore has 
three features: It relates to second best 
optimization, it is partial rather than general 
equilibrium and it is rough and ready" . 55 
The rationale of marginal cost pricing must now be translated into 
partial equilibrium terms. To do this it is necessary to accept the 
three basic postulates proposed by Harberger56 as the basis of a 
"c()nventional" framework for all applied welfare economies. The 
postulates arE: 
(a) the competitive'. demand price for a given unit rr.easures the 
value of that unit t" the buyer; 
(b) the competitive supply price for a given unit measures the 
value of that unit to the seller; and 
(c) when evalrating the net benefits or costs of a given action, 
the costs and benefits accruing to each memcer of the 
relevant group should normally be added without regard 
to the indivic'.uals to whom they accrue. 
Harberger's plea is thus for the general acceptance by economists 
workir.g in the field of welfare economics of social welfare 
55. Turvc' y,R., £P.cit., p. 21. 
56. Harberger, A., "Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare 
Economica: An Interpretative Essay", J.E.L., (Sept., 1971), 
pp. 785-97. 
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function that maximizes the sum of consumers' and producers' surplus 
over comp.etive cost, and which is neutral with respect to income 
distribution. A public enterprise should therefore aim to 
Maximize W; TR + S - (TC-R) (1 :17) 
where W ; net economic welfare, TR ; Total revenue, 
S ; consumers' surplus, TC ; total cost and R ; 
inframarginal rent. 
Implicit in this approach is the view that public policy analysis should 
be concerned principally with issues of efficiency in resource 
allocation, leaving equity considerations in the hands of fi scal 
authorities. 
Assuming, for illustrative purposes, that all factors are available in 
completely elastic supply, inframarginal rents will be zero and the 
net welfare gain i s: 
W ; TR + S - TC 
5Q Now TR + S ; 0 P(Q')dQ' where p(Q') is the demand curve. 
Differentiating this expression with respect to Q yields 
(TR + S) ;)g P(Q')dQ' 
; p(Q) 
and ~Q (TC) ; MC (marginal cost) 
(1:18) 
(1 :19) 
Thus the necessary and sufficient conditions for optimization are: 
dW d (TR + S) - ~Q TC; 0 (1 :20) d Q ; dQ 
whence P - MC ; 0 (1 :21) 
and d
2W dP d 2 
, (TC) 0 (1 :22) 
dQ2 
; 
d ,} dQ 
It can thus be seen that according to this pll.rtial equilibrium 
approach, marginal cost pricing is a necessary optimality condition. 
The intutive rationale for the optimality of marginal cost pricing 
is that if the price of a good gives a money measure of the subjective 
value, to each consumer, of the marginal unit of consumption of 
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the good and if marginal cost gives a money value of the value of 
output sacrificed by supplying the marginal unit of the good, then, 
only if price equals marginal cost is the value of the marginal unit 
t.o consumers just equal to the value of what has to be sacrificed to 
provide it. As Rees has stated: 
" •••• the intention of marginal cost pricing 
is to impose on the consumer the cost of 
providing his marginal unit of consumption, 
so as to cause him to adjust his total 
consumption to the point at which the yalue 
of the marginal unit to him is just equal 
to its costs. 1157 
Although this partial equilibrium rationale of marginal . cost 
pricing provides a useful framework for the formulation of public 
enterprise pricing rules in the next chapter, it does not, in 
itself , constitute a particularly rigorous justification of the 
optimality of the marginal cost pricing rule since it does not make 
clear the welfare value judgements on which it is based, n c rthe 
impliCit assumption about compensation for the redistribution of 
income nor the fact that its validity is totally dependent on the 
existence of a first best economy. 
Thus, ii1 brief, it can be seen that although the analysis in this chapter 
has been conducted at a fairly abstract level, it is nonetheless 
necessary to support by logical argument the validity of any normative 
recommendation concerning the optimality, or otherwise, of any 
rule for public enterprise pricing. 
57. Rees,R., op.cit., p. 47. 
56 
CHAPTER T\yO 
Of-TIMAL PRICING l{UL8S AS A IN STRUMENT FOR DECENTRALIZED 
DECISION TAKING 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter the justifiability of using a piece~eal optimi-
zatio n procedure to formulate a pricing policy for a public enterprise 
was established. This procedure usually involves the following s teps 
(i) The de termination of a structure of prices for the goods or 
services sold by the pUblic enterprise which is based on 
the marginal cost of produc ing these goods and services; 
(ii) The adjustment of this price structure for what Turvey has 
classified as "known and significant non-optimalities" which 
cause a departure of the conditions for optimal pricing from 
a s imple equality between price and marginal cost. 
The first part of this chapter will d escribe how this piecemeal 
optimization procedure can be used t o formulate the conditions for 
optimal pricing by public enterprises. These conditions will form the 
normative basis against which the actual pricing policies of particular 
public enterprises in South Africa w ill be evaluated. 
The second part of this chapter will consist of an evaluation of the 
extent to which the pricing rules derived from t hese conditions can be 
used as instruments of decentraliz ed control inducing public enter-
prises to pursue their objectives without ad hoc ministerial interference 
in their decisionmaking. 
2:1 
2:1 :1 
TH E: J:lASIS F()j~ A MARGINAL COST J:"RICING POLICY 
THE: APPLICATIU N OF MAl{GINAL COST PRICING AND 
INVE::::.TlVIEl"T HULES 
In the previous chapter it was esta blished that the marginal cost pricing 
principle is an acceptable starting point in the proc ess of d etermining 
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an. optimal pricing policy for a public enterprise. Although 'marginal 
cost may be defined as the addition to total cost resulting from a 
given increment in output, the actual level of marginal cost will vary 
according to the time range over which it is planned to produce the 
increment in output. In this respect a distinction is usually made 
between short run and long run marginal cost. Short run marginal 
cost is the cost of an increment in output prcduced during a period ' 
when certain inputs cannot be varied whereas long run marginal 
cost is determined for a period when all inputs are variable. Invest-
ment policy can clearly only be formulated for the long run whereas 
1 prices are essentially determined for the short run. Rees has 
drawn attention to the interrelationship between price and investment 
decisions and has suggested that a marginal cost based pricing and 
investment policy should be based on the following rules: 
(i) in the short run the public enterprise should set price 
equal to marginal cost; and 
(ii) in the long run the goal of investment policy should be to 
adjust the capacity of plant to produce the level of output 
at which price is equal to long run marginal cost. 
The application of these rules is illustrated in Figure 2:1. DoDo 
represents the expected level of demand for period O. The optimal 
level of output planned for this period is therefore q 0, since at this 
level of out put the demand function intersects the long run marginal 
cost curve (LMC). Now the minimum unit cost of producing this 
output is indicated by the long run average cost curve (LAC) as being 
qox. Once the enterprise :,as installed plant of the scale required to 
produce the output qo at minimum unit cost qox, the elements of total 
cost which depend on the scale of plant will be fixed and the short 
run marginal and average cost curves for period 0 will be SMCo and 
1 • R. Kees, Public Enterprise Economics , lVeidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1978. 
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SA Co respectively. If the expected level of demand DoDo is actually 
realized in period ° then the application of rule (i) would result in 
price being set at poe which is equal to short run marginal cost and 
also long run marginal cost. If, however, the actual demand in period 
° rises to D1 D1 , then the application of the rule that price should be 
set equal to short run marginal cost will result in the price poa being 
charged which is higher than long run marginal cost. It can thus be 
seen that price should only equal both short and long run marginal 
cost if the expected level of demand in any period h. actually r ealized. 
It is assumed that for a public enterprise formulating an investment 
policy in period 0, all inputs only become freely variable at the 
beginning of Feriod 1. If the public enterprise expects the l ev e l of 
demand D1])1 to persist in period 1 then it will implement an invest-
ment programme designed to expand the scale of plant to the size 
necessB.ry to produce the level of output q1 at which the demand price 
is equal to l ong run marginal cost. 
It is clear that in strictly applying these pricing and investment rules 
the public enterprise does not take into account their implications for 
the financial performance of the undertaking. It is, however, generally 
accepted that although a public enterprise should not earn excess 
profits, it should generate sufficient revenue to cover its costs and 
thereby remain independent of Treasury support. In most cases a 
public enterprise is statutorily obliged in terms of its chart ... r to 
attain a financial equilibrium over a reasonable period of years. 
The public enterprise management cannot therefore be indifferent to 
the surpluse s or deficits which arise under a marginal cost based 
pricing and investment policy. The implications of n arginal cost 
rules for the profitability of the undertaking depend, to a large extent, 
on the assumptions one makes concerning the shape of the c ost 
functions facing the public enterprise. 
In figure 2:1 it can be seen that all the cost fup.ctions are "U-s haped". 
The U- shaped nature of the short run average and marginal cos t 
functions: is illustrative of the proposition that the input require ments 
per unit increment of output will be affE·cted by the l aw of variable 
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proportions. This law is the converse of the law of eventually 
diminishing productivity and holds that as an enterprise increases 
its output, at first the variable input requirements per unit increment 
of output will fall due to the increasing marginal productivity of the 
variable input s but that a point will be reached after which input 
requirements will rise due to the diminishing marginal productivity 
of the variable inputs used. If one makes the ceteris paribus assumption 
that -factor prices and technology are constant then marginal and 
average costs will first fall to a minimum point and then increase in the 
manner shown in Figure 2:1 .2 
The V-shaped characteristic of the LAC and LMC is illustrative of 
the laws of returns to scale . According to these laws the unit costs 
of production decrease as plant size increases, due to the economies 
of scale which the larger plant size makes possible. The traditional 
theory of the firm assumes that it is not possible to derive further 
economies of scale if the scale of plant is increased beyond a certain 
optimum plant size. Diseconomies of scale arise after this optimum 
plant size has been exceeded since the managerial function of 
coordinating and controlling activities within an organization become 
more complex a nd the decisionmaking process becomes less efficient. 
The turning up of the LAC curve is attributable to managerial 
diseconomies of scale since technical diseconomies can be avoided by 
dupicating the optimum technical plant size. 
It can be seen from Figure 2:1 that only when demand is at the level 
D*D* will the application of the marginal cost pricing and investment 
rules be consistent with the attainment of financial equilibrium by the 
2. SAC will be declining at all points where SMC < SAC and 
increasing at all point where S :VIC > SAC. It follows that 
the SMC curve will intersect the SAC curve at its minimum 
point. 
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public enterprise. This is because at this level of demand price 
equals long and short run marginal cost at the optimum output q* 
which can only be produced at minimum unit cost using the optimally 
sized plant associatE,d with minimum point of the LAC curve. If 
the public enterprise expects demand to be at >iny level below D*D* 
then according to the optimal investment rule (ii) it should adjust 
its plant size to produce a level of output at a minimum unit cost which 
will exceed its long run marginal cost. It fellows that if this expected 
IE,vel of demand is actually realized the application of the ruh' that 
price should equal short run marg'inal cost will result in insufficient 
rever,ue being generateci to cover total cost. It is possible though 
that where the actual demand in period exceeds expected demand, 
the setting of a price equal to short run marginal cost may actually 
result in a surplus of revenue over cost being earned. This surplus 
will only exist in the short run if demand is still expect.-d to be below 
D* u* since if the public enterprise follows the optimal investment 
rule it will expand plant capacity to produce output at a minimum unit 
cost which is again greater than long run marginal cost. 
It is clear, therefore, that a conflict may arisE, between the objectives 
of efficiency and financial viability when a public enterprise formulates 
its pricing policy according to the optimal pricing and investment 
rules discussed in this section. In the next section the question of 
how some of the assumptions, underlying the shape of the cost curves 
should be modified in the light of some of the insights of modern cost 
, 
theory, will be examined. 
2:1 :2 THE IMPLICATI or~s 01 ' " IODBRN MICROECOl'\OMIC 
THEORY OF CO::;TS Fe-!, \IARGINAL CO:::,T PRICING 
AND Il\VE::-.TlvIENT f~ULES 
The V-shaped cost curves of the traditional theory have been 
questioned by various writers on theoretical ~ E!iori and on 
empirical grounds. It is c onsidered that a greater realism can 
be introduced into the repre sentation of cost functions if it is 
assumed that: 
(a) short run average variable costs are constant over a rar.ge 
of o utput; and that 
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(b) managerial diseconomies are offset by technical economies 
of scale for all scales of plant capacity so that the long· run 
average cost curve does not turn up at any feasible level of 
output. 
The implications of these assumptions for the marginal cost pricing 
and investment rules discussed in the last section will now be examined. 
A. CONSTANT SHORT RUN AVERAGE VARIABLE COSTS 
It is traditionally assumed that the short run averag·e variable cost 
(SAVC) and the short run average total cost (SATC) functions are 
V-shaped. This implies that each plant size is designed a single 
level of output. As Koutsoyiannis explains this means that: 
"Any departure from (this level of output), 
no matter how small •••• leads to increa.sed 
costs. The plant is completely inflexible. 
There is no reserve capacity, not even to 
meet sease:nal variations in demand. 113 
A number of writErs including Stigler,4 Andrews 5 and Wiles 6 have 
proposed that in choosing the size of plant to produce a planned 
level of output, an enterprise decisionmaker will not only tal:e into 
accour.t the minimurr. unit cost of plant but also its built-in flexibility~ 
In particular a puclic utility producing a servic e that cannot be 
-------
3. Koutsoyiannis, A., Modern Microeconomics , Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1 979, 2nd ed., p. 11 3 . 
4. Stigler, G., "Production and Distribution in the Short Run", 
in Readings in the Theory of Income Distribution , American 
Ec onomic Association, Blakiston, 1 946. 
5. Andrews, P. W. S., Manufacturing Business , Macmillan, 
1949. 
6. Wiles, P . J . D., Price. Cost and Output , Blackwell, 1961 . 
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stored will allow for unexpected fluctuations in demand loy providing 
for a certain anJOunt of reserve capacity. In Figure 2:2 the flat 
stretch of the ~AVe curve corresponds to the built-in-the plant 
reserve capacity. It can be seen that from q1 to q2 the SAVe is 
eq,,-al to SRMe, both being constant per unit of output. It follows 
that if demand fluctuates between D1 D1 and D2D2 then the application 
of the short run marginal cost pricing rule will be equivalent to 
setting price equal to unit variable cost. If the EAVe function of a 
public enterprise actually resembles that shown in Figure 3:2 then 
it is clear that the practical difficulties usually associated with 
calculating marginal ccst for the purpose of setting prices will 
largely fall away, since most undertakings are able to calculate 
their unit variable costs of production. In a comprehensive summary 
and critique of a wide range of statistical cost studies, Johnston 7 
shows that the evidence from most statistical studies is that in the 
short run the AVC is constant over a considerable range. Although · 
these studies have been criticized cn the greunds that they de not 
distinguish between accounting and economic costs and that they fail 
to de.al adequately wit[, changes in technology and in factor prices, 
Koutsoyiannis makes the valid point that: 
"the fact that so many diverse sources of 
evidence point in general to the same 
direction (that is, le&.d to broadly similar 
conclusions) regarding the shape of costs 
in practice, surely suggests that the 
strictly V-shaped cost curves of tradi-
tional theory do not adequately represent 
reality".8 
Fig·ure 2:2 shows that if unit variable costs are constant over the 
range of output which reflects the planned reserve capacity, the 
7. Johnston,J . , Statistical Cost Analysis, McGraw -Hill, 
1960. 
8. Koutsoyiannis, 0e. cit., p. 138 . 
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short run average total cost curve (SATC) will fall continuously up 
to the leve l of output q2 at which reserve capacity is exhausted, 
If output exceeds this level, the SATe curve will start rising and 
the ;VIC curve will intersect it at its minimum point, It can be seen 
that if demand falls between Dl Dl ar.d 112D2, the application of the 
rule that price should equal st.ort run marginal cost will clearly result 
in a deficit being incured in the short run, Now, Bain has proposed 
t n at a plant 
"will have a certain load factor reflecting 
the ratio of avera,,'" rate of use to the 
capacity or best rate of use, and this l oad 
factor will generally be smaller than one , ,,9 
K.outsoyiannis 1 0 has suggested that a typical load factor will be 
be tw een two-thirds a.nd three~quarters- of capacity, If this is valid 
then it follows that not only will a decisionrnaker el'pecl the normal 
level of utilization of the plant to fall within the range ql q2 in 
Figure 2:2 but also that there will be a "cushion" of reserve capacity 
to meet any unexpected increase in the level of utilization. There is 
therefore a greater likelihood that a marginal cost pricing policy 
will reE ult in a public enterprise incuring a short run deficit where 
the enterprise has plzx.ned to use reserve capacity to meet a".y unexp"-
ected fluctu.ation in demand, It can be conc luded, t11",refore, that 
while the assumpticn. of constant short run average variable costs 
over a range of output may make it easier for a public enterprise to 
apply the short run marginal cost p:·j dng rule, it also weakens the 
case for such a pricing rule since there may be a greater probability 
that the short run financial objectives of the organiza.tion will conflict 
with the j)"O"l!lit. of this efficient pricing policy. 
9. Bain, J.:::;" Barriers to New Competition , Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachussets, 1956, p. 63 
10. Koutscyiannis,A., op.cit., p. 121. 
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B. "L" - SHAPED LAC CU~VE 
If it is assumed that a decisionmaker will plan tc expand the size of 
the plant where the level of utilization exceeds the typical load 
kctor of, say, two-thirds of full capacity , a long run average cost 
curve (LAC) can be drawn by joining the points on the SATC curves 
corresponding to two-thirds of the full capacity of each plant size. 
Figure 2:3 shows that this will g'ive rise to a "I.-shaped" LAC curve 
which does not turn up at very large scales of output ar,d does not 
envelop the SATC curves, but rather intersects them at t.he level of 
output defined by the typical load factor of Each plant. Now it appears 
to be accepted by modern theorists that production costs continue to 
fall smoothly even at very large scalE's, while managerial costs may 
rise o".1y slowly at very large scales. The LAC functior. ca.n there-
fore be represented by a "L- shaped" curve as in Figure 2:3 if the fall 
in teer.nical costs mor" than offsets the probable rise in ma.nagerial 
11 
costs. The statistic cost studies referred to by Johnston tend to 
support the view that there are no diseconomies of scale at large 
scales of output although this en pirical evider:.ce does not establish 
conclusively whether costs remain constant beyond a certain minimum 
optimum scale, or fall continuously with scale. 
If the LAC curves fall continuously with scale the LMC curve will lie 
below LAC at all scales of output. It follows that the application of 
the investment rule that capacity should be adjusted to the level of 
output where' demand equals long run marginal cost will result in the 
public enterprise incuring a deficit at every level of demand. The 
size of this deficit is, however, likely to become less significant as 
d emand grows over time. 
On the other hand a number of economists such as Bain have suggested 
that there is a minimal optimal scal e of plant at which all possible 
scale economies are derived. If the scale of plant is expanded beyond 
this minimum optimal scale then constant returns to scale are likely 
11. Johnston,J., op.cit. 
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to set in. Over this flat section of the LAC curve, LAC will equal 
LMC and the application of the optimal investment rule will result 
in all costs being covered. The case for a marginal cost based 
pricing and investment policy is therefore strengthened where there 
are constant returns to scale. 
. 12 13 A number of economists such as Rees and Turvey have developed 
a strong case for marginal cost pricing under conditions of constant 
returns to scale where it is assumed that price is used as an instrument 
to ration demand to the capacity of fully utilized plant. The charact-
eristic features of the Rees - Turvey (R-T) model of public enterprise 
pricing will be examined in the next section. 
2:1 :3 THE REES - TURVEY MODEL OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
PRICING 
A. APPLICATION OF OPTIMAL PRICING AND INVESTMENT 
RULES 
The R - T model of public enterprise pricing is based on the following 
assumptions: 
(i) in the short run, a maximum output level is defined, which 
cannot be exceeded at any cost; 
(ii) there are constant returns to scal e so that LAC is equivalent 
to LMC; 
(iii) unit variable costs are constant so that SR\.IC is equivalent 
to :::;RAVC; and 
(iv) finit e increments to plant capacity of perfectly divisible. 
12. R. Rees, "Public Enterprise Economics", Weidenfeld and 
icolson, 1978 . . 
13. Turvey, R., Economic Analysis and Public Enterprises , 
London, Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1st ed ., 1971, pp. 13-79. 
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Figure 2:4 illustrates how the marginal cost pricing and investment 
rules will be applied under these conditions. In the figure, q 0 
represents the maximum output capacity of the plant in the short run, 
r denotes unit running cost which is equivalent to both short run 
marginal and average variable cost up to the level of output qo, while 
r +k represent the sum of unit running and capital cost which, given 
the assumption of constant returns to scale, is equivalent to both long 
run average and marginal cost. 
If demand is at the level Dl Dl the public enterprise will follow the 
short run margi nal cost pricing rule by setting price equal to unit 
running cost. It can be seen from the figure that there will still be 
excess capacity ' if the public enterprise applies this rule but that a 
greater underutilization of capacity w(lUld occur if the price was set 
at any higher rate. By setting the price equal to unit running cost, 
however, the public enterprise will incur a deficit of kqo in the 
short run. According to the optimal investment rule that capacity 
should be adjusted to the level where price equals long run marginal 
cost, the public enterprise should implement a disinvestment programme 
with the goal of reducing the output capacity of the plant to ql if it 
expects demand to remain at the level ill D l . It can thus be seen that 
any deficit which arises under a rr.arginal cost based pricing and 
investment policy will only be temporary in nature and will be eliminated 
by the adjustment of capacity to optimal levels. The investment policy 
of the public enterjOrise will therefore be used as the instrument to 
reconcile any conflict bet\\een the financial and efficiency objectives 
of pricing policy. 
If demand is at the level D2D2 then an excess demand will result if price 
is set equal to unit running cost. In this situation both Rees and 
Turvey recommend that this excess demand should be rationed through 
the normal operation of the market mechanism. In other words price 
should be allowed to rise to the level p2 at which the qua:J.tity demanded 
is equal to the maximum output capacity of the plant, qo. It can be 
seen that at the price p2, a deficit equal to ( (r + k) - p2)qo will 
be ocurl'ed, in the short run and that the purpose of investment policy 
should he to reduce the output capacity of the plant to q2 so that a 
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marginal cost pricing policy can generate sufficient revenue to cover 
total costs. 
If demand is at the level D3D3 then the price p3 will ration demand 
to the maximum output capacity qo. A surplus of (p3 - (r + k) qo 
will be earned in the short run. This surplus will, however, be 
eliminated if the public enterprise follows the optimal investment rule 
of expanding the output capacity of plant to q3. 
The Rees - Turvey model strengthens the case for requiring public 
enterprises to adopt marginal cost based pricing and investment 
policies in a number of ways: 
(i) it ind.icEtes the manner in which pricing policy can be used 
as a tool to promote the efficient utilization of facilities; 
(ii) it indicates the appropriate response which a public enter-
prise should rrake to the signals wbich arise in the production 
and marketing of its prod uet. For example, excess capacity 
should provide the signal for the public enterprise to adjust 
its price downwards provided that price is not allowed to 
fall below the level of unit running cost while excess demand 
should I:::e regarded as a signal for the public enterprise to 
adjust its price upwards. Furthermore, if the public enter-
prise expects to earn a surplus this should be regarded as 
a signal for it to expand the scale of its plant while an 
expecteci deficit should indicate the need to rationalize its 
operations by reducing the capacity of its plant; 
(iii) it suggests that any conflict between economic efficiency 
and financial viability should be only temporary and that, 
in the long run, the pursuit of an effieie nt pricing and 
investment policy is fully consistent with the attainment of 
financial equilibrium by the public enterprise; and 
(iv) the model car. be extended to deal with the problem of 
formulating prices where demand fluctuates between peak 
and off-peak periods. This will be discussed in the next 
sub-section. 
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13, THE ExTENSION OF THE MODEL TO DEAL WITH PEAK 
LOAD PRICING 
It is often the case that there is a systematic fluctuation in the demand 
for the services provided by a public utility within a given period, 
this pattern repeating itself from period to period, These fluctuations 
are usually not sufficiently prolonged to enable the public utility to 
adjl.st the capacity of its plant to match them. Consequently, public 
utilities often resort to intertemporal price discrimination or peak 
load pricing policies to deal with this problem of fixed capacity and 
fluctuating demand. 
The theoretical solution to this problem was developed by Boiteux 14, 
S · 15 H' hI 'f 16 B h 17 d m'll' 18 F' telner , lrsc el er , uc anan an ~ rl lams on 19ure 
2 :5 shows how a peak - load pricing policy can be applied within the 
framework of the R-T model. 
Figure 2:5 is dravm on the assumption that demand fluctuates on a 
regular daily ~asis with there t::eing a period of peak demand, D1 D1 , 
between, say, 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. and 2. period of off-peak demand, 
D2D2, between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. The basic guidelines of the R-T 
model for pricing policy are that: 
. . _---_._--- ---
14. Boiteux, lvl ., "Pe ak load Pricing" in Nelson, J . R., (ed.), 
"Marginal Cost Pricing in Practice", Englewood Cliffs ,N., 
1964, pp. 59-90. 
15. :::,teiner,P .0., "Peak loads and efficient pricing", Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Nove mber, 1957, pp. 585-610. 
16. Hirschleifer, J., "Peak loa.ds and efficient pricing: Comment ", 
(luarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1958, pp. 451-62. 
17. Buchanan,J ,M., "Peak loads and efficient pricing: Comment", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1966, pp. 463-71. 
18. Willian·son,O.E., "Peak-load pricing", American Economic 
Review, Vol. 56 (1 966), pp. 81 0-27. 
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(i) where there is excess capacity, price should be dropped as 
low as possible to induce the maximum utilization of this 
excess capacity provided that prices still cover unit running 
costs, and that 
(ii) where capacity is fully utilized, prices should rise to restrict 
demand to capacity and thereby generate revenue which will 
make a contribution to capital COEtS. 
It can be seen frono Figure 2:5 that the application of these guidelines 
will lead to peak-off-peak price differentiation. 
Figure 2:5 (a) illustrates the situation where off-peak demanc is at 
such a low level that excess capacity results even where price is set 
equal to unit running costs. If price is allowed to ration peak demand 
to the maximum output capacity of the plant, qo, then it can be seen 
that it is only during the peak period that price should make s ome 
contribution toward unit capital costs. This prediction has given rise 
to the practice by some utilities of allocating capitc.l costs only to 
peak period consumers. It should be pointed out though that it is 
implicitly assumed in the peak load pricing model represented in 
Figure 2:5 that the demand functions in the two periods ar'e indeper.dent. 
It may, however, be the case that by charging a much higher price in 
the peak period the public ent8rprise may induce such a shift of cons-
umption to the off-peak period that it in fact becomes the new peak 
period. As a result of being aware of the possibility of this problem 
of "shifting peaks" arising, public enterpri,..es usually do not in 
practice allocate all capital costs to. the peak period. 
Furthermore it is possible that by setting price equal to unit running 
cost in the off-pec.k period, excess demand may arise in this period. 
Figure 2:5 (b) illustrates the conditions in which this situation may 
occur. In the figure the excess demand which arises in the off-peak 
period is r e moved by allcwing price to rise to p2 while the higher 
price, p1, iE. charged in the fJeak period. Quite clearly it would be 
inefficient for the public enterprise to allocate all capital costs to 
peak period consumers in thiE situation . 
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In formulating an optimal investment policy it should be recalled that 
the net social benefit or marginal value to consumers of an increment 
in the output capacity of plant is measured by the difference between 
price and running charges (p-r). Now since an increment in plant 
capacity generates outputs and therefore . benefits in both peak and 
off-peak periods the relevant measure of the marginal benefit to 
consumers of an increment in capacity is the sum of the marginal 
values of capacity peak and off-peak consumers. The planned daily 
capacity of the plant should therefore be expanded up to the optimal 
out put where the sum of the marginal values of capacity in the two 
sub periods is equal to marginal capital cost that is: 
(p1-r) + (p2 -r) = k, (2:1 ) 
Figure 2:6 indicates how this investment rule should be applied. 
If the capacity of plant is initially fixed at the output level qo, then 
the application of a peak l oad pricing policy will result in the price 
p1 being charged in the peak period and the price p2 in the off-peak 
period. It can be seen from the figure that (p1 - r) + (p2 - r) > :, . 
This provides a signal for the public enterprise to implement an 
investment programme to expand plant capacity up to the optimal 
output leve l '11 at which the contributions generated in peak and 
off-peak periods are sufficient t o cover capital costs. 
There are often additional administrative and metering costs associated 
with differentiating prices over an additional sub-period. Consequently 
an additional pricing period should only be introduced if the net social 
benefit of doing so exceeds the additional administrative and metering 
costs. Figure 2:7 indicates the welfare losses associated with 
charging a uniform price over an entire period as an alternative to 
differentiating betw een the pric es charged to peak and off-peak 
consumers. In Figure 2:7 the public enterprise has to decide between 
charging a uniform price p* in both periods which would generate an 
equal contribution per unit to capital costs or charging a price pl in 
the peak period and a price p2 in the off-peak period with the contri-
bution to capital costs only being made in the peak period. It can be 
seen that if p* is charged in the off-peak period, excess capacity equal 
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to (qo - q2) will arise. The welfare loss associated with this excess 
c apacity is indicated by the area of the triangle abc which measures 
the net loss in consumer's surplus resulting from c harging a price 
higher than short run marginal cost. If p* is charged in the peak 
period, excess demand equal to (q1 - qo) will arise. This may induce 
the public enterprise to implement an investment programme designed 
at expanding the output capacity of plant to q1. The welfare loss 
associated with charging p* in the peak period can therefore be meas-
ured in terms of the additional capital costs of investment less the net 
gain in consumer's surplus equal to the area def which arises from 
charging a lower price than p1. It will thus be justifiable for the 
public enterprise to differentiate between peak and off-peak prices 
if the welfare losses associated with charging a uniform price in both 
periods are greater than the administrative and metering costs. The 
same principle can be applied in deciding whether to introduce any 
further pricing subperiod. 
e. EVALUATION OF THE R - T MODEL 
It has been shown that there is no long conflict between the efficiency 
and financial objectives of a public enterprise if a marginal cost 
pricing and investment policy is applied under the conditions which 
characterize t he R - T model. The assumptions underlying the shape 
of the cost curves in the R - T model may be valid in the foll owing 
eire umstances: 
(i) where the provision for reserve plant capacity gives rise to 
a flat stretch of the SAVe curve where unit running costs 
are constant; 
(ii) where the output required can only be produced by scales of 
plant capacity greater than the minimum optimum scale at 
which, as Bain ha"'S suggested, constant returns to scale 
s e t in; and 
(iii) where it is not possible to increase tl>e maximum output 
capacity of plant in the short run by requiring worke rs 
to work overtime. 
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However, even if the cost curves facing a public enterprise approxi-
mate the shape indicated by the R - T model, there may still be a 
conflict between efficiency and financial viability if provision is 
made for reserve plant capacity in excess of that amount associated 
with the typical load factor of the plant. Figure 2:8 indicates how 
this provision for excess reserve capacity will affect the central 
predictions of the R - T model. If demand is at the level DoDo, the 
setting of price at po which is equal to short run marginal cost, will 
result in plant being utilized at its typical load factor of 2/3 of full 
capacity qo. Now, if demand is expected to rise to D1 D1 then 
according to the R - T model, price should be allowed to increase to 
p1 to ration demand to existing capacity and no expansion of plant 
capacity would be required since total costs would be covered at the 
price p1. However, in an uncertain environment a public enterprise 
may respond to the expected increase in the utilization of the plant 
beyond the typical-load factor of 2/3 qo by implementing an investment 
programme to expand the capacity of plant so that this typical load 
factor can be maintained under the new demand conditons. If this 
investment programme takes place then the application of the marginal 
cost pricing rule will still result in the public enterprise incuring 
a deficit. It follows that under conditi.ons of uncertainty where public 
enterprises make provision for a "reserve plant margin", the short 
run surpluses: or deficits incured by the public enterprise can no 
longer be regarded as signals for investment or disinvestment. 
The predictions of the R - T model will also be affected if one drops 
the assumption of perfect divisibility of finite increments in plant 
capacity. This problem of indivisibility will be examined in the 
next section. 
D. THE EFFECT OF INDIVISIBILITIES 
In practice it is often found that the plant used by public enterprises 
is indivisible over wide ranges of output and can only be varied in 
larger indivisible lumps. In Figure 2:9 the capacity output qo is 
produced by a singl~ unit of plant so that it can only be increased in 
an indivisible lump from qo to q1 by purChasing and installing 
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a second unit of plant and decreased by closing down the plant. There 
will be no change in the application of the marginal cost pricing rule 
in the short run. However, if demand is expected to remain at D2 so 
that the public enterprise expects to make a surplus equal to 
(p*2 - (r + k)qo) , then, in the long run, the public enterprise must 
decide whether it will continue to make this surplus or whether it will 
implement an investment programme to increase the maximum output 
capacity of plant from qo to ql, charge a price equal to r and incur 
a loss of k ql. If the demand price is assumed to measure the marginal 
social value of an additional unit of consumption, then the enterprise 
will expand capacity to ql if the gain in the total social benefit equal 
to the area Cdq*l qo is greater than the sum of the increased capital 
costs k(ql - qo) and increased running costs r(q* - qo). If the public 
enterprise does decide to expand capacity by this ind,ivisible amount 
then it can be s een that a deficit equal to kql will be incurred until 
such time as demand grows to the level D3 where the optimal price 
will be sufficiently high to cover all unit costs. It is clear, therefore , 
that in this case deficits are likely to . be for more prolonged in 
duration than under the implicit condition of the R - T model that 
plant capacity is perfectly divisible and investment can vary by any 
amount. 
Figure 2:9 also illustrates the problem facing a public enterprise 
when it makes a loss on a large indivisible unit of plant capacity. 
If demand is at the level Dl , then the application of the short run 
marginal cost pricing rule will result in the public enterprise 
making a loss equal to (r + k - pl * )qo. If demand is expected to 
remain at this level , then the public enterprise must decide be tween 
continuing to operate these facilities at a loss or closing them down. 
If a private enterprise was in a similar situation it would face no 
such alternative and would have to close down the plant since it 
could not survive in the long run by making a loss. It may, however, 
be economically justifiable for the public enterprise to continue 
operations provided that there is a net social benefit to be derived 
from pursuing this policy. It would thus compare the benefit society 
derives fro m the provision of output qo at pri ce p*l which is 
measured by the area abqo 0 against the cost of provision (r + k}(jO. 
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If abqo 0 is greater than {r + k)qo then society would derive a net 
benefit frem the continued operation of the plant. On the other hand, 
the plant should be closed down if {r + k)qo is greater than abqo 0, 
If, however, the continued operation of the plant at a loss is econo-
mically justifiable, then it follows that a loss will persist on a more 
or less permanent basis unless demand increases to a level ·suffi-
ciently high for a marginal cost pricing policy to generate a surplus or 
if it is decided to close down the plant. 
E, CONCLUSION 
To sum up, it appears that the application of the marginal cost 
pricing and investment rules will result in .a public enterprise incurring 
a deficit in the following circumstances: 
(i) in the short run, where excess demand is absorbed by the 
reserve plant margin and is not rationed by raiSing price 
above unit running cost; and 
(ii) in the long run, either where there are increasing returns 
to scale so that the LAC curve lies above the LMC curve 
or where indivisibilities cause the public enterprise to 
retain unutilized plant either because demand has not 
grown to the level where the plant will be fully utilized or 
because the social benefits obtained from continuing 
operations at a loss exceed the welfare losses associated 
with closing down the plant. 
It is therefore unlikely that the price structure determined according 
to the rules discussed in this section will be acceptable to the policy-
maker, It is therefore necessary to consider the next stage in the 
piecemeal optimization procedure whereby prices are adjusted above 
or below marginal cost to satisfy the conditions for second best 
optimality in an economy where there are known and significant 
non-optimalities ' . 
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2:2 OPTIMAL ADJUSTMENTS TO THE MARGINAL COST 
PRICING RULE 
2:2:1 THE EFFECT OF A BINDING REVENUE CONSTRAINT 
It is necessary for a public enterprise to pursue pricing policies 
which result in the prices charged for its services being higher 
than their marginal cost when the application of the marginal cost 
pricing rule is not expected to generate sufficient revenue to satisfy 
the revenue target of the enterprise. It will be assumed that the 
amount of the revenue target is decided by a body independent of the 
public enterprise's management so that it acts as an exogenous 
constraint on pricing policy. Although the revenue target is usually 
not set below a level sufficient to cover total costs (net of State 
subsidies) it may be raised above this level to enable the public enter-
prise to generate the internal funds necessary to finance future capital 
development. Where this reVE'nue target acts as a binding constraint 
upon the pursuit of a marginal cost pricing policy, the public en terprise 
must deterrr.ine the pricing policy which will maximize net social 
be nefit subject to this revenue constraint. This approach clearly 
differs from that which underlies,the pursuit of an average cost 
pricing policy wbere the primary purpose of pricing policy is not to 
optimize economic efficiency but rathe r to generate sufficient reve nue 
to cover total costs. In formulating a pricing policy which maximizes 
net social benefit subject to a revenue constraint, a public enterprise 
must decidE between the following apprcaches: 
(i) whetr.er a constant unit rate will be charged for each of 
its products or whether the price will take the form of a 
two-part tariff with a fixed charge and a rate per unit 
of consumption; and 
(ii) wlietlier. the objective of pricing policy should be to 
obtain maximum economic efficiency or whether it 
should serve the objectives of both economic efficiency 
and distributional equality. 
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A. THE RECONCILIATION OF FINANCIAL AND EFFICIENCY 
OBJECTlV ES THROUGH P RICE DIFFERENTIATION 
Where a multiproduct public ent€'rprise cannot attain its revenue 
target if it applies a marginal cost pricing policy, it is necessary 
to allocate the shortfall among the different outputs in such a way 
as to minimize the loss of allocative efficiency. In the case where 
the public enterprise produces two outputs with independent demand 
functions, the optimal outputs of the two goods must satisfy the 
conditions: 
Pl - MC1 = 
----
MRl - MC1 
P2 - MC 2 
MR2 - MC2 
= z 
where Z is some negative number whose value is determined by the 
revenue constraint. This expresses the condition that the ratio 
between the marginal welfare losses and marginal profit should be 
equal for both goods since oth!!rwise it will be possible to reallo-
cate outputs in such a way as to leave profits unchanged but to 
secur!! a greater welfare gain in one market than in the other. 
Now since the marginal revenue of eacr. good can be written as 
MRi = pi(l -l/ei) i := 1,2. (2:3 ) 
where ei is the price elasticity of demand for good i, it follows 
that when the optimality condition expressed in (2:2) is attained, 
then for both outputs: 
pi(l -l/iH) MCi i -= 1,2 (2:4 ) 
1 9. Rees, R., op. cit., p. 1 05, derives the optimality of this 
condition. 
where 
A. 
e1 = (l-Z)ei Z 
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In other words, the optimal deviation of price from marginal cost 
will vary inversely with the elasticity of demand of the good. As 
will be discussed in Chapter Three, a pricing policy of setting 
prices on the basis of "what the market will bear" provided that 
the prices of all goods at least covers marginal cost, may result 
in a pricir:g structure whic!: approximates this optimality condition, 
si.nce, other things being equal, higher prices are likely to be charged 
on goods with inelastic than those with elastic demand. Baumol and 
Bradford20 consider that the intuitive rationale for such a ' rule is 
that the damage to welfare resulting from departures from marginal 
cost pricing will be minimized since the rela',ive quantities of the 
goods sold will approximate their marginal cost pricing proportions. 
If the two goods are interdependent in demand then the optimal prices 
and quar:tities must satisfy the relationship: 
Pl - MC1 = P2 - MC2 = Z (2:6) 
MR1 ~ + MR1 2 - MC1 MR22 + MR21 - MC2 
where MRi,J, i,j, = 1,2, is the effect of the ith output on the 
revenue of the j th. The sum MR11 + MR12 represents the total 
effect on the revenue of the enterprise, of a change iI:. output 1, via 
the effect on both its own demand, and that of good 2, The only 
difference between the optimality condition in (2:6) and that in (2:2) 
is Ll:at in the former this total effect is taken into account. The 
intuitive rationale for (2:6) thus remains the same as for (2:2). 
20. Baumol, W.J. and Brad.ford, "Cpt'.mal Departures from 
Marginal Cost Pricing", A. E. R., 1970, pp. 267-283. The 
writers trace the antecedents of this discussion to F .Ramsey' s 
"A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation" in Economic Journa~, 
March 1927. This argument was taken up by Pigou, A. C., in 
A Study of Public Finance, 2nd ed., 1947, while Boiteux,M., 
was the first writer to present the analysis in the form of a 
discussion of public utility pricing in "Le 'revenue distributable ' 
et les pertes economiques, " Econometrica, April 1951. He 
then completed a definitive analysis of the subject in terms of 
Pareto optirllality in "Sur la gestion des Monopoles Publics 
astreints aL'equilibre budgetaire", Econometrica, Jan., 1956. 
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An implicit assumption of the analysis in this section is that a 
public ent€Tprise can only charge a single unit price for any of its 
services. In the next section the question whether in the second 
best situation created by the existence of a revenue target, a smaller 
welfare loss. may result from charging a two-part tariff consisting 
of a fixed charge and then a price per unit of consumption, will be 
examined. 
B. TWO PART TARIFFS 
The rationale for a two part tariff is that the fixed charge is in the 
nature of a lump sum tax since it is paid for out of consl!mer' s 
surplus and therefore does not affect the value the consumer places 
on the ma.rginal unit of consumption. If this is accepted then it 
should be possible to meet the profit target from the fixed charge 
and Eet prices equal to marginal cost. It can however, be shown 
that changes in the fixed charge w ill affect the demand for a public 
enterprise good and hence resource, allocation, firstly, because of 
the income effect on demand and secondly, because some consumers 
will rather not consume the good at all than par the fixed charge. 
These two effects are illustrated in the consumer choice problem 
depicted in Figure 2:10. In the absence of any fixed change, the 
consumer's initial position of equilibrium will be at point d where 
the budget line yo if; tangential to the indifference curve Vo . If a 
fixed charge F is imposed on good 1 then befcre the consumer can buy 
any amount of the good he must first pay F so that his income is 
reduced to Yl = yo-F , which defines the nevI budget constraint shown 
as y l' in the fig-ure. If the consume r refuses to pay the fixed charge 
and buys nothing of good then "is income will remain at yo but he 
must remain at point a in the figure since he must spend all of y 1 
on q2. The consumer will do this if the new consumer equilibrium 
is at poir.t e on the indifference curve cVl since in this case point a 
represents a higher level of utility than point e. On the other hand, 
if point e lies on the curve bVl the consumer will pay the fixed charge 
and consume ql * of good. It should be noted though that the quantity 
consumed of gocd 1 fall s from qOl to q l * due to the income effect. 
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O~-----Cq:~·I--~nc~O'-----~------~-------------
., 
FIGURE 2:10 The Effect of a Two Part Tariff on Consumer Choice 
89 
Now if these result s are €,'eneralized over the whole market for 
good I it can be seen that an increase in the fixed charge will cause 
both a fall in the nurr.ber of consumer's n, and in the level of 
consumption by those who pay the fixed charge and who continue to 
consume the good. The imposition of a fixed charge to meet a profit 
target will thus cause welfare losses due to the underconsumption of 
the gocd and it is ther<>fore necessary to deterrrine an optimal two 
part tariff Vlhich will generate the required profit target with a 
minimum los s in efficiency. 
The profit constraint, S, under a two-part tariff can be expressed as: 
where P1 ql is the rever..l'e from sales of the good produced by the 
public Enterprise and Fn is revenue from the payment of fixed 
charges. Given that 
fl (PI ,F) d'l dql ql = '1 
-< 0 
dPI dF 
(2:8) 
ar.d 
n = f2 (Pl,F) dn dn .-' 0 dP I dF 
'-.. 
(2:9) 
it can be shown that the cptimal price and fixed charge, which 
t.:'-'rough (2:8) and (2:9) \\ill determine total c'.emand ql and the 
numbex' of consumer's n must satisfy the conditions 
where 
Pl - " 'IC I 
1vI.R.1- MCI + ¢I 
= 
(Pl -MC1)ql 
F 
MHF + (Pl - Mel) 
> 0 
dql 
dF 
=:6 (2: 10) 
(2:11) 
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Equation (2:10) sets out the condition for optimality that the ratio of 
the marginal welfare loss of output to the marginal profit of output, 
adjusted for the effect of changes in output on the revenue from the 
fix e d charge, should be equal to the ratio of the marginal welfare ' 
loss with respect to the fixed charge to the marginal profitability of 
the fixed charge. If these ratios are unequal then it would be possible 
to find variations in price and the fixed charge which would increase 
welfare while leaving total profit unchanged. 
C. THE RECONCILIATION OF FINANCIAL, EFFICIENCY AND 
EGt:ALITY OBJECTIVES THROUGH PRICE DIFFEREN-
TIATION 
The acceptance, in principle, of Graaff' s proposal that a public 
enterprise pricing policy should be formulated " • • •• with regard 
for its effect on the distribution of wealth as well as for its effect 
on the allocation of resources,,21 implies that both the objectives 
of economic efficiency and distributional equality should be taken 
into account in allocating among the outputs produced by a public 
e nte rprise, the shortfall from the reve nue target which would be 
expected to result if a marginal cost pricing policy was applied. 
If consumers have differing preferences and consume goods in 
different proportions, the change in relative outputs resuIting.' 
from the adjustment of public enterprise price s above marginal cost 
will also effect the distribution of welfare among consumers. A 
policymaker may therefore seek t o differentiate the price adjust-
me nt applied to the different outputs produced by a public enterprise 
in a way which improves distributional inequality and contains the 
loss of allocative dficiency. Rees 22 has defined the conditions 
21. Graaff,J., deV., Theoretical Welfare Economics, 
Cambridge University Press, 1 st ed., 1957, p. 155. 
22. rtees, r<., op.cit" p.121. 
, 
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for optimal price differentiation in a case ",tere a public enterprise 
produces two goods as: 
pj (1 
- 12) ; MC j ; 1 ,2 (2:12) 
ej 
where kj ; 1 + :Qi (2:13) 
Bj 
13j · being the ·Lagrangean n' ultiplier associated with the revenue cons-
traint aI'd Dj representing the "distributional characteristic" of the 
respective goods. The size of this distributional characteristic if; 
determined by the relative proportions of the good consumed by 
different consumer groups weighted by the marginal social utility of 
income associated with each group. 
It can be Eeen from (2:12) that if the two goods have the same demand 
elasticities, then the greater relative divergence of price from 
marginal cost should be allowed fer that good with the lower distri-
butional characteristic. In other words, when the shortfall frem the 
revenue target is allocated over goods, relatively smaller welfare 
losses are imposed on those goods, large proportions of which are 
bought by consumers with high marginal social utilities of income. 
It follows that generally the distributional characteristic may offset 
or reinforce the effects of different demand elasticities among goods. 
A good with both a high demand elasticity and high distributional 
characteristic will have a relatively lower price/marginal cost ratio 
then one with opposite characteristics. It can therefore be concluded 
that the overall allocation of the shortfall among outputs will depend 
in part upon the relative losses in allocative efficiency as represented 
by demand elasticities, and in part upon the relative losses in 
distributional equality, as measured by the distributional characteristic. 
2:2:2 SECOND BEST PROBLEMS 
The marginal cost pricing rule for a public enterprise is only strictly 
applicable to a first best economy in which there is no divergence 
of price from marginal cost in an)' other sector of the economy. The 
theory of second best suggests that where there are deviations of 
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price from marginal cost ir sectors which are interdependent with 
public enterprises, then it is no longer optimal fer the latter to set 
their prices equal to marginal cost since second best optimality may 
require public enterprises to allow their prices to deviate from 
marginal cost in such a way as to minimize welfare losses. The key 
element in this problem is the relationship between the output of the 
deviant sector, q1 ' and the public enterprise price P2' 
(2:14) 
It can be shown that the optimal public enterprise price P2 * must 
satisfy the condition 
(2:15) 
If q1 is a substitute for q2' then dq1 /dP2 will be positive so that 
the term on the right hand side will be positive as a whole. It 
follows that in this case the public enterprise price should exceed 
marginal cost by an amount which is greater the greater is the 
price-marginal cost divergence in the deviant sector. Conversely 
if CJ 1 and q2 are complementary goods, then the optimal P2 * will be 
below marginal cost. 
The marginal net social benefit of the public enterpriEe good q2 
depends not only on the difference between its own price ar.d marginal 
cost, but also on the changes it induces in the output of the devia.nt 
sector. It can be shown that rr,arginal net social benefit will be zero 
and total net social benefit will be maxirr ized if the public enterprise 
sets its price to attain condition (2:15) since this condition can be 
rewritten as: 
(p * - MC ) + (r- * - MC ) dq1 ~ 0 
2 2 1 1 d 
<:;2 
(2: 1 6) 
where the first term can be interpreted as the partial marginal net 
social benefit of q2 in market 2, and the second as the partial marginal 
net social benefit of q2 in market 1 • 
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The relationship between these marginal social net benefits ami 
output i~ shown in Figure 2:11. q2 is defined to be the output at 
which P2 = MC2 and curve A shows how the value of the difference 
P2 - MC2 increases as q2 is reduced below q2' Curve B is drawn 
on the assumption that the second partial marginal net social benefit 
- (Pl - MC1 )dq l / dq2 falls as q2 is reduced. This assumption is 
essentially a second order or stability condition. 
This figure clearly shows why it will no longer be optimal for a public 
enterprise to adopt a marginal cost pricing policy in a second best 
situation. At output q2' the loss in welfare resulting from a small 
reduction in q2 is given by P2 - MC2 and is therefore zero, while the 
gain in welfare in market 1 is measured by - p2 - MC2 - (Pl - MC1 ) dq/dq2 
represented by point b in the figure. Since the gain in welfan, in 
market 1 from a reduction in q2 is greater than the loss in market 2 
there is scope for Pal'etG improvement. Consumers in market 1 
WGuid be better off and no-one else worse off if they could pay the 
consumers of good 2 to reduce their consumption and release resources 
into production of good 1. The market, however, would fail to organize 
tt.is mutually beneficial exchange. The public enterprise though could 
achieve the same result if it reduced its output from q2 to q2 *, where 
A and B intersect, by allowing its price to rise above marginal cost 
by the amount P2 * - IvlC 2 • It can thus be seen that by adopting an 
appropriate pricing policy, the public enterprise could bring about the 
required resource reallccation ar:d thereby exhaust all possibilities 
for rr:utually beneficial exchange. 
A secone type of second best problem arises when a public enterprise 
buys its inputs from a sector wbch charges a price greater than 
marginal cost. This is reflected in Figure 2:12 wt.ich illustrates a 
bilatera.l rronopoly situation where the public enterprise is the sole 
buyer of a good and a private enterprise the sole seller. Although 
the public enterprise is the sole buyer it choosE;s not to exercise its 
[r.onopsonistic power and accept.s the supply prices determined 
accordicg to the private enterprise I s marginal cost curve, MC. The 
demand curve, D, shows at each level of output, q, the marginal value 
product of n.e good for the public enterprise which, in an otherwise 
first best economy, measures its m,,;rginal social value. The optimal 
A 
B 
FIGURE 2:11 
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quantity of the good which should be produced by the monopolist and 
bought by the public enterprise is q* since at any other output, the 
marginal value product of the good will differ from its supply price. 
The monopolist, however, is unlikely to accept the profit associated 
with the optimal price p* since it will maximize it s profit at price 
pm by restricting its output to qnI where marginal revenue is equivdent 
to marginal cost. The public enterprise may therefore have to adopt 
a strategy of announcing that it will buy an amount q* ar:d then nego-
tiate with the monopoly over price. If a price is higher - than p* such 
as p 1 is determined by negotiation, the public entE,rprise should still 
use in its determination of input mix, output and final price, the 
"shadow price" p* r ather than the actual price p'. The significance 
of p' is that it determines the profit or loss of the public enterprise 
and so the result of the payment of a price p' instead of p* for the 
input is that there will be a transfer payment from the Treasury, whicb 
has to subsidize any public enterprise operating loss, to the monopolist. 
If it is assumed that there are no welfare effects associated with a 
public enterprise deficit or surplus it .follows that the value of p' will 
affect income distribution rather than resource allocation. 
The next section will deal with the problerr. of how "shadow prices" 
may be applied when t he market ratE' of interest does not affect the 
public er.terprise cost of capital. 
2:2:3 THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE COST OF CAPITAL 
In forrr.ulating rules for optimal pricing in the previous section, the 
existence of an interest rate, r, which determines the cost of capital 
to a public enterprise has been presupposed. Although it is not 
necessary to consider the cost of ce.pital in short run pricing problems 
involving fixed capacity, it becomes an important parameter in the 
analysis, once capacity is treated as variablE' in the long run. This 
is because it will, in r elation to other prices, determine tht ' least 
cost input combination and thereby, the relation between total costs 
and output so that it becomes an important component of marginal 
cost. The cost of capital is also that rate used in discounting net 
social benefits of future consumptior:, so as to deterrr.ine that level 
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of investment which maximizes their net present value. It follows, 
therefore, that" .... sophisticated pricing rules are unlikely t o 
achieve economic efficiency ..•. if the value of the cost of capital 
is non-optimally chosen, given its pervasive influence on the 
solution. ,,24 
In a first best economy, a public enterprise will satisfy the necessary 
conditions for a Pareto optimal allocation of resources to investment 
if it invests up to the point where its marginal rate of return on 
investment' (mg) is just equal to the market rate of interest. 25 It will 
thus adopt a similar investment appraisal rule to private enterprises, 
only undertaking those investment projects for which the time stream 
of benefits discounted at the market rate of interest are greater t han 
the cost of the project, and doing this until 'rrig = r. It follows that 
private firms will also maximize their net present value by expanding 
investment to the point where tt.eir rr.arginal rate of return (mp) is 
equal to r. 
Now since 'mg = r 
and mp = r 
it follows that mg = mp . (2:17) 
This satisfies the condition for the optimal allocation of investment 
between private and public enterprises. Now, since every house-
ho ld will maximize its utility by equating its marginal rate of time 
preference (p) with r, a l'areto optimal allocation of present and 
future consumption among households will occur since: 
pi = r for households 1 •... , n 
and a Pareto optimal allocation of resources to total investment will 
24. }(ees, !{., op. cit., p. 124. 
25. A derivation of these conditions is conducted by .t<.Rees, 
op.cit., pp. 125-132. 
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also occur since from 
mg = r = mp = pi. (2:18) 
In sum, it can be seen that, if the public enterprise adopts the 
market rate of interest as its cost of capital and pursues an investment 
appraisal rule designed to maximize the net present value of investment, 
then it will satisfy the necessa:ry conditior.s for Pareto optimality in 
investment in a first best economy. The market rate of interest will 
furthermore provide information about the opportunity cost of resources . 
devoted to capital which can be used to derive the valte of marginal cost 
upon which the pricing policy of the public enterprise will be based. 
A seond best problem occurs when the market rate of interest no 
longer measures both 
(i) the time preference rate of every household and thereby 
fails to provide information on the value of current versus 
future consumption; and 
(ii) the marginal rate of return on investment in the private 
sect:>r and thus does not provide information on the 
opportunity cost of resources devoted to public rather 
than private investment. 
An. example of such a second best problem occurs when the profits 
of private enterprises are taxed. In this case private enterprises 
w ill maximize their net present value by investing up to the point 
where their marginal rate of return equals the tax adjusted interest 
rate , r* J that is: 
mp = r * = r 
1 -t 
(2:19) 
where t denotes the rate of compa.ny tax. It is necessary to 
examine the effect of this imperfection on the three conditions for 
Pareto optimality in investment: 
(i) the Pare tian optirrality of the allocation of present and 
future consumption among consumers will be unaffected 
since every consumer will still maximize utility by equating 
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his time rate of preference with the market rate of 
intere st; 
(ii) the Pareto optimality of the allocation of investment 
betwee n private and public enterprises will, however, 
be affected. This is because private enterprises will 
maximize their net present value by equating their 
marginal rate of return on investment with a tax 
adjusted interest rate (r' = r/1-t) which is actually 
higher thaI' the market rate of interest. If the public 
entErprise uses the market rate of interest as the cost 
of capital used to discount the time stream of future 
benefits associated with investment projects, it follows 
that in the equilibrium position where private and public 
enterprises are both maximizing their net present value 
of inves tment: 
mp = 1 ~t > mg = r (2:20) 
This represents a suboptimal allocation of resources to 
investment, sinc.-, if inves tment could be diverted from the 
public enterprise to private enterprises, the total return 
on inves tment in the econo my could be increased. 
Competitive markets and the application by public enter-
prises of the familiar investment appraisal rule would, 
however, fail to effect this IEutually beneficial exchange. 
It follows t hat the cost of capital of the public enterpri se 
needs to be adjusted upwards t o correct problem of 
overinvestment by public enterprises a,nd underinves tment 
by private enterprises in this second best situation; and 
(iii) the necessary condition for a Pareto optimal allocation of 
resources to total investment will also be violated if 
private enterprises al'e taxed since it follow~; from (2:18) 
that nIp> pi = mg. 
If consumers reduce their current consumpticn and invest it in 
private enterprises, they will be more than compensated for their 
sacrifice. However, if public enterpri!',es continue to adopt the 
market rate of interest <.s their cos t of c2,pital, perfEctly competi-
tive lTlarkets will fail to effect this mutually beneficial exchange. 
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If the policy of taxing companies is unalterable, then the public 
enterprise may be able to move the economy to a second best optimum 
by adjusting upwards its cost of capital and thereby reducing the 
optimal level of its investment. In pursuing this policy of reducing 
investment and increasing the cost of capital, the public enterprise 
planners must realize that this will require a reduced bond issue 
and hence a fall in the market interest rate, r. This will cause a 
rise in both current consumption 'and private enterprises investment 
to an extent determined by their sensitivity to the interest rate. 
Taking these two factors into account Hees derived the condition 
for second best optimal investment as follows: 
where 
+ mg = G1 (l+r) + G2(1+ r ) 
1 -t 
o < G1, G2 < 1, G1 + G2 =1. 
(2: 20) 
The equilibrium marginal rate of return for the optimal level of 
public enterprise investment is thus a sinple weighted average of 
the consumer's time preference rate (which is equivalent to the 
fT.arket rate of interest) on the one hand, and the marginal rate of 
return to private sector investment, on the other hand, where the 
latter can be determined by a simple correction to the market 
interest rate. The weights are: 
dxo £.IT> 
G = dr and G2 = dr (2:21 ) 
------ ------dxo + £.IT> dxo + £YP 
r r dr dr 
where xo represents the level of current consumption and yp the level 
of private enterprise investment. 
As j~ees has stated: 
II the weight whict. the market interest 
rate receives depends entirely on the 
strength of the interest effect on current 
consumption ••••• relative to that on 
investment. The reason is that these 
determine the extent to which the public 
enterprise investment displaces, at the 
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. . . t . t" 26 margm, consumptlOn or prlva e mvestmen • 
In other words, the above condition expresses the equality between 
the marginal rate of return on public enterprise investment and 
its opportunity cost, which cap.. be determined in terms of the 
displacement of current consumption ar..d private enterprise inveEt-
ment which occurs at the margin. 
It follows, therefore that the public enterprise cost of capital will 
take the form: 
r * . = Qr1 and Q2 r 
1 -t 
The public enterprise can thus satisfy the conditions necessary for 
optimal investment if it rr.aximizes net present value, vg; in other 
words 
2iL 
vg = 1 +r * - yg 
using r* ir. disc ounting. 
In conclusion, it can be seen that in a second best situation the 
adoption by a public enterprise of a "test discount rate" based on 
estimates of the marginal rate of return on private investment may 
be suboptin 'al since generally, we must have 
r<r~- <....E... 
1 -t (2:24) 
to compensate for the r-esource misallocation that reEults fre·m 
the tax distortion. The a.nalysis in this section indicates in 
a general v,ay, the way in which the cost of caFital should be 
26. Ibid., p. 138. 
102 
adjusted to correct for unalterable market distortions. It should 
be noted that, in the same way as in other second best situations, 
the informational reqliirements of the public enterprise planners 
who formulate those rules may substantially increase so that 
that the optimality conditions may be merely useful to indicate 
the direction in which price adjustments should occur. 
2:2:4 CONCLUSION: THE OPTIMAL TARIFF STRUCTURE 
The discussion of optimal pricing principles in this section leads to 
the conclusion that there are two main considerations which should 
be borne in mind in formulating an optimal structure of tariffs for a 
multiprodLct public enterprise. Firstly, it is necessary to determine 
the structure of marginal costs. This will be a.ffected by the technical 
relationship between inputs and outputs, market or "shadow" input 
prices, and the degree of capacity utili zation. Secondly, the optimal 
relationship between prices and marginal costs must be cietermined. 
The structure of optirLal price/marginal cost ratios have been shown 
to depend on the nature and degree of interdependence with markets 
in which prices diverge from· marginal costs, on the demand elasti-
cities of the goods, and on their distributional characteristics. 
In the next section the extent to which these optimal pricing rules 
go towards accomplishing the objectives of a decentralized system 
of control of public entE>rprises will te evaluated. 
2:3 
2:3":1 
EV ALL'ATIOl\ OF F EICING RU L ES 
PUBLIC EhTERPRI.':'.E DECISION TAKING AND THE 
ROLE OF PRICING RULES 
----_._-_. 
Public ·enterprise ciecision taking ta.lces place in a delegated choice 
situation since the public enterprise does not make choices in terrr.s 
of its own interests but is rather obliged to make decisions in the 
"national interest". The rational interest may be explicitly or 
implicitly defined by a minister in terms of an objective function 
which requirt1s the public enterprise to pursue policies 
(i) 
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which are ccnsistent with an efficient allocation of 
resources within the economy and productive efficiency 
wit.hin the public enterprise j 
(ii) which ensure that the public enterprise remains financially 
viable and able to break even without recourse to Treasury 
financing; and 
(iii) which further the aims of government distribution and 
macroeconomic stabilization policy. 
It i.s oJten the case that conflicts exist between these different objectives 
and that the pursuit of any particular objective involves trade-offs in 
terms of performance with respect to other objectives. There are thus 
two requirements for public enterprise decisions to conform to the 
national interest: 
(a) there must be a satisfactory statement of objectives which 
resolves the conflicts between different objectives by 
attaching relative wei"hts to these objectives. If a 
consistent, stable and comprehensive statemer:t of 
objectives cannot be obtained then the minister may seel: 
to resolve the conflict ty sequential attention to the 
ir,terests of various interest groups. This may involve 
ad hoc intervention in the decisions of a public enterprise 
to further the aims of a particularly pressing policy 
objective. However as Rees put it: 
" •••• suct: intervention blurs the lines of 
authority and rE'sponsibility, duplicates 
decision-taking, absorbs scarce re::::.Qurces, 
leads to delay in implementing decisiol'.s, 
ar,d breeds dissatisfaction among public 
enterprise executives who feel their 
discretionary power sharply constrair_ed. ,,27 
27. Rees, R., op.cit., p. 11. 
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As the demands upon public enterprises increase, so to 
does the necessity to grant these enterprises special 
priyileges relative to private enterprises to enable ther.1 
to fulfill thesE demands in the I national interest I; and 
(b) once a statement of objectives has been formula.ted ty a 
pU,blic enterrrise it is necessary to devise a system of 
control to ensure that decisions actually taken are 
consistent with these objective.:. In designing a system 
of control the following two kinds of costs '!Yill have to 
be traded off against each other: 
(i) tl:te. costs of operating the system which include the 
costs of resources absorbed in monitoring decisions, 
collecting and communicating ·information, and 
examining alternatives as well as the delays in the 
implementation of decisions which the control system 
might cause. These costs will be minimized in a 
decentralized control system where the public 
enterprise is given the discretion to take any decisions 
which will lead to the attainment of a · clearly specified 
set of objectives. On the other hand these oper ating 
costs will be . maximized if a centralized system of 
control is adapted where the decision-taker has to 
justify every decision before it is implemented since 
in these circumstances there will be a duplication 
of decision-taking with the decision-taker ac ting 
essentially as preliminary organizer of information; and 
(ii) the costs which occur when decisions do not correspond 
with objectives. These costs will be higher for a 
decentralized then a centralized system since in the 
former case there will be a tendency for the decision-
taker to develop his own preference ordering over the 
outcomes of decisions which differs from that he is 
supposed to adopt. 
To facilitate decentralized decision taki.ng a minister should derive 
ground rules from the objective function which can be generally applied 
by the public enterprise in its day to day management. Examples of 
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such ground rules are marginal cost pricing, target rates of return, 
and the use of a test rate of discount in applying discounted cash flow 
techniques to investment appraisal. The various optimality conditions 
for pricing and investment by a public enterprise v,'hich were discussed 
in sections 2:1 and 2:2 should clearly form the basis for these ground 
rules. There are, however, two major problems which face a public 
enterprise in formulating ground rules from these optimality conditions. 
Firstly :the tlorader the range of objectives which the public -enterpriser 
are required to pursue, the less effective is likely to be their 
performance of any particular objective. This is because the public 
enterprise may be constrained in its pursuit of any single objective 
by a requirement to meet target or minimal levels of performance on 
other objectives. This can be illustrated by reference to the conditions 
for optimal pricing set out in the previous section. Where a public 
enterprise is required to meet a profit target to satisfy the objective 
of financial viability or where it is required to take into account the 
objective of distributional equality, these additioI'-'l.l objectives act 
as further constraints on optimal pricing, with the result that the 
optimal pricing policy is that which attains these objectives with the 
minimal loss of allocative efficiency. The problem is thus that 
although public enterprises have an impact on a wide range of economic 
variables, there are diminishing returns to extending the number of 
policy objectives which use public enterprise pricing policies as 
instruments to secure their attainment. In fact if one accepts the 
Tinbergen28 rule that to achieve any given number of policy objec-
tives requires at least an equal number of instruments, then public 
enterprises should be used as instruments to obtain a strictly limited 
number of objectives. For example, public enterprises may be 
required to employ the most efficient pricing and investment policies 
28. J. Tinbergen, On the Theory of Economic Policy, North-
Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1952. 
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subject to meeting a net cash flow constraint while other instruments 
should be used to attain regional, distributional and macroeconomic 
objectives. In this case however, the other instruments may have to 
offset the distributional effects of "efficient" public enterprise pricing 
policies. 
Secondly, a related problem is that the information required to 
implement an optimal pricing rule tends to increase as the number of 
practical constraints placed on decentralized decision taking by the 
public enterprise increases. In the simplest case where optimality 
conditions are fulfilled by a policy the public enterprise is required 
to know the following information: 
(a) the demand function for the current period (Do) when inputs 
cannot be varied; 
(b) the demand function (D1 ) for the future period in which 
inputs can be varied; 
(c) how input requirements vary with output 
(i) when one input is fixed and 
(ii) when all inputs are variable; and 
(d) the price of variable inputs, the cost of capital and the 
annual rate of plant depreciation. Where> there is a 
systematic pattern of demand fluctuations within a period 
then it is also necessary to know the peak and off-peak 
period demand functions. 
This information is a basic requirement for the application of any 
optimal pricing rule since all such rules require that price should 
be related to marginal cost in such a way as to minimize welfare 
losses. Additional information will be required in each of the following 
cases: 
(i) where there is a departure from marginal cost pricing in 
a market related to the one served by the public enter-
prise then, as indicated in equation 2:15, the public enter-
prise must know how output in the related market varies 
with changes in its output, dq1 
dq2 
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(ii) where the public enterprise purchases inputs at prices 
which differ from their opportunity costs then it must 
know their "shadow prices II ; 
(iii) where a multiproduct public enterprise is required to meet 
a profit target by allocating it over the different outputs 
then it must have information about both the own price 
elasticities of demand and cross elasticities of demand 
of the various outputs; 
(iv) where the public enterprise meets a profit target by 
charging a two-part tariff t.hen it is required to know the 
functional relationship between 
(iv • i), output and the price and fixed charge q1 = f1 (P1' F) 
and 
(iv.ii) the number of consumers and the price and the fixed 
charge, n = f 2 (P1,F); and 
(v) where a multiproduct public enterprise is to take distributional 
considerations into account then it should have ir.formation 
about the marginal social utilities of the consumers consuming 
its different products, and the proportion of each output 
which they consume, as indi cated in equation (2:12). 
It can be seen that while the additional information requirements 
(i) and (ii) result from a realistic adjustment by the public enterprise 
to the environment in which it operate's, the last three requirements 
(iii), (iv) and (v) result from the integration of additional public enter-
prise objectives with the primary pricing policy objective of securing 
allocative efficiency. It is clear that it becomes increasingly difficult 
to apply pricing rules in a process of decentralized decision taking 
where they are required to further additional policy objectives. It 
can be concluded that the cost in terms of foregone efficiency and 
additional information requirements of integrating additional policy 
objectives into public enterprise pricing policies should be compared 
with the increased burden placed on other ir:struments if public 
enterprises ignore these objectives. 
In a perfectly competitive environment where there are no externalities, 
market determined prices provide the information which coordinates the 
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decisions of producers and consumers in a decentralized manner. 
The basic rationale behind the use of pricing rules as instruments for 
the decentralized control of public enterprises is that they should 
constrain these enterprises to make decisions which result in the 
highest level of welfare for the economy as a whole be ing attained. 
In evaluating pricing rules in the next section the fe.llowing factors 
will be considered: 
(ii) 
2:3:2 
The extent to which they substitute for the functions 
normally performed by a competitive market process, and 
The effectiveness with which they internalize into public 
enterprise decisions, factors which would be external 
if it were to act as a private enterprise. 
PUBLIC E?\TERPRI~.E DECISION R ULE!: AS A SUBSTI-
TUTE FOR COMPETITION 
It is a common feature of public enterprises that they operate in an 
environment in which competition has been limited to a greater or 
le sse r extent. Any policy recommendation for a public enterprise 
should therefore suggest rules which substitute for the various 
functions of competition. This approach obviously requires that the re 
should be a clear understanding of the nature of competition. Unfor-
tunate ly economic theory has been historically characterized by 
considerable ambiguity concerning the meaning of competition. 
<vlcNulty29 considers that the failure of distinguish between market 
structure and coclpetition lies at the root of this ambiguity. 
Whether it was seen as price undercutting by sellers, the bidding up 
of prices by ':myers or the entry of new firms into a profitable 
industry, competition was introduced into economics by classical 
29. McNulty, P .J., "Economic Theory and the Meaning of 
Competition", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 82, 
1968. 
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writers as a concept which was intended to have empirical relevance 
and operational meaning in terms of contemporary business behaviour. 
Adam Smith viewed competition as an ordering force which, in the 
long run, drove price to its lowest sustainable level and thereby 
ensured allocative efficiency. Following from the introduction of the 
concept of perfect competition into economics by Cournot, neoclassica.l 
economists focussed on competition as a description of an ideal market 
structure which could lead to a general equilibrium which ' satisfied 
the Pareto optimality conditions. It is paradoxical that in this state 
of perfectly competitive general equilibrium no price-cutting or any 
other form of competitive rivalry between firms would be possible. 
As Littlechild30 has put it: 
"The situation depicted in the perfect 
competition model represents the situation 
when the competitive process has run its 
courset!. 
In evaluating pricing rules as a substitute for competition, corr.petition 
will be viewed as a description of the process of rivalry betvreen 
firms seeking to gain a competitve advantage over each other by, 
say, cutting prices, improving quality, cutting costs or introducing 
new products, techniques or methods of organization, in whicr. no 
firn is able to sustain its advantag'e by preventing other firms from 
imitating it. 
In a dynamically changing economy with imperfect dissemination of 
inforrration, the ircentives and pre~sures generated by a competi-
tive market proc e ss induce private enterprises to meet consumers' 
wants at the lowest possible cost. If they fail to do this then they 
30 . Littlechild, S.J .. "The Fallacy of the Mixed Economy" 
H oloart Paper No. 40. Institute of Economic Affairs, 
London, June 1978, p. 30. 
110 
are unlikely to survive for any length of time. A key role in this 
process is played by the entrepreneur who is characterized as 
being alert to profit opportunities not so far grasped by other market 
participants. By the very act of exploiting these opportunities the 
entrepreneur will bring them to the attention of other market 
participants and they in turn will respond with new alertness so that 
profits which exist due to unnoticed opportunities are competed away. 
In a competitive environment profits and losses therefore serve two 
functions. Firstly, they provide a feedback on performance since 
entrepreneurs who are suc cessful in discovering and meeting the 
wishes of consumers are rewarded by profits; those who are 
unsuccessful are penalized by losses. Secondly, they signal which 
activities ought to be encouraged and which industries expanded in 
order to move the economy in the direction of greater allocative 
efficiency. 
Although optimal pricing rules replicate the conditions for an 
allocatively efficient equilibrium they clearly need to be supplemented 
by mechanisms which provide the incentives and pressures necessary 
to induce the public enterprise to take advantage of the opportunities 
to increase net social benefit which continually arise in a dynamically 
changing environment. 
A competitive market process will also generat e strong pressures 
in private enterprises to c ontain costs by reducing X-inefficiency. 
A firm which tolerates X-inefficiency will find it difficult to survive 
in a competitive environment since it cannot shift the responsibility 
for this inefficiency on to consumers by exercising market power to 
charge higher prices. In a survey of a number of studies dealing 
with the relationship between X-inefficiency and market structure, 
Scherer found that firms generally respond to an increase in 
competitive pressures by making vigorous attempts to reduce costs 
and concluded that "incentives for cost reduction under a pressure 
theory of motivation had more powerful behavioral effects thaI) 
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31 incentives under a reward theory alone." 
The optimal pricing rules of a public enterprise are generally 
formulated on the assumption that costs are minimized and therefore 
take no account of X-inefficiency. Where however, a profit target 
is incorporated into the pricing rule this can place pressure on the 
public enterprise to contain costs provided that sufficient control 
is exercised over prices to ensure that the enterprise does not use 
its market power to raise those above the ir optimal levels t o cover 
up internal inefficiency. The centralized monitoring of prices 
increases can, however, result in the loss of many of the advantages 
of a decentralized system of control. Rees bas suggested i nstead 
"that the pursuit of technological and managerial efficiency should be 
divorced from the question of profitability and should be unde rtaken 
directly, rather than indirectly through pricing policy. ,,32 The 
appropriate instrument would be an "efficiency audit" in terms of which 
an independent outside body would be exclusively concerned with 
producing analyses of the efficiency of public enterprises, choosing 
its own area of investigation, and having full rights to information. 
The gains· in decentralization would come about because this outside 
body would not be involved in the process of formulating decisions, but 
rather in appraising and monitoring the outcomes of decisions and 
procedures. In this way the attempt to stimulate greater managerial 
and technological efficiency cOl,ld be made consistent with greater 
decentralization of pricing and investment decisions. 
31. Scherer, F .M., Industrial market structure and economic 
performance, Rand McNally Publishing College, Chicago, 
2nd ed., 1980, p. 466. 
32. R . Rees, op.cit., p. 111. 
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A competitive environment is likely to create a strong incentive among 
firms to introduce new products and new techniques provided that the 
advantages gained from such innovation are not competed away too 
rapidly. Quite clearly optimal pric ing rules are not directed at the 
innovative ability of the public enterprise so that it is necessary to 
consider whether there will be sufficiently strong pressures and 
incentives, to stiIT'ulate it to introduce the new products and techni-
ques which would have been introduced in a competitive environment. 
Leibenstein33 has suggested that a public enterprise is "likely t ~ be 
consistent with organizational structures under which it is difficult 
to introduce improvements and there is little to prevent such 
organizational structures from surviving for long periods of time". 
There are a number of reasons why this is so: 
(a) there is generally no penalty to the management of a public 
enterprise for not introducing an innovation even when it 
is profitable to do so; 
(b) there is insufficient reward in terms of promotion for 
introd ucing a profitable innovation when profit targets 
are already being met; 
(c) the losses attributable to innovation are conspicuous and 
may create promotion difficulties for the management 
involved; and 
(d) there is frequently a division in the organizational structure 
of the public enterprise between these capable of 
introducing changes as against those interested in doing so. 
It follows that a system of rewards and penalties needs to be imposed 
on a public enterprise which stimulates the management to adopt 
organizational structures which are more responsive to innovation 
opportunities. In the next subsection the question of how the scheme 
of bonuses and promotion may accomplish this purpose will be discussed. 
33. Leibenstein, op.cit., p. 176. 
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In a competitive market process firms choose their role by reference 
to profitability. Their chosen role involves them in a complex 
of actions which benefit consumers of goods and services. If a 
firm decides to cease to provide a good or service others' take its 
place. Furthermore some activities may be undertaken or services 
provided only because they foster customer goodwill and thereby 
improve the firm's standing vis-a 'vis its rivals. The duties or 
obligations of a firm operating in a competitive market do not need 
to be defined because they ar e explicitly defined by the market. A 
public enterprise, on the other hand, is given a function to perform 
and is usually protected fr om competition in order to perform it. 
In the absence of competitive pressures, the imposition of pricing 
rules does not ensure that the public enterprise will perform services 
which a private firm would perform in the interests of fostering 
customer goodwill, so that its social obligations and duties need to be 
explicitly defined. Nove34 has suggested that minimum .service 
obligations may be regarded as "a necessary substitute for competition" 
and that the formulation of optimal pricing and investment rules should 
talce these obligations into account as a practical constraint upon 
policy. 
2:3 :3 INTERNALIZ ATION OF EXTERNALITIES 
The pricing and investment rules for public enterprises can a ls o be 
evaluated according to the extent to whicr. they internalize to the 
public enterprise what would normally be externalities. In formulating 
these rules in the prev ious section, externalities were ignored since 
it was assumed that marginal net social benefit could be measured by 
the difference betwee·n price and marginal cost. There are tw o broad 
approaches to dealing with externalities through the use of the price 
system: 
34. Nove, A., Efficiency Criteria for Nationalised Industries , 
Allen & Unwin, London, 1973, p. 53. 
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(a) a system of state taxes and subsidies can be imposed which 
cause demand prices to reflect marginal social benefits 
and supply prices to reflect marginal social costs; and 
(b) externalities can be incorporated into the objective function 
of a public enterprise so that pricing rules are adjusted 
to take account of them. For eX§l'mple in section 2:2:1 the 
optimal tariff structure of a multiproduct public enterprise 
was adjusted to reflect the distributional characteristics 
of the goods it produces. 
Both these methods of internalizing externalities are optimal in a 
static world where demand, cost and social welfare functions are 
known with perfect certainty. However, in a world of dynamic 
change and uncertainty there are likely to be competing means of 
efficiently internalizing externalities in a decentralized way without 
ad hoc interference by the government in the decisions of the public 
enterprise. 
Granick35 has studied the systems of incentives established to induce 
decentralized decision takers to internalize externalities in ' both ' 
Soviet enterprises and in the subunits of large American firms. 
In Soviet enterprises managers are assumed to maximize their 
discounted future income subject to the constraint of avoiding 
actions that are likely to lead to dismissal. Managerial income is 
largely derived from bonuses which depend on the enterprises 
fulfil ment of a small number of specified plan indicators such as 
output or sales, cost reduction, profit and labour productivity. 
Annual plan indicators are set at levels which are quite ambitious 
35. D. Granick, "The Internalizing of Externalities in Socialist 
Enterprises and in Subunits of Large American Firms" , 
in Shepherd W., op.cit., pp. 77-95. 
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in relation to the potentialities of a high proportion of enterprises 
so that they usually cannot be fulfilled except by violating other plan 
instructors to which bonuses are not specifically attacl:ed. Further-
more managers will often be reluctant to overfulfill a plan indicator 
in one year since this may result in higher plans being set for following 
years. Given that the set of centrally fixed prices relevant to the 
enterprise do not reflect supply and demand conditions, Granick 
concludes that "enterprise managers fail to internalize a surprisingly 
important group .of performance criteria which are internalized in a 
capitalist firm". 36 For example, the product mix produced is often 
not that requested by users ,quality of product tends to be low and the 
introduction of new products is often slow. 
The Russia.n failure to handle externalities through non-parametric 
mechanisms may be contrasted which the apparent success which 
Granick found in a study of the reward system for senior managers in 
a small number of large decentralized companies in the United States. 
Bonuses do not play the same role of discouraging externalities that 
they do in Russia since they are based not so much upon a set of 
well-defined and weighted criteria of performance as upon subjective 
evaluation of the manager t s performance. Furthermore the pattern of 
career development is more important than bonuses in the American 
company reward system. Given that managers tend to rotate rapidly 
among major job functions and among major subunits·.within the company, 
it follows that the executive who maximizes performance of his own 
subunit at the expense of other subunits within the company will be 
jeopardizing his future career advancement since this usually depends 
on his acceptance within these other organizations. Externalities 
will thus be internalized to the subunit managers through the criteria 
for adyancement which are used in the company. 
36. Ibid., p. 83. 
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The results of Granick' s study can be considered relevant to public 
enterprises operating in a market economy in that it indicates the 
need to develop direct incentives in terms of career advancement, 
salary and bonuses for the managers of these enterprises to pursue 
t1-.eir delegated objectives. There are however, a number of factors 
which may limit the transferability of the incentive system operating 
in large decentralized private enterprises to a public enterprise: 
(a) the pattern of career advancement followed by top managers 
in a public enterprise is unlikely to lead therr. into jobs in 
the departments responsible for controlling the enterprise; 
(b) the subjective evaluation of managerial performance is 
complicated by the multiplicity of conflicting objectives 
public enterprises are required to pursue; and 
(c) it is very difficult to reward successful risk-taking 
activity by top managers in the s ubstantia.l fashion that 
is possicle in priV'ately owned companies. 
A particular case of this problem of internalizing externalities will 
be examined with next section, that is, whether public enterprise 
pricing policies can be used aE instruments of regiOllal policy. 
2:3:4 PUBLIC ENTERP RISE PRICING AND INVESTi'v.ENT 
POLICY AS AN IKSTRUi\IENT OF REGIONAL POLICY 
Regional economic policy is directed against those cases of regional 
inequality which constitutes problems and which cannot be corrected 
by the a.utomatic operation of market forces. Stillwell37 has 
identified three types of problem regions: 
(a) underdeveloped regions where there are deficient employment, 
trading and consumption opportunities and a limited provision 
37. F.J.B.Stillwell, Regional Economic Policy, MacMillan 
Studies ir. Economics, MacMillan, London, 1972, pp. 10-25. 
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of infra structural facilities and public services. Oettle 38 
considers that such regions may exhibit any of the following 
characteristics: 
(i) low wages, a narrow spectrum of job choice and 
limited promotion opportunities for workers; 
(ii) limited local or regional marketing and procurement 
opportunities for firms; 
(iii) high price levels and a narrow spectrum of product 
choice for consumers; and 
(iv) unfavourable conditions of use, incomplete availab-
ility and low quantitative and qualitative capacities of 
infrastructure facilities; 
(b) regions which are depressed due to their above-average 
dependence on industrie s which are static or declining in 
demand at the national level or which suffer from some 
endemic disadvantage such as their pe ripheral location as 
regards the major market centres; and 
(c) regions suffering from congestion "Since increases in 
concentration add more to total diseconomies than to 
total ec onomies. 
In S outh Africa the basic strategy of regional polic y !las been and 
remains to encourage private investment in selected industrial devel-
opment points in order to propagate a self-generating process of growth 
at these poles which would stimulate the d evelopment of underdeve-
loped regions and counterbalance the forces of concentration in 
39 
congested areas. There are two broad groups of incentives directed 
38. K. Oettle, "Obligations on transport for underdeveloped 
regions in IV. Blonk, ed., op. c it., pp. 22 .23 • 
• 
39. See , for example, the informati0n new "letter of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Information The 
Promotion of Industrial Development. An e lement of a 
Coordinated Developme nt Strategy for Southern Africa, 
Pre toria, April, 1982. 
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at stimulating private investment at these growth poles: 
(a) cash grants offered to firms during the first years of 
investment to overcome the liquidity problems often 
faced during this period; and 
(b) a system of taxes, subsidies, and infrastructural investment 
designed to offset the long term cost disadvantages 
associated with locating investment at these growth poles 
rather than in areas of high industrial concentration. 
T~ere are a number of ways in public enterprise policy can be used 
to further regional policy objectives: 
the public enterprise can be obliged to provide a minimum 
level of service to underdeve loped regions regardless of 
whether a perpetual loss is incurred on these services. 
If the losses on these unremunerative services are financ ed 
by state subsidy this will clearly have implications for 
allocative efficiency and resource allocation within the 
economy but it will not affect the pricing policy adopted 
by the public enterprise. On the other hand if the public 
enterprise is required to finance the unremunerative 
services from the revenue earned on its other services, 
this will have the effect of raising both the profit constraint 
and tariff structure for these services. To apply the 
optimality rules developed in this chapter, the public 
enterprise will thus have to adjust its tariff structure 
to meet the new profit target with a minimum loss of 
allocative efficiency. A system of control will also have 
to be established to ensure that X-inefficiency is contained 
in the provision of the unremunera.tive services; 
(b) the public enterprise may be required to offer subsidized 
rates to consumers in the underdeveloped regions. As 
explained above the implications of these subsidized rates 
may depend on whether they are internally or externally 
subsidized; and 
(c) the public enterprise may be influenced to locate its new 
investment in the underdeveloped regions. This may 
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necessitate a diversion of resources from areas of high 
industrial concentration where there is rapid growth in 
the demand for public services to underdeveloped regions 
where demand may initially lay behind the increased 
provision of these services. It fQllows that this policy may 
initially worsen excess capacity in underdeveloped regions 
and congestion in concentrated areas. If prices are related 
to marginal costs, then there is likely to be a price differ-
ential in favour of the former region which will act as a 
subsidy offsetting the cost disadvantages of private 
investment in this region. 
The relationship between public enterprise and regional policy could 
only be considered in a general way in this subsection. It is clear 
however, that there are limits to such generalization and in the 
following chapters this relationship will be considered with referenCe. 
to specific public enterprises in Soutt-. Africa. 
3· , . , 
3: 1 : 1 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TRANSPORT 
THE FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION POLICY 
THE STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TRANSPORT 
SECTOR 
This chapter will apply the analytical tools discussed in Chapter 
Two to evaluate the pricing policies of a public transport undertaking 
, 
in general and ,:::'outh African Transport Services (SATS) in particular. 
Before this can be done it is necessary to ' examine the special charac-
teristics of the transportation sector within which a typical public 
transport undertaking would ope rate. 
The products of transportation are the services supplied in moving 
goods or people from one place to another at the time the movement 
is desired. Transportation thus produces place and time utilities. 
The demand for transport therefore arises due to the advantages that 
people see in doing different things in different places, An individual 's 
decision to make a trip i s dependent on the attraction and accessibility 
of-the destination. Klaassen 1 expresses the potential of a destination 
in terms of the perceived benefits and costs of making the trip. The 
be nefits are corrposed of the nu mber and quality of the opportunities 
at location while the costs include the sac rifice-.s of money and time and 
the risk of making the trip. The transport user's perception of cost is 
influenced by his level of income , (since high-income users w ill place 
a relatively higher v2.luation on time and risk) and the extent t o which 
he is able to choose between diffe rent modes of transport for the trip. 
1 • Klaassen, L.H., " Optimum use of transport networks and its 
possible contribution to welfare are maximization," in 
Polak,J.B. and vander Kamp,J.B., ed ., op.cit.,pp. 98-119. 
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This modal choice will not only be d~termined by the relative prices 
of the different modes of tl'an s[)ort but also by such quality dimensions 
as their relative speed, safety and reliability. Each mode of transport 
provides a wide range of heterogeneous services which may be either 
specific to a particular mode, or substitutable for, or complementary 
to, the services provided by other modes. It is clear that ar.y evalu-
ation of the pricing policies of a public transport undertaking must take 
into account these intermodal substitution and complementary relation-
ships within the transportation sector. 
The economic structure of the transportation sector is profoundly 
affected by the distinction between fixed and mobile plant which charac-
terizes the capital equipment used in this sector. Fixed plant or 
infrastructure is extremely costly and long-lasting and has 'little 
alternative use so that capital investE'd in transport infrastructure is 
irretrievable for other purposes. Its operating costs are low relative 
to capital costs and there are usually economies of scale up to a 
certain plant size while there are also big indivisibilities between 
practical levels of capacity. Finally, it is costly to expand infra-
structure in stages since it r.lay stimulate d e velopme nt around it and 
raise land values, and hence the cost of acquiring andlor expropriating 
private property. These charactE,ristics of fixed plant explain why it 
is us ually provided out of public funds or by a public enterprise or 
natural monopoly. In the case of railways, where the owner of track 
facilities is able to become the sole supplier of operating services on 
the track since these services are consumed in direct conjunction with 
the track facilities, a natural monopoly is likely to arise because: 
(a) the initial capital investment is large and thus represents a 
significant barrier to entry; and 
(b) when the plant is fully utilized, double tracking will require 
a large additional investment, which cannot profitably be 
made unless a large increase in traffic is expected. 
If, instead of double tracking a new firm entered the market, an almost 
completE' duplication of facilities would be necessary and the immediately 
available traffic would pre sumably be inadequatE' to allow either firm 
a profit. Competition between two firms could not survive because of 
the continued and unavoidable presence of excess capacity and a 
122 
monopoly would thus e merge. In most countries railways are operated 
as public enterprises since a private firm would have the potential to 
exercise its monopoly power to restrict output and raise prices and 
would be unlikely to provide socially desired services if it was 
unprofitable to do so. 
In contrast to fixed plant, the mobile units of transport equipment are 
relatively cheap and short-lived, highly flexible since their mobility 
enables them to have a multitude of alternative uses, and limited in 
their optimal size since the range of sizes over which economies of 
scale ".re possible is generally not large relative to demand. Further-
more they are likely to have high operating costs relative to fix ed 
costs. 
The effect of these characteristics on market structure can be seen in 
the road transport industry where there is a public provision of road 
infrastructure so that private firms are only involved in the provision 
of operating services. Effective competition between a large number 
of road operators is likely to result from the easy conditions of entry 
into this industry which are caused by: 
(a) the small siz,e of the initial investment required; 
(b) the ease with which mobile equipment can be shifted between 
diffe,rent locations and uses; and 
(c) the fact that investment can increase by small amounts in 
respopse to growth in traffic. 
The effective intramodal competition within the road transport industry 
is likely to induce private road hauliers to seek ways to improve the 
quality and reduce tbe costs of their services since in a competitive 
environment prices cannot be raised above opportunity costs for any 
length of time. However private road hauliers are unlikely to take 
account of externalities, in particular congestion. Congestion occurs 
when a marginal increase in traffic causes a declir..e in the average 
speed of traffic. The costs of congestion include the value of time 
losses and the increase in fuel consumption, wear ar.d tear, labour 
and overhead costs which resu.lt from traffic delays. 
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3:1 :2 INTER~10DAL COMPETITION 
The economic structure of the transport industry is likely to be 
characterized by considerable intermodal competition between public 
and private enterprise. This is exemplified by the competition in 
freight transport services between railways ar.d road hauliers which 
exists in most countries. 
Intermodal competition may improve the efficiency of the transport 
system as a whole if it is unrestricted since it will enable the user 
to choose that mode which offers the most preferred service in terms 
of cost, speed, safety, reliability and traffic utility. There will thus 
be a strong indt:cement for the different modes to improve their compe-
titiveness in terms of the cost and quality of their services. 
The main argument agair st unrestricted intermodal competition is that 
there is considerable inequality in the structural, institutional and 
legal conditions affecting each mode. For example, railway interests 
often argue that railways have to meet their infraEtructural costs 
whereas road hauliers can make use of publicity provided road infra-
structure. It therefcr€ appears that a precondition for deregulating 
inteTmoda.l competition in freight transport services is that a syster.l 
of road user charges should bE' imposed which reflect the social 
opportunity costs of using road infrastructure including the ClOst of 
congestion. A discussion of the practical problems associated with 
road user charging and of the various types of road user charges 
falls beyond the scope of this thesis. It is important to note, though. 
that if road user charges do not reflect opportunity costs then this will 
create a '''second best" problem in formulating the pricing policies for 
a public transport enterprise since there are likely to be complementary 
and substitutionary relationships betweer. its services and those 
provided by private road operators. 
It can thus be concluded that in formulating the pricing and investment 
policies of a public railway undertaking, it is necessary to take 
acc ount of the economic environment in which it "perates and the r,ature 
and extent of intermodal competition in the transport sector. It is 
also necessary to consider the special characteristics of tLe- Railway 
production process. This will be examined in the next section. 
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3:1 :3 THE PRODUCTION PROCESS ON THE RAILWAYS 
~ailways technology consists of the simultaneous operation of three 
distinct processes which are physically connected by the flow of empty 
and loaded railway trucks. The three processes are loading of trucks, 
switc1-.ing of trucks and line-haul operation. 
(a) LOADING F ROCESS 
The loading process generally consists of the assembly of the 
freight, the loading of railway trucks and the forwarding 
of trucks. It is an operation which is carried on at the 
terminal and involves the employment of the following 
input services: labour, fuel, equipment and fixed plant 
including termir al building space. The output is the number 
of loaded railway trucks. 
SWITCHING PROCESS 
Yard switching involves the employment of switch engines 
in picking up, assembling, and sorting ra.ilway trucks into 
trains. In the switching process the followir.g input 
services are err.ployed: le.bour, fuel, equipment and fixed 
plant. The output is the number of transferred railway 
trucks. The productivity of the switching process is 
affected by a number of factors which vary between different 
switching yards:. 
(i) t3e distance between the assembly yard and the loading 
docks and sidings which contain the trucks awaiting 
pickups. As this ciistance increases, the distance 
covered by a switch engine as it transfers a given 
number of trucks also increases; and 
(ii) the degree of circuity in the routing of switch engineo. 
Circuity of routing is necessitated by the sca.tter of 
railway trucks. If there are fifty trucks awititing 
pickup, they may be at fifty different locations, at 
the same location, or distributed in some intermediate 
fashion. Circuity implies a greater expenditure of 
engine time tc pick up a given number of trucks over 
a route of a given length. 
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(c) LINE-HA UL OPERATION 
The line-had process involves the transfer of loaded and 
empty trucks between terminals. Labour, fuel, equipment 
and fixed plant are employed as input services. The outputs 
produced are loaded truck/kilometres loaded, transported 
railway trucks; and empty trucks/kilometres. The output 
of the line-haul process may thus be varied by changing 
either the number of trucks to be hauled or the distance 
over which they are to be transported. It is also necessary 
to take account of the flow of empty trucks which are returned 
from consignees to points where they are to receive new 
consignments of freight. An imbalance in the directional 
flow of trucks may cause er.1pty trucks to accumulate at 
"surplus" terminals which receive a greater number of 
loaded trucks than are sent out. These trucks are then 
transported, without return loads, back to terminals in 
"deficit!1 areas. 
The special nature of the Railway production process must clearly be 
taken into account in evaluating the allocatio,-; of traffic between the 
different modes. This will be discussed in the next section. 
3:1 :4 INTER1II.UDA L COORDINATION 
One 0f the m",in objectives of tn __ nspert policy is to enSure that there 
is an efficient allocation of traffic between the diffE-rent modes. This 
mE-ans that each mode should specialize in the carriage of n.ose 
traffic flows in which it has a comparative cost advantage . In this 
section the factors which should be taken into aCc0unt in any evaluation 
of the ' allocation of traffic betwe€.n modes will be considered. 
The optimal distribution of traffic to different modes of transport 
depends on a large number of variables rela.ting to the cost and 
service characteristics of the modes and the natt:.re of the goods 
being shipped. The main interr:.odal service difference is speed, 
with trucks being faster than trains on any given arc since trains 
often have to collect traffic at intermediate points and may be slowed 
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down by the periodic stops of other tra.ins in the system, whereas 
trucks can carry smaller loads over the entire arc without any 
lengthy stops. Furthermore, besides having faster arc speeds truck 
service will usually be faster by virtue of having fewer transloadings. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3:1. IT goods are to be transported from 
factory A to factory B by rail, then they will first have to be loaded 
on to trucks at factory A and then sent by road to station A where they 
will be offloaded. They must then be loaded on to a train at station A 
and railed to station B where they will be offloaded and then loaded 
onto a truck whicl: will take them by road to their final destination at 
Factory B. If the traffic is carried I ,} trucks, then they will be loaded 
on to the trucks at factory A and carried directly by road to factory B. 
Rail transport in this case, will involve three loading and unloading 
operations compared to the single operation that would occur if the 
goods were transportE·d by road. 
It also can be seen frorr the figu.re that the Railways is likely to 
incur far higher terminal costs than road haulie·rs. At the same 
time rail costs are likely to increase at a slower rate as the 
length of haul increases compared to road transport costs . The 
effect of this is shown in F igure 3:2 where it can be seen that at a 
particular length of haul, OD~' , rail transport will become the 
cheaper mode. Obviously if the length of haul is shorter than OD* 
tben the goods should be carried by road. 
The allocation of freight traffic between the different modes can be 
exan:ined in t<,rms of a "decision tree" prope,sed by AboucharL 
which is shown in Figure 3:3. According to Abouchar the maiL 
factors affecting the allocation of traffic between road and rail 
are the value of the commodity, the length of haul and the density 
of traffic along the route. As can be seen in Figure 3:3 high-value 
and medium-value freight are assig?ed to road, exc€·pt when a rail 
2. Abouchar,A., Transportation Economics and Public P olicy 
with Urban Extensions , Wiley & Son, Toronto, 1977. 
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F IGURE 3 :1 Intermodal Co- or dina tion 
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128 
Rood 
Rail 
0'" ~istance 
~ Comparison of the Cos t - Distance Relationship 
of Rail and Road Transport 
129 
High and mooium value Low value 
Dense Thin Thin Dense 
Shart haul Lonq haul Shart haul Long haul 
«200krrj (>250kmi ... .. «SO kml (>75 kml 
.... Rail 
a, Truck 
FIGURE 3:3 A Decision Tree for the Intermodal Allocation of 
Freight Traffic • 
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connection exists on the arc and the individual commodity flows are 
dense. In shipping high-and-medium-value commodities shippers 
usually choose the mode on the basis of speed. They will thus only 
choose rail if they can reduce their shipping times to times attainable 
by road. This usually requires the shipper to have his own siding 
and to ship to buy.ers with sidings. 
The decision tree also indicates that all commodities which are shipped 
over a long haul should be carried by rail. However, the minimum 
length of the haul over which a commodity should be shipped by rail 
will vary according to the nature of the commodity and the circum-
stances in 'which it is being shipped. For example, the owners may 
own a small fleet of vehicles which are normally unwanted at the end 
of the day and may thus be available for a short haul to the station. 
The cost of doing this may be low especially if the goods can be 
moved direct from lorry to railway wagon. The minimum length of 
haul at which rail becomes less costly will be at a much shorter 
distance than in the case where goods can only be shipped at peak 
periods to the station and when there is a lower probability that they 
can be loaded directly on to the appropriate railway wagon. Thus 
although, the comparative advantage of rail generally increases with 
length of haul it is not possible "to lay down that costs per ton 
forwarded by road or rail" for any given mileage. ,,3 
Figure 3:3 also indicates that 10w-valu9, short-haul dense flows 
should be shipped by road. An example of such a traffic flow would 
be the shipping of building materials which are quarried in or close 
to cities. These would not typically originate at a railhead. There-
fore, if they are to be shipped by rail, at least one truck-rail 
tra.nsfer would be required. In this case, road transport is normally 
cheaper than rail transport. 
3. Ponsonby, G.J., Transport Policy: Coordination through 
Competition, I.E.A., Hobart Paper, No. 49,1969. 
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Another low-value assignment which would normally be shipped by 
xoad would be a traffic flow with such a low density that railroad 
construction along its arc would not be justified in the first place. 
The considerations reflected in this decision tree are usually taken 
into account by Governments in regulating intermodal competition in 
the transport sector. A problem with this approach, however, is 
that it is difficult to prescribe general rules to assist in the rational 
allocation of traffic since the circumstances in which a modal choice 
decision is made will only vary between shippers but also over time. 
In section 3:9 it will be argued that efficient intermodal coordination 
is best achieved when the costs of the different modes are reflected 
in their prices so that the individual shipper be able to choose the 
mode which transports his goods at the lowest cost. Co-ordination 
is thus generally more effectively achieved through competition than 
by regulation although it is admitted that reg'ulation must occur when 
the competitive process breaks down. 
The provision of transport services by the different modes. clearly 
takes place in a spatial context. In the next section the question of 
how the supply of transport both affects and is affected by the spatial 
distribution of economic activities will be considered. 
3:2 THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT ENTERPRISE 
POLICIES ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The reciprocal relationship between space and transport must be 
borne in mind in evaluating the impact of the pricing and investment 
policies of a public transport enterprise on regional development. 
The distribution of economic activities in space should not only be 
viewed as a static determinant of the shape of the transport network 
existing in a country but should also be seen as a dynamically 
changing structure which can be influenced by many factors including 
the availability, cost and quality of transport services. 
The pricing and investment policies of a public transport enterprise 
may affect the availabil~ty, cost and quality of transport services and 
hence the spatial structure in the following ways: 
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(a) A V AILABILITY 
If the priorities for the investment projects to be under-
taken by a public transport er.terpri:oe are determined 
according to net present value criteria which ignore 
regional development objectives, then there may be a 
tendency for investment resources to be diverted from 
regions with declining demand toward growing' regions. 
At the same time the public transport enterprise which 
operates on these "commercial criteria" is likely to 
adopt a policy of closing down unremunerative lines in 
declining regions. The availability of transport services 
to users and shippers in these regions is there fore likely 
to diminish and this will be a factor contributing to their 
decline. The government may influence the availability 
of transport services in these regions by: 
(i) insisting that public transport enterprises incorporate 
regional factors into their investment criteria; and 
(ii) obliging these enterprises to provide a minimum 
level of servic e in these regions as a public duty. 
(b) CCST 
The pricing policies adopted by a public transport e nte rprise 
will have a regional impact on the cost of transport. The 
regional implications of particular pricing policie s will be 
examined in section 3:5. 
The quality of a transport service offered in terms of its 
ability to handle a large volume of goods, speed, ability 
to form networks, regularity, fre que nc y of service, 
safety and ccmfort will vary according to the mode and 
route of transport. The affinity of the users of transport 
services for these different dimensions of quality will vary 
according to the objective properties of the goods to be 
transported and the subjective preferences of the transport 
users. It follows that the wider the modal choice the greater 
the range of users whose quality requirements will be 
satisfied. If a public transport enterprise adopts certain 
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pricing policies it may only be able to remain financially 
viable if it is protected from intermodal competition. 
Modal choice can therefore be expanded. and the overall 
quality of service irrproved if the public enterprise adopts 
pricing policies which do not require the restrictior. of 
intermodal competition. 
For the purposes of this section an improvement in either availability, 
cost or quality is defined as an improvement in transport services. 
In predictin€," the regional i:npact of an improvement in transport it 
is important to cor.sider whether it affects the transport system 
linking two regions or the transport system within a r egion. The 
effect of an interregional transport improvement on the development 
of different regions of a country can be examined with the use of a 
simple model based on the following assumptions: 
(a) The same commodity is produced in the two regions of a 
country, regions 1 and 2; 
(b) In region 1 the cost per unit of output, at the factory is 
C1 while in region 2 the cost is C?; 
(c) The distance between the production centres in each region 
is M; 
(d) The commodity is not pr:ldl;ced at any site between the 
regions ; and 
(e) The transport costs are a constant t money units per 
kilometer in both directions. 
The market area boundaries measured along the direct route between 
the production centres in each region, as illustrated in Figure 3:4 
may be represented by M1 and M2 where 
M1 + M2 = M (3: 1 ) 
T he equilibrium values of M1 and M2 will be the distances from the 
r egion 1 and region 2 production centres at which production costs 
plus transport costs will be equal, given by: 
C 1 + tl\11 = C2 + M2 
Cos Is 
(C+lm) 
0 
1m,' 
- FIGURE 3:4 
C2 
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If (/I,( - Ml) is substituted for M2, then the equation which can be 
derived for Ml is 
Ml = t (M + C2 - Cl ) 
t 
(3:3 ) 
It follows that if production costs are lower in region 1 than ir.. 
region 2 (Cl C2), then the market area Ml will increase when 
transport cost fall. This is shown in Figure 3~<: where the initial 
equilibrium market boundary is at point a where 
C2 + tM2 = Cl + tMl 
If the transport cost per ;,ilometer fa.lls by the same amount in both 
areas from t t o t' then the llew equilibrium market boundary will 
occur at b where C2 + t' ~;2 = cl + t' l'v!l . It can be seen that the 
market area for the product. produced in region 1 expands fr om 
IVi l to hI' 1 while that for r eg·ion 2 contracts from M2 to lVi' 2. 
Generally, if there are tw o producing regions and if one region had 
relatively low manufacturing costs, then improving interregional 
transport would enable the low cost region to expand its market and 
in some cases, this could involve the complete e limination of production 
in the high cost region . This conclusion would lend support to 
Bonnafous'argument that an i mprovement in interregional transport 
between developed regions and underdeveloped regions which are 
" .notin a positiion to bear being put in close communication \vith more 
advanced regions" could actually "aggravate inequalities of development" 
by exposing the underdeveloped region to more intense interregional 
com petition and the draining of its resources. 4 
4. Bonnafous, A ., " Underdeveloped r egions and struc tural 
. . 
as pects of trans port infrastructure", in Blonk, IV ., ed., 
Transport and regional development , Farnborough 
::;axon House , 1979, p. 49 . 
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However, it is unlikely tha.t the C9st differences between two regions 
would be of the same order, or ever, in the same direction, for all 
forms of output so that transport improvements would normally 
encourage specialisation and increase interregional trade flows. 
It follows that in certain underdeveloped regions where there is an 
insufficient transport supply given its activities and prospects then 
an improvement in interregional transport will favour its development 
prospects by providing greater accessibility for its firms to the markets 
for products and inputs in more developed regions. An example of 
this would be a region with considerable tourism potential which has 
not been fully tapped due to poor transport service. 
An improvement in intra~l'Egional transport will usually assist in the 
development of a region by expanding the local marketing, procurement, 
employment and consumption opportunities of firms and households 
located at the designated growth poles of the underdeveloped region. 
The analysis in this section has so far focussed upon the structure 
forming effects of an improvement in transport which results fro~ 
changes in the pricing and investment policies of a public transport 
ente rprise. However, as stated at the start of this section, there 
is a reciprocal relationship between transport and the spatial distri-
bution of activities so that it is also necessary to consider the effects 
of this type of transport improvement where it is necessitated by the 
l ocation of new investment at growth poles in underdeveloped areas by 
private firms, in response to regional policy incentives. If these 
firms are not to suffer from a long-term cost disadv2ntage relative 
to firms located in more developed regions with larger local markets 
and hence lower transport costs. the n an improvement in transport is 
necessary and the government may therefore influence the priCing and 
investment policies of public transport services to improve the 
transport services in underdeveloped regions. Although an improvement 
in transport may not remove the private cost advantage of the region 
with the krger market, they would make it less important in relation 
to total costs and thus reduce the extra cost associated with prod uction 
in the underdeveloped region. 
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It can be concluded that while an improvement in transport may not 
itself C'louse economic development to take place, when government 
action results in new industrial growth in an outlying region, then 
improved transport facilities must be provided and this consideratior. 
should be taken into account in formulating public enterprise pricing 
and investrr,ent policies. 
The considerations discussed in this chapter would have to be taken 
into account by a public transport enterprise formulating its price 
and investment policy in any country. In the rest of this chapter, 
attention will be focussed upon the policies of the public transport 
enterprise in Sout!-. Africa, applying the generaL framework of 
analysis developed so far in this and the previous chapter. 
3:3 ADIV.INIST RATION OF TRANSPORT POLICY IN SOUTH AF RICA 
The administration of transport policy in South Africa is vested at 
government level in the Minister of Transport. His portfolio 
comprises two separate and independent departments of state, namely 
the South African Transport Services (S.A. T. S.), which is 
essentially a state owned public utility transport undertaking, and 
the Department of Transport, whose primary functions are the 
regulation and coordination of various aspects relating to transport 
and the rendering of certain related services. 
Amongst the principal functions of the Department of Transport are 
the provision and maintenance of an efficient system of national roads, 
the control of certain forms of r.1otor transport defined by laws, 
including the regulation of commercial motor carrier road transport; 
motor vehicle insurance in so far as this concerns the protection of 
third parties against losses from motor vehicle accidents; the promo-
tion and coordination of commercial civil aviation and air safety; the 
administration of the South African Merchant Shipping Act and the 
relevant regulations for ensuring marine safety and welfare; the 
provision of meteorological services; arid the.control of .sea and beach 
pollution by oil. The Department of Transport also nw-ns all the 
national ar.d ce::,tain other major airports and provides the attendant 
air control services. 
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S . A . T . S. is a multimodal organisation and opera.tes and provides a 
wide range of transport services on a closely integrated and 
coordinated basis. These services include a network of rail service 
covering the length and treadth of the country; its commercial 
harbours; an extensive road transport 'service; pipelines for the 
conveyance of crude oil, petroleum and related products; and the 
domestic overborder and ' international airline known as South African 
Airways. 
The organisation is entirely state-owned, ownership being v ested in 
the State President while its control and administration is exercised 
by the Minister of Tran:;;port who is assisted and advised by a board 
of three commissioners. The day to day management Df SATS is 
e ntrusted to a director general who i", assisted by two deputy general 
managers and ei/;'ht assistant general managers. On account of the 
siz,e of South African and by reason of the extensive nature of its 
rail sErvice, the network is divided for local control p;~rposes 
into ten separate geographic regions or systel1:s, each under the 
control of a system manager. 
The rail transport policy of South Africa. is, by virtue of the economi-
cally strategic value of transportation, embodied in various Acts cf 
Parliament, and in thiE re&pect Parlia ment plays an important role' 
in d etermining that policy. The Republic of South Africa Constitution 
Act provides. i nter alia, that "the railways, ports and harbours of 
the HepubJic shall be administered on business principles. due regard 
being had to agricultural a.nd industrial development within the Republic 
and the promotion by mean s of cheap transport. of the settlement of 
an "gricultural and industrial population in the inland portions of all 
provinces". In addition, the Act provides that, in so far as revenue 
is concerned. the organization's total earnings shall not be more than 
sufficient to meet the necessary outlays f c, r working, maintenance. 
betterment, depreciation and contributions to its sinking fund. and the 
payment of interest on capital. In other words, while it must opera.te 
on business principles it cannot do so with a profit incentive. 
Uther important provisions of the Constitution Act in regard to the 
transportation policy of oS.A.T.::;. are that no harbour or railway line 
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for the conveyance of pL!blic traffic shall be built without the specific 
approval of Parliament, and furthermore that the estimates of 
expenditure on both capital projects and expenditure froal the revenue 
derived from the operation of the various transport modes and related 
services shall be submitted annually to Parliam.ent Jor ".cruting and 
approval. 
The funds required for capital expenditure are, after appropriation 
by Parliament, iri the main obtained from the South African Treasury 
by means of loans. These l oans are, generally speak ing, not redeemed 
and interest on such loan drawing is paid in perpetuity to the Treasury. 
To the exter.t that available Treasury funds may be insufficient, and 
a.Iso to afford greater flexibility in the financing of the capital deve-
lopment programme, direct access to the capital market is available. 
This access is subject to the approval to the Minister of Transport in 
consultation with the Minister of Finance. The repayment of such 
direct loans, as well as the interest thereon, is guaranteed by the 
Minister of Finance. 
3:4 THE TARIFF POLICY OF S.A.T.S. 
The tariff policy of S. A. T. S . is based upon the following principles: 
(i) S.A.T.S. l'vIUST BE MANAGED AND OPERATED ON 
B USINESS PRINCIPLES 
Since S. A. T. S. is administered as a Government business 
undertaking independent of the Central Government in so 
far as it concerns financial matters, the provision that it 
should be run according to business principles implies 
that it should balance its budget without recourse to the 
State Revenue Fund. Although it is usually not possible 
for S .A . T • S. to balance its budget exactly each year , it 
is accepted that an equilibrium between revenue and 
expenditure must be attained in the long term. To facilitate 
this, annual provision is made for either surpluses to be 
transferred into a Rates Equalisation Fund or for deficits 
to be .financed from this Fund. Table 3: 1 sets out the 
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operating results of S . A. T . S . for the period 1977/8 t o 
1983/ 4. It can be seen that while the organization has 
been able transfer its excess earnings to the Rates 
Equalization Fund throughout this period, the financial 
position appears to have deteriorated and that it is 
estimated that this F und might have to be used to finance 
substantial deficits during 1982/3 and 1983/4 . Although the 
requirement that S. A . T . S . be managed on business principles 
implies that the or ganization as a whole 5hould attain financial 
equilibrium, it d oes not preclude the cross-subsidization of 
losse s incurred on certain services from the excess earnings 
generated by other services . 
TABLE 3:1 OPERATIl'<G RJ:;SULTS OF THE S.A. T RAl'iSPORT 
SERVICES 1977/"(8 TO 1983/84 
Year 
1977/78 
1978/7 9 
1 979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 * 
198 3/84* 
*£stimate 
Surplus/(Deficit) 
R Million 
185,8 
274, 1 
111 ,0 
196,9 
95,0 
(370,2) 
(631,7) 
Source: South African Transport Services, w:emorandum by the 
Minister of Transport Affa irs setting out the es timated 
results of working for the financial year 1982/83 and 
anticipated r evenue and e xpenditure for the year 1983/84 
togethe r with the la.test traffic and other s tati s tics , 
W • P. A - 83 , Pretoria, Governme nt PrintE·r . 
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It will be shown that cross-subsidization takes place 
between the different-modes, services, routes and 
traffic flows served by S.A.T .S. Table 3:2 illustrates 
the cross-subsidization which has taken place between 
the different modes of transport provided by S. A. T . S . 
TJ.BLE 3:2 OPERATING !{ESULT::; OF THE DIFFERENT TRANSPORT 
MODES PROVIDED BY TH~ S.A. TRANSPORT SlCRVICES, 
1 977/78 TO 1983/84 
Mode 
Railways 
Harbours 
Airways 
!-ipelines 
Operating Results: Surplus or (Deficit) 
R million 
1977/78 19"r8/79 1979/80 1980/81 1 9E1/8~ 1982/83 1983/84 
26,5 45,0 (27,9) (1 ,4) (150,2) (654,3) (854,7) 
46,1 61,0 84,4 95,9 139,9 239,5 189,0 
6,1 42,4 (54,2) (39,6) ( 57,9) ( 99,2) (120,0) 
107,1 125,7 106,7 142,0 163,2 143,8 154,0 
All SerVices 185,8 274,1 111 ,0 196,9 95,0 (nO,2) (631 ,7) 
*Estimate, 
.source: 
• 
South African Transport Services 198:;, ' [\'~emorandum 
by the Mini ste r of 'l'ranspor( Affairs setting out the 
estimated results of working for the financial year 
1 982/3 and anticipated revenue and expenditure for 
the year 1983/84 together with the latest traffic and 
other Statistics • IV. P . A - '83, Pretoria, Government 
Printer. 
It can be seen that over the past five years the deficits incurred 
by the Railways a.nd Airlines have been cross-subsidized out 
of the surpluses earned by the Harbours and Pipelines. 
It fact this cross-subsidizaticn is r.ece~sary if S. A. T. S. is 
to be independent of Treasury support and at the same time ful-
fill its socio-economic obligations in terms of the following principle. 
N 
.;-
----
Pipelines 
R 152 m 
--
-----
Uvestoc K 
R12m 
---- ----
Harbours 
R92m 
---- ---- ----
-
Parcels Subsdiary 
R36 m Services 
R40m Cool 
R82m 
S. A.RAILWAYS + HARBOURS NE T RESULT 1981/ S2 
F IGURE 3:5 
---- ---- --- ----
Airways 
R 118m 
Goa:ls 
R 172m 
Pas sengers 
R 311 m 
1/ 
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(ii) THE TARIFF POLICY OF S.A. T. S. HAS TO TAKE INTO 
CONSIDERATION THE ECONOMIC NEEDS AND TRANSPORT 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC 
In applying its tariff policy S. A. T . S. must not only seek to 
protect its financial viability but it must also ensure that its 
tariffs are determined in such a manner that they promote the 
economic development of the country. In certain instances 
this leads S.A. T. S. to set uneconomic tariffs for socio-
economic services. These have been defined as services: 
"for the promotion of the community and its needs; 
for the development of the country; 
for promotion of the community's standard of living; 
that are politically orientated, and 
that provide vital transportation links as cheaply as possible. ,,5 
In other words socio-economic services are provided for the 
benefit of the community at rates which do not cover the costs 
attributable to these services. The passenger services 
provided by S.A. T. S. probably bear the greatest burden of 
uneconomic social services. As a result an annual loss is 
usually incurred .~ the passenger division which is partly 
subsidized out of State Revenue and partly cross-subsidized 
out of the earnings of other services. Figure 3:5 shows that 
in 1981/82 a loss of R311 million was incurred on passenger 
services after taking into account the state subsidy of R287 
million received in respect of these services. Although 
Figure 3:5 indicates that a loss was incurred by freight 
traffic, this was probably the result of the particularly poor 
performance in 1981/2 and it appears that in previous years 
surpluses on freight traffic were used, together with those 
5. S.A . Railways and Harbours Board Report, R.P. 79/80, 
Pretoria, Government Printer, p. 25. 
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earned by the Harbours and Pipelines, to cross-subsidize 
6 the passenger losses. The provision of uneconomic 
social servic es therefore tends to make cross-subsidization 
between services necessary. 
(iii) THE "COLLECTIVE PRINCIPLE" 
According t o the "collective principle" the same rate per 
tonne/kilometre or passenger must be charged on traffic of 
the same class over the same distance and under the same 
conditions and circumstances notwithstanding the fact that 
different rates may be justifiable on similar traffic over 
different sections of lines due to say, differences in the 
density of traffic, empty running of trucks , standard of 
track, gradients and curves. This leads to cross-subsidi-
zation between the different routes served by the railway 
network. It is difficult to quantify the extent of this cross-
subsidization since S.A. T.S. does not disclose costs and 
revenues by routes but it is clear that the failure by S. A. T • S . 
to reflect route cost differentials in its tariffs does cause 
such regional cross-subsidization to exist. 
(iv) TARIFF DIFFERENTIATION 
Tariff diffe r entiation is an accepted commercial principle 
underlying the tariff policy of S. A. T . S. By differentiating 
its tariffs, S. A . T . S. seeks to improve the utilization of its 
6. S . A. T • S. does not disclose in its annual reports the surpluses 
or d e ficits incurred by the separate divisions but independent 
studies t end to indicate t hat freight services were, as a whole, 
profitable in recent years. 
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facilities and at the same time generate revenue to cover 
total costs and the losses incurred by uneconomic social 
services. The Transport Services Act of 1981 restricted 
the application of tariff differentiation by prescribing discrim-
ination in tariffs between persons using the same service 
under like conditions but allowed preferential rates to be 
granted subject to certain conditions to achieve certain goals. 
Rate differentiation has been applied by S. A. T • S. according tc the 
yalue of service principle or "charging what the traffic can bear". 
This prirciple has been interpreted in the following way: 
" •••• the Railway Administration has been careful to avoid charging a 
higher rate on low grade traffic than such traffic could affc rd to pay. 
In other words, this principle has been a reductive factor-not a factor 
for increasing ta.riffs. The principle can thus be morE' accurately 
described as 'not charging more than the traffic will beaT' which is 
really a beneyolent means of 'tempering the wind to the s,horn 12.mbs '. ,,7 
The Schumann Committee . fOUI'.d that this principle was complementary 
to the principle that rates should. be set according to the cost of service 
since the maximum rate which may be levied on a particular conmodity 
should be based on "what the traffic cal'. bear" while the minimum rate 
should at least cover the costs directly attributable tc the particular 
service . Railway traffic mainly consists of freight and passengers. 
It is now necess>Lry to consider how these tariff making principles 
are applied to freight and passengers respectively. 
3:4:1 
(a) 
7. 
FREIGHT TRAFFIC 
TRAFFIC VC;LUME AND COMPOSITION 
The dominant importance of freight traffic in the activities 
of S. A . T • S. is indicated in Table 3:3 which sets out the 
R. S. A. , Report of the Committee en Railway Rating Policy 
and Location in Soutt Africa · , Johannesburg, April 1964. 
In the text this will be referred as the Schumann Report • 
,[p, 13 L.t; 3:3 I<AILI\AY::> l~t;VJ';NUE 1977/78'[0 1981/82 
19',"1/ 78 1978/'19 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 
Transportation Services Rm ci /v Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % 
Passengers 181,3 9 ,4 195 , 5 8 , 9 334 ,1 13,3 437 ,5 14,5 530 , 6 14 , 7 
.t'"'arcels 47, 8 2,5 49,2 2,2 49,2 2 ,0 63 , 1 2,2 79 ,0 2 , 2 
Mail>, 9, 0 0 ,5 10,1 0 ,5 10 , 2 0 , 4 13 ,1 0 , 4 17 , 1 0 ,5 
Goods 1379 ,0 71 ,7 1576,1 71 ,8 16'/3 , 9 66 , 4 1939,8 64,3 2299 , 3 63,7 
Coal 199 , 1 10 ,3 241,3 1 ,0 295 , 1 11 ,7 361 , 1 12,1 450 , 6 12 , 5 
Livestock 12,0 0 ,6 11 ,6 0 , 5 12,6 0 , 5 13,0 . 0 ,4 14,3 0 , 4 
Hents & Storage 21,3 1 , 1 22,2 1,0 24 ,7 1 , 0 28 ,2 0 ,9 34 ,8 1 ,0 
I\"li~ cellaneOllS 75 , 1 3 , 9 88 , 0 4,0 1188,8 4 , 7 156 ,7 123 , 6 3 , 4 
.p. 
5 ,2 
'" 
TOTAL 1924 , 6 100 ,0 2194 ,0 100,0 2519 , 3 100 ,0 3017,5 100 ,0 3612,2 100 ,0 
:Source: Anr,uaj l<eports ::> . A , I{a ij" ay ar·d Harbours 1977/78 to 1979/80. S .A.T .S . 1980/81 to 1981/82 
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contributions to revenue by the various services provided 
by the Railway division of S. A . T . S. during the period 
1977/78 to 1981/82. 
It can be seen from Table 3:3 that the contribution of goods 
traffic to total revenue ranlfed from 71 ,8 per cent in 1978/79 
to 63,7 per cent in 1981/82. Although it may appear that the 
contribution of goods traffic has declir ed significantly since 
1978/79 this can largely be attributed to the fact that substantial 
increases in State compensation to passenger services have 
been included in total revenue and that if one excludes these 
amounts then the contribution of freight traffic during this 
period can actually be represented by the percent&ges shown 
in Table 3:4 
TABLE 3:4 CONTRIBUTION OF FREIGHT TRAFFIC TO REVENUt; 
COLLECTt;D FROM TARIFFS: 1977/78 TO 1981/82 
Year 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
73,3 
73,7 
71 ,3 
69,9 
69,2 
Goods, Livestock 
and Coal '1-' 
84 ,5 
85,5 
84,4 
83,6 
83,1 
The average contribution of goods traffic during this period 
has thus been 71 ,5 per cent while that of goods, coal and 
livestock has been 84,2 per cent. This relatively dominating 
positron of goods traffic is of particular significance in the 
financial structure of S. A . T • S . 
The total volume of freight conveyed by rail has exhibited a 
fairly rapid rate of growth. The Schumann Commi ttee " 
reported that bet" een 1 91 0 and 1 963 the tonnage of freight 
trans ported by the Railways had grown at an average annual 
TABLE 3:5 S.A.T.S . GOODS T RAFFIC 1977L78 TO 1981/82 
1977/78 1978/79 19'79/80 1980/81 1981/82 
Ton % Ton 01 
'" 
Ton % frOn % 'l'on % 
Millions Millions Millions Milli ons J.1illion s 
Live Stock O ,~ 0 , 3 0 ,4 0 ,2 0 ,4 0,2 0 ,4 0 , 2 0 , 3 0 , 2 
Live Animals & Animal Products 0 , 6 0 , 4 0 , 6 0 ,4 0,6 0,3 0 , 5 0,5 0 ,4 0 , 2 
Vegetable Products 1oS , 5 11 ,9 19 , 5 11 , 9 17 , '1 9,7 18 , 2 9 , 9 19 , 1 10 . 1 
Animals & Vegetable Fats & Oils 0 , 0 ,1 0 , 1 0 , 1 0 ,1 0 , 1 0 , 1 0 , 1 0 , 1 0 ,1 
Timber and Paper lJ r oducts 7 , 2 4 , 6 '7 , 1 4 , 4 ~ '} ! , I 4,2 8 ,0 4 , 3 7 ,3 3,9 
Total Agriculture 26 , 9 17,3 27 ,7 1'! , 0 {~6 , :; '14 ,5 27 , 2 14 , 7 27 , 2 14 , 5 
Mineral Products 56 , 7 36, 5 57 ,6 35 ,3 66 , } 36 , 4 61 , 6 33 , 4 62 ,0 32 . 9 
Base Metals 9 ,0 5 ,8 10 ,5 6 , 1+ 12 , <' 6 ,7 11 , 7 6 , 3 11 , 2 6 , 0 
Coal traffic: revenue earning 39, 5 25 , Lf 43 ,5 26 ,7 52 , '7 20 ,8 57 , 4 31 , 1 60 ,8 32 , 3 
co 1 , 4 0 , 8 v Locomotive coal 2 , 2 2 ,0 1 , 2 1 , 7 1 ,0 1 ,7 0 , 9 1 ,5 
Total Mining 107 , 4 69 , 1 113 ,6 69 , 7 133 , 3 '12 ,7 132 , 4 '71 , 7 135 ,5 72 ,0 
Prepared . tcoodstuffs : 
Chemical _ P':t>oducts . 
Articles of store, cement a nd as bestas 0 , 6 0 , 4 0 , 6 0 , 1~ 0 , '/ 0 , 1. 0 , 9 0 , 5 0 , 8 0 , 4 
Cerami c products, glass & glassware 
Machinery & mechanical appliances, 0 , 6 0,4 0 , 4 0,2 0 , 1+ 0 , 2 0 , 5 0 , 3 0 , 5 0 ,3 
electrical equipment & Components 
Vehicles, aircraft and spares, 0 ,5 0 , 3 0 , 5 0 , 3 o , ~ 0 ,3 0 ,5 0 ,3 0 ,5 0 ,3 
transport equipment 
Textile and footwear 0 , 8 0 , 5 0 , 8 0 , 5 0 ,8 0 ,4 0 ,3 0 , 4 0 ,8 0 , 4 
Container traffic 0 , 3 0 , 2 1 , 4 0 , 9 '] , l) 1 ,0 ? , 2 1 , 2 2 , 5 1 , 3 
S.A.T.S. ::itores 6 , 0 3,9 6 , 4 3 , 9 (, , '! 3 , 6 6 , '1 3 , 6 6 ,7 3 , 6 
Miscellaneous ° r, >-/ 0 , 3 0 ,5 0 , 3 o ,G 0 , 3 0 , 7 0 , 4 0 ,5 0 ,3 
Grand T otal 155 , 3 100 ,0 -163 , 0 100 ,0 1(;3,) 100,0 184 , 5 100 ,0 188 , 2 100,0 
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rate of increase of 4,2 per cent from 10 million tonnes to 
93,5 million tonnes. During the period 1971/2 to 1980/1 
the total freight conveyed by rail increased at average 
annual rate of 6 per cer.t. Figure 3:6 indicates this upward 
trend in freight tonnage. 
The average lengtt of haul of goods traffic has exhibited an 
upward trend in the long term. During the period 1911 to 
1928 the average length of haul increased relatively rapidly 
from 286 kilometres to 403 kilometrEcs. Thereafter there was 
no upward or downward tendency for about twenty years, but 
after 1948 the average length of haul again increased reaching 
456 kilometres in 1962. The Schumann Committee · attributed 
this upward trend to the following factors: 
"(i) private road transport and the introduction and expansion 
of exempted and cartage areas, as a result of which the 
Railways has been deprived of a large quantity of short 
-distance traffic; 
(ii) electrification of lines near coal fields, which has resulted 
in falling away of short distance coal traffic; 
(iii) the mining of export minerals in the interior and consequent 
long distance transport thereof to ports; 
(iv) the. increase in the export of agricultural prodt:cts, especia.lly 
maize, resulting in more long-distance traffic to the ports ,,8 
Since 1962-63 the average length of haul has continued to increase 
reachir:g 552 kilometres in 1981/82. Although all four of the 
factors mentioned by the Scl:umann Committee have probably 
continued to underly this upward trer.d, the most important has 
probably been (i) since tnt!'lrmo.dal competition for short-distance 
traffic has become more intense. It is interesting to note that 
since the expansion of the exempted areas in which roadhauliers 
8 • Ibid., p. 37. 
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can freely compete with S. A. '1' • S. in 1977, the average 
length of haul has increased from 535 kilometres to 
552 kilometres. Although the long term upward trend in 
the average le·ngth of haul has probably resulted in an 
increase in revenue per ton, it has also probably had a 
detrimental effect un the financial performance of the 
Railways since the cost of cunveyance per tor: usually 
rises at a greater rate with increasing distance than 
revenue per ton. 
It can be seer. from Table 3:5 that the bulk of goods traffic 
consists· of goods produced in the primary industries of 
agricultClre and mi~ing. During the period 1977/78 to 
1981/82 the share of t o tal tonnage contributed by agricul-
ture a"d mining averaged 86,6 per cent. The importance 
of mining appears to have grown relative to agriculture 
during this period with the share of agricultural goods 
falling from 17,3 to 14,5 per cent and the share of minin g 
goods rising from 69,1 to 72,0 per cent. This can be 
attributed to the development of the Richards Bay Line 
and the increase in coal export traffic by 128 per cent 
from 13,4 million tons in 1977/78 to 30,6 million tons in 
1981 /82 . S ince 1911 the following trends in traffic 
composition can be discerned: 
(i) the importance of the agricultural sector grew with 
the "cpplication of more modern fa.rming techniques, 
with its contribution to total tonnage rising frofT'. 
15,4 per cent in 1911 to 25,9 per cent in 1962-63 
but appears to have declined in recent years as 
indicated by the fall in its contribution to 14,3 
per cent in 1981/82; 
(ii) the transport of mineral products grew from 1 t 
per cent in 1911 to 16 per cent in 1962-63 to 
32,9 per cent in 1981/82 due to t he rapid growth 
in the mining and export of base minerals; 
(iii) the transport of coal declined in importance from 
59,2 per cent in 1911 to 33,4 per c(,nt in 1962-63 
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wUle in 1981 -82, local shipments of coal contributed 
only 16,8 per cent of the total tonnage conveyed by 
the Railways. This downward trend can be attributed 
to the increasing utilization of alternative sources 
of fuel in the domestic economy of which the electri-
fication of railway lines is but an example. The 
substantial increases in export shipments of coal 
has to some extent contributed to a reversal of this 
downward trend; and 
(iv) the cGntribution of merchandise to rail traffic has 
not increased over the last seventy years despite the rapid 
expansion of do",estic trade and industrial production. 
This is probably due to the concentration of indus-
trial activity in areas where road transport plays 
an important role. 
The physical tonnage of goods offered for shipment mainly 
affects the operating requirements of the Railways while the 
financial implications of traffic volume and composition can 
only be ascertained Riter the structure of rates for freight 
traffic have been considered. 
(b) TARIFF POLICY WITH RESPECT TO FREIGHT T1<AFFIC 
In the case of freight traffic, the application of a policy of 
rate differentiation involves three steps: 
(i) the specification of a schedule of tariff scales 
setting out the relationship between the rates 
charged or. fifteen different tariff classes; 
(ii) the classification of commodities into the tariff 
scale; and 
(iii) the determination of special rates to take account 
of the special circumstances of particular commo-
dities which cannot be classified into the tariff 
scale or of particular groups of users who require 
special treatment in tE,rms of national development 
policy. 
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The basic structure of rates is embodied in the tariff scale 
which comprises fifteen tariff classes consisting of two 
groups; that is tariffs 1 to 10 for high-ra.ted traffic, and 
tariffs 11 to 15 for low rated traffic. The relationship 
between these tariff classes is shown by means of the index 
in Table 3:6. When compiling the basic tariff scales, consi-
derations regarding particular commodities or regions have 
no bearing at all because such factors are taken into account 
during the classification of commodities or the determination 
of special rates. The basic tariff scales, therefore, are 
not designed to suit a particular commodity, but to serve as 
a basic framework for the tE.riff structure. The railway s 
generally accept the view that the interrelationship between 
tariff scales must be maintained when rate adaptations are 
necessary, so that the basic structure will not in H.e course 
of time become distorted. 
TABLE 3:6 INDEX OF TARII'F SCALES AT 225 KM IN 1980-81 
TARIFF 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
INDEX 
100 
86 
64 
57 
50 
43 
32 
32 
25 
21 
14 
14 
11 
11 
11 
9. 
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TablE 3:6 indicates that, while the gaps between tariffs are 
not very large, there is an appreciable difference between 
the highest and lowest tariffs. It has long been c ontended 
that the degree of rate differentiation embodied in the 
tariff structure is excessive in magnitude. In 1960, 
Verburgh 9 noted that" ... the wide margin between rates 
in the highest and rates in the lowest class of the South 
African railway tariff scales is clearly illustrated .... 
where a comparison is made with a number of European 
countries. In South Africa, a number of the lowest 
railway rates, such as the rates on lime and sand, are 
only one tenth of the highest rates, like those on furniture 
and several other high-rated manufactured articles. By 
contrast the lowest rates on the railways of ... European 
countries ... are about one third of the highest rates". 
The Schumann Report also drew attention to the fact that 
rate differentiation by the South African Railways was 
excessive and recommended that the rates on high tariff 
classes should be lowered while the rates on l ow tariff 
classes should be raised. If the rate differentiation applied 
by the railways is conside red excessive, this implies that an 
element of cross-subsidiz ation has become entrenched in the 
tariff structure in the sense that the rates charged on. high-
rated goods are kept artificially high to generate a surplus 
necessary t o subsidize the uneconomic rates on low-rated 
goods which fail to cover their direct costs. S .A. T. S. 
appears to have accepted the contention that its rate discrimi-
nation is excessive since it has adopted a policy of increasing 
the rates on low-rated goods by a greater percentage than on 
Verburgh, C., South African Transportation Po licy , 
Bureau for Economic Research, University of Stellenbosch, 
1960, p. 59. 
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high-rated goods on every occasion when there is a general 
upward adjustment of rates. This 'is reflected in Table 3:7 
which compares the maximum rate increases for high-rated 
and low-rated goods, for each year in which there was an 
upward adjustment of rates during the period 1970-1980. 
TABLE 3:7 COMPARISON OF RATE INCREASES FOR HIGH -
AND LOW - RATED GOODS: 1970 - 1980 
HIGH - RATED LOW - RATED 
1970 - 1 
1971 - 2 
1972 - 3 16, 8% 2 6, 1?5 
197 3 - 4 
1974 - 5 5 , 3% 21 , 2;~ 
1975 - 6 
1976 - 7 17 , 2% 19 , 8% 
1977 - 8 
1978 - 9 11 , 4% 12~~ 
1979 - 80 
Source: Annual Reports, '::> .A. Railways and Harbours, 1979- 80. 
The tariff scales are also characterized by a tapering of 
rates since the average charge per kilometre be comes 
less as distanc e incre ases. The degree of tape r is not 
based solely and exclusively on the taper in unit cost 
but also to a c onsiderable extent on the principle of 
"what the traffic can bear". There is thus a greater 
degree of tape r in r e spect of the lower tariffs as c ompared 
with the higher tariffs, as well as in respect of longe r 
distances compared with shorter distance. 
The actual freight rate which is levied on a particular 
commodity is finally determined by the tariff class in 
which it is classified . The factors which are considered 
156 
important by the railways in framing the goods classification 
can be grouped into those demand factors which determine 
the highest class in which a particular commodity should be 
classified and into cost factors which determine the lowest 
class into which it should be classified: 
(i) DEMAND FACTOR.S 
There are a number of criteria of the ability of a particular 
article to bear a certain rate, but accordir.g to the Schumann 
neport the !?ailways generally considers the following two 
to be the most important: 
(a) V ALU£ 
The value cf a commodity in relation to its weight 
clearly affects its capacity to bear a particular 
railway rate. This is because the transport cost 
per unit of weight as a percentage of value becomes 
less as value increases. For example, the trans-
port cost of clothirg, even at a high rate, is 
insignificant in relation to the value of the clothing, 
whereas the cost of a long distance haul of coal 
even at a low rate may as much as the selling price 
at the colliery. It follows that commodities with a 
high value can usually bear a higher rate than those 
with a low value . 
(b) ::,IMILARITY 
In practic e , comfJlOdities which arE-.. similar in 
nature, and with respect to their use and relation-
ship with other commodities, are usually grouped 
in a common tariff class. This is considered to be 
fair by the Railways and obviates the problem of 
having to deal with continuous representations by 
consignors who feel they are being unfairly discri-
minated against since their commodity is classified 
in a different tariff class to a closely related 
article. 
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(ii) COST FACTORS 
There are a number of factors which affect the direct costs 
which must be covered by the rate charged in the particular 
tariff class into whiCh a commodity is classified. The 
following factors are usually considered important by the 
Railways in determining the lowest class intG which a 
commodity should be cla.ssified: 
(a) RISK 
Where an article is liable to break or become 
damaged or lost easily, there w ill be additional 
expenses involved in its transport such as packing 
and insurance which should be taken into account 
by the Railways in detenmining its minimum tariff 
class. 
(b) LOADABILITY 
The actual weight of a commodity which can be loaded 
into a truck will be affected by factors such as its 
weight in relation to its size, its ease of handling 
and its shape. If an article is so voluminous or 
awkwardly shaped that, say, less thar: 2 tonnes of 
it occupies all the space of a 10 tonne railway truck 
then it will clearly have a higher transport cost 
per unit than an article which utilizes the space as 
well as the weight ca.pa.city of the truck. It follows 
that the !)lore loadable commodity should be classified 
on a higher tariff scale than the less loadable 
commodity. 
(c) HANDLING 
In determining the correct tariff class for a commodity, 
account should be taken of the extent of the physical 
handling of the corrmodity by the railways since this 
will clearly increase the cost involved in its despatch. 
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(d) TRAFFIC VOLUME 
The transport cost of a particular commodity will 
clearly be affected by the volume, frequency and 
regularity of its despatch and these factors 
should be taken into account by the Railways in 
classifying the commodity. 
Ap,art from the compilation of different tariff scales and 
the grouping of all commodities into different tariff classes 
there are also special rating arrangements which differ 
from the usual pattern and which have arisen in special 
circumstances. The rates charged in these special 
instances appear to be based on cost reflecting the gradual 
trend in railway tariff policy from value of service to cost 
principles. 
The granting of cost based export rates is an accepted 
policy of S ,A, T ,S , Although the Railways has generally 
charged lower tariffs on exported .commodities since the time 
of the Union, the application of the cost principle has been 
followed since 1971 when the Reynders Commission 
recommended that this principle should be the dominant 
factor in determining rail tariffs f e r ex ports. Based on 
this principle, it is generally possible to bring about a 
significant reduction in rates for high-valued commodities 
railed for export. However, it has also resulted in the 
increase of certain uneconomic rates for low-valued 
commodities. S, A. T, S, will only grant a cost based 
export rate to shippers if they can prove the normal rail 
rate from the point of dispatch to the nearest port is the 
f,wtor militating against the successful marketing of the 
product at a competitive price abroad, 
S ,A. T ,:::;, has introduced contract rates on a cost basis in 
instances where the traffic to be conveyed is offered in 
such quantities that special traffic arrangements have to be 
introduced to use optimally the mobile plant. The reduction 
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in cost which is attained through these special traffic 
arrangeffient~ is then passed on to the shipper by a rates 
reduction which could not have been made if the traffic 
were conveyed under normal conditions of carriage. 
Since it departs from these normal conditions of carriage 
S . A . T . S. has to enter into a contract with the shipper 
whereby the shipper can only be charged at contract rates 
if he offers for conveyance a tonnage greater then a speci-
fied minimum tonnage per annum. 
::'.A. T.S. has also i ntroduced block-load rating arrangements 
to pass on to shippers the cost-savings it incurs when 
traffic is conveyed in block-train loads comprising 39 
vacuum-braked or 50 air-braked bogie trucks from one 
point to another without S. A . T . S. being involved in the 
marshalling of the train. 
With the introduction of large scale containerization on 
1 July 1977 S. A. T. S. deemed it necessary to provide for 
unit container rates based on the size of the container 
irrespective of its contents or mass since only the size of 
the container would affect the cost of conveyance . Although 
these rates were initially only applied to traffic shipped 
between City Deep and Durban they have since been extended 
to other major harbours of South Africa. 
There also exists a system of rebates in respect of outgoing 
traffic from irdustrial development points which is designed 
to compensate for the longer term disadvantages in terms 
of transport costs which are associated with locating at 
these points. In recent proposals for a regional devel-
opment strategy it was proposed that: 
liThe existing system of rail rebates in 
respect of outgoing traffic will be retained 
and expanded in the case of industrial 
development points. All existing industries 
in identified industrial development points 
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will be eligible for these rebates . ,,10 
It should be noted, though, that these rebates are paid by 
the State to shippers so that the Railways is not required 
to depart from commercial principles by being obliged to 
apply these rebates in its own tariffs. 
(c) THE FINANCIAL PERFOl~MANCE OF RAILWAY FREIGHT 
SERVICES 
The practical result of the application of a differential 
rating system is that the contributions which high and 
low-rated traffic respectively make to total freight 
revenue will not be in the same proportion as the 
contribution which they make to total freight tonnage. 
This is indicated in Figure 3:7 where it can be seen that 
high-rated traffic makes a far greater contribution to 
revenue than to traffic volume. The reason for -this is that 
agricultural and mining products which make up the bulk of 
railway freight traffic are classified at low tariffs so that 
they do not make the same impact on the revenue generated 
by the railways. 
Figure 3:7 also shows that the share of high-rated traffic 
has declined significantly during the last ten years both in 
terms of traffic I'evenue and volume. This can be attributed 
to the increasing intensity of intermodal competition which 
mainly affects high-rated traffic since the Railways tends to 
10. Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, The 
Promotion of Industrial Development: An Element of a 
Coordinated Regional Development Strategy for Southern 
Africa S.A. Digest, Apri121982. 
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have a comparative advantage in the long distance bulk 
transport of the products which are classified at low tariffs. 
The declining market share of rail transport in the face of 
competition from own and road transport for freight is 
reflected in Figure 3:8. It can be s een that during the ten 
years between 1971/72 and 1980/81 the share of rail transport 
fell from 61 per cent to 51 per cent and that it is expected to 
fall to 40 per cent in 1987/88. This deciine may be intensi-
fied if the proces s of deregulation continues. 
In the annual reports of ::;. A . T . S. no distinction is made 
among the costs related to the various classes of goods 
traffic. It is thus not possible to obtain from the information 
published by S. A. T. S . any indication of profitability by 
tariff class. In an independe nt study Ke,medy11 used the 
internal costing information of the Railways to calculate 
the profitability of each tariff class. He found that in 
1981 /82 surpluses on high-rated commodities, container 
traffic, and traffic carried at contract and block-load rates 
cross-subsidized the losses incurred on low-rated commodi-
ties, ore and livestock, so that only a small overall "urplus 
was earned by the freight division of S. A . T . S. It is also 
interesting to note that Kennedy, found that for commodity 
classes 1 to 10, a large deficit was actually incurred for 
commodity class number 1 which was offset by the surpluses 
earned by other high rated traffic. It can thus be seen that 
11 • Kennedy, T • L. , S. A . T . S.: Profitability by Tariff Class , 
unpublishe d memorandum, National Institute of Transport 
and Road Research, C . S. I. R., Pretoria, 1982. The actual 
affiounts of th e deficits and surpluses for each tariff class 
calc ulated by Kennedy are confidential. 
FIGURE 3:8 
163 
c 161%) 
1971/72 
1~/81 
A 141%) 
C 140%) 
1987/881 Proja:;ted) 
A: Own Transport 
B. Private road lransport and S.A 15. road and pipsine transport 
C : Rail Transport 
Market Share of Rail Transport, 
1972/73 to 1981/82 
(a) 
164 
the differential rating system applied by the t<ailways 
actually results in a significant amount of cross-
sllbsidization between commodities . 
PASSEl\GER TRAFFIC 
TRENDS IN TRAFFIC VOLD. iE AND COMPOSITION 
Passec.ger traffic consists mainly of passengers. parcels 
and mail , the former being of predominant importance. 
Table 3:8 indicates the percentage of the total revenue of 
the railway portion of the undertaking which was generated 
from these sources during the period 1977/78 to 1981/82. 
TABLE 3:8 F'£~CENTAGE OF TOTAL t<AILIVAY REVENUE 
CONTRIBUTED BY PASSENGER Tt<AFFIC 
Year 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
Source: 
(1 ) (2) 
Percentage Percentage 
10,1 12 , 3 
9 , 1 11 ,6 
8,8 15 ,6 
9,0 17,0 
9,4 17,3 
.::i.A.T.:::3. Annual Report 
Column (1) i n Table 3:8 represents the percentage contri-
bution of passeng'er traffic revenue before taking into 
account the c ompensation rec eived by S. A • T . S. from 
the State for operating- uneconomic social passenger 
services while column (2) represents the percentage 
contribution after this amount has been included i.n 
passenger traffic revenue. The Schumann 9ommi,ttee 12 , 
12. Republic of South Africa, op.cit., p. 43. 
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reported that in. 1962-63 the percentage contribution of 
passenger traffic to total revenue was about 14 per cent 
compared to more than 25 per cent at the time of the Union 
and the peak figure of 31 per cent in 1919-20. Although 
column (2) of Table 3:8 might indicate that this declining 
trend in the contribution of passer.ger revenue has been 
reversed in recent years, a comparison between column 
(1) and column (2) shows that this can be mainly attributed 
to increases in the compensation received from the State 
and that the actual tariff revenue received from passeng-ers, 
parcels and mail ha5 actually averaged 9,3 per cent of 
total revenue during the period 1977/78 to 1981/82. 
The long term declining trE-nd in the relative importance 
of passenger traffic is fundamentally dl.e to the g-rowing 
intensity of competition from otter modes of transport. 
Nevertheless the total number of passenger journeys has 
increased from 28,2 million in 1910 to 339,7 million in 
1962-63 and 753 million in 1981/82. 
At the time of Union, first and second class traffic accounted 
for approximately tw G thirds of the total number of passenger 
journeys. Since then the scene has changed considerably 
with third class traffic constituting 83 per cent of total 
passenger traffic in 1981/82. This change can be ascribed 
to the increasing urbanization of Blacks which has led them 
to rely ir.creasingly on rail transport whereas Whites have 
tended to rely more and ll'ore on road transport. 
Passenger traffic is categorized into t.wo main types for 
ta..-iff makil1g purposes: suburban traffic and main-line or 
long-distance traffic. Suburban passenger traffic has shown 
a rising trend with the total number of journeys increasir.g 
from just under 42 million in 1918-1919 to 318 million in 
1962-63 and 707 millior in 1981-82. The Schumann 
Committee reported that w.hile all classes of suburban 
traffic increased during the years prior to the Second World 
War, White suburban traffic remained virtually static in 
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volum\! in the first twenty years after the war in spite of 
population growth and low passell€"er fares. This static 
condition of White suburban traffic appears to have persisted 
during the last twenty years with about 110 million. 
journeys being undertaken in 1 962-63 and 123 million in 
1981/82. This trend can be almost entirely attributed to 
the increased utilization of motor transport. The relatively 
rapid increase in suburban third class traffic resulted in an 
increase of its contribution to the total number of suburban 
journeys from just under 30 per cent in 1918-19 to 66 per cent 
in 1962-3 to 78 per cent in 1981-1982. The growth in black 
suburban traffic can be attributed to the rapid rate of growth 
in the lirban black population and their location in townships 
outside the large urban areas which has compelled them to 
rely predominantly on train services in travelling to and 
from work. 
The share of total passenger traffic constituted by main line 
traffic has shown a long tlerm declining trend falling from 
18,7 per cent in 1918-1 9 to 6,0 pe:.' cent in 1 981 -82. After 
reaching' a peak of 17,2 million in 1945 the number of first 
and s,econd class main-liuE' journeys has actually decreased 
to 3,2 million in 1981 -82. On the other hand, there has been 
an upward trend in the number of third class main-line 
journeys with about 3,7 million journeys being undertaken 
in 1918-1 9, 17 million in 1948-49 and 42,3 million in 
1981-82. 
(t) 'IJ:lE STRUCTURE OF l'ASSENGEI~ FARES 
A different structure of fares is set for main-line and sub-
urban traffic. There are three different journeys in respect 
of nain-line journeys, the fares being in inverse proportion 
to the number of passengers per compartment. As first, 
second and third class compartments provide accommodation 
for four, six ane: eight passengers respectively, the second 
class faTe is equal to 4/6 or :/3 of the first class and third 
class 4/8 or 1/2 of first class. There is al~, o a lower scale 
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applicable to journeys by Blacks on special trains betwee n 
Black residential areas and, e specially, the mining areas. 
In 1981/82 only RO, 4 million was generated from the fares 
charged on those special trains. The same rate schedule 
is charged for single and return journeys, although it is 
based on a tapering scale so that for long distances t i1e 
return fc,re is considerably less than double the single fare. 
The revenue generated from the fares c harged t o main-line 
passer.gers is significantly r educed by the fact that railway 
staff, government officials, public officers and others are 
entitled to free or privileged ticke ts. 
Suburbar, fares are set at rates which are significantly 
lower than those charged fer main-line traffic. This 
arises from the density of suburban traffic and the use 
of special cheaper types of passen€,'er coaches which 
provide more accomodation pe r coacp. than thOSE: used 
for main-line traffic. The difference between s ingle and 
return fares is however, far less accentuated for suburban 
passenger" !f..an for main-line passengers. Only two 
classes of accomodation are now provided for suburban 
traffic. The standard rate differential between these tw o 
clasf;es is less than that which exists for main-line 
passengers. However, a substantial part of third class 
traffic consists of black passen"ers being transported on 
the lines constructeu bE.tween resettlement schemes and 
the main urban areas. The authorities have take n the view 
that these black passeng'ers could not afford to pay rail 
fares at a ratE: wbch would produce sufficient revenue to 
enable the Railways to operate these passenger services 
on r emunerative basis. Consequently v ery l ow fares are 
charged ar..d the State undertakes to compensate S. A . T . S. 
for cperating these unremun nrative servicns. The amount 
of compensation r eceived by S. A . T . S . has risen drama-
tice.lly by 571 per cent from R42, 8 million in 1977/78 to 
R287,3 million in 1981/82. In addition, S.A.T.S. offers 
reduced rates on monthly seas or. tickets for the ber.efit of 
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passengers of both clas'ii€s who use the services on a 
regular basis. 
The ct.arges for parcels and excess luggage conveyed by 
passenger train are based on the prirciple of degressive 
rates, that is, the freight charge per kilogram decreases 
as the mass of the article increases. As may be expected 
the rates a,re considerably greate.r than is the case of 
traffic carried by goods train, especially where small 
parcels are concerned. 
(c) FINANCIAL l'£RFOI<lV1ANC..,', GF THE PASSENGE1< SECTWN 
Table 3:9 indicates tte amount ar.d composition of the 
revenue generated by passenger traffic curing the period 
1977/78 to 1981/82 . 
, 
TA1:lLE3,:9 REVENUE GENERATED BY FA::;SENGER TR.AFFIC ____ _ w 
1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/ 81 198 1/82 
~\!a in Lir:e Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % Rm % 
J:'irst Class 4 , 7 2 ,6 4 ,6 2 , 4 6 , c 1 , 8 7 , 5 1 , 7 9 , 6 1 , 8 
;::,econd CIE.SS 14 , 5 8,0 14, 6 7 , 5 17 , 3 5 , 2 20 ,6 4 , 7 25 , 1 4 , 7 
Third Class 61,5 33 , 9 60 , 3 30 , 8 69,6 20,8 84 , ~ 19 ,3 106,2 20 , 0 
::,pecial Trains 1) , 2 O,e01 0 , 1 0 , 0 O ~ 3 e ,o 0 , 2 0 , 0 
'1 lJT ,\ L '0 , 9 44 , 6 79,5 40,7 92 , 9 2 '( ,8 112 ,8 2;,8 141,3 26 , 6 
.::,uburban 
FirsL Class 19 , 4 ,10,7 19 , 4 9,9 23 , 2 6 , 9 28 , 1 6 , 4 6 , 2 33 , 1 
111ird CIE.ss 33 , 2 21 ,1 41 , 6 21 ,3 46 , 2 13,8 53 , 6 12 , 3 68 , 9 '3,0 
Compensation 
for socio-
economic 42 ,6 23,6 55 , 4 28 , 3 171 , 9 5 1 ,4 242 , (' 55 , 5 287 ,3 54 , 1 
TUIAL 100 , 4 55 , 1., 116, 4 59 , 2 241 , 3 72 , 2 324 , ( 74 , 2 389,3 73 , 4 
Cl<AND TUTAL 181,3 100 , 0 195,9 100 , 0 334 , 2 100 , 0 437 , 5 1UO , 0 530 , 6 100 , 0 
::'ource: ::'.A.T.::'. J\nEual Hepe-rts 1977/78 to 1981 /82 
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It can be seen from Table 3:9 that the share of total 
passenger traffic revenue contributed by suburban traffic 
has increased sie;nificantly from 55,4 per cent in 1977/78 
to 73,4 per cent in 1981/82. This can be mainly attributed 
to the substantial increases in State compensation for socio-
economic services during this period. If the amount of this 
compensation is deducted from total passenger revenue, the 
percentage contribution of main-line and suburban traffic 
can be calculated as the percentages shown in Table 3 :10 
TABLE 3 :10 PERCENTAGE CONTRIB UTION OF MAIN-LINE AND 
SUBURBAN REVENUE FR OM FARES 
1977/ 78 1978/ 7 9 1979/ 80 1980/ 8 1 1981/82 
Main-Line % 58 ,4 56, 5 69 , 4 58 , 0 58 , 0 
Suburban % 41,6 43, 5 30 ,6 42,0 42 , 0 
Total % 100 , 0 100 , 0 100 , 0 100 , 0 
'Source: S.A.T.S. Annual Report 1977/78 to 1981/82 
It can be se e n that in 1981 / 8 2 , although main-line traffic 
constituted but 5,8 per cent of the number of journeys 
it contributed 58 per cent of the revenue generated from 
passenger fares. This can be attributed to both the greater 
distances covered by main-line journeys and to the higher 
level of mair.-line fares relative to suburban fares. 
The contribution to revenue made by third class traffic 
appears to have grown significantly over the years. The 
Schumann Committe.e reported that in 1918-19 this traffic 
contributed 28 per cent to total revenue from passenger 
train traffic. By 1962-63 this contribution has risen to 
almost 50 per cent while in 1981-82 third class main-line 
and suburban traffic contributed about 72 per cent of the 
revenue g'enerated from pass e nger fare. If one considers 
that ~tate compensation was mainly received in respect of 
third class traffic then the total contribution to total 
170 
passen~er traffic revenue from this traffic amounted to 
87,3 per cent. Conversely, it can be seen that the percen-
tage contribution of first and second class traffic has declined 
considerably, with these classes of traffic only contributions 
12,7 per cent of total passenger revenue i n 1981-82. 
S.A. T .S. does not publish inforcation concerning the 
allocation of expenditure to its different services so that 
it is not possible to obtain from its annual reports any 
indication of the loss incurred by its passenger services. 
The Schumann Committee " reported that in 1962-63 a total 
loss of R44, 3 million was incurred by passenger services. 
This amount appears to haye grown substantially in the 
last twenty years. The Fran zsen Committee ,1 ~eported 
that in 1977/78 a tota,l loss of R320 million was incurred and 
estimated that losses of R368 and R407 million would he 
incurred in 1978/79 and 1979/80. Heydenrych 14 has indicated 
that in 1981/82 the total loss of rail passenger services had 
grown to R598 million. The total loss on passenger services 
has thus grown by 1250 per cent in the last twenty years and 
by 87 per cent in the last five years. This loss is partly 
financed by State compensation and partly cross- s'ubsidized 
out of the revenue derived from other services . The portion 
of the loss which has been subsidized out of St2.te funds 
appears to have grown substantially in recent years 0 In 
1 977-78 State compensation amounted to R42, 8 million 
which was 13,3 per cent of the total loss of R320 million. 
In 1981-82 til(; State contributed R287 'million wr,ich was 
48 per cent of the total loss. The burden of cross-subsi-
dization passenger services places on other sen-ices has 
13. RepUblic of South Africa, Re['ort of the Committee of 
Enquiry into Socio-Economic Rail Fassenger Services , 
Pretoria, May 1 979. 
14 . Heydenrych,J.A. and Kennedy,T.L., Economic Efficier.cy 
of Rail ,Transport, Papel" deliyered at the Annual Transport 
Convention, Johannesburg, July 1983. 
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therefore not increased substantially rising from R277 
million in 1977-78 t o R311 million in 1981-82, an increase 
of only about 12 per cent in 5 years. 
The Schumann Commi.ttee r eported that i n 1962-63 losses 
on passenger traffic were incurred by first and second 
class main-line and all classes of suburban traffic, with 
third class main-line traffic apparently breaking even . It 
is likely that third class main-line traffic has remaked 
the least unremunerative class of passenger traffic since 
the share of main-line passe nge r revenue generated by 
this traffic has risen from 43 per cent in 1962-63 to 75 per 
cent in 1981-82. The bulk of the passenger services loss 
is therefore still likely to arise from the first and second 
class main-line and suburban traffic. 
3 :5 EVALUATION OF S.A.T .S. TARIFF POLICY 
In this section the tariff policy of S. A . T . S. for both freight and 
passenger traffic will be evaluated in terms of both its effect on 
economic effic iency and the spatial distribution of economic activity. 
3:5 :1 FREIGHT 'TARIFF POLICY 
3:5:1 :1 THE SYSTEM OF RATE DIFFERENTIA TION 
The Schumann Committee levelled the criticism against the tariff 
structure for freight traffic that the range of rate differentiation was 
excessive. To examine the validity of this criticism, it is necessary 
to compare the existing tariff structure of S. A . T . S. with that which 
would result if tariffs were based on the optimal pricing principles 
discussed in the previous chapte r. According to these principles 
the rates charged for different commodities should vary according to 
the marginal cost of transporting them. As will be explained in a 
following section, a marginal cost based tariff structure can be 
approximated if the rates for different commodities are set so that they 
at least cover the costs which could be avoided if the Railways refused 
172 
to ship a particular commodity . If rates are based on this principle, 
then there will be some differentiation of rates since the avoidable 
cost of shipping different commodities will vary according to factors 
such as risk, load ability, handling and traffic volume. As was mentioned 
in the previous section, these factors are taken into account by the 
Railways in classifying commodities into the tariff scale so that to 
some extend the present tariff structure r e flects "cost of service" 
principles. However, the extent of rate differentiation which would 
be reflected in a "cost-orientated" tariff strucutre would probably be 
much smaller than that which characterizes the existing tariff structure 
of the Railways. For example, Verburgh1 5 pointed out that the ratio 
of the highest to lowest charge in a tariff structure where commodity 
rates are differentiated primarily according to loa.dability was 3 to 1 
while the current ratio for the Railways is about 9 to 1. Furthermore 
the tapering of rates also appears to be applied to a greater degree 
than is necessary to reflect the decline in cost per unit with distance. 
, 
To some extent, further rate differentiation beyond that which would 
characterize a cost-based tariff structure is justifiable, where tariffs 
based on marginal cost do not generate sufficient revenue to cover the 
total costs of the railway undertaking. In section 2:2:1 of the pre vious 
chapter it was shown that price discrimination will be optimal under a 
binding financial constraint where the deviation of price from rna::: ginal 
cost is in inverse proportion to the elasticity of demand. The principle 
is to some exte nt, follow ed by the Railways since it takes the volume 
per unit of weight of 'a good into a ccount in determining the highest 
tariff into which it should be classified. The elasticity of d emand with 
r espect to changes in railway rates of a commodity with a high value 
pe r unit of weight such as clothing is likely to be low since its t rz.nsport 
cost per unit of weight is low and a change in railway n .tes will have 
little impact on the price at which clothing is sold. The Railways is 
thus justified in classifying this commodity into a high tariff scale. 
'15. Verburgh, . op.cil.,p. 59 
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It is also justified in classifying in a lower tariff scale a commodity 
such as coal which has a high elasticity of demand with respect to 
changes in railway rates due to its low value per unit of weight. 
The application of the value of service principle by the Railways 
becomes untenable however, for those classes of traffic for which 
the Railways is subjected to intermodal competition. For these 
commodities the limit on the rates which the Railways can charge 
is set by the cost and quality of the alternative transportation mode. 
The Railways does not appear to take this factor into account since 
the tariffs charged for high-rated commodities appear . to be 
uncompetitive in relation to the cost and quality of the transportation 
services provided by road hauliers. The effect of this can be seen 
in the serious declir,e in the share of high-rat.,d traffic carried 
by the Railways as shown in Figure 3:0.7 .• The extent of rate differen-
tiation applied by the Railways is therefore probably excessive and 
there is a clear need to narrow the gap between the tariffs charged 
for high-and-Iow-rated commodities. Although the Railways appears 
to have recognized this problem and has made some progress towards 
narrowing the gap by raising the tariffs on low-·rated commodities by 
a greater percentage than those on high-rated commodities every time 
the tariff structure is adjusted upwards, this had led to a particularly 
slow process of adjustment. The problem of resource misallocation 
resulting from excessive price discrimination has thus persiste d for 
a considerable period of time so that the distorted railway rates 
structure has been incorporated into long term investment and location 
decisions. 
As was explained in the previous section, the necessity for this 
excessive rate diffe rential arises frorr. the fact that the tariff 
revenue derived from conveying high-rated commodities is used to 
cross-subsidize the losses incurred on low-rated traffic and 
passenger services. In fact the Franzsen Committee estimated 
that in 1977/78 "the general tariff level on goods services is about 
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18 per cent higher because of cross-subsidization". 16 If the Railways 
accepted the principle that the tariffs set for eac.h service should at 
least generate sufficient revenue to cover its avoidable cost and that 
if this does not occur, the quantitative and qualitative level of the 
service should be reduced, unless State compensation is received 
then the burden of cross-subsidization on its other services would be 
eased. It would then be possible to reduce the tariffs on high -rated 
ccmmodities to levels which would make rail services more competi-
tive with those provided by road operators. Furthermore it is als0 
likely that this policy would result in an upward adjustment of the 
tariffs charged on low-rated commodities. To the exte nt that these 
tariffs have been artificia lly low, the y have probably enccuraged the 
excessive growth of this traffic and consequently caused an excessive 
investment in rail capacity to meet the requiren ,ents of this traffic. 
An upward adjustment of tariffs on low-rated commodities might thus 
result in some savings on the Railways investme nt programme . It 
would bE' unlikely that this tariff adjustment would meet with significant 
market resistance since the Railways has a comparative advantage in 
the bulk transport of the agricultural and mineral products which are 
classified into low tariff scales . 
It can be concluded that the system of rate differentiation applied by 
the Railways is excessive but that the cause of this distortion is 
probably rooted in the conflicting demands on Railway tariff policy 
which underly the pattern of cros s-subsidization. These conflicting 
d e mand s will be examined i n more d0tail in a section 3:6 . It is 
now necessary to consider in more detail the failure of the Railways 
to reflect route cost differentials in its rates . 
16. Re public of ::;outh Africa Report of the COIrmittee of 
Enquir~.T into Socio-.I:;conomic !Zail 1:'8:ssenger S e rvic e s , 
Government Printer, Pretoria, May 1979. 
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3:5:-1 :2 THE PROBLEM OF UNREMUNERATIVE ROUTES 
According to the "collective principle" applied by the Railways the 
same rate per tone per kilometre is charged for a particular class 
of traffic regardless of the route on wtich it is carried. This 
ignores tl"_e fact that costs may vary considerably between different 
routes. As Verburgh has noted: 
"In flat country the cost of constrllctior: 
and the cost of exploitation is much lower 
than in mountainous country, while on 
routes with dense traffic and a high degree 
of utilization the unit costs are lower than 
on routes where a low degree of utilization 
is a normal long-run phenomenon. ,,17 
The effect of applying the "collective principle" is that the traffic 
on certain routes wili fail'to cover the costs directly attributable 
to the routes since either 
they handle a disprcportionately high percentage of low-
rated traffic and/or 
t.he high unit costs associated with these routes are not 
-
reflected in the rates charged for the traffic carried along 
them. 
It fellows that the traffic on these routes is effectively being cross-
subsidized by traffic on more remunerative routes. If an average 
cost pricing policy is adopted this will mean that the rates on 
unremunerative routes should be raised to reflect the higher costs 
incurred on these routes. Such a policy may, however, be suboptimal 
since where there is excess capacity on a line the opportunity cost of 
ind ucing extra traffic to use, the line may be limited to the running 
costs of providing the rail service since capital costs will have 
already been sunk into the line and will be unaffected by any increase 
in its utilization. 
17. Verburgh,C., op.cit., p. 73. 
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Hotelling1'8 has argued that in this situation of .,xcess capacity, the 
government vlill be able to secure an improvement in welfare by 
requiring the Railway to set its rates equal to the short run marginal 
cost incurred on the line and financing the resulting deficit through a 
state subsidy. However, as Vias shown in the last chapter, the short 
run marginal cost pricing rule should be accompanied by an investment 
policy directed at adjusting ca.pacity tc t.he optimal level vlhere the 
price which restricts demand to capacity output generates sufficient 
revenue to cover total custs. Subsidization would thus be a temporary 
measure directed 2,t Enabling the public undertaking to pursue an 
efficient pricing policy while it takes steps to streamline its operations 
and reducE' surplus capacity on unremune rative lines. A railway under-
taking such as S. A . T .::; ., howevtr, is oftEn faced with the problem 
of indivisible facilitie s so that it may not able to simply reduce the 
capacity of its investment in-railway track and structures , switching 
equipment and station buildings on its unremunerative routes to optimal 
levels but must instead choose tetween closing down the route or 
continuing to operate it at a loss. Such a choice should be based on a 
cost-benefit analysis based on a consideration of all the quantifiable 
and unquantifiablE social costs and ber.efits including the effect on 
regional development of the alternative decisions. It can be concluded, 
though, that regardless of indivisibilities, the pursuit of an efficient 
pricing and investrr.E'nt pc-licy by the Railways can only ta}:e place if 
it has the discretion to c lose down unremunerative r outes where there 
is a net social benefit to be gained cy doing so. It follows tLat the 
applicatic'n of the "collective principle" by the Railways tog-ether with 
its public obligation t :> connect all parts of the country with each other 
by an integrated railway system will r es ult in a cross-subsidization 
18' . Hotelling, H . , "The General Welfare in Relation to Problems 
of Taxation and of Railway and of Utility Rates" in .Readings 
in Welfare Economics, AEA Series, Vol., XII, Allen & 
Unwin, London. 
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of unrHnunerative routes which will not only result in the retention 
of a large amount of surplus capacity on unprofitable routes but 
also the restricted development of railway capacity on more profi-
table lines. 
A further problem with this cross-subsidization of unremunerative 
routes is that the responsibility for inefficiency on these routes may 
be shifted from its source so that the pressure to contain X-inefficiency 
within the organization may be less tha n where each route is r e quired 
t o cover its direct costs. 
19 l\ove has however, argued that p:lblic €.nterprises should be required 
to meet public obligatiiOns since they are not subject to the constraint 
often imposed by the competitive process on private enterprises 
w hereby they are required to pursue activities which may appear 
unprofitable in them~elves in order to foster consumer goodwill. This 
argument largely applies to circumstances where the Hailways is in 
the position of a natural monopoly. It may be the case that routes which 
are unremunerative for the l<ailways can be served by road transport at 
the same or slightly higher tariffs but at a cost which is only a fraction 
of rail transport. In such cases it is clear that the Hailways should be 
relieved of its public obligation to provide rail services on these routes. 
3:5 :1 :3 THiC BFFECT OF FK8IGHT TARIFF POLICY ON 
IN!) U ::'Tl<IA L DBCENT HA LI:::iATION 
It is now necessary to consider the effect of the L<ailway' s tariff 
policy upon industrial decentralizati on in :::iouth Africa . It is 
generally accepted that an adequate railway sy sterr. exist" in this 
country in the sense that most produc e rs have reasonable access 
to a railhead. The l;d.ttern of regional development is thus in 
19. . Nove , A., Sfficiency Criteria for Nationalised Industrie!- , 
Allen & Unwin, London, 1973 . 
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most cases not affected by the availability of rail services but may, 
in some cases, be affected by the structure of railway rates. 
Although it has been argued that the high rates charged on manufac-
tured goods and the low rates charged on raw materials may have 
contributed to industrial concentration in the four main urban areas 
of South Africa since transport costs would have been minimized by 
location near the market rather than near the raw material source, 
it is now generally conceded that railway rates structure was not a 
basic factor in this regard. As the Schumann Committee commented: 
" the existing location pattern of 
sec ondary ind ustries has grown out of 
the initial development of the harbour-
towns and the mining of gold in the 
W't t d ,,20 1 wa ersran area.... .. 
In a study of the effect of railway rates upon industrial location in 
South Africa, the Schumann Committee reached the conclusion that 
" in the case of less than 5% of the number of all industrial under-
takings in the Republic of South Africa, railway" rates play an 
important role in respect of the place of location, that in the case 
of an even smaller percentage of the instances these rates playa 
deciding role, and that it is confined to the classes of industry producing 
the following goods: non-metallic mineral products, wood products, 
chemical products and the basic metal industries, and to a lesser extent 
, 21 
also to foodstuffs and metal products. " The Railway I s rating policy 
will thus be an importance influe:tce on location decisions of manufac-
turers of raw materiale which satisfy the inter-industry demand. 
However, even within this group of industries there will be industries 
where the value of the raw materials and manufactured products is very 
high in relation to transport charges so that they can be located alnost 
anywhere. These have been termed "footloose" industries. 
20. R.S.A., op.cit., p. 152. 
21 • Ibid., p. 80. 
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Examples of industries whose location may be affected by the Railway's 
policy of rate discrimination would be the wood-processing and ferro-
alloy industries. With respect to both these industries the Schumann 
Committee found evidence that the wide gap between the tariff charged 
on manufactured goods and the tariff charged on raw materials has 
tended to discourage location near the raw ma.terial source. Thus the 
fact that the rate on manufactured timber products such as flooring 
blocks and paper is considerably higher than the rate on unproceEsed 
timber may have been a factor in preventing large scale wood processing 
at the forest. Similarly the low rates charged on ores and limestone ' 
and the high rates on manufactured ferro-alloy products has been a 
factor in disc ouraging the decentralization of this industry to its 
raw matE!rial source. Any chang'e in Railway tariff policy which results 
in a narrowing of the range of rate discrimination may thus, in certain 
cases, be corr.patible with tr_e objective of industrial decentralization. 
The effect on industrial decentralization of the hig-h degree of taper 
which characterises the l-<ailway rate structure depends on the 
particular circumstances of the industries affected. On the one hand 
a high degree of taper tray expose a manufacturer in an underdeveloped 
region to competition from manufacturers in large industrial areas. 
Since the latter can generally take advantage of large scale economies 
it will be difficult for local manufacturers to compete with them and in 
this case the high degree of taper may actually discourage decentrali-
zation. On the other hand a high degree of ta.per may promote decentra-
lization by expanding the marketing and procurement opportunities of 
firms establisbed within the area since they can sell their products and 
procure their raw materials at competitive prices on markets at 
greater distances from their location than in' the case where there is a 
lower degree of t"per. 
As was shown in section 3:2 it appears that in g-eneral, a : reduction' 
in the cost of transport will benefit both local firms established within the 
underdeveloped regior .. and firms located in industrial areas who sell 
their products and c·btain their raw materials in the region. The net 
effect of the reduction in the cost of transport on industrial decentral-
ization is thus difficult to determine although it can generally be said 
that it will encourage greater r€'g-ional specialization and foster the 
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development of those industries in which the region has a comparative 
advantage. 
Despite the fact that the Schumann Committee considered that the 
Hailway tariff policy of allowing a larger differential to exist between 
high and low-rated commodities and permitting' a high degree of tapering 
of rates with distance could, in certain cases, discourage decentral-
ization, it tended to ignore the fact that this l'ating policy also supports 
the con.tinued operation of loss-making lines by allowing cross-
subsidization to take place.. If the Railways were to change to a more 
competitive. rating policy it would have to take reute cost differentials 
into account and if it could not obtain a state subsidy to continue the 
operation of unremur.erat ive lines, it would bave to close them down. 
Thi" cO'lld affect tt.e availability of transport services if. remote areas 
and might thus discourage industrial decentraliza.tion to these areas. 
It follows that although the general p r inciplEs underlying the current 
rating policy of the Railways do not always favour industrial c.ecentra-
lization, they do enable the R.ailways to fulfil its "common carrier" 
obligation to provide rail services wherever they are needed and may 
thus work IT.ore in the interests of regiona.l policy than any other 
pricing principles which can only be implerr.ented if tte ~ailways 
were freed of these obligations. 
It seems to be a principle of the current inc:ustrial decentralization 
policy of the ~outh African Government that an underdeveloped region 
cannot be d eveloped t,) its full potential unless firms are encouraged 
to locate it this region by being offered special concessions which 
counteract the long term cost disadvantages of locating there. One 
such concession is the rail rebate on all outgoir.g traffic which is 
only granted to manufacturers located at the specified industrial 
development points. This rail rebate thus only benefits industries 
located or seeking to locate in underdeveloped regions and reduces 
their comparative cost disadvantage relative to industries located 
in developed areas. It seems that tt.e objectives of industrial 
decentralization policy can bE' better served by a system of special 
rail rebates than by an adoption of the general principles underlying 
1<ailway rating policy. 
3:5:2 
(a) 
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PASSENGER TRAFFIC 
MAIN LIf'E TRAFFIC 
While third class passenger services have remained fairly 
viable, first and second class services have been charac-
terized by escalating losses, a falling number of journeys 
and a decreasing share of total passenger revenue. These 
problems have largely been caused by the increased compe-
tition which first and second class rail passenger services 
have faced from motor and air transport. A situation of 
excess capacity has therefore arisen fe·r these services 
which would probably be exacerbated if the Railways 
adopted the average cost pricing approach of simply raising 
fares to cover unit costs since this would probably cause 
a further loss of market share to other modes of transport. 
According to the optimal j:ricing and investment rules 
discussed in the last chapter the Railways should actually 
raticnalize its operations by cutting back both the quanti-
tative and qualitative level of fin;t and second class passenger 
services and it might also encourage G. greater utilization 
of the capacity of these services by offering discount rates 
particularly in off-peak, out-of season periods. This 
could be regarded as a t6~porary measure until the capacity 
of the passenger system has been reduced to a more economic 
level. 
In thi<; respect, the existing structure of passenger fares in 
terms of which second class are set at 2/3 and third class 
at 1/2 of first class fares may be regarded as a bit inflexible. 
It is based on the average cost pricing principle that if the 
cost of running a third class passenger coach is the same as 
that of a first class coach then the charge per passenger on 
the third class coact. shoulc. be half that charged to first 
class passengers since the former coach co.n accomodate 
twice as many passengers as the latter. However, if fares 
are to reflect marginal cost principles then rates should vary 
(b) 
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according to the utilization of a particular service since 
rates should. be increased to ration the number of passengers 
to the capacity of a. fully utilized service and lowered to 
encourage the greater utilization of an underutilized service. 
In the latter case rates should not be allowed to fall below 
the unit operating cost incurred for this service. 
The Railway practice of issuing free or privileged tickets to 
employees and public officials should be discontinued since 
it conflicts with commercial principles and probably contri-
bdes to the loss incurred by the passenger service. 
SUBURBAN TRAFFIC 
It is apparent that the fares for all classes of suburban 
passenger services are set below the rates which would be 
charged under a pricir g policy based on marginal cost 
prir,ciple,s. The Franzsen Committee 22 f ound that in 
1977/78 an increase in fares of an average of 162 per 
cent was r,eeded to cover avoidable costs. In the following 
five years, tr.e costs of suburban passenger services 
continued to increase more rapidly than the revenue th ey 
produced so that the IE,vel of passenger fares continued 
to fall even further bele·w avoidable cost. There are, 
however, a number of valid reasuns why suburban 
passenger servicE's should be underpriced: 
(i) The Group Areas Act compels Blacks to live i n 
townships outside white urban and industrial 
areas. As a result Black workers in the main 
metropolitan centres have come to rely to a 
great extent or rail passenger services in 
commuting to and from their workplaces. Third 
class passenger fares have been set at uneconomic 
22. Republic of South Africa, op.cit., p. 2 . 
23. 
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kvels to alle .. iate the burden imposed 0" coth 
workers and employers by the locational require-
ments of the Group Areas Act. 
(ii) It is generally accepted by urban policy makers 
that an increase in the level of suburban passenger 
services will yield significant extercal benefits 
sicce rail transport makes a far lower contricution 
to traffic congestion than. road transport so that 
any diversion of traffic from road to rail will not 
only reduce the sO'.cial costs of road congestion 
but also ease the continuos pressure on the 
authorities to expal,d the road system. It may 
therefore be acceptable, in terms of optimal 
pricing principles, for the Railways to set the 
fares for its suburban passenger services below 
their avoidable cost since these fares do not fully 
reflect the marginal social benefits associated 
with suburban rail transport. 
Despite the fact that it may economically justifiable for 
passeng'er fares to be set below avoidable cost, it is 
questionable whether the Railways should be required to 
financ '> the resulting lossses on its passenger services 
through cross-subsidization from its other services. If 
the Railways is to be obliged to perform certain social 
services then it is equitable that .ct should be c0mpensated 
by the State for any losses which arise from these social 
obligations. This principle appears to have been endorsed 
by the Franzsen Commi.ttee which recommended that 
"S. A. T • S. must be reimbursed from external sources for 
supplying uneconomical but essential passenger services 
that are in the country I s interests, but for which tl·.e the 
costs cannot be recovered through the market mechanism. ,,23 
Ibid., p. 3. 
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The Committee indicated that the available external sources 
were a levy on employers, a levy on fuel and a levy on road 
hauliers but suggested that the most equitable means of financing 
rail passenger losses would be through an employer levy based on 
the wages of workers and applied in selected areas on a differential 
basis. The selective application of such a levy is considered ' 
equitable "because all sectors, particularly the agricultural 
s ector, are not affected to the same extent, and because all 
geographic areas do not experience transport problems to the same 
,,24 Th C ·tt . . d th f t th t h extent..... e ·omm1 ee recogmze e 8.C a suc a 
measure would affect the cost of labour and recommended that 
"necessary steps must be taken to control the relationship between 
labour and capital. ,,25 This confirms the conclusion reached. in 
Chapter One that, unless a subsidy is financed through a lump 
sum tax, it will not only affect the distribution of income but also 
the allocation of resources in an economy. It is apparent therefore, 
that both external and internal subsidizatic-n of loss-making services 
are costly. The main advantage of a State subsidy over a cross-
subsidy, however, is that the distorting impact of the former is 
likely t o be more diffuse, spread over the entire economy , whereas 
the distortionary impact of tte latter will be mainly confined to the 
public enterprise and the sector in which it operates. It can, 
perhaps, be argued, from the point of fairness, that where a public 
enterprise such as S.A. T.S. i:; required to continue the operation 
of a loss-making service as a social obligation, then the economy 
as a whole· should bea r this burden in the form of external subsidies, 
rather than the particular public enterprisE: and the groups interested 
in its operations. Although the share of the losse s on rail passenger 
24 • Ibid., p. 3. 
25. Ibid., p. 5. 
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services borne by the State has risen from 13 per cent in 1977/78 to 
48 per cent in 1981/82, there is clearly scope for a further increase 
in State ~ubsidization since the actual amount of the losses which 
are financed through cross-subsidization has increased from 
R278 million in 1977/78 to R311 million in 1981/82. The Franzsen 
Committee, however, indicated that a major concern of the Treasury 
is that "the present method of subsidization is creating problems for 
the State because it shows an escalating tendency, and Treasury 
has no control over the rate and escalation". Since there is a 
continuous pressure to expand the capacity, particularly of third class 
suburban passenger services, there is also a need to control the 
establishment of new services to prevent an excessive escalation of 
the losses associated with these services, It was in this respect that 
the Franzsen Committee recommended that the National Transport 
Commission should monitor the introduction of new services. 
Furthermore it was considered that "the best rr.ethod for the Treasury 
of contributing to transport subsidies" was by "making interest-free 
capital available for passenger services. This would clearly obviate 
the problem of rising interest charges ccntributing to the losses 
incurred on these services. 
A factor which should be taken into account in formulating the tariff 
structure for suburban passenger services iF that the demand for 
these; services fluctuates on a regular daily basis between peak and 
off-peak periods. Since the capacity of the suburban railway system 
is determined by peak period transportation requirements, it is a 
typicd problem of such a system that capacity is underutilized in 
off-peak periods. By failing to inco~porate a peak/off-peak price 
differential into its pa ssenger fare structure, the Railways misses 
the opportunity to both improve the utilization of its system in 
off-peak periods when a lower price should be charged and to reduce 
the pressure to expand its capacity to meet growing peak period 
transportation requirements and to the reby achieve savings on its capital 
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investment programme. It should be borne in mind though that the 
external benefits associated with rail passenger services probably 
reach their greatest level during a peak period so that the optimal 
peak/off-peak price differential may be significantly less than where 
these externalities are not taken into account. If, however, the 
Railw~ys is induced to raise its passenger fares in the future to 
increase the revenue derived from these services and to t hereby 
ease the burden of subsidization, it may improve the efficiency of the 
utilization of its facilities by limiting these fare increases to pee.k 
period travellers. 
The Railway tariff policy for passenger services cannot be regarded 
as a possible instrument to use in improving the spatial distribution 
of economic activity, since the passenger rail system is designed to 
meet the transportation requirements of a particular spatial structure. 
The c urrent struct"re and level of passenger fares is therefore directed 
at maintaining the ex isting spatial pattern of e.c onomic activity 
3:5:3 CONCLUSION 
In general, it can be seen that many of the problems associated with 
the Railway's tariff policy with respect to freight and passe nger 
services have arisen from its failure to reconcile the conflict that 
exists between the derr.and that, on the one hand, it should be 
managed according to business principles and, on the other hand, 
that it should, iTo certain instances, provide socio-economic services 
in the interests of broad national economic needs and transport 
requirements. If there is to be greater consistency of principle in 
the application of Railway tariff policy there is clearly a need for a 
cor.si,tent definition of the Railway I s objectives . It is difficult to do 
this when there are conflicting demands mad.., by different inte rest 
groups on the Hailways. In the following section the nature of these 
conflicting demands will be examined and a way in which they may be 
reconciled will be suggested. 
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3:6 CONFLICTING D]';MANDS UPON S. A. '1' • ~ . POLICY 
In Chapter Two it was explained how a public enterprise operated 
in a delegated choice situation. The "managerial" theories of 
the firm propounded by writers such as Williamson26 may therefore 
provide fruitful insights into the polic:y problems of a public enter-
prise such as S. A. T . S . since, like a large private organization, 
it is characterized by a division between ownership and control, 
although, in the case of S. A . T . S. ownership is vested in the State 
and not private share-holders. Management may therefore tend to 
pursue policies which maximize their own utility subject to safe-
guarding their job sect:rity by meeting the minimum requiremer.ts 
plac ed on them by tl. e owner s. 
A public enterprise s Ech as S. A . T . S. differs, however, from a 
large private organization in that its management is not the final 
b ·t . h b .. 27 b h . d ar 1 er m t e argammg process etween t e groups mtereste 
in goa.! formation. This role is performed, in the case of S.A.'1'.S. 
by the MinisH,r of Transport who attempts to ensure that the objective s 
of S .A. T . S. are consistent with the following broad objectives of 
transport policy: 
(a ) The optimal allocation of resources to the transport sector. 
The efficient utilization of resources in the provision of 
transport services. 
The deve lopment of transport s e rvice s to narrow the gap 
be tw e en transport demand e.nd supply. 
----------------------------------------------
26. 
27. 
Williaro1son, 0., "Managerial Discretion and Business 
Behaviour", American Economic Review, 1963. 
The process of reconciling multiple objectives in a large 
organization described in this section applie s the 
behavioural model of the firm developed by Cyert, R. M. , 
and March, J . G., A Behavioural Theory of the Firm , 
Prentice - Hall, 1963. 
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However, in the process of formulating goals for S.A. T. S., the 
Minister would have to take account of the demands of the following 
interest groups: 
(a) 
28. 
THE MANAGEMENT 
The management of a public transport-enterprise such as 
S. A. T . S. are likely to be interested in tt.e widest possible 
degrEe of autonomy in its decision making to enable them 
to manage the oq;anizatien accordin g to commercial 
principles. To the extent that puUic policy limits their 
managerial discretion by regulating rate setting and 
in posing uneconomic social obligations, the management 
of a public transport enterprise is likely to demand 
comFensating privileges such as state' aid in the form of 
subsidies and grants and protection from competitors 
wt,o are not subjected to these obligations. 
According to Williamson28, the utilit~ ' of managers is 
lik e ly to be a function of salaries, power, prestige and 
job security. These factors are depe ndent on the growth 
and performance of the organization so that management is 
likely to favour policies which improve its growth a!Cd 
perfcrlnance potential regardless of Vi hether they are in 
the broad national interest. 
THr~ GSERS OF PUBLIC TRAl'\SPO!(T SERVICES 
The consumers of transport services are not a homo-
gene ous group with uniform requiremer,ts but they are 
like ly to demand the widest possible choice, of transport 
services so that. they can choose tbe particular corr.bination 
of price and quality which most clcse ly suited to their needs. 
O.Williamson, op.cit. 
(c) 
(d) 
3:7 
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THE TREASliRY 
To an extent that varies with political social and economic 
conditions and fiscal policy, the Treasury will be faced 
with a scarcity of funds relative to the public projects 
that require Treasury financing. Consequently it will 
favot:r any policy which ensures that E .A .T .S . at least 
breaks even since this will obviate the need to finance a 
deficit on .its dperations and will free funds for other 
projects. 
OTHER INTEHEST CRCUPS 
From time to time there may be demands on S. A . T . S. to 
pursue external macro-·economic, s oc ial or political 
objectives. For example, S. A. T. S. may be r equired 
to prorrote industrial decpntralization or provide services 
to black passengers at subeconomic rates as a necessary 
concomitar.t of the Group Areas Ac t. 
There is a clear need for thE! transport policy maker to 
rE!cogniz E! and r econcile theEe conflicting demands. In 
S outh Africa the reconciliation of conflicts has typically 
been purs ued by the sequential attention to demands and 
ad hoc policy commitments. In oth er woro s , priority 
see-mE t o have teen attached to the rr. os t pressing demands 
and policy commitments made to the interest groups 
involved, while attenticn to the demands of other interest 
groups is pos tponed until fut ure periods. This i s 
illustrated in the following review of the histcry of the 
transport p olicy with respect to the transport of freight 
by r02.d and rail in South Afric.:._. 
HI STORICAL REVIEW OF FREIGHT TRA NSPORT POLICY 
- ---- ---------
IN SOlJTH AFmCA 
The evolution of the transport policy of S. A. T. S. can be traced 
through a number of stages each of which arose from the policy 
commitme nts made in the previous stage. 
(a) 
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MONOPOLY MANAGEMENT AND THE PROMOTION" OF 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The interpretation often placed on the Constitution Act, 
in so far as it refers to transport, is that S. A. T • S. 
should not only fulfil the role of a common carrier on a 
non-profit basis, but that it should als 0 act, unilaterally 
as it were, to pre,mote development in various regions by 
ccnstructing development railway lines. This approach 
was clearly evident in the €'arlier days when the 
development of the country outside urban areas was 
entirely dependent on railway constructic.n since, in the 
absence of road transport and suitable inland waterways, 
there was EO alternative fast and efficient surface trans-
portation mode. This resulted in a fairly extensive ne twork 
of new railways being constructed from the ports to 
various parts of the il 'terior. Special endeavours were 
made to meet rural transport needs, so that it was 
necessary to tolerat e for long time a relatively l ow volume 
of traffic for the initial years of operation in anticipation 
of z.dequate expansion with the passage of time. Thi s 
policy was assisted by the relatively low railway construc-
tion costs prevailing at the time, 
Furtherrr.ore since the State railway undertaking held a 
noonopoly over n.e provision of overland transport services, 
it was considered necessary to regulate tariff:; by 
generally obliging th e railways to levy the sar:,e rate per 
tOll per rrile or othe rwise on traffic of the same class 
carried c \'er the sc.me distance and und er the same C ondi-
tions and circumstances, These standardized tariffs were 
furthermore set according to the principle of charging 
"what the traffic can bear" rather than according to the 
cost of providing the service. 
The expected financial performance of mar.y of the railway 
lines constructed during this earlier period proved to be 
disappointing once the lines were open to traffic mainly 
29. 
190 
because the potentialities of the regions served had been 
very mucb overestimated. Since the railways were 
required to break even and had adopted a tariff policy 
of charging "what the traffic can bear", the losses 
inct:rred by the traffic conveyed on these unremunerative 
lines was made good by a system of cross-subsidization 
whereby monopoly gains were made on more remunerative 
tra.ffic which was conveyed at rates well above the ccst 
of conveya.nce. 
THE MUTOR TRANSPORT ACT OF 1930 AND THE REGU-
LATION OF INTERMODAL COMPETITION 
With the development of the motor vehicle during the 1920s 
as an economically viable and efficient transport mode, a 
multitude of private transport operators entered into 
competition with the railways, and towards the end of the 
decade motor transport developed and flourished virtually 
unc ontrolled. Due to the intense competition that prevailed, 
not only between road and rail but also between the road 
operators themselves, it was considered necessary to have 
some form of regulation and control in order 
(a) to coordinate rail and road transport in such a 
manner that these two modes of transport would 
be comple mentary rather than unnecessarily 
t Ot' 29 compe lIve. 
(b) to restrict destructive competition between the 
road hauliers themselves. 
It should be noted that although S. A. T . S. does operate its 
own extensive road transport services, these are mostly 
operated as ancillary and feeder services to the railways 
and are regarded as an integral part of the rail network. 
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Consequently a Motor Carrier Transportation Act was 
promulgated in 1930. Its main object was to permit the 
private carrier to convey short distance traffic under 
prescribed circumstances in the larger urban areas and 
to reserve long distance traffic for n.e railways. The 
machinery set up by the legislation for the accomplishment 
of this purpose Vias the permit system which affected 
persons providir g road motor transportation for hire and 
reward. In 1932 the pern ,it requirements were extended 
to those firms wishing to convey tr.eir own goods Road 
hauliers did not have to acquire permits in the following 
circumstances: 
(a) if they were deemed to be outside n.e defir ition of 
"road transportation" in the Act, 
(b) if tr.ey carried exempted goods , a comple te list of 
which is published in the Government Gazette, 
and updated periodically . 
(c) if the y ca.rried goods within the limits of the zone 
from their place of 'ousiness as defined in the 
Act; and 
(d) if they carried goods within the limits of " exempted 
are as" as d e fined in the Act, 
The e ff e ct of the s e ex emptions was to pe rmit the d e velopment 
of private and public road haulage within urban are as, 
However, in all other (as e s private and public road haLliers 
were required to submit permit applicz.tions to Road 
Transport Boards which allow road transportation for goods 
to take place only under the following conditions: 
(a) for goods that are neede d urgently; 
(b) for goods that are impossible to ship by rail; 
(c) for goods that are unreasonable to sl,ip by rail, 
or other existing transport. 
30. 
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Kennedy3Q has undertaken a thorough-review of numercus 
permit applications at several road transport boards and 
a numbe r of appeals against refusals to grant permits 
made to the National Transport Commission and, although 
he found that the interpretation of the Act does not appeal' 
to be uniform throughout the country, he was able to make 
the following observations about how the boards decide 
whether to rejec t a permit application 010 the g-rounds that 
reas onable tral'sportation facilities exist: 
(a) permit applications ger:erally not granted if all 
the applicant can prove is that road haulage is 
more cost efficien t than rail tran~portation; 
(b) only in extremely rare instances are permits 
issued where the primary justification is extreme 
harm to the applicant; 
(c) permits are granted more readily if convincing 
support is demonstrated by present or prospective 
shippers and/or users of the proposed servic€-, 
rather than claims by the prospective haulier 
himself; and 
(d) Sorr_e boards view a joint rail/ road rr.ovement 
utiliz ing S.A. T.;';. facilities as a "reasonable 
service" while others do not. 
The imposition of controls over intermodal competition 
thrcugh the pern ,it system illustrates tbe typical pattern 
exhibited by the growth of governmellt regulation ir. 
~outh Africa in that the need for for thiE new regulation 
arose from the fact that the existing regulations had become 
outmoded as a result of unforeseen developments in the 
Kennedy , T . L., C osts of Road and Rail Transport , 
Technical Note 11/23/82, National Institute for Transport 
and Hoad Research, CSIR, South Africa, July 1982. 
(c) 
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transport sector. Thus the high rates charged on certain 
traffic carried by rail, which had been imposed due to the 
need to cross-subsidize unremunerative lines had made 
these classes of traffic particula.rly vulnerable to 
intermodal competition from road transport. The rail-
ways therefore required protection from intermodal 
competition if they were to continue this p olicy of cross-
subsidization and this led. to the institution of the permit 
system. The effect of the pernlit system was to confer on 
the railways what was tantamount to a quasi - monopoly in 
respect of certai n defined traffics, enabling it to pursue 
its then established policy of charging "what the traffic 
can bearll. 
The institution of this policy of railViay protection in 1930 
was justified on the grounds that at that time the road 
system was relatively underdevEloped and would be 
inadequate to handlE' l arge increases in freight traffic. 
Furthermore, ~ , ince the re was an adequatE railway 
infraEtr uc ture already in place, it was considered that 
it would be uneconomical from thE' country 's point of 
view to allow large amounts of traffic to be diverted from 
rail to road. 
EC()~OMIC G.ROWTH ANQJHE~ l\EED FOR DERE~~LATIO!,:" 
1 930-1 9,7 
During the years which followed the promLigation of the 
1930 Motor Transportation Act , the ccnditions whic h had 
initially favoured the institution of the pern,it system 
gradually d ec lined in importancE. The hig-hway ne twork 
was greatly improve d, severa l routE-s of the South AfricaE 
Railways becan' e congested , delays to goods shipme nts 
were cecof'1ing more frequent , and there were growir..g 
doubts among industrialists and some government officials 
as to whether the exis ting regulatory er:vironment was in 
the test interests of the cc-untry. 
31 • 
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This changing attitude prompted the Marai~, Commission3J 
to be appointed in 1 965 to investigate the appropriate 
roles which the various forms of transport must fulfil in 
order to promote the development of the economy in the 
most efficient IT.anner. The 1960s was a period of rapid 
economic growth and there was a widespread belief in 
the industrial and commercia.l sectors H,a t t he capacity 
of the railways might inhibit further growth. This seemed 
to be confirmed by the increasing incidence of delays on 
the railways. 
The essence of the Marais CommiE sion' s findings was that 
it may not be in the country's t,est interests for all 
commodities to move by rail, cor.sidering the inherent 
advantages of road trar,sport. Whereas transport 
policy had previously been aimed at s ecuring the 
optimum utilization of the railways. it was considered 
tha.t the allocation of tx aIl$port resourceE should be 
reassessed against the relative cost comparisons of 
road a.nd ntil transport, from the perspective of the user. 
The recommendaticns of the Marais Commission were 
however, never implemented. 
In 1,)77 the van Breda Commissi on WaS appointed to investi-
gate the re\'ision of the 1930 :vlotor Carrier Transportation 
Act. As a result of its recommendations there was some 
piecemeal deregulation in the transport sector: 
(i) the Act expanded the zones within which public 
and private road hauliers may convey goods without 
a permit. For public hauliers, thi s zone is a 40 
R. S . A •• .Report af the Commission of Inquiry Into The 
Coordination of Transport in South Africa • Pretoria. 
1969. 
(d) 
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kilometre radius from the place of business, and 
for private hauliers conveying their own goods, 
the radius is 80 kilometres; and 
(ii) "exempted areas" were defined, within which no 
permits were required.. These exempted areas 
were basically the metropolitan areas of South 
Africa. 
CURREI\T SITUATION 
The revision of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act in 
1977 indicates that the pendulum of government thinking 
with respect to deregulation of the transport sector has 
swung away from the strong support for a tight reg'ulatory 
environmer.t evidenced in 1930. The amendments to this 
Act are seen by some as evidence that South Africa is 
following a world-wide trend toward deregulation. However, 
the deregulation that has taken place has been essentially 
piecemeal in character and has largely arisen as an ad hoc 
reaction to the fact that the system of regulatory controls 
had become outmoded due to' the industrial and ecenomic 
development which has taken place since t.heir introduction. 
The problem with the sequential approach to conflict 
resolution is that it tends to postpone and not satis-
factorilj' reconcile the conflict between opposing interest 
groups with different objectives. It seems that there is a 
widening polarisation between the management of S. A. T . S. 
and its users and competitors. Furthermore none of these 
groups appear to be satisfied with the current state of the 
deregulation process: 
(i) road hauliers are calling for "more direct road 
and rail competition within a wider range of 
commodities and claim that the existing restrictions 
are prohibiting an efficient road haulage 
32. 
33. 
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system,,32due to underutilization of trucks and the 
costs and delay s of obtaining permits; 
(ii) shippers are generally dissatisfied with the fact 
that roa.d tr"nsport boards are the authority to 
determine urgency of goods or the adequacy of 
existing transport, and not the industry or firIT .• 
itself. They argue that "transportation is one of 
the many elements required in the proces s of 
production, and the decision of what mode of trans-· 
port is most st;itable should be in the hands of the 
firm, just as any other production decision . ,,33 
They r ecogni zE" the need to utiliz e S . A. T .:::'. for 
the majority of their transport needs , and are 
generally satisfied with the service r eceived . 
However, they generally expre ss "a great need 
to have the flexibility to use road motor transpcrt 
for a small portion of their businE.ss which 
occasionally require quick urgent deliveries". 
They believe that as shippers they are i n the best 
position to determine these urgent situations; and 
(iii) i.n r ecent years S .A. T. S. have incurred substantial 
deficit s or t heir oper a tions , and they t end to be 
vlary of any deregulatory i nitiatives which would 
result in their high-rated fre i gh t tra.ff ic beir.g 
d iverted t o road transport and therefore exacerl::at e 
t heir deficit position. They are like ly to oppose any 
further erosion of the ir protected position which is 
not accompanied by their being freed from the 
obligations and r estrictions which necessitated their 
protl'cti(,n in the first place. 
Ibid., p. 1 5 • 
Ibid., p. 21. 
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From S.A. T. S. point of view there are basically three 
prerequisities which must be met tefore they support 
further deregulation: 
(i) S . A. T . S . should be relieved of the financial 
burden of meetirg certain uneconomic social 
burdens, the most important beir:g the subsidi-
zation from its own resources of rail passenger 
services; 
(ii) it is considered necessary that the competitive 
potential of the various transport modes te placed 
on an equal footing as regards infrastructural 
costs; and 
(iii) the tariff structure of the Railways should be such 
as to enable it to be more cOlT!petitive and far more 
flexible than at present. 
It appears that there is a need for cOlT!prehensive structural change 
within the transport sector, and a clearly defined delineation of the 
objectives and responsibilities of S.A. T. S. These issues will be 
discussed in the next section, but before this can be done it is necessary 
to examine the changes which haye already ocurred in the liailway' s 
policy with respect to regional development. 
It is considered by S. A . T . S. that the railway network is sufficiently 
developed to serve most areas in the country even in rural areas 
where most farms are within close proximity to a railway station or 
siding and the movement of crops to the railway can be handled econo-
mically by feeder road transport without any need for further railway 
construction. The stage of development in South Africa has, therefore; 
been reached where further railway construction may be needed mainly 
in connection with industrial expansion and the exploitation of nineral 
r e sources. Accordingly the policy has been adopted by S . A . T . S. of 
constructing new railways solely where: 
1 • "Such lines are required for departmental purposes, for example 
to link already busy lin~,s with others to provide alte rnative 
routes over which to dive rt existing traffic instead of providing 
increased traffic on existing lines. 
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2. It has been definitely established that road transport services 
cannot adequately cope with the transport requirements of the 
region to be served and that the quantity and nature of the 
available t.raffic is such that a railway line will be an economic 
proposition. 
3. The railway administration is indemnified by interested parties 
of fir.ancial standing against any losses sustain<od-iI, the exploi-
tation of the line. ,,34 
The investment policy of S. A . T . S. has thereby come to be det~'rmined 
more by economic criteria than regjonal devdopment objectives since. 
"in determining the economic justification. for new railway lines . due 
regard is had to the a_vailable traffic offered for tra,nsport. as well 
as the future potential development ir the rE-gion concerned. ,,3-5 
The policy of ;,:, A. T;5. with respect of guaranteed lines indicates the 
direction in which tr.e reconciliation of the conflict between transport 
- and regional policy may proceed in the future.S. A. T • S. is prepared 
t o construct lines on behalf of interests in either the public or private 
sectvr who can furnish an unqualified and unlimited guarantee against 
y.,orking losses. This r e presents a historical extension of the following 
principles: 
(i) where S 0 A 0 T 0 S 0 is reG uired by the government sJ:>ctor to 
provide sen ices at a tariff insufficient to cover ccsts. tbe 
Constitution "oct makes provision fc,r the payment of losses 
out of statc' funds; and 
(ii) y.,he;ce S. A 0 T • S. has operated privately owned railways on 
behalf of the owner,;. it has usually been agreed that S o A. T. S . 
should be indemnified against operating losses . 
34 • Loubser. J . G. H •• "Transport and rE' gional policy in South Africa" 
in W. Blonk. ed •• op. cit.. p. 245. 
35. Ibid •• p. 245. 
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A guaranteed line can be financed or constructE,d either by S. A . T . S. 
or by the interest concerned. The recent tendency, however has 
been for the government depa.rtment or private undertaking which 
applies for a railway line tv finance, and in the case of a private 
undertaking, to construct the line si.nce S. A. T • S. teLds to have most 
of its funds tied "p in its existing capital investment programme. 
Guarantee agreement s are concluded for a period to be mutually 
agreed upon between the guarantor and S. A. T . S . The guarantor 
is compensatEd against any capital expenditure he incurs in the 
following wanne r: 
(i) they are exempted from paying the capital cost compcnent 
of the tariff charged for operating servi~es ; and 
(ii) the c2.pital cost portion of the tariff payable by all other 
users of the line 2.S well as any operating surpluses are 
paid OVE'r to the guarantor to redeem the capital invested 
in the line. 
S. A . T. S. therefor e operates the line at cost until such time as thE 
capital invested by the guarantor has been fully recovered. Although 
there i f; no advantage for S . A. T . S . in operating the gua ral'teed line 
dr,ri r,g the guarantee period, it also suffers no loss, and will benefit 
from the additiona.l traffi c generated for the reEt of the railway 
network ar.d fr om e'perating the liLe after the expiry of the guarar.tee· 
period. This. approach would therefore appear tc r econcile the 
conflict between regional policy objectiveE and the cbjective of 
operating an economically efficie nt ar.d financiall y vdable railway 
network, sinc e the burden of bearing the risk of losse .. o~ a railway 
line constructed in an underdeveloped region i s transferred fro .. l 
the railways to intEres t s din·ctly concerned with the develoIOment of 
the region. 
3:8 THE RuLE OF X-INEFFICIENCY AN)) A F1V.MEWORK 
FUR DEREGULATION 
It is apparent froOi sectiun 3:-7 that stror:'g pressures bave built up in 
the transport sec tor fcr its derE gulation. The majer adva ntage of 
deregulation is that modal choice decisions are taken direc tly by 
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shippers. Shippers are therefore likely to choose that transportation 
mode which meets their quality of service requirements at the lowest 
cost. Deregulation of intermodal competition may thus indt:ce a 
public transport enterl'ri se to behave like a private inter-prise in 
seeking ways to: 
(a) cut costs and reduce X-i r.efficier.cy, 
(b) meet the quality requirements of shippers in a_ rr:ore 
satisfactory manner and 
(c) introduce new services, production ted.niques and organi 
zational methods. 
It has already been Deserved that a large public monopoly witt. its 
survival guarantE-ed by n.e :-3tate "ill face far less external pressure 
to adopt measures which improve operating efficiency and service 
quality tt.an a firm operating in a corrpetitive environment which would 
threaten its survival if i t tolerated any "X- inefficiency". X- inefficiency 
may thus arise ir. a large public monopoly such as S.A.T.S. S i nce 
individual agents within its organization can "hUt thE' re&ponsibility 
for failing to contain X-inefficiency on tc either other ager.ts within 
the organization or consumers, through higher prices. or the State 
through higher- subsidies, In the case of S. A. T. S, there is evidence 
tt:at many of the recent measures "hich have beeL introduce-d to improve 
operating- efficiency and service quality arose as a result of the decline 
of its share c.f the transport market for high-rate-d comnlodities. This 
is indicated in the following statement: 
"During recent years. excessively rising costs of labour, equipment 
and matE,rial coinciding with variations in the conveyance of profit-
abl e traffic, have brought about suct. a transformation in the earning 
and spending patterns of the past that an in- dejOth examination of the 
working methods in general and a critical analysis and re-eveluation 
of the measure of prcductivity were called for. Consequently enhanced 
efficiency, toge the r with inter,sified e ffort~" both t echnol ogical and 
• 
administrative, towards increasing productivity was applied in an 
effort to restore the equilibrium between revenue ar.d expenditure. ,,36 
36. S. A. Railways and Harbours, Annual Report 1971 -72 
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In thie. respect van der Veer sees the containerization programme 
implemented by S. A. T . S. as "an effcTt to consolidate its portion of 
high-rated tr2.ffic". He goes on to state that: 
" •••• this method of transport largely 
enabled rail transport to overcome two of 
the disadvantages asscciated with this mode, 
namely relatively long transit times and 
pilfera.ge and damage to freight. Secondly, 
it could satisfy the growing demand for a 
door-to-door service. Apart from contri-· 
buting to a more efficient transport system 
overall, particularly in respect of the cost 
benefits from unitisation and standardisation, 
containerization did succeed in preventing 
a further ' decline in the proportion of high-
rated t:.caffic". 3:r 
Other measures irtroduc o,.:i during the last decade te irr.prove the 
operating efficiency of :::= • A. T . S. included the following: 
(i) the elimir'ation of steam traction and the on-going 
programme of E>lectrificatie,n of railVlay lines; 
(ii) the cor.version frem vacuum and air brakes to improve 
train and line capacity; 
(iii) the. develcpment of a high stability bogie to increase the 
axle-,loading capacity of wagons; 
(iv) 'thee construction of a new central marShalling yard for 
the Reef area whict-. will assist in redt:cing delays to freight 
trains; and 
(v) the ' introduction of a zoning scher,1e which "entails the 
division of the rail system into various zones, each of which 
is served from a concentration depot, and the running of 
bl e,ck load trains from the point of e,rigir. to the dee.tination". 
This has resulted in improved transit times fcor trains and 
turnarotcnd tiDies for wagons. 
37. van der Veer, ::;. D., The Role of Rail Transport in the 
Total Transport Scene , Paper delivered at P,nnual 
Transport Convention, Pretoria, August 1982, p. 9. 
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The effect of these meas".res is reflected in Figure 3: 9 which indicates 
that the operating e fficiency of rail freight services measured in terms 
of gross ton kilometres per train hour has increased by an average of 
7,95 per cent annually between 1973/74 and 1980/81. It can be seen 
from the abover.1entioned statements by Railway officials that a major 
factor motivating the Railw ays to introdt:ce these measures to improve 
operating efficiency and s ervice quality has been the d ec line in the 
Railway's share of high-rated traffic as a r esult of the inc r eased 
intensity of intermodal competition fron, road l:auliers. 
T his t ends t o confirm Scherer's thesis that "incentives for cost 
reduc tion under a pressure theory of motivation have more powerflJl 
behavioural effects than unde r a rf,ward theory a lone". 38 Now it i s 
clear that the deregulation of the trans port sector would r esult in 
the Railways being exp08ed to a greetE'r intensity of intermodal 
competition and therefCl'''' a greater pressure to implement measur e s 
which inc r easE operating e fficiency and 8eryice qhality, than it 
presently has to face. There is tberefore likely to be an even 
greater incentive for Railway management to seek ways of containing 
X-inefficier.cy and r e ducir.g slack within the organization . 
Furthel'more der8gulation may e nable the railways to specialize in 
tr.ose sr:rvicE,s for which it has inherent competitive advantages. 
For eX2mple, the movement of bulk ccmmod ities, i n train loads or 
multiple wagon l oad8 C2,ll :, ... : .. erformE,d very efficiently and 
e ffectively by thl? railways . The full est possibl e developmer.t of these 
services may be 'hindered if the railways is also requirE'd to handle 
other types of traffic f"r which it is a r e l ative ly i T efficient mode such 
as s ingle wagon load s , and small packages. 
38. Scherer, F . M. , Industrial Market Struc t ure and Ec onomic 
Performance , Rand McNally P ubli8hing Company, 2nd ed . , 
1 980, p . 466 . 
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A further advantage of the deregulation of intermodal competition is 
that it would introduce a greater n'easure of flexibility into the trans-
port sector. As the histrorical review of transport policy in South 
Africa illustrated, regulations tend to make ser.S8 only in the context 
of the time and circumstances in which they are introduced and tend 
to become outmoded with new developments in the transport sector. 
It is equally apparent, however, that a precondition of unrestricted 
intermodal competition in the transport sector is that each mode is 
able to compete with all the others on equal terms. In the area of 
inland freight transport intermodal competition largely takes place 
betw een S. A. T . S. and privately owned road hauliers. It is of 
crucial importance that the function, responsibilities and compen-
sating privileges of S.A.T.S. be clearly defined in a manner which 
is equitable to all interest groups involved. The traditioroal approach 
in South Africa is to compensate the railways for its burden to perform 
various social obligations by protecting it from intermodal competition 
in certain areas. The permit system, however, clearly operated to 
re s trict intermodal competition and it seems that if deregulation is to 
take place, and, if the railways are still to be required to meet 
certain obligations, then alternative methods of compensation will have 
to be introduced. An obvious possibility is that state subsidies and 
grants should be paid to thE> railvlays where it is required to perform 
uneconomic social obl igations. These railway services should thus be 
regarded as merit goods and the amount of funds made a,-ailable f"r 
their provision would be determined according to the same criteria as 
any other form of government expenditure. 
The main problem with this type of deregulation programme is that it 
may result in considerable structural readjustment in the transport 
sec t or which may be initially painful tc, railway interests as resources 
are diverted from rail to road transport. It may also be difficult t o 
ensure separate accountability by the railways for its social and 
[Jurely economic functions. Furthermore if stat., grants and subsidies 
ratter than a system of protection are to be relied on to compensate 
the railways for pE>rforming social obligatiol'.s, this will place further 
press urE> on scarce Treasury funds and will run counter to the current 
tre nd to cut governme nt expenditure particularly on social programmes . 
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An important consequence of this approach to deregulation is that 
S.A. T . S. should be freed of the responsibility to promote regional 
development since this often places on this public und e rtaking a burden 
to' continue to operate unremunerative lines and thereby conflicts with 
the objective of providing economically efficient and financially viable 
transport services, as was explained in section 3:2, if this policy 
leads to a d e terioration in the availability, cost and quality of trans-
port services in underdeveloped regions then it may run counter t o 
the currE nt goyernment policy of promoting industrial decentralization 
by encouraging private investrr.ent at developrr.ent points in these 
regions. 
A solution to this problem of reconciling conflicting regional and e fficiency 
objectives n:ay be indicated by the current policy with respect to 
guaranteed lines whereby the l'isk of losses is borne by the parties 
interested in their construction and not t r.e r a ilways. This suggests 
that it may be fruitful to investigate· the policy of transferring the 
responsibility for ensuring that r egional transport needs are met from 
S . A . T . S. to a governme nt department interested in regional deve lopment. 
Th is approach to regional transport policy was proposed for France 
by L' Huillier and Domenach39 • They suggeste,d tha.t a regional 
transport authority (RTA) should be set up in each region to deal with 
"every mobility problem ha'!ing to do with th e good management of 
regional spac·e". 40 The R,1 A should be certified to negoLate from a 
s trong position with all operators of the regional transport system 
and should be "ble to contract with some of ther.l for short or long 
periods ,granting sllbsidies or not. in order to plan for an effective 
and socially effic ient transport seryice . The RT A would fulfil the 
role of a consultant, arbi tra tor and auditor so as tc permanently 
39. D.L'Huillier and U.Domenach, "Transport and regional 
policy in France", in W.Blonk. ed., op.cit., pp. 121-140. 
40. Ibid., p. 137. 
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survey the quality of transport service and its adequacy in regard to 
the general objectives of the region. 
In situations where the transport needs tif a region could be best 
served by a monopoly then the RT A could simulat e the pressures and 
incentives of a competitive market by calling for tenders from all 
transport operators and awarding the contract to provide transport 
services to the lowest bidder. There would thus be competition for 
the market rather than corr.petition in the market. This type of bidding 
model was propos ed as an alternative institutional solution tc the natural 
monopoly problem by Demsetz 41 who argued that it might eliminate all 
discretionary power in production forcing a competitive solution. This 
approach would seem to be entirely consistent with a deregulated 
environment in the transpcrt sEctor. 
Rowley and Peacock42 , however, have poirted to a number of problems 
with this competitive bidding solution: 
the inputs required for a successful bidder to enter into 
production must be available to the rr.any potential bidders 
at prices determined in open markets; 
(ii) the costs of collusion on the part of rural bidders must be 
prohibitively high; and 
(iii) t.he .. bidder who is initially successful "'ill he.ve substantial 
advantages at subsequent biddings when ccntract :-enewals 
fall due in terms of market information, property rights 
to specialist factor inputs and the goodwill built up over 
thE! contract period. Further the costs of transferring 
41. . Demsetz, H ., "Why regulate utilities? ", Journal of Law 
and Economics, .\ 964. 
42. Peacock,A.T., and Rowley,C.K., "Welfare Economics 
and the Public RegUlation of Natural Monopoly", Journal of 
Public Economics, 1972, pp. 227-244. 
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transportation rights to a new operator would tell in 
favour of the existing operator. 
Although these problems may be neutralized through countervailing 
regulatory measures, this would run counter to the policy of 
deregulation. Apart from being a vehicle for' stimulating intermodal 
competition within a region, it can be argued that RTAs will ,als.o 
be able to integrate transport e.nd regional policy objectives in a 
more effective way since they will be a position to treat transport 
as unly one factor tc be taken into account in' an overall regional 
development strategy. In view of the mutual interaction between 
traEsport and regional development it would seem essential that. this 
integrated approacr. be taken, This would be in line with the trEnd 
towards integrated transport policy which Klaassen observed in 
Europe in the seventies. 43~ Furthermore tr.is approach would 
ensure ttat ::::.A. T. S. was treated on equal terms with all other 
transport operators and would enable S.A. T. S. to pursue the objec-
tive of providing an efficiency and financially viable t.ransport service. 
3:9 A RECOMMENDED PRICING AND INVESTMENT POLICY 
3:9: 1 
FOR A PUBLIC TRANSPORT ENTERPRISE OPERATING 
IN A DEREGULATED TRANSPORT SECTOR 
THE SPECIAL PQSITlON OF A PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
ENTERPRISE OPERATING IN A DEREGULATED 
TRANSPORT SECTOR 
It is important to realize in recommending a pricing and investment 
policy for an organization such as S. A . T . S., that if the transport 
43. Klaassen,L.H ., and Bourdrez,J.A., "Integrated trar.sport 
planning" in W .Blonk, ed" "-E.. cit. , pp. 63-77. 
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sector is deregulated, then S. A. T. S. will be in a different position 
compared both to other public enterprises and to a large private 
transport undertaking. 
A typical public enterprise is normally required to distribute its 
products and services on a national scalp. Sir..ce the availability of 
its products and services is irrposed externally, such a public enter-
prise is required to set its prices to "reflect the marginal cost of 
that availability in all situations, so that the level of demand will reflpct 
those marginal costs". 44 If the South African traDsport sector is 
deregulated in the manner financially vlaR~e J:r;anspor~ se~yJ_ce 
longer be under a constraint as to the availability of its services. 
It could provice or not provide them at its discretion while the responsi-
bility for ensuring that adequate transport services even in underdeve-
loped areas would be vested in the regional transport authority. In 
markets where there are available good substitutes for rail services, 
the existence of these substitutes will place a limit on the price which 
can be obtained for rail services. Now there is no necessary relation-
ship between the ma~imum price the market is prepared to pay which will 
depend on intermoda.l competition and the marginal CC,,! of handling the 
traffic concerned. This problE·rr will be explored in the next section 
where it will be shown that "the role "f long run marginal cost is, 
therefore, as an investment indicator and not as a pricing constraint,,45. 
with the public transport undertaking operating· in a deregulated transport 
environment "relating its long-run marginal costs to its prices and not 
46 
the other way round. " 
44. Joy,::;., "Pricing and Investment in Railway Freight 
:::ervices", ~ournal of Transport Economics and Policy, 
September 1971, p. 233. 
45. Ibid., p. 232. 
46. Ibid., p . 232. 
209 
On the ober hand, if S. A . T . S. operated in a deregulated situation 
jt could not be compared to a private transport undertaking which is 
likely to take any long run ol'Porturjty to exploit a monopoly situation 
and retain and protect any monopoly profits to the extent necessary to 
satisfy the enterprise: s objectives. A public transport unde rtaking, 
however , should have as its prirr,arJ' goal, the maximization of rail 
service subject to a break even constrairt. It is therefore likely 
to invest in any situation where long run profits are being earned 
with the object of expanding service either in volume or quality to 
a point where this surplus is eliminated. In other words, as a public 
undertaking, :::i.A. T.:::i. should not become profit - orientated i r the 
same Vlay as a private enterprise. 
3:9:2 ADAPTATION OF OPTItvlAL PUICING AND INVESTMENT 
It will be recallE·d that in Chajlter Two it was recommended that a 
pu blic e nterprise shou.ld proceed with the fellowing steps in formul-
ating its pricing and investmEnt policy: 
(a) firstly, the following rules £houlcl he applied in det" ;rmining 
prices and planning the levd of investrr.ent: 
(i) if there is exc€ss ca.pacity in tt.e short run, price: 
shoule'. be :set equal te short run ma.rginal cos t; 
(ii) if capacity is fc.lly utilized in the short run , price 
shodd !,e allowed to rise to the rate sufficient 
to restrict demand to capa.city; and 
(iii) in the long rue the goa.l of investment policy 51.ould 
be to adjust I.he capacity of plant to produce the 
level of OL·.tput at which price is equal te long run 
marginal cost; a.nd 
(b) secondly, the resultant tariff schedule and investment 
programme should be adjusted ace ordiLg to the principles 
cf "piecemeal optimiz,ation" to take into accoc.nt tl non-
optimalities" resulting from, say . departures from margina.l 
cost pricing in indt:stries clesely rele.ted te the public 
enterprise or a binding rever,ue constraint. 
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Now, if the 2ailways is to adapt tt.ese pricing, and investment rules 
to its particular circumstances, the following measures are g·oing 
to have to be i:nplemented; 
(i) firstly, the Railways must be freed from its common carrier 
obligations and permitted to negotiate contracts on mutually 
acceptable terms with its custom.ers; and 
(ii) secondly, the Railways will have to adopt a system of 
costing which enables the costs attributable to particular 
routes and partie ular traffic flow s to be me as urEd. 
The issues involved in the practical implementation of H.ese r.lea~· ures 
with respect to RailWay frei,,·ht services will now be examined. 
3:9:2:1 l'\E(J(!TIP,TION OF RATE~: 
Unce a Rail" ay undetaking· is freed of its common carrier obligations, 
it i~ able to accept traffic on terms negotiated with its customers. 
As a result it is no longer censtra;ned to set its rates according te 
published national scdes but can, instead, charge its services at 
negotiated rates. This considerably irr.proves the Railway's 
competitive position in a. der" gulated trar.sport market since its 
rates need no longer functicn as a signal to road hauliers of the 
maximum rate beyond which they cannot increase their own charges. 
For rr,ost long term contracts it will usually be necessary to insert 
a price variation clause irto the agreement in terms of which rates 
are adjusted upwards either in step with the Railway's own cost 
index or a national index <.>f y, holesale prices. For short term 
contracts rates would be rene,;·oti2.ted cn terr.lination of the contract 
and it would probal::ly not be neces~ary to insert a price variati( ,n 
clause. 
An advn.l.tag-e of allowing t~,e t<ailways to negotiate its rates on an 
individual basis with its customers rather than requiring them to be 
set according- to a published national scal<· ·is that a greater flexibility 
can be introduced into .'<fLily. ay rate scc,edule, It will thus be possible 
for the Railways to charge its services on a "per wagon or I1per train" 
rather than a "per tonne /kilorretre basis" to take account of tbe fact 
that it is e heap·er to transport a wh ole wag-on or train load rather than 
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a part load. Furtt.ermore, it will also be possible for the Railways 
to stipulate consignment tra.in size or regularity minima for traffic 
ca.rried accordir.g to a conventional "per tonnejkilorr.etre" rc:;.te' tc 
ensure that it is not burdenecl with uneconomic traffic on an uneconomic 
route. 
In the c".se of determining tariffs for large consignments of traffic, an 
operational analysis would have to be carried out to determine whether 
the requireci quality of service could be provided. This would draw 
attention to any unusual costs associateci with the traffic consignment. 
For smaller consignments, however, such operational analysis would 
not be justified 2.nd it would ce necessary to exercise control over price 
minima by an initial screening whicb codd use a tuble of critical 
distances showing (i) by traffic ty pe, (ii) by terminal conditions and 
(iii) by load l'er wagon, what would be the minimum length of haul at 
which a tariff competitive with road transport wodd be profitable for 
rail traffic. It might also be r.ecessary to also have a review procedure 
by w blch ar:y proposr,d rate couk t ·e compared. with the market. The 
screening critEria would have to be reviewed in the light of changes in 
road haulage prices or in rail cost." . ~ nd volumes. 
Now, to apply the rules discussed in Chapt.er Two ,Railway freight 
tariffs should be allowed to fluctuate between an upper limit at whicb 
price rations demand to capacity and a lower limit at which short run 
marginal costs are being covered. In practical terms, the upper limit 
for frEight tariffs would be determined by the cost and quality of road 
transport. 47 while the lower limit would be deterlTJined by the Railwzy' s 
unit operating costs. 48 These optilT.al pricing rules are, however. 
47. These are likely to be important factors determining the 
position of the demand function. 
48. In Chapter Two it was shown that where plant is d e signed 
with a certain built-in flexibility, there will be a ra.nge of 
reserve capacity over which short run avera.ge variable 
costs will ce equal to short run marginal costs. 
212 
derived in circumstanc es where the determination of prices is essentially 
a short term decision. In cases where tariffs have to be negotiated for 
long term contracts the short run pricing rules are not strictly relevant 
and tariffs should be based on the long run marginal costs of the parti-
cul'.r traffic flows. Quite clearly, a long term contra.ct should not be 
entered into unless the Railways expects to cover long run marginal 
cost. 
THE CONCEPT OF ATTRIBUTABLE COST 
Under a system of negotiated rates, costing information would no 
longer be used to set prices, which would be market determined, but 
would rather form the basis Cof two types of decisions: 
(i) whether or not to accept a particular traffic or 
(ii) whether or not to replace a particular asset being usee: 
by a whole va.riety of traffics of varying levels uf long run 
profitability. 
The cost concept strictly applicable to this type of policy problem is 
le,ng run marginal cost defined by Leftwich as "the change in total 
cost resulting from a one-unit change in output when the firm has 
ample tine to meet the change in output by changing the scale of the 
plant".49 In the British transport sect.or where there has been 
substantial deregulatic.n, "British Rail's investment strategy is to 
replace assets only to the capacity which is justified by traffic vthich 
are a ble to bear their long run marginal costs. ,,5 0 
There are, however, considerable practical difficulties involved in 
obtaining a measurement of long run marginal co~t in an organization 
49. Leftwich, R. H., The Price SJ:stem and Resource Allocatior 
Holt, Rhine hart and Whinston, New York, 1960. 
50. Joy,S., op.cit., p. 233. 
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such as the railways where facilities are used to jointly provide for 
a variety of traffic flows and which are indivisible over a large range 
of activity. 
Shillinglaw has proposed the concept of "attributable cost" as "an 
attempt to bring the long run margin.al cost concept into a practic2.1 
context and make it operational." He defines attributable cost as 
"the cost per unit tt.at could be avoided, on the average, if a 
product or function were discontinued entirely witho~t charging' the 
supporting organizational structure". 511 Shillinglaw believes that 
the concept of attributable cost is applicable to the type of quantita-
tive policy decision which "differs from the short-run decision in 
the time interval dl!ring which the decision is expected to remain in 
force (since) it does not deal with unique situations, but is expected 
to provide a continuing answer to a recurring question. ,,52 Fu;ther-
more, Shillinglaw explains that s,uch decisions "do not hinge on the 
trade-off between present outla.ys and future benefits but on the 
expected annual profit contributie,n of a given segment Gf the business 
over an extended period of time. ,,53, Attributable cost would thus 
seem to provide very much the sort of information which is required 
by a transport undertaking operating a system of negotiated rates in 
a deregulated er.vironment. 
In recommending this concept for this type of quantitative policy 
decision, Shillinglaw notE'S that it is "less comprehensive but more 
readily measureable than long run marginal cost. ,,54 It differs 
from long run marginal in: 
51 • Shillinglaw, G., "The Concept of Attributable Cost", 
Journal of P,ccounting Research, Spring 1963, pp. 73-85. 
52. Ibid., p. 74. 
53. Ibid., p. 84. 
54 • Ibid., p. 82. 
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(a) its assumption of linearity in the long rur. cost function 
since" ••• the objective is to find a unit cost figure 
that can be used as an estimate of how costs will be 
affected by a decision to expand or contract a particular 
segment or aspect of the business assuming that enough 
tin"," is allowed to permit a permanent change in capacity . ,,55 
This unitization of cost is desirable from the point of analy-
tical flexibility since estimates of attributable cost per unit 
fDr each major product function performed provide the cost 
c oeffic iE·nt s necessary for studying any given segme r.t of an 
undertaking's ac tivities whilE they may a l se be used in 
trend "nalysis as a means of detecting symptoms of trouble 
ahead, Shillinglaw does not consider this "unitization 
to be harmful "as long as the applicati on of the concept is 
restricted to the clas:; of probler;s for wl:ic:h it i s desi~;ned"; 
a rcd 
(b) attributable cos t assumes that e xpansion or contrac tion will 
be accomplished by adding to or subtracting from e}: isting 
facilities whereas long run marginal cest is base d on H .e 
as sumption that all resources are free ly flexible in form 
as well as it arr.ount . 
In measuring attributable cost it is clear that short run v<\riabl e cost 
should be includec. but it i" also generally ac cepted that the uniti -
zation of short r un variable costs only would lEad to the exclusion of 
fixed cests which could and should be aUe,cated t o th ose segments of 
the undertaking whicl-. occasion them. In classifyin g fixed cos t s . a 
distinction c"n be made bE,tweei1 fixe c. costs which are en the one hand 
divisible or indivisible and t.hose whi ch are, on the other hand either 
tracE·acle t o a productor common with respect to both prcducts and 
functions. A fix ed CGst is divisiblE' V significant shifts in t he volume 
of activity require increases or permi.t decreasGs in the total amount 
55. Ibid.,p. 82 . 
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of that cost. Divisibility thus requ.ires either the existence of a 
substantial number of similar input units or the availability of input 
units of various capacities. The main proble ms with attributing fixed 
costs to a particula.r segment of an undertaking are thus: 
(a) the lack of traceability of a cost to a particular segment 
(b) and substantial indivisibilities in this cost. 
In discussing wk:ich types of fixed ccst should be included in attributable 
cost Shillinglaw proposed that both divisible and indivisible fixed costs 
which arE' traceable to the particular line of activity being considered 
should be part of attributable cost since these costs would 
pable through abandonment of the line of activity involved. 
bE! esea-· 
56 Joy , 
however, has also considered what portion of common . ccsts to 
include in attributable cost. 
This is pa.rticularly important from tt.e viewpoint of ra.ilway pricing 
since a distinctive feature of the railway production process is that 
it is cba.racterized by the joint sl!pply of different Eervices to diffErent 
types of traffic. Although railway seTV ices can be broadly diviced 
between those provided fer frEight and passengers ,the railways a.l,o 
transports differen t kinds of freight while the transport of both 
freight and passengers over different stretches of track and at 
different tin'"s of the day might all te regarded a.E separate commoditie,' 
"jointly supplied by the railway system. I\ow, Joy finds. it is nece s sary 
to distin€,'uish cetv:e£'n specific, jcint aI'd ccmmon costs. 
:::,pecific costs are those costs incurr(·d in th e production of a particulal" 
product which, with due notic e c an ce avoided by ceasing to make the 
product. Common costs are incurred in the production of two or more 
products where it is cheaper to produce them together than separately 
but wL en' the le·vel <.f common ccst would d e cline if thE! production of 
one of the products ceased. Joint costs are those costs incun'ed in the 
---------------
56. Joy,S., op.cit., pp . 237-240. 
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production of two or more products, the level of which will not chalOge 
with tte abandonment of aEY of the separable outputs. 
Figure 3:10illustrates the distinction between these costs in the case of 
a railway route providing for passenger or freight service. Block (a) 
represents the cost of maintaining the earthworks and the minimum costs 
of providing and maintaining one line of pernaneEt way and it is 
fix ed for as long as long as the route is to remain open at all and is 
joint to all the traffics that use the rv·ute. The costs of tbe extra 
facilities required to provide given passenger and freight frequencies 
are represented by the blocks (b) and (c) respectively. Block (b+c) 
r'~present" the total cost of providing these facilities if passenger 
and freight routes are provided separately. The common cost of 
providing these facclities for both passenger and freight services on 
the onE' route is represented by block (b, c). This is smaller than 
block (b+c) since the requirements of these two types of traffic are 
to some extent complement. ry. The specific costs on the route are 
the costs of a.ctual wear and tear caused by the passage of trains, and 
any signallin€,' operation costs which weuld be avoided if the particular 
train or trains did not run. Part of the common costs (b,c) can howeve r, 
also be specifically attributed to either the passenger or freight 
servic es as is shown in Figure ):11 . 
The common costs £2-~sed by freight traffic are represented by the 
dott ed portion of the rectangle (b, c). This is the difference between 
(b.c ) and (b) and is the cost which would be saved if passenger traffic 
was removed frem the route. The dashed portion of the rectangle 
r epresents the COlTmon costs caused by passenger traffic ane! is the 
differel!ce between (b ,c) and the freight traffic cost rectangle. 
Generally, then thE' common cost caused by a particular traffic can be 
calculated by subtracting tbe value of the common cost incurred in 
transporting all traffics except the particular traffic in question from 
the common cost of all traffics including this particdar traffic. 
These attributable common costs can be added to the specific costs 
for the particular traffic to determine the attributable cost of this 
traffic. In cases where there is congestion on a route the withdrawe.J 
Cost 
(a) 
FIGURE 3:10 
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( b) (c) ( b,c) 
Specific, Joint and Common, Costs of Providing 
Rail Passenger and Freight Services 
Cost 
FIGURE 3: 11 
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of a particular traffic will result in cost savings for the remainir.g 
traffic flows wUch should be added to the traceable costs of ttis 
traffic. 
Finally, it should be noted that cost causation is best esta.blished by 
finding the peak period and studying the mix of tra.ins dt:ring this 
period since it is the facolities used. during this period which determine 
the capacity of the route. 
In conclusion it can be seen that ~ . A. T. S. is to adopt a system of 
negotiated rates ir a deregulated. environment then it will have to 
know much more n .an hitherto about: 
the variability of all costs with cbar.ges in traffic volumes, 
and 
(ii) the revenue and "attributable costO characteristics of 
traffics at risk in a reduction or increase in the volume 
of activity. 
It fe·How s that the nevI role cf cost analysis would be t c indicate how 
much railway and how much traffic .',; . A. T. S. should have and root 
how much to chare;e for the traffic. The l'rice to charge will be 
determined by referencEs to the market through negotiation with 
users. It is in this ser.se tf,at Joy suggests that Eritish r<ail which 
ope rates in sirT ile.r circumstances "will be rElating its long-ru r:. 
mar~inal costt' t v its prices, instead of tte other \\ay roune:.,,57 
3:9:2:3 uJ:::CI~,IUN W j LE::. FUr< Il':V 1:>,T:\,8]\JT PULICY 
The o bjective of the railway costing sys tem d escribed ir the previoL:s 
section would be t c' dc,ten:,ine a schedule of the attributable costs 
of the different tyr-es of traffics and routE's. Together with a schedule 
of negoti:t.ted rates this cost schedule would provid e the information 
51. ,Joy, S ., op. cit., p. 234. 
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necessary to apply the following decisions rules: 
(a) ::Steps should be taken to avoid costs if at negotiated 
competitive rates:. 
(i) all the traffic on a particular route cannot generate 
sufficient revenue to cover the costs attributable to 
the route; and 
(ii) .an individual traffio flow cannot cover its attributable 
costs. 
Ir. both cases the ultimate type of cost avoide.nce would be 
. to abandon either the traffic or route cencerned. In the 
case of a route however, cost avoid2.nC€ may, for example, 
take the form of a refusal to re·place an asset, or the 
replacement toy an asset of lower capacity, or limiting the 
route to freight traffic only. In the case of an ir ,diviC.ual 
traffic, an intermediate step in cest aveidance may be to 
qualify the a.cceptance of traffic to periods when there is 
spare capacity or to a nominated class of wagons available. 
A problem with cost avoidance is that more time elapses 
before a major cost ca.n be avoided than i s needed to 
incur a new ccst. The railways would however, he.ve to 
redirect its analytical efforts towards shortening the lag 
between the loss of trrcffic and reduction in costs since in 
a deregulated envire.nment "a transport organizaticn' 5 life 
i,,; one of acquiring and sheo.dine; traffics and acquiring amI 
shedding traffics ar.d e.cquiring anG shedding associr,ted 
costs. ,,58 The e ffect. of this decision rule is that no traffic 
will be carried ur..less it can a t least cover its a.ttributable 
costs so that most traffics will also be generating sufficient 
revenue to not only do this but also to mak e a contribution 
to non-attributable costs. It is important to note though 
that this d oes not imply cross-subsidiza.tion since even if 
5'8. Ibid., p. 234. 
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a particular traffic flow can generate er.ough r evenue to 
cover its attributable costs and still contribute to the 
attributable costs of other traffic on. the route, then the 
railways should still cease to offer its services to the 
latter traffic if it cannot cover its own attributa.ble costs. 
(b) Given that the goal of a public transport enterprise should 
be to maximize it.s service subject to a break even cor.straint, 
it follows that if the Nailways earns," :;,urplus on any route 
then it should consider expanding the quantitative and quali-
tative capac ity on thiE ro': te. The t<ailways will tflUE 
institute a progran me of investment designed to expaEd 
,:;;pacity on those routes where there is the greatest 
ccntribution to un attributable costs. The investment 
d ecision rules (a) an.d (b) would thus fLnction t o e nable 
the Rail"~.rs to adjust the capacity and cost of each 
facility to reflect the profitability of the traffic handled. 
In the next section the pricir g and investment rules will be eyaluated 
from the view[-oint of the tteoretical notion of cptirr ality. 
3:10 EVALUATICN OF "COrv:PETITIVE" Pt<ICI;\G AND 
3:10: 1 
Es sentially tit" investrcent dec'.sion rules described in the last section 
represents a practical a[-plication of the optimal investmer.t l'olicy 
discussed in Chapter Tw c . It will be rE'ca.ll ed that the aim of 
investment is to adjus t capacity to the level at which demand equals 
long run ma.rginal cost. If this capacity was at its optimal level then 
the price 'c;et equal to long run marginal cost would ger.erate sufficient 
revC':,ue to cover total costs so that in t.he 10IJg run the Railways would 
be aUe to ",ttain its long run oejec t cve of ILaximi:z:ing sr,rvice ,,' ubject 
tc a break even ccnstraint. 
However, as was also shown in Chapter Three the optimal applicaticn 
of this investment rulE depends on. railvlay facilities being completely 
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divioible and variatle in the long run. It is obvious though that in 
praet.ice railway facilities are indivisil::le over wide ranges of output. 
It may thus be the case that where a re·ute is not covering its 
attributable cost~, the only type of cost avoidance available to the 
RaU"ays may be to clc·se down the route. It will be recalled fr om 
s e ction 2:1:3 tha t where there are indivisibilities it is possible fcr the 
social benefits of continuing the operation of a loss-making facility t o 
exceed the costs that would be saved if it was closed down even if one 
accepts the Harbe r ger postulates that: 
the compe titive demand I'rice for a giVen unit measur es the 
value of that unit to the demander ; 
(ii) the competitive supply price for a given unit measures the 
value of that ucit 1.0 the supplier; and 
(iii) wh,n eval uating the net benefits or ccsts of a given action; 
the costs and benefit s accruing- to each member of t hE' 
relevan t groups should normally be added without reg-ard 
to the individuals to whom t hey accrue. 
This "as shown in Figure 2:9 where the net social benefit of ccntinuing 
to opera.te the r out e i s. measured by the d iffe r er.ce between t he area 
under the demand curve a t capacit y output and the tetal route capital 
a.rod n nnir g' costs. This measur e of net ,;oc;;o1 benefit may be under -
esti mated since it does not take account of t he' folle wing factors: 
(a) the revenue accruing to the traffic flows on othe r parts of 
the ra.ih uay network w bich are gener ated ley the traffic 
carried 2Jon€; unremunerative rot:.tes. In other w Grds, 
each route should not be viewed independently but one 
s l',ou ld also consid er its contribution t o the intl'rdepende nt 
syst.,m of r ailway line.s; 
(b) the ex t e rnal e,conomies. accruing t o fi rms and hoeseholds 
located in the regien served hy tte t:nref.1UnerativE' 
railway line . Where such external €conomie~ exist the 
d.emand price of a unit the rr.argi nal net benefit of the unit; 
and the area under the d e riland curve will no l onger measure 
a ll the social benefits resulting from the use of the line; aJ,d 
(c) the ", arginal social utility of income of the use rs of the 
unre Jr.une.rative railway line may bH great e r tban the natienal 
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average. McGuire and Garn59 have suggested that the net 
social benefit resulting from public projects in particular 
regions should be weighted ~y all "&-rea need indicG.tor". 
They suggested that tbE' "area need indicator" for region 
i, Ri, could be forn:.ulated as follows 
l<i = a E Ei 
c Y 
+ b yi 
d 
E 
where Ei represents the ratio between the na.tional average 
employment rate aDd the <..rea er.1ployment rate, Y/Yi, n.e 
ratic between the national median family incop,e and the area 
median family income, while the parameters a, b, c ,d, could 
be set to reflect the "welfare implications of area emplcyrr;ent 
and i7lcome statistics". 
The employment of sucr. an area ne<.'u indicator would indicate that the 
goverLment is not neutral about tr.e regional di~tribution. The social 
benefits resulting from the use of a ,railw2.y-linE' passing through a 
region with low level of employn'ent at median family income would 
receive a weighting significantly gr.",ter then one. 
It can thus be seen that where indivisibilities. externalities. interde-
pendencies and regionaL'inc'ome distribution ccnsiderations are taken 
into acccunt, it may be economica'lly justifiable fer tt.e Railways to 
continue tbe operation of certain loss-making lines. However, if 
tr.E' t<.ailways is to compete on equal tern' S with private road transport 
cpe rators it IT.ust receive a State subsidy to er~aLl e it to ccntinue 
ope rating these lines at a more or less pe rpetual loss . .:>ubsidizatic n, 
however, is not a costiess process although the costs of su bsidi."atiop. 
are difficult to quantify. If no additional revenue is raised loy the 
59. iVlcGuire and Garn, "The Integration of Eqcity and Efficie ncy 
Criteria in }'ublic I'roject "election", Economic Journal, 
December 1 969. 
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Tre asury to enable it to finance the losses on these lines, then 
scarce Treasury funds will be diverted from alterLative uses so that 
the cost of subsid ization can be measured in terms of the effects of 
reducing the public funds available for other uses. If it is decided 
to finance the subsidy by raising taxes the n there are likely to be 
ne t welfare losses since most feasible methods of taxation cause firms 
to make their production and e mployment decisions according to n 
i"Ltte rn of r e lative prices which is different (0 that faced by house-
holds. On the other hand, if the subsid y is financed from funds raised 
by the issue of gove rnme nt bond", this will have the effect of displacin g 
private sector borrowing on the capi.tal nle.rket and will cause an upward 
adjustment in the interest rate and consec,ueLtly the cost of fund s r ai"ed 
in this market. Regardles" of the way in "hich the subsidy is financed 
the r e is always .. the da.nger that whe re the S tat" undertakes t o subsidise 
t he l cs s-makirg operations of a public ente"'prise ~uch as the !(a ilways 
this wiil lead to a rel,,~,~, ti Ol'. of th~, pressure t o contain costs ar.d reduce 
"X-inefficiency" within these operations. In "urn, although the costs of 
a state subsidy in tern.s of its e ffec t on allocative efficioncy within the 
economy and preducti"e efficiency wi thin a public enterprise caD. not te 
properly quantified, they should. ne v e rtheless be taken into account 
in any decision concerning Y ... hetr~er or not to clcs8 down an Lnremun(;'rativ€:.' 
rail way route. 
J:1 0:2 h'ATl~:(j l'uLICY 
The tV!O main irr.plicntions of the d e r cg'ulation of the trar.spo rt sector 
for l..:ailwaj rating policy are that: 
(- \ 0. . : 
(b) 
tl'e b:ailv/ays would be exposed to i nteH"cdal competition fro m 
read transpc.r t ~o that it will have to negotiate IIcompetitive tl 
rates with its users; and 
the Eailwa.\'~, y;(.'uld be r e li e ved of it" cemmon carrier obli-
gations and could therefcre witbdraw its uneconomic 
services . Furthermore there would 1'.0 longer be a need t c 
cross-subs idize thes e i...!neconomie services by rai s ir. g the 
rat"s ct,arged 011 its other servic€·s. It follows that, as a 
general rule, the ' "'ailways would on ly ccntinue t eo perform 
its uneconomic ~oci~:.l obli ~;ation s if it r eceived financial 
compensation from the ::.t at8 . 
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As a. result of these changes in the basic constraints on rating 
policy, a process of adjustment in ratEs until they reflE·ct the costs 
attributable to the various traffic flows and routes should take place. 
r 'or instance, if the rate charged for a particular traffic has been 
kept artificially above its attributable costs in order to cross-subsidize 
uneconomic traffic flows, the J:<ailways will have to reduce this rate 
to forestall the lc'ss of this traffic to road transport operators if the 
statutory protection of the Railways against interIT.odal competition is 
removed. fhe monopolistic profits earned by any traffic flow are thus 
likely to be red~ced by increased idern':odal competition and the rates 
charged on t11ese traffic flo,", s may ter.d towards the level where they 
CGv(>r long run marginal costs. if marginal cost pricing principles 
arE adopted by the !<ailway it is possible that a surplus will be earned 
on routes with dense tra.ffic flows wr.ere rates are raised to reduce 
conge stion of the railway facilities . If the optimal investment policy 
outlined in this section is adopted these sc.rpluses. will only be temporary 
since the capacity of the &ailways will be expanded by investment so 
that rates will have to be reduced towards, the lEvel of attributable 
costs to er.sure that this expanded capadty is fully utilized. As has 
been seer., wherE' a deficit is incurred on a particula.r route, the 
!<ailways will h",v€ to take various \,:easurGS to reduce the level of 
service provided for this traffic until thE, deficit is eliminated. It 
ca;) thus be seen that the combined effects of ir.termodal ccmpetition 
and a flexiblE' inve stment policy should E'nst.;l'e that (,<ailwRY rates 
tend t"",arc; the fev e l where they reflect attributable costs. in th e 
case ~) f rates ne€:;otiated for long term contrE.cts, the rtaUways Vofould 
be rt'yuired tc ensure tha t these cover long rUG marginal cost. The' 
Railway rate structure is thus HI(ely to bear a closer relation to 
cost under a II cc·rr.petitive rr pricjng ana inVEstment }:olicy than it 
does at present. 
This may be R factor promoting more efficier.t intermoda.l coordination 
in tt-.e transport sector. If the prices charged by the diffr,rent modes 
of transport rdlc'ct the opportunity costs of providing them, thell it 
is likely that consumers will chcose thE' mode which can provide a 
particular transport service at tile lo"est cost. As a result the 
different modes of transport are likely to spec:ializp. in tt-,e provision 
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of those services in which they have a .competitive acyantage. As 
was shown in section 3:1 :4 the transport of goods by rail involves 
heavy terrrinal costs so that the comparative cost advantage of rail 
transport will improve as the length of haul increases. It does not 
follow that a particular distance shoulC. be laid down up to which 
direct delivery by road is cheapest and best, and above which it 
would be in the national interest to go by rail since, as Ponsonby 
has noted," in almost every ite m of cost the amount will vary according 
to the circumstances" • . 60 If the prices charged by the different modes 
reflect cost then the user will be able to take account of the particular 
circumstances facing him in deciding which mode to use. For example, 
even if a user normally ships his goods by rail, an emergency order 
may arise which cannot be met in sufficient time if the goods are shipped 
by rail but which can be rr:et if the shipment is made by truck. It can 
thus be concluded that the transport sector should be more efficiently 
co-ordinated if the process of intermodal competition and adjustment of 
rail capacity to demand causes railway rates to reflect cost to a greater 
extent than is now the case. 
'rhe economic impact of the Railways introduCing a cost-based t"riff 
policy in a deregulated transport environment has been evaluated by 
Kennedy. 61 The initial effect of this policy would be that some freight 
traffic would be diverted from rail to road transport since certain 
shippers, who under the current permit system are required to use rail 
transport even where it is less costly for nem to use road transport, 
would be allowed to exercise free modal choice. Shipper's modal 
choice would, however, not only be determined by the differences 
60. • Ponsonby, G.J . , Transport Policy Coordillation through 
Competition , I. E. A., Hobart Paper No.4?, 1969. 
6.. Kennedy, T .L., Economic Allocation of Transport 
Resources , Paper delivered at Annual Transport 
Convention, Johannesburg, July 1983. 
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between road and rail tariffs but also by the differer:ces in the quality 
of service provideci by each mode. For this reason Kennedy quantified 
the cost to shippers of using a mode with a higher average transit 
time in terms of the cost of capital tied up in inventory and the additional 
warehousing required for higher inventory levels. On the basis of his 
calculation of the cost to shippers of using either rail or road transport, 
Kennedy estimated that in 1980/81 approximately 1,18 billion ton 
kilometres (.f railVlay traffic would be diverted to road hauliers. 
Kernedy suggested that the overall impact of this diversion could be 
estimated in terms of: 
the benefits to the private sector which would rE·sult from 
reduced transport costs, productivity improv~ments 
arising from reduc€,d empty running of trucl:s and enranced 
equipment utilization and the additional traffic growth which 
would not have resulted if it were not for the increased 
availability of road motor transport; 
(ii) the reduction in net income of tLe 1<ailways r .esulting from 
the loss of revenue earning traffic and 
(iii) the increased da.mage to the roads and the increase of 
traffic congestion resulting from the greater volume of read 
haulier traffic. 
Although Kennedy's study is at the time of "riting, incomplete, his 
preliminary results indicate that the private sector benefits resulting 
from this traffic diversion will be significantly greater than the net 
income loss of the 1<ailways. Kennedy's analysis however, fails to 
taj{e into account the response of the Railways to the pressures of a 
competitive environment. It is probable that in a competitive environ-
ment the Railways would have a strong incentive to adopt measures 
which improve its operating efficiency anC: service quality and thereby 
help it to recover some of the traffic it loses to road hauliers. 
Furtherrr.ore, if the Railways pursued a fl Ex ible pricing strategy of 
l owering the rates on diverted traffic to pear the variable cost level 
and raising the rates on retained traffic, it could substantially reduce 
the impac:t of deregulation on its net income. I<ennedy' 5 method of 
estimating the economic impact vf traffic diversion may therefore ter.d to 
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understate the net economic benefits v;l;ich could be derived from the 
Railway I s applying the efficient pricing principles discussed in this 
Chapter within the framework of an equitably deregulated transport 
environCLent. 
There are, hewever, two problems which may arise in a der€gula.ted 
transport sector where the Railway I s adopts a I competitive I rating 
policy. 
(a) Firstly, Railways typically face the problem that there are 
often considerable lags in adjusting the leve l of capacity 
and cost to reflect the profitability of the traffic handled. 
Ir. particular, at any point in time there may be excess 
capacity because either; 
(i) the Railways has not yet completed a programme 
of reducing the cape .. city on unec onomic lines or 
(ii) traffic has not yet grown sufficiently to fully 
utilize capacity which has recently beem expanded 
by a large indivisible amount. 
In cases where there is excess capacity, the only costs 
which the Railways would incur in ac~epting additional 
traffic would be the marginal l 'unning costs associated 
with normal railway operations. According to marginal 
cost pricing principles, the Railway s should i n these 
circumstances, lower rates toward the level of unit 
running costs to attract additional trdfic in orde r to 
improve the l.tilization of unutilized c ap2.city. If this 
policy results in a deficit being inc urred then the 
Railways will need some short terrr. financial compell-
satior. to enable it to pursue efficient pricing polic i e s 
while c2,pacity and demand are 8djusting to a long run 
equilibrium. The application of this type of marginal 
cost pricing and investment policy may, howevc'r, mean 
that the cost and availability of rail servic e s will vary 
to a r, 'uch greater extent then is currently the cas e . This 
may lead to 2.n increase in tr.e risk and uncertainty associ-
ated with long term location and investment decisior.s in 
(b) 
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~outh Africa since it wculd involve a departure from the 
stable tariff structure and service availability conditions 
which have historically characterised the provision of 
railway services in this country. 
If the transport sector is del'eg'ulated the Ra.il'll£.ys will toe 
under pressure to lowEr it.s rates to reflect costs only 
if it faces effective intermodal competition. The Railways 
may, however, havlS a monopoly over the transport cf 
certain commodities with thE; result that a nceasure of 
external cOlltrol cover the tariffs set for these commodities 
will need to be exercised to ensure that they are ba,.ed on 
the long run llwrginal cost of conveying them. Furthermore 
it is conceivable t.]-,at even where ro"d hauliers do provide 
substitute services there may still be collusion between the 
Railways a.nd road hauliers witr. respect 1.0 the fixing of 
rates. There . are however, a number of factors which 
would malee it difficult for the Railways ar.d road hauliers 
to agree on fixing sub;tantially above competitively deter-
mined levels: 
(i) there ·are a large number of road hauliers and 
entry into tbis industry is relatively easy since 
capital costs are low in relation to operating costs. 
Furtherrr.ore [,lany firrr,s transport their goods in 
their own vehicles. It would thus be difficdt for 
the Railways to establish generally acceptablE' terrr,s 
of c:"Husion with sl,ch a l'umer(-us and diverse grcup 
of rivals. 
(i i ) as has been explained, the cost s tructures d road 
hauliers are different from these of tr,e Railways, 
mainly due to the fact that read operators do not 
have to incur the c[-,.pital cost of providing fDr their 
infrastrLcture. The Railways are thus likely to 
be faced to a greater extent with the pro bIen, of 
ad.justing their rates to improve the utilization of 
capacity and are therefore unlikely to agree with 
road hauliers on any comrr;on level of rates; 
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(iii) the transpol·t :.i€rvir.es provided by the different 
modes are betE,rogeneous in nature with the cost, 
speed, frequency and regularity to the user of the 
services provided by the different modes varying 
considerably according to the circumstances. 
The terms of rivalry are thus multidimensional 
and it. weuld be extremely difficult to reach any 
collu.sive agree meat to restrict interrr,odel rivalry. 
It can therefore be concluded that in a deregulat"c: transport sector 
inter-rr.odal ri,-alry is likely to exist on some services betw0.en ro[,d 
hat:liers and the Railways which will enSl·re that pressure will bE 
Flaced on the different modes to reduce rates to competitive levels 
and that t::ansport users "i:l be able to choose the mode prcvidirg 
a service at the lowest ",,;·;t. Thi~ rivalry is also likely to place 
greater pressure on the Railways te c,mtain "X-inefficier,cy" within 
the organization as described in sect.ion 3 :8 so that both. gre'ater 
prodt'ctive and a.llocative efficieilcy are lil:ely te rEsult from tbis 
policy. 
3: 1 0:3 INDU ST RLI,L DECENTHALI::3 .'\ Tl(;j\i 
If the transport sector is dere~ulated ard thc· Railways is allowed to 
negotic..te rates and withdraw its unrer.ll. nc:~~a tive servic€os then, as 
was shown in th e previous ~ection, railway }'ates are likely tG reflect 
cost more closely thac_ ·,·here they ar.· fonLulated a.ccording to 'vdue 
of service' principles. As a result th E' rate's ctarged OD. manufactured 
goods a .re- likely tv decrec..se r e lative to those .~ha.rged or. raw materials. 
Consequently tb ere rr.ight be a certain amount of decentralization t oward 
the raw mate.·rial source in those industries V\:hich proc8::~ :":' raw n~ateriah. 
fc.r intermediate or interindustry demand. Furthermore th E' recillction 
ir. the degree of taper as it t",,',ds t o rdlect Cust more than valu0 cf 
service '"By aflord some protection to l ccal industx'ies ill underdev c·loped 
rE'giop..s from c ~ lr.·petition frorr. industrie~ in the de veloped area!::. 
HowevE'r, the irr,pact on regional dE·velopmer,t of 1', change in the basic 
tariff ~. tr,-,cturE is "tOt likely to be significant since t.be effect of 
cbanges ir. raihHl.y rates will vary both in directior. and in mag'nitude 
between tbe different sectors. 
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lviore important weuld be the effect of relieving the Railways cf its 
responsibility to pron:lOte regional development where this conflicts 
with commercial principlns. This is necessary if the Railways is 
to c ompetl' on equal terms with road operators but it means that the 
Railway" n:ay have to close down unremunerative lines in underde-, 
veloped regions unless it receives adequate financial corr.peDsation 
frolr. the State or Regional Transport Autl:.ority. The closure cf 
railv.,ay lines in underdev€:.'!oped arE-:as anc': the expansion of t.he 
railway network in d eveloped areas may actually rHmlt in greater 
ir:eqllalities in r egional development since firms are unlikely to 
locate in areas "here there is an inadequate provision of transport 
sen' ices . It follows that any decisions by "the Railways to reduce 
the l evel of service provided in ltnderdeveloped area'" must be clcsely 
monitored by Regional Transport Authorities. If it is consid ered 
that regional transport needs cannot \:;e adeq'Jately met by thH existing 
}'oad ".ervices, t h",n suer, bodies n,ust have thH funds to su\:;sidi"e the 
continued opHration of loss-makin.; lines. In "0,;sidering the amount 
of subsidi"2.tion which should be paid to the Railways. the govHrnme nt 
should also take account of the consideratiens discussed in section 
3:2 sincE' the effect of a line closure is likely te· ba.ve national as well 
ae l'egional implications. 
If the Rai~\' ays i~; to be freed of i t s responsibility te pre.mote regional 
devGlo pment. it al~ 0 follows that it "i:l not have to grant spe<.:ial 
rebates to outgoing traffic frorL industrial development points where 
the l'€Vpnue earn8u en this traffic falls s hort vf the costs attributable 
to it. As has been ntenti oned these rebates are useful compcnents of 
prese"t ::.outh African decer:tralizatie·n policy since they compensate 
firrr,s located 3 t ind 'J strial (' < vele pITIent points for the lc.ng t .. rm cost 
di~. advantage of locating at a greater distance fro m the markets in 
the d e nsely pcpulated urtan are[Js of South Africa. It follows that 
the R.egional Transport Authority will have to off', r ' financial compen-
sation to ar.y transport operator which carries traffic at special ratc's 
from underdevelope d areas. 
It can be concluded that if the Raily,ays is to adopt competitive pricing 
and investment policies in a deregulated transport er,vironment then 
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this is likely to conflict witl> the objectives of regional policy. There 
will thus be the type of effici"r.cy / ",quality trade-·off discusseci in 
Chapter Two. As has been suggested the conflict between equality 
and efficiency should be recognized and dealt witt. by an adeq"ate 
division of respol'.sibility between the Railways and the State. The 
Raih"ays should tt us be required to pursue efficient pricing and 
investment policies and tr.e resulting' reg'ional inequalities should 
be dealt with by public regional policy. 
3: 11 CONCLUSION: SUMlviARY OF FIl\'DINGS AND RECOMI,,'ENIJATIONS 
In conclusion to this chapter the !".ain findings and recommendations 
will be summarized. 
(a) In form ulating goals for S. A . T . S. the State has had t o 
rec cgnize and reconcile conflicts between the demands 
made by the different groups interested in tt.e activiti€·s 
cf this orga.nization. Historically these conflicts have been 
reconciled by sequentia.l attEntion to the most pressing 
demands and ad hoc policy commitments to tt.e interest 
groups involved. This approach has tE'nded to postpone 
and not sntisfactorily reconcile the conflict between 
opposing intE'rest groups with the resl:lt that the current 
situation is characterized by a widening polarization 
between the intE,rests of :::: . A . T . S. management and its 
users and competitors . To break this impa.sse it is 
sugges ted that there should be a clearer definition of 
::;. A. T :::;. objective" and a delineation cf its duties and 
reSljOnsibilities acco'rding to the principle that a railWay 
utility should n1aximi>:e its service subject tc a breaJ..-
even constraint. To fac ilitate this apFroach, the recomm-
er,daticn by the Fransz€·n Commission that :,: . A. T. S . should 
not be required to provide uneconomic social services 
unless they are fir..anced throug'h a State subs idy should be 
implemented. 
(b) lt appe ars that the protection from interrr.oda.l ccmpe tition 
wl:ich is afforded to S. A. T . S. through the currer;t pe rmit 
syster.1 has t ended to promote inefficiency in the frei ght 
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transport sector by restricting consumer's freedom of 
modal choice. Deregulation of the tr·ansport sector would 
reduce the tl'unsport and distribution costs. incurred by 
shippers by enabling tl:em te choose the most efficient 
transport mode and would place pressure on S. A. T • S . 
to seek ways to retain the share of the freight marke t 
by cetting costs and reducing X-inefficiency, improving 
the quality of service and introducing new services, 
prode.ctie..n techniques and organizational methods. Dereg-
ulation should nc,t, however, be undertaker. in a piecemeal 
manner by simply relaxing the permit system since this 
could seriously undermine the financial pe,..fc.rmance of the 
R.ailways. The State should therefore atteGlpt to ensure 
that intermodal competition t.akes plac0 on equal terr.1S by 
introducing an equitable system of road user charging, 
subsidizing uneconomic rail services and allcwing S.A. T.S. 
greater flexibility in determining its tariff structure and level 
elf service. 
(c) The present fre i ght tariff policy of S. A . T . S . appears to be 
be characterized by an excessive rate differential between 
high-rated and lew-rated commodities laq;ely because the 
rE,venue der1ved frem transporting high-rated commodities 
is needed to cress-subsidize the losses incurred on other 
rail services. If the Railways i s relieved of the burden of 
cross-subsidization and it it is allowed to negotiate rates 
with its custor.·ers below those published in thE. offici-al 
tariff scales, then this differential is likely to be narrowed 
to the extent that it largely reflects the differences in the 
costs of transporting different commodities. If this is the 
case, rdl tariff~. will signal to consumers the approximate 
opportunity cost of choosing this mode. 
(d) Route ces t differentials are presently not reflected in 
Railway freight tariff~ with the result that Lnremunerative 
routes tend to be cross- subsidized from the revenue earned 
by more profitable routE'S' If the Railways is to become 
more competitive in a deregulated environment, it is suggested 
that it should design a costing system which attrit:utes costs 
(f) 
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to different routes and different traffic flows on routes. 
This would provide the Railways with tt,e information 
necessary to adjust the capacity of services to reflect long 
run marginal cost. The substantial losses incurred '::oy 
Railway passenger services should be dealt with through 
a policy of rationalization rather than by raising tariffs. 
Although it is desira ble for unremuneocative social services 
to be financed by tr.e Stat£·, there iE a need for the State 
to control the establishment of new services to prevent the 
burden on the Treasury from escalating. More efficient 
utilization of passenger snrvices could also be obtained 
through the introduction of peal: period price differer.tiation. 
It has been suggested that the large differential between 
the rates charged for lT,anufactured goods and raw IT.aterials 
may have encourc.ged some ir.ciustI'ie~ to lccat€ near their 
mar:cets rather than tf.eir raw material source, but it is 
unlikely that the Railwa.y-tariff structure ha" been a Eigni-
fie ant factor influencing the spatial, distribution of economic 
activities in South Africa. The current system of rebates 
offered to firms trar.sporting comn, odities from industrial 
development points has in any CEse ter.ded to compensate 
mandacturers at these points for the high railage COE.tS 
incurred aE· " result of Joce.ting at relatively great distance 
from the main urban are8 s. If the Railways is forced to 
close down unremunerative lines to remain cor..Jpetitive this 
may affect the availability of transport services in underde-
veloped areas. It is therefore necessary for R.egional 
Transport Authorities to be establisloed to ensure that 
regiopal transport needs are being provided, 
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~HAPTER FC-UR 
ELECTRICITY 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the tariff policy of the Electricity Supply Commission 
(Esc om) in South Africa will be investigated and evaluat.,d according 
to the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter Two. Befcre 
this can be done it is necessary to first examine the characteristics 
of electricity supply and demand which are likely to affect the tariff 
policy of an electricity utility, and then to consider how a tariff 
structure can be practically formulated which reflects rr.arginal cost 
pricing principles since this can be used as a standard against which 
to compare tice existing tariff policy of Escom. 
4:1 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
4:1 :1 THE SYSTEM OF GENERATICN Al'iD TRP,NSMISSION 
Turvey has described the characteristic features of an electrical 
power system as follows: 
"At ~lny ncoment in time, an electrical power system can be regarded as 
consisting of a nuncber of nodes, all of which are linked to some of 
the others by transmission lines. Each r:ode contains generating 
capacity and/ or a load to be met •• , •• The lc-ad to be met at any 
node is the load of a distribution ne twork so that such a node is a 
point where transformers reduce voltage to distribution voltage and 
the current is fed into the distribution network supplied by the node. ,,1 
1 • Turvey, R., Optimal Pricing and Investr.1ent in Electricit.Y. 
Supply - An Essar in Applied Welfare Economics, AllEn 
& Unwin Ltd., London, 1968, p. 1. 
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The total load of a power system is therefore the sum of the loads of 
the ccnsumers served by the network plus its distribution losses. 
In IT.uch of the literature dealing with the application of the theory 
of marginal cost pr icing to the problem of formulating an optimal 
tariff structure for an electricity utility, it is usually assumed that 
the power sYEtem is operated in an optimal IT.anner. In this section 
the conditions for the optinal operation of a power system in both the 
short and long run will be c onsiderec • 
A. SHORT ,;:UN Ol'TIl\lIZATIOl'l 
To illustrate the r.ature of the Ehort run optimal solt.tion to the problem 
of operating a power system, the special case of a system of two nodes, 
with each node being a peint at which a thermal generating plant is 
operated and a giver. 102.d requirement is supplied, will be exnn,ined . 
if t.he two nodes WE're not connected by transmission lines then the 
load reqdrEment at each node would. have to be entirE·ly by its 
generating plant. b ov!<,;ver, in the case where the two nodes arE 
connected loy transmissic·n lines and the margiLal cost of generation 
at node 1 , m1 , is greate:- thaI! tloat at node 2, the electricity utility 
would reduce its fuel and tra.nsport costs by generating electric.ity 
is excess of the load requirement at node 2 and transmitting it to 
node- 1 where the electricity generated should be less than the lead. 
:::;inc£' capacity-related ccsts will be fixed in the short rUL, it follows 
that short run optimization i.nvolves meeting tbe giver. loac requirement 
by operating the generating pIc nt Lt €ach node at the level wilere fuel, 
trar.sport and other running ccsts are minimized. In this eX2.rr·ple, 
the nlinimization of the~,e costs "'ill occur 'When the transmission of 
electricity from node 2 to node '1 has reached the level where thE' 
difference between the marginal generating c c st at each node is 
proporti onal to the incrementc.l transri'ission loss, I. The condition 
for short run optimization is therefore that: 
m1 _. m2 
1 -I 
This implies that the incremental co::t of increasing the load by 
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1 kilowatt-hour (kWh) at node 1 must be the sarr,e whether the extra 
unit is generated at node 1 or is prcvided by generating and trans-
mitting marC' from node 2. It follows from this optimality condition 
that once the marginal cost of generation tas been calculated at any 
one node, the marginal cost at every other node can be calculated 
by making adjustments for incremental trans.nission losse s along 
the network. AS will be sh ow 1.'. in section 4:3 this considerably 
redv.ces the computational difficulty ir·volved in forrr.ulating a 
margir:.al cest baEed tariff structure, 
if a network is being operated in a manner which satisfied the 
optimality condition 4.1 , then the marginal generating cost at each 
node VI ill toe g'iven and it is possible to deterr:·jne which stations 
should operate and at what rate, how by Lour. Turvey explains 
heurly optimization as follows: 
"At any given hour the system has a certain number of geHerating 
plants. Some of these will not be avaikble for lS·eneration beca.use 
they are undergoing repair or overtaul. Those which are available 
can be arranged in merit order, i, e, accordir:..g to tr.eir rr.arginal 
generating cest~. The i'n,d required during the hour in questicn 
can be most cheaply met by runnin[; the highest merit (lowest 
rr.arginal cost) plant, then the next and so on until total generation 
2 
ec;ua ls the give·n load. " 
It is clear t hat once account is taken of transr:' ission le·sses and 
ccnstraints, this problem becomes more ccrnplicat.,d 2.1thou[h the 
general condition for optirr,um stated above remains valid. Turvey, 
however notes that ever. in tl e ab!':ience of transmission constraints 
the plant available dllring an ) hcur Ir,ay not always be run in full 
merit order. j'le lists the folle·wing reasons fer thj~: 
------
2. Ibid .. , p. 8. 
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"(a) at certain times of day, demand rises faster than the rate 
at which a conventional thermal plant can be brought up 
to full Ie ad; 
\b) there is a minimum time of several hours for which it is 
economic to shut down conventional therrr.al plant; if 
demand is expeeted to rise again within a shorter peri cd 
it i;; chea.per to run at minimum load and correepondingly 
reduce the load on other plants with slightly lower 
marginal cost than to shut down and then use heat in 
bringillg' the plant up to speed; 
\c) the unused capacity of the plant with the highe st margiEal 
cost among those running may be IE,ss than is desired 
to meet the risk of sudden increase in demand 0 ••••• 
and the risk of a sudden outage of generating plant. 
It will then be nece ,,· sary to have several plants running 
with spare capacity to provide the required reserve. ,,3 
Although these complications do have a.n important effect on the 
day-to-day operation of the system, they playa much less signifi-
cant role in broad system planning and in the costing of load 
increments for the purposes of forrrulating a tariff structure. It 
will be shown in section 4:3 that the general principle of hourly 
optimization gives rise to the uSeful proposition that the short rur.. 
marginal cost of generation is equivalerrt to the marginal generating 
cost of the plant which is used last in merit order to meet any lcad 
increment. 
LONG-RU t-< OPTIMI2',ATION 
in the long run an electricity utility will be concerned with planning 
the installation of generating and transmission capacity to meet 
3. Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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forecasted load requiremer.ts. The benefits derived from installing 
a new generating plant largely consist of the fuel savings which 
arise as a result of using plant with a lower marginal generating (;ost, 
mi, thaD. that of the "marginal" plant, m. The present value of such 
fuel savings, PV(S), can be represented as: 
pv(S) = PV(ii. - mila (4.2) 
where a is unity when the new plant is operating and z ero when it is 
not. Now an incremer.t to one year's plant :Jrogramme of 1 klV of 
g·enerating capacity will result in a IIet change in th e present worn. 
of all system's cost of: 
k - pViii-. - mila + P V(Rj (4.3) 
wh ere k represent s the unit ca.pital cost of the ):lant and R d'",'otes 
the annual rr. air,tenance and olanning costs of keeping the plant in 
operation .. The exprt.ssion (4.3) is equivalellt to thE~ long run. marginal 
cost of f,eneration. 
In deciding on what type of plant to install , the electricity utility 
should aim to adjust tr,,, existing plant mix towards an optimal IT,ix 
at which it would r.ot be pcssible to redLce the preSE,nt worth of all 
syste[f, ccsts by substituting bet weell the capacity of any plants in 
the system. If A denotes "Ule allllUltized v<:;.·.lue 0f" ~ ihen the 111arginal 
condition for optimal plant mix is that the value of 
A (k - PV(m - miJa) + 1'( 
l'e the safT,e for all plant used ;.fi the s y s tem. It i ,; possible that the 
optimal plant mix may·cor. tain a number of d iffe "cl't types of plant 
sueh co.s! 
gas turbines which have a low cavital C(2t peT klV, and 
high IT arginal cost per kWh ; 
(ii) thermal plant which has a high capital e ost per kW and 
low marginal cost per kWh; (.r 
(i ii) hydroelectric or nucle'll' plant which has a very leigh capital 
c os t per kiV arid an extremely lew marginal cost per· kWh. 
240 
It follo,,'s that in choosing the type of new plant to be included in its 
plant programme, the electricity utility will usually face a trade--
off between savings in capital and in fuel costs. It is usually the 
case that an electricity utility uses hydroelectric and thermal 
plant to meet the base I02_d requirements which are likely to occur 
in every period while gas turbines are used to meet the clectr';city 
require rLents which are expected to arise only during periods of 
peak demalC.d. Furtherraore it is likely that a number of different 
vintages of each type of pknt may be operated. If it is assumed 
that technical progress is embodiec in newer vintage of plant in the 
manner suggested by Salter 4 , then it follows that each vintage of 
plant will shift down the merit order of operation as newer vintages 
with greater efficiency of fuel use are installed a.s part of an ongoing 
investment programme. lhis programme should be conducteC in such 
a way as to minirr.ize the present worth of system costs by ensuring 
that the D1arginal condition that the value of A(k - pv(ffi - mila) + R 
be the same for all generating plant, is satisfied in the long run. 
In planning a programme of investmeiC.t in transmission the electricity 
utility should balance tile cost:.; per k\\' against the ber..Bfits of 
expandir.g the transmission capacity. Two types of benefits c·an be 
derivc·d fl'c·m exp8.nding transmission copacity : 
(i) 
4. 
firstly, it may be t he case that it is not possible to 
operate the systerc, in the optimal manner indicated by 
conditioD 4.1 since transnlission lines may be loaded to 
full capacity. Thus if, for exan:ple, ml . > m2/l -1 due 
to a transmission capacity constraint tr.en the expansion 
of the capacity of the lines linking the two nodes· will 
enable the electricity utility tc save fuel and transport 
Salter,W.E.G., Prc.cluctivity and Technicai Change, 2nd ed., 
Cambridge, 1966. 
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costs oy substituting the electricty generated at node 2 for 
tnat generated at a higher cost at l!ode 1 ; 
(ii) seccnnly, the expap"i c'll of the capacity of the tl';cl'smissicn 
lines may actually reduce t.r.u.nsmission los"es along these 
lines. 
T ransmis"ion caF-acity ~. I,olild ! : 'e·refore be expanded to tI,e optin ,al 
level, when; th" prese;;t wort!: of these benefits is eqliivalent to the 
c&.pital cost of an il~crement in trar:smission capul'.lr.: ; 5 1\0 nccount 
has yet been taken of tl", dfect. vf risk and uDet)rtainty on planning. 
This will be considered in the next sectioJ1. 
l'f.CERTAINTY AND RESE!<v E PLANT lV,A!<GINS 
In ~lanning the expansion of a ::ystel.&l of i:if'.llel'at.: un a~ld tl: r..:;:E.missiun, 
;. 
a; .. 6lectricity !!t)lity ,,,.i11 face the following types c,r riSK: 
\i) future load requir0mentc; n,ay differ from levels 
forecast.·; u; 
\ii) actual YV i.;.: C:i . til:~.l c:onCitif)nS may deviate from standard 
wcc..tLel' cono itloIls ; 
(.I.ii) cielays in the c;'JIlstrur.:tion of new plant and 'Jeplai);l c:tl 
outugc s "·,a ,, aff ecl the p l ar,r;ed ayaila):!lity of j: lant; and 
(iv) ther" /l' < .. r be unexpected deye:opment in techn(,logy anc'. 
relati v e input prices. 
Turvey assesses these djJler·enL t) pes of risk as folIo" s: 
" •.•. , weather and availability risk can ce dealt with in tE,rrr.s of 
frequency districutions, they can be the subject of probabilil.j 
calculaticns of more 0:-' If-::.:lE sophistication according" to the availability 
c f data. The pure forecasting risk ca.n be t ! 'Eated in a similar ma.nner 
by the arbitrary but useful exredient of attributing a certain variaO'lce 
t(, forecastiq( errors in t.he light of experience and hope. T he 
5. Turvey, R., 2E.!.~!!., dE'rives this optimality condition 
mathematically on p. 23. 
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uncertainty about prices and tecbnology, however, can be expressed 
in probability, terms only if engineerin!: planners are prepared to 
express their guesses as subjective probability distributions, 
something which SN'ms unlikely. ,,6 
If uncertainty about prices and tecbnology is ignored al!d it is ass umed 
that forecasti r.g, weather anc: a" ailability risks can be expressed in 
probability terms, then the optimal operation of It system requires 
that the mean expectation of the present worth of syste.1: cost~ be 
minimized. 
The problerr. cf risk and uncertainty mainly in'pinges on the planning of 
electricity geno:ation and transmission with rE·spect to detem!ining 
the approrriate size of the margin of capac ity OVGr a"d above that 
required to meet tbe most probable dema .. "d . Figure 4.1 shows the 
probability distribution of peak demands in standard weather cor.diticns 
in, say, year t T 6. q is the most prob,,-ble dema.nd bLt, if it is 
assul1'.ed that the distribution is "ormal, than tf.ere is n 50 per cent 
probability that peak demand will actually exceed Ci. The consequencr, 
of excess demand would be "load-·shedding" - zome consumers have 
to be completely deprived cf the e;<cess demand so that output is 
J·eE.trained te capa.city. If planned cal'ac-ity output were to exceed q, 
howevor, the risk of excess der.land would be less since the area of 
the dif?triblJtion abcve; it ,"ould be sr.;nller. Giv e n the precise para-
meters of the prubability distributic·n f(q), the probability that demar.d 
will exceed capa.city can be fcund fc·r each possible 1e.,,(·1 cf c"pacity 
outr·ut. The plar.ners ca.n thE·n choose a "critical risk level" or 
probability that demar..d will exceed capacity, shown by tte area II* 
i(-
in Figure ·' .1 and founc. the capacity output corre!"ponding to this, q . 
There will thus be a margin of capa.city output over most likely odpll! , 
6. Ibid., p. 61. 
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z* = 11* - q. Consequently there is a margin of installed capacity 
* over tte capacity most like ly to be required, K - K. 
Berrie states that, in practice, the choice of the risk level is based 
on a "risk standard which enables the good inage of electricity at 
larg'e to be mair"tuined but without committing those consumers to too 
heavy a capital l::urden. ,,7 
T here is therefore iI. trade-off between cost ar.d risk . If the objective 
of thn investment in the capacity margin is to maximize Det sccial 
benefit then it follows that capacity should incre&.se up to the point 
where the marginal sccial benefit of the recuced risk of supply 
interrupti or. just equals the marginal cc·st of add i.ng to capacity. 
In practice it is thovght tc be ;r-,possible to measure n.is marginal 
svcial benefit., so that tr.e capacity margin decision must be made to 
maintain "the good image of electricity". In effect this n:eans that 
tt.e capacity margin is determined by planner's prEfE-rences. If 
adequate contl'ol is to be exercised ever the public enterprise then 
this decision should be made by a planning body independent of the 
daily management of thEe' electric i ty utility. There are two kinds of 
effects of powe~j" cuts which may concern planner". The immediatE 
effects are public irritation, criticisr., and political pressure. The 
longer run effect may be a decline ill the growth of electricity demand, 
as Ct'nsumers switch to s ubstitutes for electricity whose supply seems 
to be more reliable. These must obviou.sly be "eig'hed a.gainst the 
costs of spare ca.pacity determining tile margin. 
7. Berrie , T • II' ., "The Ec onomic s of System PI" .nning in Bulk 
Electricity Suppl."" in Public Enterpris~, R_ Turvey ed. , 
Peaguin, Harmondsworth, 1 968 . 
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4:1 :3 THE ~)ySTEM OF DISTRIBUTION 
The system of distribution is much less capable of analytical treatment 
than generation and transmission, because the concept of overall 
syster,1 optimizat;'on has r,o meaning in the case cf distribution. In 
contrast iC C generating capacity which can be sl:bstituted for capacity 
in another part of the country, provided that there is sufficient 
tranEmission capacity, "each part of the distribution system is specific 
to the consume).-s served ~.;y it, ,,8 Cons0quently there is a significant 
difference in inv~stment planning in tha.t investr;:ent in genera.tion and 
transmission c"pacity is related te total load growth and the charac-
teristic s of the whole geneL'ating syst.em whereas investment in 
distribution is usually "nothing but the sum of a very large r,umber of 
individl'.al schemes, e:ich detHrrrined by t[,e prospective growth of 
load in relation to distribution capacity in a particular locality or by 
a need t.o replace a particular unsafe or absolete piece of equipment, ,,9 
For example, the capital expenditure required to meet the electricity 
requirements of a new factory will "ary conslderably according to 
the lecation of !.t.e fc.ctory in relation to existing supply lines, their 
voltag'e 18,' el and their present leading. It follows that ir ... contrast 
with generation and transmission, information about costs cannot be 
obtained 2. S a by-prodl'.ct of a general optimizB.tion procedL<re so 
that. it is nec€.ssary to adopt an inductive approach to costs in the 
case: J distribution. 
The fundion of a p& l ticular distribution neh'ork is to forward the 
energy availa ble :it eac h node of the transmission sys t em to final. 
consumer:.; . F igure 4.2 illustrates the distribution network frolT. 
node B to a number of consumers C1 , C2 •.. Cn. The capacity to 
8. 
9. 
Turvey, R., op. cit., p. 68. 
Ibid., p. 68, 
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bE> provided for the cOllr.ection of nach client is directly det.ermined by 
the lllaximum demand of t.he client. It is, however, unnecessary t" 
give the transmission line AB a capacity equal to the maximum demands 
of each consumer. The peak usag'es of each may be systematically 
staggered with respect to the others, and, even supposing that they 
occur at the same time, the uncertain nature of each of the instant-
aneous demands CH,at . .,s a very slight probability that all customers 
will use their maximum capacity at the same time. 
As '." as explained in. the prc-;' ious section, the capacity to be installed 
qo should include capacity z in excess of the most probable derr,a.nd 
q, at the time of the peak, i. e •. 
qc = q + z (4.5) 
where z ~ Lg (4.6) 
HerE' g designates a pax'a meter charac-teristic of the random irregul-
10 
arity of thE' collective demand at the time of the peak and L denotes 
the Lagrangean multiplier. The capacity margin should becorr:e 
, larger with incre:u;es in the irregularity g of the demand. 
Individual d em£.nds are also uncertain and therefore require the 
distributor to allow for a margin over theIr average value at peak, 
qi. However, thi" margin is affected not only by an irregl!.larity 
parametEr gCi but also by a correlation parameter Ci measuring 
tI-.e tendency for the accidental peaks of the cop-sumer to coincide 
with thE' irregular behaviour of other customers. A low ,due for 
Ci thus describe£. a tEndency for the uncertainties of customer i 
to be partially offset by the "et of uncertainties of other consumers, 
1 O. The time of the peak will be made up of all hours during 
which a peak may appear "ith a certain probability. 
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while a high value for Ci indicates a tendency for these individual 
uncertainties to be adc!.ed to the uncertainties of the collective 
demand. Consequently, a given irregularity will be responsible for 
higher irregularity margin to the extent that it is accom.panied by a 
higher value of Ci. 11 
The responsibility of customer i for the collective c[cpacity margin 
z = Lg will be characterized, up to a factor, by the product of the 
two parameters Ci and gi 1. e.: 
z = Lg = L 4 Cigi 
1 
(4.7) 
The necessary capacity for the line segment AB may therefore be 
expressed as a ['unc tion of the characteristics of each individual 
consU!ner, in the forrr.: 
qo = ~ (~i + LCi. oil (4.8) 
,V ow siEce the collective safety margin is 
z = Lg 
and the coefficienl.E Ci which enter into the summation 
g _. t Ci gi 
are less than 1 , it fe llows that the collective sa fe ty margi n z is 
smaller than the s"m of the i ndi.v idual safety margins 
z <~ zi 
11. The ma thematical equivalents of the parameters qi, Oi Ci 
are the rr,ean, the standard deviation a"d the coefficient 
of cOrl'dation, respectively. 
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This implies that the capacity necessary for the line segment feeding 
'a node is always less then the sum of the capacities being fed. This 
pheacmer,on of reduction dee to "diversity" tecome-s more important 
for a districution network serving a large number of individual 
demand5. 
4:2 THE DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY 
4:2:3 DETERMINANTS OF ELECTRICITY LEl'vIA ND 
The demand for e lectricity is a dE'rived demand. E lectricity is not 
demanded for itself but for how it can be used by suitable equipment 
to convert electrical energy into other forms of energy such as 
heat, light, sound and moticn. The use of electricity is therefore 
l..sually not possible without expenditure by the consun,er on electrical 
appliances and complemer.tary gocds. Thus as Hermann has noted 
" •..•• (the) demand for e lectricity and the elasticity of (this) demand 
with r e gard t o both price anei income, i£ conse quently d e t e rmi ned not 
only by the absolute- level of tr.e price of electricity as suc h but also 
by the cost of a.ppliances, the uniqueness of the function for which 
the appliance is ,, :sed, the existence of substitute appliances using 
other forms of energy and the price of competitive forms of energy." 1 2 
F urthe rmore , it is also often the ca£e that E:quiJO-ment which uses 
elecVicity as ;t.s energy S0urce is electricity specific aEd cannot 
us e e.ny othe r a lternative scurce of energy . This means that in 
conside ring the individual consumption behaviour which underlies 
t h e dC-'''0stic consumer's demand for electriCity or.e must disti nguish 
between the individual c or.Sl:mEr' s clec:sioI'. about whether or not to 
r,urchase an electrical applial".ce a !ld his dec is; or. about the amount of 
12. He rmann, G . F' • K., Electrici!v Tariffs, Unpublished D. Comm. 
The sis, Unive rsity of Stellenbosch, 1974, p. 8-1. 
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electricity to use once the appliance has been acquired. A si.milar 
distinction car: be made with respect to the individual decisions which 
undel'ly the demand for electricity for indt:.strial, commercial, mining 
and traction uses. Here electricity is regarded as an input into tbe 
production process a.nd the decision makel" will often be concerned 
with the price of electricity insofar as it affects, lirstly, the choice 
between a finite number of production processes with different 
electricity requirements and, secondly, the amount of electricity te be 
used by a particular production process once it has been adopted. 
The influence of the price of electricity on the decision to purchase 
all a.ppliance or to adopt a particular production process will depend 
or.. the cost of electricity in relation to the cost of equipment and the 
cost of alternatlVe nnE'rgy used by substitute types of equil=-ment. 
The cost of electricity is related to both the price of electricity and 
the amount of electricity required to use the equipment, and it is 
generally the cz.se that the demand for electrical ec;uipment is inelastic 
with res~,ect to the price of electricity where the equipment has low 
energy requirements, ",,0 the cost of electricity is low in relation to 
the cost of the equipment. Examples c·f appliances !;s ed by domestic 
consumers where the decision to acquire the a.ppliance is almost 
cc·mpletely uninfluenced by the price of electricity are T. V ., radio, 
sound reproduction equipment and varicus sn:all appliances used ir.. 
the home. However with ap['liances used in cooking, food prepar-
ation, water and s['ace heating and air conditioning, the cost "f 
electricity is high in re k tion to the cost of nquipmGil' and the same 
functions ca.n be performed by substitute 2.ppliances using other forms 
of energy so that the price of electricity may hecol'1e an importLnt 
factc.r in the decisior, to acquire such equipment. 
Once an electricity appliance has been purchased or the electrical 
equipment used in a productic,n process has been installed the price 
of electricity can usually only affect the "'-lY,oum of electricity use d 
by the particular electrical equipment. In cases where a minimum 
ar:oount of electricity is required for the normal operation of the 
equipment so that a reduction in the electrical power used belo;" 
this minimum would prevent the equipment from adequately performing 
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the function for which it was purchased, the amount of elect.ricity 
used will be highly inelastic with respect to changes in the price 
of electricity. A refrigerator is an example of an appliance for which 
electricity demand becomes highly price inelastic once it has been 
purcha""d since a fixed amount of electricity is necessary for its 
regular use. Equipment used for water-heating or air conditioning 
provide examples of electrical equipment for which there is a mlch 
less definite limit to the amount of energy that .nay be demanded ty 
tt,e consumer sc that changes in the price of electricity influer.c e its 
cons umption l:,y these types of e quipment ever: after they have been 
purcha~ ed. 
An individual decision maker's demand for electricity is thus determined 
by H.e energy requirements of the electrical equipment Le uses or 
plans to use , It is very difficult to graphically represent on individual 's 
eltlctricity derdand since much of this demand consists of energy blocks 
of fixed ,,,idth within which tho c;uant..ity demande d is almost completely 
ine lastic. As Hermann ha:= commented: 
!lTLe blocks cf demand do not form any conti-
nuous pattern and the number of derr:and 
blocks will depend on the appliances available 
tc the::. c.onSllmer. 111 J 
The discontinuities which characterize individual e lec tricity demand 
will however tl'r·d to disappear when oPO con"iders groups of consumers; 
thi s is due to the factors Euch as the variation in consuml'-! !' habits, 
consumption pat1..,rns relative demand intensitiec' and tte law of large 
numbers, anc on", eonld expect a group demand (!urve to ce a conventional 
continuous downward sloping fl nction. The pattern of individual demanci 
should, however, be reflected in the tariff structure since electricity 
tariffs affect eaell consum€·r individually, which is one of tte reasons 
13. Ibid., p. 8-4. 
252 
why many electricity utilities adopt a two-part tariff structure is 
because it causes the average price of electricity paid by each 
consumer tv fall as he incn,ases his electricity consumption and 
therefore discriminates against his price inelastic demand in favour 
of his price elastic dE,mand for electricit.y. In other words, each 
consumer will consume a minimum amount of electricity in uses for 
which the cost of electricity is low in. relation to equipment cost 
and there are no alterrative energy sources and will be unlikely 
to reduce his electricitJ' consurr,ption below this minimum amount 
even when the i:nposition of a. two-part tariff results in him paying 
a high average price fe,r this first block of consumption. Furthermore 
this two-part tariff will encourage the consumer to expal'd his consump-
tion of electricity in uses where there are availatle substitutes 
. 
sinCE' t.bis will result in a reduction in the aye rage priCE' he pays for 
electricity. 
4:2:2 SECTORAL COKSU1vIP'fluN 10 J' TTERNS 
Since electx'icity cannot be stored,any unexpected fluctuation i n its 
d emand will directly affect the utilization of the systpm. It follows 
that in formulating its tariff and capital developmer.t policy an 
electricity utility reeds-to ascertain whether the re are any regulari-
ties in the pattErn of demand a.nd consumption of the main consumer 
groups. The consuP'ption 2.nd demand pattern of industrial consumers 
is normally dEpendent on the nature of production processe~, the degree 
Of mecr.anisation, the ty pe of mactinery used and tl1e number of shifts 
,,"orked. In the case d corrmercial consumE,rs, the incidence of peak 
and off-peak perioes is det.'rnlined by shop and office h ours , light.ing 
conditions, seasons, displays and the like, while the peak energy 
demand of electricity used for traction will, fo ,o nx ampl.", depend on 
the rail traffic flow. It is usually not difficult to ascertc.in the expected 
consumption pattnrn fc·r such consumer catt~gories:. However, in the 
case of domestic consumers, it is usually more difficult to predict 
the pattern of consumption since, as Herrnann has suggeste<i, this 
"is likely to vary under the influence of >,ocial changes, types of 
entertainment available fashion, eating habits, climate etc." It is 
therEfcre necessary for an electricity utility to frequently investigate 
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changes in these consumption patterns to deterrrine whether its 
estimates of peak and off-peak, daily and seasonal electricity 
usa.ge are reas()Eable. 
A:2:3 GI<OWTH IN nlE DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY 
Growth in the demand for ele'ctricity may be ca.used by either an 
increased dem2.r.ti from existir:g consumers or due to the connection 
of new consumers. In a dual economy s uch as Soutt. Africa, there 
is still scope for growth in electricity demand as electricity supply 
facilities are made av"ilabIE' to the economica.lly less developed 
groups of the population. An example of this would be the proposed 
electrification of S ()weto. In the devdoped sector of the ec onomy , 
however, derr.and growth is likely t o almost entirely arise from 
increased consumption by existing consumers, which may be due 
either to increased use cf existing appliances or the introduction 
of new uses. It is now necessary tv bring this analysis of the demand 
and supply of ele'ctricity toge ther to consid(~r how an electricity 
utility can practically implement a marginal cost pricing policy. 
4:3 THE FORMULATJON OF A MARGINAL COST-BASED 
TAfI.IFF STRUCTURE 
It will be recalled from Chapter Twt' that the adoption of a marginal 
cest f-ricing policy by a puhlic en.terprise would basically i nvolve 
applying the following rules: 
(i) setting price ec;ual t o short run marginal cost (SRMC) 
wl,en there is excess ca.pacity; arid 
(ii) allowing price te ration demand to the l evel of fix., d 
capncity when ~apacity is fLily utilized. 
Wher. the system is optima.lly planned and operated. in tt.e manner 
described in section 4:1 , tt.en the price set ace ording to these 
rules will just cover long run marginal cost (LRMC). In this 
section the following stages in the formulation of a margina.l cost 
based tariff structure will be described: 
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( ) the identification and calculation of the various components a 
of long run marginal cost; 
(b) the a.pplication of rules (i) and (ii) above to derive a tariff 
structure designed to cover LRW.C given the typical pattern 
of electricity demand and subject to metering costs; and 
the adjustments which should be made to a IEarginal cost 
based tariff structure if it is to reflect financial and 
second best criterja. 
4.3.2 THE CALCL'LATION OF LONG RUN MARGINAL COST 
In the c.:mtext of electricity supply, Muc.aeinghe dE,fined long run 
marginal cost (LRMC) E.S "the incrEmental cest of optimum adjust-
ments in the system expansion plan and systecn operations 
attributable to an incremental demand increase 'vhich is sustained 
into the future. ,,14 Three broad catt'e;ories of marginal costs may 
be ind€·ntified for the purposes of calculating LRMC: capacity 
costs, energy costs ar·d consumer costs. Marginal c2.pacity costs 
are the investment cost~ of generation, transmiss5.on and d:~:tri­
butior.. facclities a,,~, ociated with providing adclitional kW of 
capacity. Marginal er.ergy costs are the fuel and operating 
costs of supplying adrFtional kWh of electriCity consuJ:1l'tion. Marginal 
consumer costs are the increr,ental costs dir"ctly attributablE> to 
ir ,dividual conSL<mers including costs of conrection, metEring 2,nd 
invoicing. In the first tl1:.:'ee part~ of this secti(ln the nature 2.nd 
lTethod of calculation of these compcnents of LRl'v!C ""ill be described 
while tho final part will deal with the use of shad.:,,: pricing to ensure 
that LRMC reflects economic resource costs. 
14. Munasinghe, M., Electric Power Pricing, Staff Working 
Paper, World Bank, Washington, July 1979, p. 25. 
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A. El\ERGY COSTS 
Boiteux and Stasi 1 5 have shown that where a. system of electricity 
genera tion and transmission is optimally planned and operate,d, it 
is sufficient to know the marginal energy costs at one node of the 
network and the optimurr. configuration of energy movements to 
deduce, step by stE'P , the marginal cost of energy at all nodes of 
the netvlork by addition or subtc"action of ;narginal transmission 
costs. The procedure involved in calculating the marginal energy 
costs at eac h node f.light therefore in practice involve the following 
steps: 
(i) given the load curves anticipated for each node, ar..rJ their 
forecasted development through time, it would be nec essary 
to determine the facilitie s to be installed and the c orres-
ponding configurations of energy movements; 
(ii) the corresponning marginal energy costs at different 
hours and seascns of the year would have to be calculated 
for a selected node; and 
(iii) these marginal ccsts would l:;rre to be prepagated from 
noele to node by the addition or subtraction of tramsissicn 
los ses. 
Since the first part cf this calculation would ce detern .ined 
indepc;;dently of the tariff making process as part of the capital 
development programme of the e lectricity utility, the calculation 
of the long run marginal energy costs is redt:ced to th e calculations 
rr,entioned in (ii) and (iii) above. These cdculations would. hu wever 
be subject to varioL:s cross checks since, as has already been notn(l, 
1 5 • Boit"ux, M., and Stasi, P ., "The Deterrr,ination of Costs of 
Expansion of an Interconnected System of Production a ,,'; 
I:istr ibution of EIFctricity" in Nelsun,J. R., ed., Marginal 
Cost Pricing in Practice, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1964. 
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they rely on the properties of a theoretical optimum which may not 
exist in practice. The principles of these cross checks will be 
explained after the main features of the calculation are indicated. 
CALCULATION OF lYJARGINAL ENERGY COSTS AT A 
NODE OF THE TRANSMISSION NETWORK 
The first step in the calculation of marginal energy costs 
is to choose a base node. It appears that the results 
obtained will gain significanc e in proportion to the 
importance of the node selected and to the extent that 
generation for the transmission network is predominant 
at t.his mode relative to generation for local use or relative 
to imports. 
Let us first consider, for example, the cer..tre of thermal 
production for South Africa at the Transvaal coalfields. 
At a particular time on a particular day a given 
maximum demand must be supplied by the thermal power 
stations of this region. To satisfy this demand for power 
at least cost, the load dispatching service for the region 
is arranged so as to require the most efficient stations 
to work at full capacity. Only the least efficient power 
station which must be maintained in operation to meet the 
total demand for power from thermal Etations does not 
operate at full capacity, since there is no reason for the 
power demanded to coincide exactly with the productive 
capacity of an integral number of stations. This last 
power station will be denoted the "marginal sta.tions". 
If at this time, a call for extra power is made, this extra 
amount will be produced by the marginal sta.ticns ,;ince the 
more economical stations are already working at full 
capacity while the other sta.tions are less economical. 
The cost of an additional kWh is therefore equal at this 
time to the cost of coal required for the production of 
kWh by the margiral station. Generally, it follows that 
at every instant, the marginal cost of production of a 
257 
kWh in the Transvaal region. is equal to the proportional 
cost of the station which is marginal at that instant. 
It follows that, in principle, it is sufficient to ask the 
dispatcCing centre which station is marginal for every 
[,cur of the year, given the pcwer demanded from the sd 
of thermal plants in til<: regicn, in crder to deduce the 
schedule of the 8760 marginal generating costs. 
::O;uch a schedule would, howeve:.' , be of little use to tariff 
!Takers sinc€' it would be highly imr:ractica: to offer a 
taTiff whose price; va'.-ie,; from tour to hour. It is therefore 
necessary to calculate the average marginal energy cost 
of generation. o\'(,r appropriate rating periods which are 
selected by examining t[,., systen, load duration curves 
to determine the periods during which d€,mand presses 
on capacity. Studies ill France, by Boiteux, 16 and in 
Brilain, by Turvey17 and Crew 18, indicate that this 
sched:.;le 0; the marginal ellE rgy costs of gene ration 
should be differe" tiated in both winter and summer betweer. 
"peak" "full use" alJ d "slack ll hours. For the purposes 
of siIT'plifyin€; the analysis of l ong run n,arginal cost it will 
be assurred that the electricity system dces r,ot (>xhibit 
marked seasonal variations of d'2n;a:od and tbat Ihere are 
only two rating period s by tim"" of dc,y, that is, peak and 
off--peak periods. 
16. f'.oiteux, M., "The Tarif Vert of Electricite de France" in 
Nelson, J . R., ed., ~<:.~. 
17. .Turvey, R., ':>I'..!<:.i.!,' 
18. Crev., "Electricity Tariffs" in Turvey ,R., ~!!., 
pp.258-283. 
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(ii) THE PROPAGATION OF MAHGINAL COSTS 
(iii) 
Figure 4.3, illustrates how the r.1arginal cost of energy in 
peak hours at node P of the network may be calculated, given 
the rr.arginal energy cost at node A. Since the energy 
moverner.ts in this peak period are known, n,e directions in 
which the energy moves between the varicus nodes A, B, C, 
•••• P and the positicn of the neutral points (N) are known. 
By virtue of the property of optimum configurations of 
energy movements, which has already been discussed the 
marginal energy cost at B is this rr.arginal energy cost 
at A, increased by the mar15inal transmission cost AB. 
In a like manner, t he mar ginal cost at 1'1 can be calculated 
as the s,um of t he flla.rginal cost of B and the marginal 
transn,ission cost along BJ". From N to C the mOV6ment 
is in the direc t ion opposite to til" flow of energy so that 
the marginal cost at C is the marginal cost at N reduced 
by the marginal transmission cost Cl\ and so on. 
The marginal cost of transmitting' an additonal kWh along a 
segment such as AB is the sum of the transmission losses 
alon~ the line, which aT" proportional to the square of the 
current and the deterioration in custorr,er service resulting 
from the drop in volta.ge. An additional kWh will, however, 
only cause a volt.age drop when the line is operating at full 
load . The rr.arginal cost of trar;srnissiol'. must therefore be 
increased at. times of full capacity by a t.erm equal to the 
distribut'.on of the fixed charges of expansion ever the 
kilo watt-hcurs transmittt'd. 
CROSS CHECl~S AND TESTS 
- ----------------
The method of calculation described above lends it.self t.e a 
number of checks: 
(a) the marginal price calculated at, say, point P from 
point p, in figure 4.3 should ccincide with the 
proportional cost of the marginal station at P. 
A 
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The same will apply at every point on til<: trans-· 
mission netw ork; 
(b) whatever the route followed from one r:ode to another, 
after adding or sul:tracting transmission costs as 
dictated by the energy moven,ents e:1colCntered on 
each route, the delivered price should be t he sarr.e; 
and 
(c) the schedule cf marginal prices calculated for a 
given region should coincide witt the operating 
cost of the new facilities which are being inst.alled 
in the legien. 
If there is any lag in new installations in a region, it will 
appea.r as an excessive importecr sincec its costs will rise 
relative to other regions. By char gil g for the production 
of H.e new plants in a region according to its schedule of 
marginal costs, on average, a satisfactory eql.lilibrium 
should be cbtainec bE·tween the annual value of energy 
produced bj' each plant, and the annual cost ef this production. 
Finally, it can be seen tha.t the LRMC of energy during the peak period 
will be equa.l to the running cost of the plant used last in merit order 
to rr.eet an increment in peak period electricity cor.slimption adjusted 
by the apl.' ropriate peak transmission loss factors at Each voltage 
level along the transmission network. Similarly, the LR.\IC of 
er.ergy resulting from a load increment d'clring the off-peak period 
is usually equal to the running costs of the least. efficient base 
load plant used during this period aloo adjusted for the transmission 
losses along the ,.etwork. It sl:ould be noted tbat the tralJsmission l oss 
factors for adjust.ing off-peak costs will be s~'aller than the peak period 
loss factors, since theSE losses are a function of the square of th" 
current-and current flo,,;,', ":::8 great€ st during the peak period. 
B. MAI{GINAL CAPACITY COST 
The LRMC of capacity can be ascertained elY determining the change 
in system capacity costs rE suIting from a !3ustained incremellt in 
lcng run peak demand. The ecffect of a gIven increment in demand is. 
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illustrated in Figure 4.4. It can \,e se'.:r. that it would be necessary 
to change the expansion pre gramme of the syster.1 to meet the new 
incremental load. In calculating the LRW.C of ger,erating capcity 
(LRMC gc) it is importar.t to 2.scertain whether this change in the 
expansion programme is effHcted by either advancing the commi-
ssioning date of generating units designed to meet the base load 
or by installing units which an, designed to meet only the future 
peak load. In many systems gas turbines which have a relat:''Tely 
low capital cost and high operating costs are used to meet peak 
demand. If this is the case, then the LHMC gc can be e"timated in 
terms Cof the cost per kll' installed of gas turbines annuitized over 
their expected lifetime, (Ae). This figure should be adjusted for 
the reserve o1!a rgin (RMo/;) and losses due to stat.' on use (Lsu~;o ) 
to derive the following exprtlssion fer the LRMC of generating 
capacity: 
LRMC gc = AC. (1 + RM/100)(, .. LSL!/100) (~.10) 
If, however, the incremer,tal l oad i s to be IT,et by advancin g U.e 
installation of base 1"ad plant then it should be noted that this 
p l a nt has" i:datively high capital cost and l ow operating cost, so 
that it is important tc deduct from the adjusted ar.nuitized cost per 
kll' installec ... ~ thi" plant, the potential fuel savings which are 
expected to result from th" displacement of less efficielJt plant by 
these new base load units. 
The LR}'·.C of the transmiss<un and distrit utio n network should be 
allocated to incremental capacity, since the designs c f the".e 
facilities are determined primarily by the peak k'l' that t hey cr,rry 
.rathe:r ttan by kll'h elect:icity requirement, . • The capacity costs of 
transndssion and cistribution facilities must be identified since the 
consumers at each voltage level should bEo charged only ups tream 
cus t. Thus if, for example , there 2.re three supply voltages C2.te-
gories: high, medium and low, the LRtvlC of capacity at the high 
vultage (HV) le'l d would be. 
LRtvlC HV Cap = LRMC Ge'l , Cap. / (1 _. LHV / 100) + 1'>. LRMC HV 
(4.11) 
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wherl' Il LI{MC HV is the 6.verage incremec'ltal cost~ of the extra 
high voltage (EHV) and HV tr"nsmissiol'. facilities annuitized 
over the lifetime of the plallt and LH v% is the percentage of incoming 
peak power that is lost in the EHV and HV network. Similarly the 
LR ,C of capacity to medium voltage consumers could be calculated as 
follows: 
LRMC MV Cap = LRMC HV Cap. /1 - LlIN / 100 + /':,. LR~iC MV 
. (4.12) 
where~K!vJC MV is t he annuitized average incremental cost of 
incremental medium voltage capacity such as distributie,n substations 
and primary feeders while L;-';' V ~~ is the percentage of incoming peak 
power that is lost at the ;\IIV level. 
In attributing these capacity costs to consumers it may be useful to 
distir.guish, as Boit eux and Stasi have done. betv!een the costs of 
the II collec tive", "semi individua.l'! and "individual" network. The 
collective network includes the facilities which are located so far 
upstream from an individual consumer's connection that the random 
characteristics of the consumer's behaviour play an insignificant 
role ir. determining their capacity since these facilities will be 
supplying a large number of consumers. The capacity of this section 
of the netwcrk will therefc·re d npend primarily on the average consum-
ption of consumers at the time of the collecti ve peak so that the costs 
of this capacity should be allocated according to the average kWh 
coneurred durin ... the peak period. The semi-individual network 
usually serves a small n~mber of consumers of similar size so that 
the uncertainty of consumption of an individual cons umer may be a 
s ignifica nt fa.ctor in determining the capacity of these facilities. 
Furthermore the load peaks of those local distribution networks, 
may differ fron' the system peak. J::loitetix and· :"tasi suggested that the 
effect of local peaks and irregular individual dcw:and on the capacity 
of the se.mi-individual network can be best allow ed for when the cost 
of th is capacity is allocatee: according- to the contracted maximum 
power dem2.nd of the customers. The individual network includes those 
facilities which arE- specifically provided for individual consumers. 
The costs of these fac:lities will form part of the consumer-related 
costs to be discussf,d in the next sub- section. 
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C . COl\'SUMER COSTS 
Consumer costs are those cc·sts which are incurre d to supply individual 
consumers. They are therefore allocated directly to the individual 
consumer for whom they are incurred. These costs consist cf non-
recurrent expenses such as service drop lines, meters and the 
la bour used for installation which may be charged to the customer 
as a lump sum or distributed payments over several years and r ecurrent 
expenses such as those incurred for meter r eadicg, billing and 
administration. The!"e e}:penses are in the nature of a fix ed cost 
which does not vary sigr.ificantly v;ith either the kWh consumption or 
contracted kW demand of conSUIT.ers , so that they form a relatively 
small proportien of the total costs incurred :.n supplyir:g large 
consumers. 
D. SHADOW PRICING 
The market prices of the inputs used by an electricity utility may 
diverge from their rrarginal social costs due to monopoly practices, 
external econofP.ies and diseconomies and interventions in the ma.rket 
process through taxes, import duties and subsidies. It may thus be 
necessary to use. the "shadow prices" of these inputs which measure 
their economic resource; cost, b e th to ca.lculate the LRMC of 
e l ectricity and t.o determin., an optimal investflent programme. It is 
usually necessary to adopt a c cmrr.on yardstick or numeraire which 
provides a measure of economic value in order to derive a consistent 
set of s hadow prices fer the inputs used by the Ltility. Little and 
Mirr'lees 16 have propcsed tilat an appropriate numeraire should be a 
unit of unc ommitted JOublic income at border prices, expressed in 
16. Little, 1. M. D. and Mirrlees , J • A ., Project Appraisal and 
Pla!!ning for Developi'!lL Cour,tries , Basic Book s, 
New York, 1974, Chapter 9. 
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real terms, which is basically equal to a unit of freely disposable 
foreign exctange available te. the governn'ent but expressed in terms 
of units of local currency converted at the official exctange rate and 
deflated by an apprcpriate price index. By using such a numeraire 
the distortions caused by inflation, taxes, duties and subsidies are 
removed. 
To facilitate the estimation and use of shad ow prices, the inputs used 
by the utility should be categorized into tradable and non-tradable 
items. The most important tradable inputs used by an electricity 
utility are usually capital goods and petroleum based fuels. The 
shadow pricing of such inputs presents little problem, since either 
the world market or border prices may be used where appropriate. 
In the case of non-tradable items which are locally purchaseci inputs 
whose values are known only in terms of domestic market prices, 
it is necessary to convert these market prices into border shadow 
prices by multiplying- them by appropriate conversion f,wtors. Before 
the conversion factor can be applied it may first be necessary to 
adjust the domestic market prices of these inputs, so that they reflect 
their marginal social costs of production , For example, the resource 
costs. of extraction should be usee. for coal which has no significal't 
export market while the market price of urban land may be a good 
indic2.tion of its economic value unless it is used for agricultural 
or reoreational !=urposes. It should be noted too that the rate of 
interest used by the utility should be adjusted in the manner indicated 
by (2.20) which takes into account the fact that the tax exemption of 
public enterprise income results in investment by these enterprises 
displacing private consumption and priVate enterprise investment at 
different rates •. In other words, the interest rate used by the utility 
should reflect the opportunity cost of capital. 
In the case of non-tradables which are not important enough to merit 
individual attention or for which there is insufficient data, a standard 
conversion factor (SCF) may be used. The SCF is e<;ual to the 
official exchange rate divided by a shadow exchange rate appropriately 
defined, A useful approxi.mation of this shadow exchange rate may be 
the free trade exchange rat~, when the c ollntry is moving towards a 
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free trade regime, since this will reflect the average level of import 
duties and export ~.ubsidies. The SCF calculated on the basis of this 
exchange rate will usually be less than unity. It follows that the 
division of LRI\,IC calculated according to the border prices of inputs 
by this standard conversion factor will result in an optimal market 
price for electricity which is greatE·r then this border priced LRMC. 
Once the LRMC of electricity production has been calculated according 
to the principles described in this section, it is necessary to devise 
a tariff structure which will result in the recove,ry from each consumer 
or consumer group of the LRMC incurred in supplying their electricity 
tariffs. The principles underlying the formulation of a tE.riff schedule 
according to the criterion of economic efficiency will be discussed in 
the next section, 
4:3:2 THE FORl\,iULATION OF AN OPTIMAL TARIFF STRUCTURE 
It will be recalled from the specification of the peak load pricing 
model in Chapter Two , that the optimal utilization of the capacity of 
an electrical power system will be attained when the recovery of 
capacity costs through tariffs is lirr ited to those periods when the 
charging of a price equal to marginal running costs would result in 
the demand for electricity being greater then the capacity of the 
system. This is illustrated in Figure 4.5 which is drawn on the 
assumption that demand fluctuates on a regular daily basi" between 
peak and off-peak periods. It can be seen from Figure 4.5 that if 
a marginal cost pricing policy is adopted by the electricity utility 
then the price of electricity will be set in the off-peak period at 
p 2 which is equal to unit running cost r, and allowed to rise to pl 
to restrict demand to fixed capacity qo, in the peak period. The 
recovery of capital costs, k, will therefore only be recovered in 
peak periods and total capital costs will only be fully recovered if 
an investrr,ent policy is followed whereby capacity is adjusted to 
the optimal level indicated at qo where the peak price, pl, is 
equal to LRMC. The basic implication of this peak lead pricing 
model for the tariff policy of an electricity utility is therefore that 
"the off peak consumer should not make any contribution to capacity 
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cost, which should be apportio ned entirely to the peak consumer; and 
if mor e than:one consumer uses the total capacity availa ble , the several 
consumers should contribute to the cost of capacity in proportion of the 
intensities of their de mands .,,17 This conclusion iE, however, crucially 
dependent on the following assumptions which undcrly the simple model 
illustrated in Figure 4.5: 
(i) running coots are constant over the finite output of the system; 
(ii) capacity costs are const2.nt per unit of capacity; 
(iii) finite increments in capacity are perfectly divisible; 
(iv) demand i s i I·d ependen t as between different consumers aI'.d 
time periods; and 
(v) LRMC is constant. 
It will be shown that the relaxation of theEe assumptions makes it 
necessary to reasseES t he i mplications of the peak l oad pricine; 
model for electricity tariff policy. 
The assumption tt.at r unning costs are constant over the finite output 
of the system appears te, be unrealis tic, particular in view of the 
discussion of the ger.eratir g system in section 401, wtere it was 
suggested that an optima l mix of generat ing plant would cont ain a 
number of units with differing operating costs and that such a system 
should be operated in merit orde r with the plant with the l owe st unit 
running costs being used first to meet the de mand for power. The 
short run marginal cost of g'eneration (SRMC gen) curve cap. the refore 
be more realistically depicted as a rising stepped func tion as shown 
in Figure 4.6. It is assurr.ed that demand fluctuates on a regular 
da.ily basis between pee . k , full-use and slack periods repre sented by 
the demand curves D1 , D2, and D3 re~.pectively . It can be seen from 
F i gure 4.6 that D1 intersec t s the SRMC gell curve i n its vertical 
portion which indica.te:s that if a marginal cost pricing policy is 
adopted the price cf ele.ctricity should be set at p1 t o limit tt e l oad 
17. Hermann,G.F.K., or.cit., p. 7-2. 
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to its limit L1 which is defined by the ca..pacity of tr.e system. It 
is clear that the greatest contribution to generating capacity costs 
will be made in the peak period but it no longer follows that there 
will be no recovery of these costs in the other periods if the marginal 
cost pricing rules are applied. It can be seen from Figure 4.6 that, 
in both the full-use and slack periods, the setting of price equal to 
SRl'vIC ger: results in the generation of rever:ue which is greater that 
the operating costs incurred so that a contribution to capac ity costs 
is made in both period s. The relaxation of the assumption that there 
are constant unit running costs may therefore strengthen the case for 
time-of-day differentiation of tariffs, since it means that capacity 
cost recovery is no longer restricted to one period but may, in fact, 
be spread out over other periods if marginal cost principles are 
applied. Furthermore if the other assumptions of the peak load 
pricing model hold, it still follcws tt.at an optimal investment policy 
will result in capacity being adjusted to the level" here total revenue 
covers total costs. It will now be shown, though, that the relaxaticn 
of some of these assumptions may prevent an electricity utility from 
preserving a balance between total revenue and total cost if it 
pursues a marginal cost pricing and investment policy. 
If the capacity of the system can only be expanded in indivisible units 
then it is clear that there may be times when tot"l revenue will not 
cover t otal cost if the marginal cost pricing rules are applied. 
HowevE-r, as Hermann has noted: 
"In the case of generating plant the assuC'Jption 
of perfect divisibility is not important. In 
a reasonably large utility capacity is acded 
by constructing additional power stations with 
several generating units, each of which, if 
only from stand l:y considerat ions will represent 
a demand increment of perhaps three or four 
percent. With a growth rate of eight to ten per-
cent per annum, any surplus capacity due to indi-
visibility· will ' therefore be of very sholt 
duration in relation tc the life of the pla.nt. "18 
1 8 • Ibid., p. 7-4. 
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It follows that a marginal cost pricing policy will result in the 
recovery of most of the capacity costs associat",d with generating 
plant. This, however, is unlikely to be the case in the case of the 
facilities used in the transmission and distribution network. This 
equipment is much more likely to be characterized by indivisibility 
since it is usually designed to allow for several years I load growth 
and may therefore have a substantial amount of excess capacity for 
much of its life. As was explained in the previous section, the cost of 
carrying an incremental load along an underutilized transmission 
and distribution network is usually limited to the cost of energy 
losses along the power lines. If only this cost is charged to the 
consumer it is clear that a substantial portion of H.e cost of trans-
mission and distribution capacity will not be recovered from tariff 
revenue. It can thus be seen that where indivisibility exists, a small 
proportion of generating and a relatively la.rger portion of transmission 
and distribution costs may not ce recovered. 
The application of marginal cost pricing rules is also likely to lea.d 
to a residual of unrecovered capacity coste where the utility allows 
for uncertainty by providir.g for more capacity than is necessary to 
meet future forecasted load requirements and where LR~~C is a 
declining rather then a const",nt function due to economies of scale. 
The question which now arises is whether these r"sidual capacity 
costs which result from the presence cf indivisibility, uncertainty 
or economiE>s of ecale should be apportioned to peak consumer,; as an 
extension of the basic principle which underlies the peak load 
pricing model. The main difficulty associated with allocating these 
resmual c.osts entirely to peak period consumers is that the level 
of price in one period may influence the demand in other periods so 
that this may create a "shifting peak" problem. rIO other words if, 
say, residual capacity costs are charged to peak consumers whose 
demand function is represented by D1 in Fie;ure 4.6, then this may 
result in an inward shift of the curve D1 and an outward shift of D2 with 
the result that period 2 may become the new pea.k period. To obviate 
this shifting peak problE·m it has been suggested in a report by the 
British Electrical Research Association that the optimal method of 
allocatir.g residual ca.pacity costs between time periods may be as 
follows: 
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"There will be certain times whell, no matter how 
small a charge is made (even zero) ie. respect of 
demand related cost or whatever likely changes 
occur due to other c2.uses, some plant will still 
be lying idle. This is the off-pot8ntial peak 
period, and there is then no liability for plant 
expenses, and no dema.nd rel".t8d cost need be 
allccl).ted. During all other times there is SO!l1e 
pote ntial of an absolute peak arising, and Cc.st 
must be allocated a.ccording to this liability. 
Throughout this potential-peak period there is a 
gradc.ated peak r"sponsibility or potentiality, 
measured by the price differ'en tiation which woule'. 
ter:d to .,roduce a constant height load cc.rve. ,,19 
In other worde., the objective of the tariff maker in allocating 
residual capacity costs to diffen,nt time periods should be to smooth 
out dema.nd fl uctuations o';e1' tirr.e. The desired effect of this mE,thod 
of cost apportionr 'en is shown in Figure 4.7 where the consumer 's 
load curve attains a platea u c.ver the main hours of daily use instead 
of the typical peaking of Hlectricity requirements fcr a ~hort period 
arocnd 8.00 a.m. and 5.00 p.lT' . 
These b'l.sic principles of mar ginal cost pricing provide a use-ful 
indicatie·n of tnE. main factors to be taken intu 2.ccount by an electricity 
utility in structuring- its tariffs, It is now necessary t o examinE' how 
a practicable ta riff struct llre can be devised which is based on the"e 
principles. The foll oW ing discu,sion will fr eque ntly refer to the 
tariff- making practices of Elec tric i tc d e France whic!:, perhaps 
n·e.ro tllan ar,y othe r elEc tric ity ut.ility in the world, has atter:'ptEll 
t o tlas€· the structure of its tariffs or marginal cos t pricing principles. 
:vleck has pointed out with respect. to thi s tariff policy te.at "the 
traditional concept of marginal cost pric ing, already somewhat 
19. British Electrical and Allied Industries Research Association 
Report No. KIT 109, 1945: An improved method of allocating 
to clc.sses of consumers the demand related portion of tbe 
st~ndinf( cost. 
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attenuated in certain re spects in Boiteux' s theory, becomes much 
more attenuated in prac tic e _. so much so, indeed, that one wonc.er s 
whether it is proper t o call the final result marginal cost pricirg 
at all". 20 In spite of this, the view has been taken tt.at tte purpose 
of a p.' arginal cost approach t o pricing policy is not to attain strict 
conformity with the conditions of a the oretical optimum since thi s is 
usually not completely practic2.ble but rather te' indicate the direction 
in which the pattern and structure of rates should be rearranged. t o 
achieve greater allocative e fficiency. As Vickrey has pointed out: 
"The dominant i ssue is one of whether t he patte rn 
of rate s should be based on tradition, inertia and 
happenst.c nc e , or whether i t is t o be deve l oped 
cy a careful weighing of the relevant fac t ors with 
a view to g uiding consumers to make as efficient 
use uf the fac ilities which are available " .21 
The structuring of tariffs by Electricite de France is larg-ely acceptable 
i n terms of this approach. 
1n IT.a.ny electricity utilitie:; consumers are charged according t o a 
three-pa,.-t tariff witt. a fixed service charge pe r ccnsurrer covering 
consumer relat.d costs, a cbar g-e whi ch is fi,ed per kWh consumption 
baseci on the tnao:imum demand in k\\' of t he consumer which is designed 
to cover at least a. portion of the den·,a.nd r e lated capacity costs, 
and a. charge Fer kWh which covers energy cost s and a portion of 
demand related caFacity costs. A marginal cost ta".ed. tariff schedule 
is a l so likely t e t ake the form of a thrE·e - p2.rt tariff althourh t here 2.re 
like ly t o be additional parameters taken i nto aCCOlJrt in s tructuring 
the den:a.nd ane:, in r-artieu l<.r , the er.ergy componellt of t ile tariff so 
that they vary according to, say, the margina l costs of serving 
c!emal!clS: 
20 . \loe \ , N. L., "Th" i\'ew Bulk S upply Tariff for Electricity" , 
Econo.mic Journa l , Vo l. -78,1968, p. 55. 
21. Vickrey,W., " Some ob:ec tions to marginal cost pricing", 
Journal of Political Eccnomy, June 1948. 
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(i) by different consumer categories; 
(ii) in different geographical areas; 
(iii) at different hours of the day; 
(iv) in different seasons; 
(v) by different voltage levels; and 
(vi) with different load factors. 
It is clear ttat the marginal cost of supplying electricity will vary 
between consumers on an individual basis. However, since an 
electricity utility serves a large number of consumers it is usually 
necesso.ry to classify ccnst;.mers into different categories with 
basically simila.r consumption patterns so as to minimize the deviation 
from the norm in the averaging processes that are required. An 
initial basis for such a classification would probably be a regional 
one, since the marginal cost of electricity distribution will often be 
higher in geographical areas where a relatively smaller number of 
customers are served per square kilometre of distribution network 
than in other areas. Regional differences in load density are likely 
to affect all the components of the electricity tariff with the result 
that a different tariff schedule will have to be set for each area 
served by a transmission network and the average sellin!'; prices of 
electricity will vary between the different areas. For example, fer 
the purposes of applying its Tarif Vert on a national scale, the 
Electricite de France has divided l"rance into ;;' 3 ar8as in which 
different rates apply. 
The marginal energy costs of generation are jointly incurred for all 
distribution undertakings served by an integrated national grid so 
that a load increment will cause the same increment in the energy 
costs of generation regardless of H.e area in which it arises. It 
follows that in all geographical areas, the energy charge should te 
differentiated cn the sa.me basis to reflect time of day and also, 
possibly, seasonal fluctuations in the system's load requirements. 
This tirr.e-of-day and seasonal differentiation is necessary if power 
stations 3.re operated in r.lerit order to meet the load requirements 
of the system. since the unit energy CGst of the station which is 
operated last to meet a peak period demand for power will be higher 
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than that of the station which is marginal ill the off-peak period. The 
nrain problem involved in introducing time-of-day differentiation of 
the energy chaygE is that the metering cests involved in providing 
for even two daily time periods are so much higher than those 
involved in simple kWh. rr:etering that there are a very large r.umber 
of consumers whose consumpticn is so smaJl that this additional 
metering cost is not economically justified. Furtherrr,ore, even if 
tirr e - of- day differentiat i"" it: introduced for large power users, it 
is often the case that where onh' two timE periods are used, then 
dering the peak per i od cf the day there is a \'<ory wid" variation in 
marginal energy cost, so that the pricing of all cCllsurlJr:li.olJ dr:ril g 
thi s large proportion of the day at pet.,k marginal energy cost y, ill 
rE sult in consumers in Lear-peak periods having to Fay an energy 
ch2~r€:e that mcl,} b(.:. p,r( ater thc.n the marginal ccst incurred in 
generating electricity te ",eet tbei t, d",,·'and. For this reason 
Hermann has suggest(.d that "if there are only two time poriods 
•• .• it is r:robable that the loss of efficiency resulting from pricing 
ellcr ',Y in tre r peak period! of average yariable cost is less than 
tha t rp:--li.1ti n g from pricing at short run r ,arginal cost . 11 He notes 
however, that "the z.ddition cf a third time period involves relative ly 
little more e~:JPnclitllre, in fact, no fj,j ore than an additional meter 
register, sillee the sa!. l C lin;e switch can usua.lly be adopted for nlOre 
than two time periods. ,,22 It t her ·, r 'Jr'" appears that one"" the decjsion 
to provide time·-"C-dcty n-'etE:rillg ita::. ~e(:: rnadc- it i~ l1kely tc be 
econolllically justifiable to provide for an atidlL.c:n~ ] ti: :·.t r--nriod. 
The Tarif Vert actually makes provision for 5 time !,oric;Gs " 'it" 
the €'ncrgy charge in each di strit,tl lion UndE'Ttaking beiIlg dirf{ ~ rcrr t jat , ~'d 
according to "pea]{11 J "norrral" , aiid "vu.lleyl! hours in willte!~, 1.nd 
11 norrr.al" apd lIyalley 11 hours in 5UITiIT'er . 
22. He:C"IHnn,G.F.I,., op.cit., p. 6-8 
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Although the margiEal energy costs incurred in power generation are 
likely to be the same fcr a given load increraent in different distribution 
undertakings, it is s till necessary to have some regional diffE'rentiation 
of the energy ~harge to r e fle ct the cost of the higher energy losses 
incurred in translnitting power to distribution lmdertakings l ocated at 
a greater distance than others from geneyating stations. Once a tariff 
maker' has ensured that the structure of the energy c ompone nt of the 
t a,riff set f e r each unde rtaking broadly rc·fl ects the fa,ctors affecting 
t he marginal energy cost incurrecl by each undertaking, he nlUst the n 
establish the main parame t e rs which should dde c-Ir. i. IK the ~ ll ocation 
of the r esidual capacity costs to t~e ciiff<.,rer.t consumers. 
It is c:.,ar from the discu ssion of th .. LRiIi:C of capa,city i.1i t.h., previous 
sec tion that the allocation of the se residual capacity cos t s should 
vary with thE! v oltage l ev-e l of the const-mers supplied, si.nce the l ower 
t ;-,8 yolta ge lev- s i the greatE, r the incremental ca,pacity cos t s o f trans-
J} ,;,'si.on and d;.stribution that tave to be incurr ed to supply power to the 
group of consnmers invol.ved, It follow s that the tariff schedule for 
et.cll d is tribut ion llndert"-k:r. g should be differer,tiatEd ac cording t o 
voltf!ge, with the allocati on of residt:al capacity cost varying inversely 
\\ i tll voltage. Thi ::: principle has be(>r, applied by the Elec tric ite de 
F rance IV i til tile ;;trllct 'Jring of tariffs according to voltage being 
dete r mined by the intervals at "bch high voltage curr ent has to l::e 
transforlr,ed into CUl' l "ent. of a low er voltage. 
~nce re£idua.l car;acity costs have been all ocatud lc ti,I;o di~. t ributi oll 
undertakings accordi,ng' to voltage, it is neces su ry Lo detorll1i.ne for 
the c:c.'nsUmer gro L'.ps at eac h voltage level within t ht; l.IlId erta l.; ing , 
the basis on whic h th e a lloc ated cap&.c ity cos ts are lc be apporti.oned 
hetween the fix ed den'and charge and the ener gy charge . 
_':'5 be.s a l ready been mentionec'. , a portion cf residual capacity costs 
SllOU Jd be cl>vered hy t he er.e r gy charge in all periods except the 
" ff-pe a k peri od in rdation to the peak responsibility of t he COlls,"mers 
c<;l)cerned, The airr of this t rc.ns fe r from d emand-related to enel 'gy-
relc.t (!u , ost s should I::e to smooth out fluc,tuations in th e load curve . 
Consequently the r.lain JOarar.:et er c,etern.ininp; thi s tran s fer should be 
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the degree of utilization by consumers of their contracted maximum 
demands for power. This can be illustrated by reference to the the 
structive of ta.riffs applicable to the 220 kilovolt (KV) group under 
tte Tarif Vert in France in 1976 as shown in Table 4:1. It can be 
seen that in the case of consumers with very high utilization factors 
there is a relatively small transfer from demand related to energy 
related costs. This is because such consumers already have fairly 
flat daily load curves so that it would be difficult to induce them to 
shift their demand from peak to normal or valley periods by differen-
tiating the energy change according to time of day by a greater extent 
than that whict. is necessary to reflect periodic fluctuations in the 
marginal cost of energy. It follows that the residual capacity costs 
allocated to such consumers are mainly recovered from the demand 
charge which will burden consumers at aD. equal average rate 
whatever the time period. 
TABLE 4:1 
De mand Energy c harge (centines/kWh) 
ch&.rge Winte r Summer 
Ve r y High u tilization 
Hi gh Utilization 
General Tariff 
Low Utilization 
(a) F/kW/an 
276 , '16 
131 , 15 
100 ,1 9 
40 , 08 
Peak Normal 
7 , 18 7 , 13 
12 , 92 10 , ')2 
19 ,67 11 , 1':' 
31 , 41 17 , 1.~ 
a) French franc per kW per annum 
Valley Normal 
5 , 79 6,40 
6 , 32 8 ,83 
6 , 45 9 ,80 
6,45 11 ,75 
Table 4:1 indicates, however, that the magnitude of the difference 
between the energy charge in Valley and peak periods iLcreases as 
the utilization fcoctor of consumers decreases. A high proportion 
of demand-related residual ca.pacity ccsts can be transferred to 
energy-related costs, recoverable during peak and normal periods 
in the case of consumers with low utilization factors since this 
Valley 
5 , 68 
6 , 25 
6 , 30 
6 , 30 
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provides these consumers to improve their ut.ilization factors by, 
where possible, shifting their der.land to valley periods. The fixed 
portion of the demand charge levied on these consumers is therefore 
correspondingly lower than for consumers with higher utilization 
factors. This categorization of consumers within each voltage class 
according to their utilization factors is therefore a means of increasing 
the efficiency of the utilization of the national transmisdon netvrork as 
a whole 0 The utilization of each consumer would be determillc.d by his 
subscription at the beginnir ~. of the year in order to encourage 
consumers to plan in advance their consumption pattern. 
In sun ,mary, theref.)re, a practicable marginal cost pricing policy would 
provide for three-part t<..riffs systematically structured according to 
geographical area, voltage level and utilization factor with a time-of-
day and , seas0nal differential in the energy cha',-ge. Tic.ere a.re, 
however, a number of factor" wbich would have to be allowed for in 
a special manner, sinc,} they car.not be taken into accm:.nt ir. the standard 
tadff schec.ule structlred in the above manner. 
Firstly, there will be a large number of consumers whose power 
requirements are too small to justify the sophisticated metering 
of t.heir demand required for ma:cginal C0".t pricing. Since the energy 
charge can r;o longer be used a.s an instrumer,t to reduce daily a!'d 
seasonal fluctuations in the demand of such consumers, it is the usual 
practice to limit their der.Jand in peak periods in a quantitative manner 
throClgh load-limiting devices. The reEjdual capacity costs allocated 
to such C0nsumeTS are recovered by means of block tariffs which 
impose on cor·sumers with very low electricity requirerrents a lower 
unit CGst of power than if a. simple two-part t.ar-:iff had been applied. 
Another case where it may be nece., sary to provide for the s pecial 
treatment of certain consumers would be wt,ere consumers are 
located at. "ubstantially Varying distance from the transformation node 
of a distribution line of giver. vcltage. Here the fact that all such 
consumers would be charged the same tariff would mean that consumers 
loca.ted near the transf',rmation node might be subsidizing consumers 
located at a greater distance from it. A subsidized station-terminal 
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tariff should therefore be charged to customers located near the point 
where energy enttCrs the system while ,a special cOll,tribution should be 
levied on ccnsumers located far away from this point. There is 
likely to be a nL.mber of these instances where it is necessary to 
charge supplementary tariffs to reflect the special characteristics 
of the cost of supplying consumers who would be inefficiently charged 
accordin;;' to the standard ta.riff sechedule. 
4:3:3 ADJUSTMEl'-TS TO A MAR::iINAL COST BASED TARIFF 
STRUCTURE 
Once a tariff structure based on marginal cost principles has beer. 
formulated it may be necessary to modify it tc take into account 
economic second best, financial, political and other constraints. 
If an electricity utility is "ot required to meet any socio-political 
objectives then the main adjustments which should be made to the 
tariff structure are (i) those which compensate for the misallocation 
of resources resulting from deviations from marginal cost in the 
pricing of substitutes and complements for electricit,T and (ii) 
those necessary to ensure that electricity tariffs ger.erate sufficient 
revenue to meet the financial targets of the utility. 
A. SECOND-BEST CONSIDERATIONS 
It will be recalled from Chapter One that it has been suggested by 
Turvey that a public utility should enly depart from marginal cost 
pricing to take account of non-optimalities which are known, 
significant and w'J:Lch can be corrected by adjusting its pricing policy. 
For example, Munasinghe noted that "the subsidies for imported 
gener<.tors and/ OJ.' diesel fuel, which exist in many developing 
countries, may make it advantageous for users to set up their own 
captive plant, even though to the €'c onomy as a whole this is not the 
least cest way of meeting the demand. ,,23 He suggested that where it 
23. Nlunasinghe,M., op.cit., pp. 35-36. 
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is not politically feasible to remove these subsidies "the low cost of 
(subsidized) private generation may require the setting of an optimal 
grid supplies electricity price which is below strict LRMC." It is 
difficult to precisely determine tte electricity price which would 
satisfy second best optimality considerations, but ttese conditions 
do indicate tt.e direction of the adjustment and the fac tors which should 
determine the mag'nitude of the adjustment. Generally, the magnitude 
of the adjustment Vlot:ld be determined by the size of the subsidy and 
the degree of substitutability of alternative energy sources. Another 
exa.mple, d a known a.nd significant ceviatic'n from nlargina.l cost in 
the price of a) . dectricity substitute iE the par"ffin subsidy which in 
many developing countries is aimed at providing basic energy 
requirement,; for low income consumers at prices they can afford. 
Here, too, electricity tc.riffs should be reduced below marginal cost 
in accordance with the :nain factcrs det.,rmining· second best optimality. 
Although many electrical appliances can be regarded as ccmplements 
of electricity, the effec t of departures from r.::arginal C05t .i.n the priceE 
of these goods on the demand and cost structure of the olectricity 
utility is usually not. EignificaI't enough to warrant adjusting its 
pricing policy to re:lect seeor.d best considerations. 
B. FINANCIAL TARGETS 
A finaD.cial target is usually set for the management of a public utility 
by the ministry to whom it is responsible. The minirnt:m financial 
target for a public Utility usually requires it to generate sufficient 
revenue to just cover total cost,. so tbat i t does not have t o be 
sul::sidized 1::1 the State. However, it is often the case with electl-icity 
utilities that they need to earn a SUTt: lus in order to generatE the 
internal funds necessary to 'Lake a contrir.·ution to the financing of 
future capital develcpment, This occurs when they cannot rely 
entirely on borrowed funds to finance their expansion programme. 
It is important for the purpose of regulating the monopolistic pc,wers 
of an elec tricil:; uti.lity that this financial target be detl?rmined by a 
body independent of its n.ar.agement. A marginal cost based tariff 
will usually generate revenue which is either above or below this 
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financial target with the result that it needs to be adjusted to satisfy 
this revenue constraint. This involves the allocation of the 
surplus or deficit between consumer categories in a manner consistent 
with the objectives of the t:tility. There are three basic criteria 
according to which t1.,e excess or shortfall may be allocated; equity, 
efficiency and equality. In the discussion which follows it will be 
assumed that the revenue g'eaerated by a marginal cost pricing policy 
falls short of the financial target although the sarne principles could 
be applied if tariffs t;ad to be reduced to remove a surplus; 
(i) THE EQUITY CRITERION 
It is usually considered equitable to appor-tion a deficit to 
consumer grou['s according to their responsibilit.y for the 
expanded financial requirements of the utility, Thus where 
the main determinant of the internal financing rn'1uirement is 
the expected growth of capital investment, then it would be 
equitable for the responsitility of the different consumer 
categories f(.r meeting the financial.target to Val"y acc ording 
to their expected g-rowth in maximum power dE',manded. 
(ii) THE EFFICIENCY CRITERION 
According to the efficiency criterion the purpose of alloce.ting 
n deficit between different consumer c"-tegories should be to 
minimize the misallocation of resourc ,'s resulting frolP. the 
fa.ilure to s~, j. ,· :€ctri.city tariffs equal to marginal cost. 
This usually involves discriminating between the various 
consumer categories, so ttat the g-reatest divergence from 
the marginal cost price occurs for the consumer group with 
the lowest price elastici~ .~' of demand, ar.d vice~, so that 
the deviations from the "optimal" levels of consumption con-
sistent with the strict n1arginal cost pricing rule are minimized. 
(iii) TH E: EQUALIT) CRlTE}uON 
To satisfy the equality criterion the profit targe t should be 
allocatE,d according to the relative iT'.erit or marginal social 
utility of income of the consumer categories. The pricing 
policy of the electricity utility could thus to some extent take 
account of the income redistribution obj"ctives of public policy. 
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It will be recalled that the condition for optimal pricing 
uEder a r€,venue constraint may be expr"ssed as: 
pj (1 
- til MC 
ej 
where kj = + .91 (2.13) 
Bj 
and whe;ce ej denotes the price elasticity of demand Dj the 
clistributional characteristic and B, the Lagrangean 
multiplier aEsociated with the revenue cGnstraint. This 
condition clearly takes account of both the efficiency and 
equality criteria, since consumer categories with both a 
high prine elasticity of demand ar.d :llarginal social utilities 
of income should ha'le a lower price/marginal cost ratio 
Elan those with opposite characteristics. If it is assumed 
that public policy is mainly concerned with the regional 
distribution cf income then the allocation of the deficit arr,ong' 
the consumer categories provided for by a marginal cost-
uased tariff ' structure may take place as follows: 
(i) the total amount by which the revenue earned by the 
utility is expected to fall short of the financial target 
should be allocated to the different distribution 
und(,rtakings in accordance with their "area need indi-
cators" which can be determined in the manner 
descri bed in Chapter Three . This bads of allocation 
should satisfy tte equality criteria; 
(ii) the allocation by each und(,rtaking to consumer groups 
within each voltage and utilization level should be 
d€,termined by an estimate of the average price elasti-
city of demand within these categories. It is 
interesting to notE here that the Electriciti, de France 
allocates its shortfall in inverse proportion to the 
length of utilization time. The greatest contribution 
per kWh towards the recovery of the deficit will 
therefore have to be made by the low utilization category 
4:3:4 
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in each undertaking, since this group of consumers 
is likely to have the lowest price elasticity of 
demand. 
EVALliATION OF MARGINAL COST BASED TARIFF 
STRUCTURE 
The main pt.:rpose of a marginal cost based tariff ·~.t~·ucture is to 
improve the allocation of resources to U'_e electricity sector . It is 
cle,ar n,at time-of-day and seasonal differentiation of the energy 
c:1a.rge may achieve this purpose if they ind t:;ce ccnsumers to shift 
thei.r demand to off-peak period s, since this will reduce the future 
level of peak system demand and thereby rest:;lt in savings in elCpenci-
ture on the capital expansion planned to meet this fore('. t,st,~c demand. 
Furthern',ore this pce.k/ off- peak price differentiation may also 
enccurage greater utilizatic·n of idle plant in off-pet.k pericds , The 
differentiation of tariff" according to voltage may also lead to savings 
in capital eXjCenditure since ccnsumers will be encouraged to r eceive 
their e lectricity at a higher voltage level , therpby red "cing' 1he nee,d 
for the electricity- utiJity to ir vest in the trar.sfcrmer and d.istribution 
equip",ent necessary to supply low voltage cor.sumers . Finally, the 
differer,tiatior. of tariffs by distribution undertaking in relation to 
area. load density may be a factor encolJraging grea.ter centralization 
of economic activity and thereby saving investment in areas with 
high tran.smission ami distribution costs per "'quare kilometre. This 
effect of a marginal cost tariff struct.t:;re will clearly have to be 
weighed against the welfare 105ses attributed to increasing the lc,ng 
term cost disadvantage of locating in less developed areas. In this 
caE·e there is a trade·-off between equality and efficiency, although 
it should be noted that it is generally inac.visable for public utilit'.es 
to pursue public policy objectives other than econorr.ic £efficiency. 
The marginal cost based tariff has the additional adv~.ntage that it is 
flexible er;ocgh to pr~vide for tt.e speciaJ treatment of consumers where 
factors other than demand fluctuations, load density, voltage and 
utilizaticn affect the rrarginal cost of supplying them ar:.d to take Cll t 
of stcond-best considerations and financial objectives. 
285 
The significance of the benefits obtainable from structuring electricity 
tariffs according t o marginal cost principles depends to some extent 
on the responsiveness of consumers to the signals conveyec. by the 
tariff structure of an electricity utility. If tariffs are to be adequately 
structured according to marginalist principles, they may bec ome too 
complicated to induce the desired behavioural changes in the majority 
of consumers. Furthermore, as was expla,ined in section 4:2 , it is 
often the case that consumers have fairly fixed electricity requiremer:ts, 
so that they may be unable to take advantage of the opportunity to 
rf,duce their electricity costs by altering their consumption pattern in 
the manner signalled by t he electricity tariff structure. It has been 
pointed Gut, for example that initially the introducti on of the Tarif 
Vert had little Significant impact 0n the lead factors of electricity 
consumers in France. This is indicated in Table 4:2 below, which 
sets out the trend in the percentage load factor (:to LF) in France 
over the period 1949-1972. 
TABLJ:; 4:2 
Ye ar 1949 1950 195 1 · 1952 1953 .1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 
r~ L.F. 62,8 57 ,8 60 , 7 61 , 1 61 ,6 62 ,3 63,6 64 ,1 62 ,7 65',5 
Year 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
% L.F. 63 ,4 64 ,4 64 , 2 66 ,6 66 ,6 68 ,0 66 ,7 64 ,8 67 ,2 68 ,5 
Betw e en 1956, when tJ-.e r;ew tariff was in the process of being intro-
duced, and 1965 "the variation in the load factor is no more than one 
IVculd expect in consequence of climatic and business cycle variations, 
and there is, surprisingly no eyidence of the reduction in contracted 
deCland , ,,24 There a,ppears to be a definite change after 1965 and this 
may be an indication that there has been a delayed adjustment to the 
24. Hermann, G. F . K., or. cit., p. 6-11 • 
1959 196C 
64 ,0 63, ( 
1971 197, 
68 , 2 66 " 
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charge in the tariff structure 0 Consumers may, therefore, require 
time to respond correctly to the pricing signals of a marginal cost 
tariff policy. 
Nevertheless regardless of whether or not the introduction of a 
marginal cost pricing policy produces a significant reduction in the 
load factor of an electricity network, it can still be argued that the 
structuring of tariffs according to tbe cost of supply in different 
areas, at different voltages and at various times of the day and year, 
provides a substantially improved basis of economically efficient 
allocation of res<.>urces than a tariff policy based on more arbitrary 
methods of cost allocation. 
4:4 DESCRIPTION AN"D EVALUh TraN OF THE TARIFF 
POLICY OF THE ELECTP.lCITY SUFPLY COMMISSION 
II'; SOUTH AFRICA 
4:4:1 INTRODUCTION 
A FROFIlE OF ESCOM 
The bulk of electricity in South Africa is supplied by the EI"ctr-icity 
Supply Commission (Esc orr} • Thi!; is u public corporation established 
as an electricity utility by t hE: Elec tricity Act No. 42, of ', 9220 
This Act was repealed and replaced by in 1958 by the Electric:ty Act 
No. 40. The functions, powers and duties of the Commission ac'e laid 
cown in section fcur of the Acto These basically require Escom to 
" s timulate the provisio", wherever required, of a "~ I eap 2.ncl abund2.nt 
supply of electricity. ,,25 In ~ts 1982 Ar.r.ual Report the basic 
objE,ct;Yt of Escom was stated to be "to provide an adequate supply of 
25. Electricity Supply Commission, Annual Report 1982, 
Megawatt Park, Sandton, p. 10. 
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electricity at cost price so that ·it can be used for the economic 
advancement of South Africa. ,,26 EsC'om' s /Jerformance is therefore, 
measured, not in terms of profitability, but rather "by criteria 
such as the amount and price of electricity provided for consumption. " 
The o:::-ganization is directed by a chairman and six other commissioners, 
all appointed by the State P:resident. Management vests in the Chairman 
who is assistE,d by a senior general manager and corporate a.nd regional 
management teams, For administrative pl..rposes, Escom is divided 
into six regions each headed by a regional manager who is responsible 
for the 'peration of power stations and the distribution system in his 
region. For accounting purposes Escom is divided into seven distri-
bution undertakings and one generation undertaking. 
By 1982 Escom' s power stations had a total sent-out capacity of 
20523 ivlW and its electricity sales represer.tec r.1ore than 93 per cent 
of all electricity sold in South Africa and about 60 per cent of that 
sold on the African continent. At the er:d of 1982, plant with a total 
sentout ca.pacity of 21035 MW was under construction or had been 
ordered including South Africa's first muclea.r power station at 
Koeberg near Cape Town. It is estimated that electricity provides 
23 per cent of the total net energy usage in South Africa and it to" 
expected that by the end of tte centllry, Escom will supply nearly 
40 per cent of the country's energy requirements. 
In 1982 Sot:th Africa had 20 coal-fired stations of which 3 were in the 
Cape, 4 in Natal and 1 3 in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. In 
addition there were two hydro-electric stations, Hendrik Verwoerd 
and Van der Kloof, on the Orange River and two gas-turbine stations 
in the Cape, while Escom also has a contract for the provision of 
power by the Cabora Bassa scheme in Mozambique. Coal-fired 
26. Ibid., p. 10. 
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stations have always generated the vast bulk of electricity sent out 
hy Escom with 96 per cent of the elech'icity sent out by Escorr. coming 
from coal-fired stations in 1982. The fac t that coal deposits are the 
main source of power for Escom generating stations has been an 
important influence on the development of the national grid, since 
most of the power stations are located near the Tra,_,~vaal coalfields. 
The electricity which is generated at these powE>r stations is transmitted 
along 400 kilovolt (KV) cacles to regional undertakings which are 
responsitle for the regional distribution of power. Electricity 
generation for the national grid is cer.trally controlled fr om Simmer 
pan near GermisLcn in the Transvaal. The system of using stations 
in their rrerit order to meet hourly load requirements is effected 
through ·the control system at Simmer pan. It can thus be seen that 
Escom operates a fully developed national trar.smission network and 
is therefore able to obtain all the benefits, d escribed in the previous 
section, which are associated with an interconnected system of 
electr.:icity generation and transmission. 
Escor; follow:;: the general practice of most electricity undel'takings 
in the world of prcviding r eserve plant capacity to meet unpredictable 
increases in demand. It appears tc be Escom I s policy to maintain a 
reserve plant margin of at least 17 per cent. 
Esc orr, has no share capital. Cap it".! expenditure and loan repaYi:lents 
are financed from internal and external source:; in the manner prf)-
se:d::ed by the Electricity Act. External finance is ol:tained by 
raising loans on local and overseas capital markets and through trade 
finance arrangec with suppliers of capital equipment. Most of the 
external finance is used to fund capital expenditure but a portion i:; 
also us<:d to refinance loans w hicr. are of too short a duration to be 
amortized OVIS-r their lives without undue strain being placed on 
electricity tariffs. Internal financE, which is obtained by the retention 
of tariff incc·me, is the other source of funds available to Escom and 
i s controlled by the provisions of the Electricity Act. This legal 
frarr.ework for the determination of Escom I s tariffs will now be 
examined in greater detail. 
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4:4:2 ESCOM'S TARIFF POLICY 
4:4: 2: 1 THE CONSTRAINT ON ESCOM' S PIDCING POLICY 
The legal framework ·for Escom' s pricing policy is laid down in the 
Electricity Act. Section fourteen provides that, except under the 
special conditions stipulated in section fifteen, the prices charged 
by Escom should cover the costs of Froduction, distribution, main-
tenance, administration, contributions to the Capital Development 
Fund, The Reserve Fund and the amount required for the redemption 
and repayment of interest on loans raised to finance capital develop-
ment. Section Fifteen provides that, in certain cases, Escom may 
supply electricity at a loss subject to ministerial approval after an 
investigation has been conducted ill terms of section eight..Escom 
must be fully compensated by the Treasury in these circumstances. 
The general principle that Escom must set its prices tc equate total 
rever.ue with total costs is made explicit in section 14(4) where it 
is stated that Escom " •••• shaH, as fa.r a5 practicable, be carried 
on neither at a profit nor at a loss and that its charges shall be 
adjusted accordingly from time to time." This principle is also 
applied to each regional undertaking since it is stipulated in section 
1 6(1) that "each undertaking carried on by the commission shall be 
separately taken into account when the prices to be charged ••• 
are being assessed or adjusted, To comply with these statutory 
requirements in formulating its tariffs, Escom must each year fore-
cast its total COStE. and total sales and set its prices to generate 
sufficient revenue to cover total costE., Escom' s pricing policy is 
tr.us subject to a revenue constraint, Escom' s record in creeting its 
annual revenue t"rget during the period 1 967 to 1 982 is illustrated 
in Table 4:3 which compares the total revenue earned with "total 
cost" ar-.d measures the surplus or deficit (in: parantheses) incurred 
during these years. 
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TABLE 4:3 
YEAR TOTAL REVENUE TOTAL COST SURPLUS !(DEFICIT) 
R , OOO R ,0000 R, OOO 
196'/ 146783 146928 ( 145) 
1968 161475 161993 ( 518 ) 
1969 176106 175374 732 
1970 193475 195866 ( 2391) 
1971 219584 219639 55 
1972 254394 258021 3627) 
1973 302034 306162 4128) 
1974 358768 364055 ( 5287) 
1975 460073 487149 (27076) 
1976 656381 656322 59 
1977 1030552 997097 33455 
1978 1301 829 1234468 67361 
1979 1529474 1511686 17788 
1980 1772000 1869967 (97967) 
1981 2140689 22 19063 (77374) 
1982 1695422 2753342 (57920) 
One should be careful to interpret the surpluses or deficits recorded 
in Table 4:3 as a measure of Escom r s profitability since "total cost" 
is made up of those iteres which must be covered by revenue in t e rms 
of section 14 of the Electricity Act and includes a number of items 
which would not generally be taken into account in determining the 
net profit before tax of a company incorporated under the Comapnies 
Act. It can be seen from Table 4:3 that at no time did Escom generate 
sufficient revenue to cover its total costs. This target was nearly 
achieved in 1971 when it made a deficit of R55 000 and in 1976 when a 
surplus of R59 000 was earned. Since 1977, however, the size of the 
annual surl'lus or deficit has ir_creased considerably with the record 
deficit of R97 967000 being incurred in 1980. This is indicative of 
the planning problems generally faced in the South Africar. economy 
which has experienced rapid inflation, and flexible exchange ap.d 
interest rates during recent years. During periods of rapid inflation 
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Escom comes under increasing pressure to moderate its tariff increases 
and thus makes it difficult for the Comr[,ission to acl:.ieve its goal of 
equating total revenue with total cost. 
Although the size of the deficits or surpluses incurred by Escom may 
appear large in money terms, it forms a fairly insignificar.t proportion 
of the total revenue earned by Escom, so that the average selling 
price of electricity has tended to bear a fairly close relation to its 
averag'e cost per kilowatt-hour as is shown in Table 4:4. It follows 
that much of the trend in the average selling price of electricity 
during tiw period 1960 to 1980, which is illustrated in Figure 4:8, can 
be explained by changes in the size and composition of the items making 
up the unit cost of electricity. It can be seen from Figure 4.8 that 
the average selling price of electricity rose very gradually up to 
about 1974. From 1975 onwards there has been a sharp rise in the rate 
of increase of the average selling price of electricity, with the 
compunded &nnual percentEge rate of increase during the period 1975 
to 1982 being approximately 17 per cent. Figure 4.8 indicates, though, 
that in real terms the rate of increase in the average selling price of 
electricity has Leen much less dramrctic. In real terms (at 1960 prices) 
the price actually declined from 0,508 cents in 1960 to 0,446 cents in 
1970. The 1980 real price includes contributions to the Capital 
I:eyelopment Fund which it did not in 1960 a"d 1 970. If these contri-
butions were excluded, the 1 980 price in real terms would have been 
0,365 ler kWh. It is apparent from Figure 4.8, then, that the substantial 
price increases during the latter half of the 1 970s could be regardec! 
as an adjustment of the electricity price from an artificially low 
level. The average selling price of electricity in South Africa is 
still fairly low when one compares it with the price c!larged in other 
countries. A report by the Energy Research Institute of the University 
of Cape Town, based on 1979 figures, found that only Norway, Iceland, 
Canada, New Zealand and Turkey have cheaper power than South Africa. 
These countries all have a high proportion of hydro-electric power so 
that South Africa compares particularly favourably with those countries 
whic!:. rely mainly on the thermal generation of elect:cicit:I. A sample 
of the results of this study is given in Table 4:5 on the fcllo"'ing page. 
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TAB L E 4:4 
(1 ) (2) 
Year Average Selling Price Average Cost Difference (1) (2) 
Cents/kW/hr Cents/kW /hr 
1967 0 ,5506 0 ,5512 (0 ,0006 ) 
1968 0 ,5590 0 ,5608 (0 ,0018) 
1969 0 ,5590 0 ,5566 0 ,0024 
1970 0 ,5545 0 ,5614 (0 ,0069) 
1971 0 ,5772 0 ,5774 (0 ,0002) 
1972 0 , 6108 0 ,6195 (0 ,0087) 
1973 0 ,6484 0 , 6573 (0 ,0089) 
1974 0 ,6822 0 ,6923 (0 ,0101) 
1975 0 ,7950 0 ,8418 (0 ,0468) 
1976 1,0360 1,0360 0 ,000 
1977 1 ,5353 1, 4854 0 ,0499 
1978 1 ,7887 1, 6961 0 ,0926 
1979 1 ,898o 1 ,8759 0 ,0221 
1980 2 ,0242 2 , 1361 (0 , 1119) 
1981 2 , 2811 2 ,3636 (0 ,0825 
1982 2 , 2811 2 ,3636 (0 ,0825) 
TABLE 4:5 
Ii\TERNATICNAL COl\IPARISON OF AVERAGE SELLING PliICE OF 
ELE( ;TRICITY IN 1 974 
Country 
Norway 
Iceland 
Canada 
Turkey 
South Africa 
Spain 
Australia 
United Kingdom 
Average Selling Price 
Cents/kWh 
0 ,77 
0 ,88 
1, 42 
1, 86 
1 , 90 
2 ,58 
2 , 60 
4 , 95 
Source - Financial Mail, Marc h ~ 1982. 
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To determine the reasons underlying the trend in the average selling 
price of electricity, it is necessary tc c.onduct a tirr.es series ana-
lysis of the components of "total cost" which must be covered by 
tariff revenue. Thus Table 4·:6, which has been directly reproduced 
from Escom Annual Heports, sets out the breakdown of total Escom 
costs during the period 1967 to 1982. It is now necessary to examine 
the trend over this period in each item in greater detail. 
A. CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTEREST AND REDEMPTICN Fl'NDS 
An Interest Fund and Redemption Fund are established in terms of 
paragraph 11 of the First Schedule of the Electricity Act "for the 
payment of interest and the redemption and extir:cti on of securities." 
The annual contribution to the interest fund is made out revenue in 
terms of paragraph 12(1) of the first schedule: 
"there shall be paid arxi transferred to the interest fund in each year 
for the payment of interest in respect of the seourities a sum equal 
to the aggregate amount of all the interest payable in that year on 
the securities outstanding." 
It can be seen from Table 4:6 that contributions to the interest fund 
have formed a substantial proportion of total cost during the period 
1 967 t o 1 982: in 1 967 the contributic ns to the interest fund formed 
25,39 per cent of total cost. This proportion rose to 33,58 per cent 
iI: 1972 although it fell steadily to 22,51 per cent in 1977 as the 
contributions to the Capital Development Fund constituted an increasing 
share of total cost. In recent years, however, the share of the 
interest cor.tribution has again risen with interest forming 26,22 
per cent of total cost in 1982. This can be attributed to the risng 
interest cost of new loan which is indicated in Table 4:7 which sets 
out the annual percentage rate of increase in interest payments during 
the period 1 968 to 1 982 . 
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Total Escorn costs 
Redemption 
Total and other 
Escorn provision Capital 
milt. kW.h for loan Reserve Development 
Year sold Interest repayment Fund Fund 
1967 26657.1 R(OOO) 37312 24536 9912 
c/kW.h sold 0.1400 0.0920 0.0372 
% of tolal cost 25.39 16.70 6.75 
1968 28885.0 R(OOO) 43282 23884 12300 
c/kW.h sold 0.1498 0.0827 0.0426 
% of 10lal cost 26.72 14.74 7.59 
1969 31 505.6 R(OOO) 50943 20809 13605 
c/kW.h sold 0.1617 0.0660 0.0432 
% of total cost 29.05 11 .87 7.76 
1970 34890.6 R(OOO) 59484 23654 15202 
c/kW.h sold 0.1705 0.0678 0.0436 
% of tolal cost 30.37 12.08 7.76 
1971 38040.0 R(OOO) 70266 30928 8568 
c/kW.h sold 0.1847 0.081 3 0.0225 
% of lotal cost 31.99 14.08 3.90 
1972 41 648.9 R(OOO) 86631 30575 3056 13596 
c/kW.h sold 0.2080 0 .0734 0.0073 0.0326 
% of lotal cost 33.58 11.85 1.18 5.27 
197;) 46578.4 R(OOO) 101 858 34200 3760 15366 
c/ kW.h sold 0.2187 0.0734 0.0081 0.0330 
% of tolal cost 33.27 11.17 1.23 5.02 
1974 52585.1 R(OOO) 114308 27151 66 28114 
c / kW.h sold 0.217 4 0.0516 0.0001 0.0535 
% of tolal cost 31.40 7.46 0.02 7.72 
1975 57869.2 R(OOO) 136963 30814 1 400 40730 
c/ kW.h sold 0.2367 0.0532 0.0024 0.0704 
% of tolal cost 28.12 6.33 0.29 8.36. 
1976 63355.7 R(OOO) 173829 41470 1 700 5~ 584 
c/kW.h sold 0.2744 0.065 5 0.002 7 0.0846 
% of total cost 26.49 6.32 0.26 8.16 
1977 67 125.4 R(OOO) 224418 63403 900 224000 
c/kW.h sold 0.3343 0.0945 0.0013 0.3337 
% of total cost 22.51 6.36 0.09 22.47 
1978 72780.4 R(OOO) 308970 76036 900 300000 
c/kW.h sold 0.424 5 0.1044 0.0012 0.412 1 
% of lolal cost 25.03 6.16 0.07 24.30 
1979 80582.8 R(OOO) 373718 88800 900 380 000 
c!kW.h sold 0.463 7 0.1101 0.001 1 0.471 5 
% 01 tota l cost 24.72 5.87 0.06 25.14 
1980 87539.3 R(OOO) 504732 101629 900 426400 
c/kW.h sold 0.5766 0.1161 0.0010 0.487 1 
% of lotal cost 26.99 5.44 0.05 22.80 
1981 93844.0 R(OOO) 603546 117088 900 435478 
c/kW.h sold 0.6431 0.1248 0.001 0 0.4640 
% of total cost 27.21 5.28 0.04 19.63 
1982 96135.9 R(OOO) 721 948 154 758 26000 450000 
c/ kW.h sold 0.751 0 0.1610 0.0270 0.468 1 
% of tolal cost 26.22 5.62 0.95 16.34 
Table 4:6 Escom Costs and Revenue, 1:967 to 1982 
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Total Escom costs 
Other power Distribution 
Sub·total stalion operation 
capital Purchase operating and 
related of and mainte- maintenance General Total Total 
costs electricity Fuel nanee costs costs expenses costs revenue 
71 760 313 42488 14618 7146 10 603 146928 146783 
0,2692 0,001 2 0,1594 0,0548 0,0268 0,0398 0,551 2 - 0,5506 
48,84 0,21 28,92 9,95 4,86 7,22 100,00 99,90 
79466 121 45117 17016 8097 12176 161 993 161 475 
0 ,2751 0,0004 0,1562 0,0589 0,028 ° 0,0422 0,5608 0,559 ° 
49,06 0,07 27,85 10,50 5,00 7,52 100.00 99,68 
85357 102 48035 19038 9264 13578 175374 176106 
0,2709 0,0003 0,1525 0,0604 0,0294 0,0431 0,5566 0,559 ° 
48,67 0,06 27,39 10,86 5,28 7.74 100,00 100,42 
98340 89 49440 21955 10594 15448 195866 193475 
0,2819 0,0003 0,141 7 0,0629 0,0304 0,0443 0,561 4 0,5545 
50,21 0,05 25,24 11 ,21 5.41 7,89 100,00 98,78 
109762 82 53587 26276 11 492 18440 219639 219584 
0,2885 0,0002 0,1409 0,0691 0,0302 0,0485 0,577 4 0,577 2 
49,97 0,04 24,40 11 ,96 5,23 8.40 100,00 99,97 
133858 95 57259 31 586 13486 21 737 258021 254394 
0,3214 0,0002 0,1375 0,0758 0,032 4 0,0522 0,619 5 0,6108 
51 ,88 0,04 22,19 12,24 5,23 8.42 100,00 98,59 
155184 117 68634 38685 17082 26460 306162 302034 
0,3332 0,0003 0,1474 0,0831 0,0367 0,0568 0,6573 0,6484 
50,69 0,04 22.42 12,64 5,58 8,64 100,00 98,65 
169 639 86 92530 48572 20617 32611 364055 358768 
0,3226 0,0002 0,176 ° 0,0924 0,0392 0,062 ° 0,6923 0,6822 
46,60 0.02 25.42 13,34 5,66 8,96 100,00 98.55 
209907 114 141 913 '44980 '18477 '71 758 487 149 460073 
0,3627 0,0002 0,2452 0,077 7 0,0319 0,124 ° 0,841 8 0.795 0' 
43,09 0,02 29,13 9,23 3.79 14.73 100,00 94.44 
270583 2399 208316 62477 19712 92835 656322 656381 
0.427 1 0,0038 0,3288 0.D986 0,031 1 0,1465 1,036 ° 1,036 ° 
41 .23 0,37 31.74 9,52 3,00 14,14 100,00 100,01 
512 72 1 15501 239228 76294 19859 133494 997097 1 030552 
0,7638 0,0231 0,356 4 0,1137 0,0296 0,1989 1,485 4 1,5353 
51.42 1.55 23,99 7,65 1,99 13,39 100,00 103,36 
685906 26364 271 222 89193 23677 138106 1 234468 1 301 829 
0,9424 0,0362 0,3726 0,1225 0,0325 0,1897 1,6961 1.788 7 
55,56 2,14 21,97 7,22 1,92 11 ,19 100,00 105.46 
843418 36061 319428 95887 28689 188203 1511686 1 529 474 
1,046 6 0,044 7 0,3963 0, 11 89 0,0356 0.233 5 1,8759 1,898 ° 
55.79 2,39 21,13 6,34 1,90 12.45 100,00 101,18 
1 033661 35806 405630 117968 36824 240078 1 869967 1 772000 
1,1808 0,0409 0.463 3 0,1348 0,0421 0,2742 2,1361 2,0242 
55,28 1,91 21,69 6,31 1,97 12,84 100,00 94,76 
157012 4106 569949 170206 43034 273756 2218063 2140689 
1,2329 0,0044 0,607 3 0,181 4 0,0459 0,291 7 2,3636 2,281 1 
52,16 0,19 25.70 7,67 1,94 12,34 100,00 96,51 
1 352706 3615 693979 261 842 59852 381 348 2753342 2695422 
1.407 1 0,0037 ~ 0,2723 0,0623 0,3967 : ~64. 0 2,8038 
49,13 0,13 25,21 9,51 2,17 13,85 • 100,00 97.90 
Table 4:6 (Continued) 
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TABLE 4:7 
ANNUAL GROWTH Ii'iT BREST COSTS: 1968 -1982 
Year Annual % in increase in interest cost 
1968 16, 0 
1969 17 , 7 
1970 16 , 8 
1971 18 , 1 
1972 23, 3 
1973 17 , 5 
1974 12 , 2 
1975 19, 8 
1976 2 6, 9 
1977 29 ,1 
1978 37 ,6 
1979 20 ,9 
1980 35 ,1 
1981 19 , 6 
1982 19 , 6 
The rate of growth in interest payments remained fairly steady during 
the period 1968 to 1975, when the a.verage annual rate of increase 
was 17,6 per cent. After 1976 the annual rate of growth of the 
interest burden showed a sharp increase with the average rate of 
increa.se during this period being about 27, ° per cent. 
The current contributions from revenue to the interest fund are signi-
ficantly inflated by the fund accounting techniques adopted by Escom, 
The investments of the redemption, capital development and reserve 
funds largely consist of Escom stock. At 31 st December 1982, these 
funds held 40,3 per cent of the book value of Escom' s internally 
registered stock. They thus form an important market for Escom stock 
over and above t h at which can be sold to local buyers or raised in 
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foreign countries. The interest earned on this stock is reinvested 
in these funds. It follows that a substantlal proportion of the total 
interest payable whie:, is charged to revenue, is retained internally 
by the Commission and thus provides a source of funds for the 
internal financing of capital development. This differs from the 
generally accepted accounting practice of companies incorporated 
under the Companies Act in terms of which transfers to internal 
funds are not treated as a charge against rever.ue but as an appro-
priation from net profit. In 1982 the interest credited to the Capital 
Development Fund which holds 8.11 its investments in Escom stock, 
amounted to R350 '163 000. This constituted 48,5 per cent of the 
total interest charge of R721 948 000. When -one considers that 
the reserve and redemption fund s hold 97 , 7 per cent and 99,95 
per cent, respectively, of thei.:- investments in Escom, stock it 
follows the major proportion of the amounts of R15 216 000 and 
R76 315 000 of interest credited to these funds, respectively, 
was charged to revenue. Table 4:8 sets .. )lit the ratios of interest 
crE·dited to internal funds to the total interest charge for the period 
1977 to 1982. Table 4:8 provides a fair indicaticn of the proportion 
of the total interest charge which is providing a source of internal 
finance to Escom. It can be seen from this tab!.e that this proportion 
has grown substantially during the last five years. This may be 
2.ttributed to ~he rapid growth -in the interest earnec! hy the capital 
development fur..d. Table 4:9 indicates the extent to which the amount 
of intere~t credited to this fund ha.o grown in recent years. 
TABLE 4:8 
Year 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
% Intere~t Credited 
Total interest charge 
35 ,6 
40 , 5 
46 ,2 
44 ,4 
51 , 3 
61 , 2 
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TABLE 4:9 
INTEREST CREDITED TO CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT FUND 
Year R'OOO Annual Percentage % Credit 
Increase Total Interest Charge 
----
1977 33169 14 ,8 
1978 70091 111,3 22 ,7 
1979 111264 58 ,7 29 ,8 
1980 15917 1 43, 1 31,5 
1981 233720 46,8 38 ,7 
1982 3501 63 49,8 48 ,5 
It is clear that as the investment base of the Capital DevelopmentFund 
grows, the interest payable out of revenue into t.his fund will also 
grow substanti ally with the result that the revenue constraint on 
Escon,' s pricing policy will become increasingly steeper. It can 
be c or-cluded tt_at the fu nd accounting techniques employed by Escom 
result in an overcharging of interee,t against l'ever.ue a nd an over-
statement of the total cost s which must be covered by revenue if Escom 
is to IIbreak even II • 
B. CONTRIBCTIONS TO THE REDEMPTION FUND 
Escom has adopted the following' accounting policy in respect of it" 
fixed a.ssets in commission: 
"Fixed assets in commission are not depreciated but are reflected at 
historical cost. Long term loans are raised to finance these assets. 
Because of the correlation between the J oans so raised and fixed assets, 
t he charge to revenue for loan amortisation takes the place of 
d e preciation. ,,27 
27. Electricity Supply Commission, Annual Report 1982, 
Megawatt Park, Sandton, 1982, p. 35. 
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Provision for depreciation of these assets thus takes place by means 
of the Redempti.on Fund for local loans and the "Provision for Repayment 
of Foreign Loans". 'The Redemption Fund is established in tE,rms of 
the Electricity Act and is maintained on a sinking fund basis to 
amortize the loan debt of long and medium term loans. When fixed 
assets are placed in commercial operation a loan is allocated as beS.ng 
the finan.cing source of these assets. An annual contribution is 
dete.rmined on a sinking fund basis for the lifetime of the loa", which at 
present is about 23 years. This contribution is based on a projected 
interest ee.rning rate to equat .. the redemption value of the loan. To 
appropriate the income necessary to make these annual contribution, 
in terIT.s of paragraph 12(2), the following amounts are paid and trans-
ferred to the reo(-mption fund: 
"(a) the net jOroceeds of any sales of fixed property belonging to 
the Commission; 
(b) all other incomings of the Commission in respect "f any 
sales of rights or interests in the nature of or analogous 
to fixed property or servitude.s; 
(c) the income of the investments of the redemption fund 
In terms of paragraph 1 6(3) t.he investments of the Redemption Fund 
" 
are revalued on an anEual ba.sis to determine whether they are suffi-
cient to meet the requirem(mts of the sinking fund. If there is a 
shortfall, ther: a contribution to the sinking fund is made out of 
re'lenue. The amounts shown in Table 4:6 as charges from revenue 
to the redemption fund a.re thus residual items, so that it is difficult 
to discern any. significant trend in these amounts. Certainly dc.ring 
the period 1967 to 1975, the cor,tribution out of revenue to this fund 
fluctuat"d in their amount. For exampl" in 1 968, 1969, 1972 and 
1974 the contributions fell from the previous annual a.mount, while in 
1970, 1971, 1973 and 1975 there was an annual increase in this contri-
bution. During the period 1976 to 1982 the contribution to the J:!'edemp-
tionFuncl showed a steady annual growth indicating that this item of 
"total cost" has placed an increasing burden on Escom' s tariff revenue. 
Although the share of "total costs" constituted 1:;y this item has 
decree.sed steadily f:com 16,70 per cent in 1967 to 5,62 per cent in 
1982 it appears to have levelled out at around 5,55 per cent during 
the last four years, 
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The contribution to the Redemption Fund together with the internal 
interest on the investment of the fund and the annual amounts set aside 
on a straight line basis for the repayment of foreign loar.s are ccarged 
to revenue instead of depreciation on fixed assets in commission. 
Depreciation is, however, charged on movable plant and equipment at 
rates considered appropriate to reduce cost to estimated re"idual value 
over the useful lives of the ltssets. The question thus arises as to 
what extent Escom I s system gives results comparable to a system of 
depreciation based on historical cost (If assets taking into account 
that the present av'erage life of .!o:scom I s assets is approximately 35 
years. The Board of Trade and Industries addressed this problem 
and found" ••• both in respect of local and overseas loans the redemption 
period of the loans is shorter than the average lifetime of the assets 
resulting in accelerated depreciation. ,,28 To illustrate this, the 
Board compared the straight line historical cost depreciation of an 
asset costing R1 000 with a life of 35 years with the c ontributior.s 
to tte Redemption Fund te· redeem a local loan raised to finance the 
purchase of the asset at 10 per cer:t interest reder.lable after 23 years 
Figure 4:9 depicts the results of this comparison. It could. be argued 
that if loans were repaid in full after 23 years, Escort: I s position 
would be the "arne as as in tte case of historical value depreciation. 
A porticn of the investments of the Red.emption fund is, however, always 
held in internal Escom stuck so that only a certain portion of its loans 
have to be repaid at their redemptior. date while the remaining 
redeemable portion is reinvested il l Escom stock. The terminal 
value of this internal portion not repaid, after 12 years for different 
proportions of internal financing is shown in Table 4:10. 
28. Repe.blic of South Africa, Board of Trade and Industries 
Report No. 1889, Investigation into the tariff policy and 
tariff structt:.re of the supply of .electricity in S oath Africa, 
Pretoria, 19'/7, p. 41. 
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TABLE 4:10 
Terminal amount (of R500 and 
R600 respectively) assuming 
interest rate of 10% 
Amount to be borrowed 
Cost of asset to be financ(.,d 
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50% Internal 60% Internal 
R1 569 R1 883 
R1 569 R1 255 
R3 138 R3 138 
-------------- ----
ESCCffi'S policy can be justified tc some extent in an inflationary 
period, since the cost of replacing ar. asset will rise substantially 
over the life of the asset, In the example above, Escom' s policy 
provides for higher replacemer.t cost resulting from an average 
inflation rate over 35 years amounting to 3,32 percent per annum. 
To support the contention by the Board of Trade and Industries that 
Escom's policy results in a greater charge against revenue than if 
its assets were depreciated on a historical cost basis, the char.;e 
against revenue which would have resulted during the period 1977 
to 1982 if fixed assets in commission had been depreciated over 
35 yea rs on a stl-aight line basis has bee n calculate-d. This (harge 
has also bee n compared witt. that which resulted under the present 
Escom Folicy of charging the contribution and interest on the Redemption 
Fund and the provision fc·r the redemption of foreign loans against 
revenue. 
It call be seen from Table 4:11 that during the _period .1977 to 
1979 and in 1982 the charges under the curre nt Esccm s y stem w e re 
g-reater than those which woule' have resulted if depredation had 
been charged on a historical basis. This, however, was not the 
c,"se ir. 1980 and 1981. Over the er.Ure period, however, the Escom 
cr.arges we re R31 ,5 millior. greater than his torical cost depreciation 
so that there appears to be some validity in the cor.clusion of the 
B O:3rd of Trade and Industries Report. 
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TABLE 4:"11 
COMPARISON BETWEEN CHARGES AGAINST REVENCE CNDER 
FRES ENT ESCOM POLIC Y AND \.\1TH HISTORICAL COST 
DEPRECIATION 
(1 ) (2) 
Years Charge on Current Basis Charge on Historic al Difference 
Cost Basis (1 l-(2) 
R' OOO R' OOO R' OOO 
1977 94153 81460 12693 
1978 110774 101846 8928 
1979 132489 120729 11760 
1980 150022 1601 15 (10093) 
1981 177503 180659 ( 3156) 
1982 231073 21 9697 11376 
C. THE CAPITAL REDElvlPTIO N AND RESERVE FUNDS 
Sinc" 1 971 Escom has been errpowered to generate funds for future 
capita.l expenditure through the Capital Development Fund. In terms of 
the 1971 am endment to the Act, the annual contributions to the 
Capital Development and Reserve Funds, excluding interest earned 
by these funds, was limited to 3 per cent of the value of unredeemed 
loans, prcvided that the accumulated amount excluding inte:::'est 
earned by these funds did not exceed 15 per cent of unredeeMed leans 
in the case of the Capital Development and 7,5 per cent in the case 
of the Reserve Fund. In 1977 the Act was again ·amended to raise 
the upper limit on annual contributions to 6 per cent and the ceiling 
on the accumulated amount of the capital development fund to 30 per cent. 
For the first five years after introduction of the Capital Development 
F und during the period 1972 to 1976, the annua.l contributions to this 
fund were well below their legal limits. For example, it was estimated 
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that in 1976 total Capital Development Fund and Reserve Fund 
contributions amounted to only 1 ,8 per cent of unredeemed loans. 29 
Table 5:6 shows that, compared to later years, the contributions 
to the Capital Development Fund made up a relatively small proportion 
of total cost. In 1972 contributions made up only 5,27 per cent of 
total costs, in 1973 5,02 per cent, in 19747,72 per cent, in 1975 
8,36 per cent and in 1976 8,16 per cent. In 1977, however, there 
was a change in Escom policy regarding the internal financing of 
capital development and the contributions to this fund increased 
dramatica lly from R53 51'4 000 to R224 000 000. The backgrounc. 
to this development was the dramatic decline in foreig'n sources 
of finance in 19.7 wUch virtually forced Escom to rely on internal 
funds if it was to continue its capital development programme. The 
importance of the Capital Development Fund as a stable and reliable 
source d financ€' has been recognized by Escom in recent years, 
particularly in the light of the h.ighly volatile nature of the foreign 
capital ma.rket. This volatility of foreign borrowing is indice.ted 
by the changing ratios of foreign to local loans as shown in Table 4 :12. 
TABLE 4:12 
RATIO LOCAL TO FOREIGN LOANS, 1976 TO 1981. 
Year 
Local % 
Foreign '%' 
197 6 
40 
60 
1977 
70 
30 
1978 
50 
50 
1979 
35 
65 
1980 
40 
60 
1981 
60 
40 
The progress which Escom has made during the period 1977 to 1982 in 
increasing the amount of the capital development up to its legal 
maxiloum is reflected in Table 4:13 . 
29. Ibid., p. 44. 
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It can be seen from column (4) that the difference between the accumu-
lated amount of the Capital Development Fund, excluding interest, and 
its legal maximum steadily declined during the period 1977 to 1981 • 
This trend is not only accounted for by the annual increases in the 
contribution to the Capital Development Fund but also by the reinves,t-
ment of interest income into the Esccm stock held by the fund. In 
1982, however, the accumulated amount of the Capital Development 
Fund fell further below the legal limit than in 1981, largely due to 
the relatively small increase in ~nnual contributions in that year. 
Colurr.ns (5) and (6) compax'e the e,ctual anr,ual contributi.cns t o the 
Capital Development and Reserve Funds with the legal rraximum which 
is set at 6 per cent of unredeemed loans. It can be seen that during the 
period 1977 to 1980 the annual contributi ons actually exceeded the legal 
limit. This indicates that it was a deliberate policy of Escom to build 
up the Capital Development Fund as quickly as possible (the annuaJ 
ccntributions to the Reserve Fund rerr.ained steadily at RO,9 million 
during this period). In 1981 and 1982, however, the annual contri-
bdions fell significar..tly short of the legal limit ,. In particular, it 
can be seen tha.t in 1982 it would have been possible to increase the 
annual contribu.tion by R195, 5 million. This would have had the 
effect of incre a.sing tota.l costs by 7,1 per cent to R2 948,8 millicn 
and the a..verage cost per kWh of electricity by 0,2 cents /kWh to 
3,07 cents/kWh. It is possible that Esccm refrained from l:urdening 
its consumers with this additional cost due to the recessionary 
cor,ditions in the economy and because it may have been considered 
that the amount of iLternal financing had reachec a satisfa.ctory level. 
The Reserve Fund was established by the Electricity Act for "the 
replacement of obsolete ma.chinery or plant and generally for the 
betterment of plant owned by the Commission or in lieu of insurance, 
or for exceptior.al repairs or emergencies, but not for ordinary 
maintenance." Contributions io this fund have never been as important 
a component of total costs as contributions to the Capital Developnent 
Fund. Table 4:6 shows that the contributions to this fund rose from 
R9,9 million in 1967 to R15, 2 million in 1970 and then fell to R1 ,7 
million in 1976. From 1977 to 1981 the contributions were held 
(~ -<. 
TABLE 4:13 
T HEND IN THE CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT FUND (C . D. F .) 1977 TO 1982 
Year (1 ) (2) (3 ) (4) (5 ) (6) (7) 
Unredeemed 30% Accumulated Shortfall 6')(. Actual Potential 
Loans x CDF from legal x Contributions Increase Unredeemed Lees limit Unredeemed to CDF In contritutions 
Interest (2)-(3) and RF to CDF and RF 
R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO H'OOO R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO 
1977 3 717 595 1 115 279 405 66 1 709 618 223 056 224 900 
t-- 1978 4 710 009 1 413 003 738 907 674 906 282 601 300 900 0 
«). 
1979 5 750 696 1 755 209 1 189 142 536 067 345 042 380 900 
1980 6 785 436 2 035 631 1 727 162 308 469 407 126 427 300 
1981 8 500 843 2 550 253 2 323 140 227 113 510 051 436 378 73 673 
1982 11 191 648 3 357 494 3 006 860 350 634 671 499 4'76 000 195 499 
)08 
steadily at RO, 9 million, althot:.gh in 1 982 they were increased again 
to R2,6 million. Since 1970 the proportion of total costs constituted 
by these contributions fell from 7,76 per cent in 1970 to 0,04 per cent 
in 1981 • 
Although the contributions to the Capital Development and the Reserve 
Fund are both charged to revenue as part of "total ccst", in terms of 
the generally accepted accounting practice of companies incorporated 
under the Companies Act these items would I::oth be shown as an 
appropriation of profits. 
D. CAPITAL RELATED COSTS 
To summarize the analysis of the capital-related component of "total 
costs" so far, it wvuld ~ :eem that a fairer measure Cof Escom' s profit-
ability coule be obtained by adopting the following procedure: 
Add: (a) Interest credited to funds in respect of Esc om :3tc.ck. 
(b) Contributions to Redemption Fund. 
(c) Contributions to Capital Development Fund. 
(d) Contributions to Reserve Fund. 
Deduct: Historical Cost Depreciation. 
Table 4:14 sets out the results of using this procedure to calculate 
the adjusted surplusesje'arned by Escom during the period 1977 to 
1982. 
It can be seen that in each of the ",-bove years a substantial portion 
of the capital related costs charged to the 8lectricity Supply Account 
c cnsists of ir ,ternally retained profits and that Esc om earns a sub-
stantial surplus in each year. It is apparent therefore that Esc om 
does not formulate its pricing policy subject to a strict break even 
c on:::traint 0 
Ir, Table 4:14 the return on sales and return on total assets was 
calculated as the percentage of the adjusted surplus to total revenue 
and total assets respectively. It can be seen that during the period 
1977 to 1979 when tariffs were raised to provide the revenue fc.r the 
!J 
TABLE 4:14 
ADJL:5TElJ ESCOM SURPLL"S 1977 TO 1982 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Surplus/Deficit (R' 000) 33 455 67 361 17 788 ( 97 967) ( 77 374 ( · 57 920) 
Interest credited to funds 79 763 125 060 172 348 224 024 309 559 441 694 
Contributions to funds 288 303 376 936 469 700 528 929 553 466 630 758 
401 521 569 357 659 836 654 986 785 651 101 532 
Less Depreciation ( 81 460) (101 846) (120 729) (1 60 115) (180 659) 219 627 
Adjusted Surplus (R' 000) 320 061 467 511 539 107 494 871 604 992 794 835 
'" 0 
Returns on Sales (ra ) 31 , 1 35,9 42,.% 27 , 9% 28 ,3% 29 , 5% '" 
Returns on Total Assets (%) 7 ,0 8,0 7,1 5 ,5 5,4 5,4 
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expansion of the Capital Development Fund the return on sales react.ed 
the fairly high figures of 3 '\ ,1 per cent in 1977, 35,9 per cent in 1978 
and 41 ,4 per cent in 1979. The return on sales and total assets showed 
a marked decline during the period 1980 tc 1982. If Escom had, 
however, raised its tariffs to generate the revenue required to cover 
the maximum possible contributions to the Capital Development and 
Reserve Funds the adjusted surplus would have been R678 66) 000 in 
1981 and R990 334000 in 1982, with the return on sales being 31 ,7 
per cent in 1981 ar-.d 36,7 per cent in 1982. The return on total assets 
in these years would have been 6,0 per ce:tt and 6,7 per cent, respec-
tively . It appears, then, that Escom has considerable amount of 
discretion within the legal constraints imposed by the Electricity Act 
to use its monopoly pO'Ner to earn a substantial return on its investment. 
The queS'.tion of whether it is justifiable for Escom to have. this 
discretionary power, will be examinee in the next section. 
Although Table 4:6 indicates that capital related charges form a major 
portion of totd costs, the above analysis shows that the capital 
related charges should be divided between those which relate to current 
consumption of capital and those: which provide for future capital 
investment. Table 4:,5 shows the effect of deducting those charges 
which are in effect retained profits from both the capital relatee 
charges and tbe "total costs" on the cost structure of Escom. The 
annual current capital consumption cha.rge after the a.djustment is 
rr.ade up of the net interest . paid to outsic:.e s;,ockholders and histcrical 
cost deprecia.tion. The effect of the adjustment is to reduc e the 
a.ve rage share of total CGsts contributed by ca.pital costs for the pericd 
1977 to 1982 from 53,2 per cent to 31 ,7 per cent. Escorr., therefore, 
is clea.rly required to genera.te revenl,e from its tariffs more for 
future ca.pita.l expansion than tc cover the current capita.l cost of 
production. 
E. CURRENT OPERATING COSTS 
. . 
Ta.bles 4:6 and 4·:15 indicate that each year a substa.ntial portion of 
Escom's total costs is n ade up of current operating costs. The 
average percentag-e of total costs contributed by the$e running costs 
'" 
TABLE 4:15 
EFFBCT OF ADJUSTMENT ON E SCOM COST STRUCTURE 
Year 
1977 R (000) 
% of total c cst 
1978 R (000) 
'}1, of tota.l cost 
1979 R (000) 
% of total cost 
1980 R (000) 
7. of total cost 
1981 R (000) 
% of total cost 
1982 R (000) 
% of total cost 
B e fore Adjustment 
Capital 
related 
charges 
51 272 
51 , 42 
685 906 
55 ,56 
843 418 
55 ,79 
1 033 661 
55,28 
1 157 012 
52 , 16 
1 352 706 
49,13 
Hunning 
Cost 
484 376 
48 ,58 
548 562 
44 ,44 
668 268 
44,21 
836 306 
44,72 
1 061 051 
47,84 
1 400 636 
50 ,87 
Total 
Cost 
997 097 
100 
1 234 468 
100 
1 511 686 
100 
1 869 967 
100 
2 218 063 
100 
2 753 342 
100 
Currer.t 
Capital 
Consumption 
226 115 
31 ,8 
2il5 756 
34,2 
322 099 
32 ,5 
440 823 
34 ,5 
474 646 
30 ,9 
499 951 
26 ,3 
After Adjustmer.t 
R unning 
Cost 
484 376 
68 ,2 
548 762 
65 ,8 
668 268 
6i ,5 
836 306 
65 ,5 
1 061 051 
69 , 1 
1 400 636 
73 ,7 
'1' otal 
Costs 
710 491 
100 
834 518 
100 
990 367 
100 
1 277 129 100 
1 535 697 
100 
1 900 587 
100 
Retained 
Profits 
286 606 
40 , 3 
400 150 
47 , 9 
521 319 
52 ,6 
5~2 838 6,4 
682 366 
44 ,4 
852 755 
44 , 9 
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during the period 1977 to 1982 was 46,8 per cent before and 68,3 
per cent after the abovementioned adjustment, Tbere can be no 
objection to charging these costs to revenue, since they are directly 
incurred in the production of electricity. It follows that every year 
Escom should aim t o generate sufficient rever:ue from its tariffs to 
at least cover these costs. 
By far the most import£.nt component of operating costs is the cost of 
fuel which is large ly made up of the cost of coal, "i.nce the bulk of 
electricity gene:!eration in South Africa is performed by coal-fired 
power stations. This is illustrated in Table 4:16 which is directly 
reproduced from Escom I s Annual Report for 1982, where it can be 
seen that the total output of coal-fired stations in 1 982 of 100 217 
million kWh made up 97,5 per cent of the total output of " 02 769 
million kWh. Furthermore, the total coal cost of R648, 5 million 
made up 93,5 per cent of the total fuel costs of b:694 millions and 
23,4 per cent of the total costs indicated in Table 4:6. 
A major benefit of the national grid netw ork operated by Escom is that 
most. of its coal-fired power stations are situated near a colliery 
specifically established to meet their coal rec;uirements. Such 
collieries are established a.s a consequence of the acceptance by 
Escc!n, of a tender for the supply of coal for a new powe r station. 
The coal supplied normally has a 10wGr calorific value than the 
standard value of that for rr.anufacturing industry, so that it generally 
cannut be used for any purpose other than electricity g-eneration. 
For example, in 1982 the average calorific value of coal consumed by 
Escom was 21,39 milojoules/kg (11M/kg) while the most recent contract 
was for the supply of coal at an average heat content of 17 MJ/kg 
whereas the standard calorific value of coal consumed by manufacturing 
industry is 24 MJ/kg. Escom therefcre enjoys a degree of monop-
sonistic market power with respect to the purchase of coal of low 
calorific content and is able tc tender for coal at prices which are 
g-enerally lower than its controlled price. 
Table 4:16 indicates that dcring- the period 1960 to 1972 the unit cost 
of coal actually fell from 0,1466 cer,ts/kWh sent out in 1960 to 0,1285 
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Coal-fired power stations 
Coal used Coal cost 
Overall 
Average Average thermal 
Thousands heat conlent kg /kW.h heal rale efficiency 
Calendar of (as received) sent MJ/kW..h sent-out basis Tota l Average 
year tons MJ / kg oul sent out % ROOO rand/ton 
1950 6323.4 22.72 0.869 19.14 18.2 5302 0.84 
1951 6662.9 22.72 0.855 19.43 18,5 6553 0.98 
1952 7 113.4 22.75 0.865 19.68 18,3 8520 1,20 
1953 7393.9 23.08 0,837 19,32 18,6 9862 1.33 
1954 8024,9 23.06 0.805 18.56 19.4 11 329 1.41 
1955 8999.1 22.89 0.188 18.04 20,0 13709 1.52 
1956 9688.5 22.96 0,765 17,56 20,5 13653 1,62 
1957 10220,6 22.79 0.150 17,09 21 ,1 17 256 1,69 
1958 10784 ,1 22.73 0.143- 16,89 21,3 19039 1,77 
1959 11548.7 22.44 0.132 16.43 21 ,9 20970 1.82 
1960 12512.6 22.52 0.723 16,28 22,1 25373 2,03 
1961 13194,9 22.39 0.122 16,17 22,3 27713 2.1 0 
1962 13955.5 22.22 0.1 19 15.98 22,5 29230 2,09 
1963 14721.1 22.15 0.708 15.68 23,0 31 009 2.11 
1964 15654.1 22,15 0.692 15,33 23.5 32367 2,07 
1965. 16 726.7 22,39 0.680 15.23 23,6 34986 2,09 
1966 16982.3 22.20 0.666 14.19 24.4 37901 2,23 
1967 18307.7 22.44 0.645 14.47 24,9 42053 2.30 
1968 19133.9 22,63 0.620 14.03 25.6 44604 2,33 
1969 19982.9 22,73 0.595 13.52 26,6 47453 2,37 
1970 21 630.6 22,97 . 0.580 13.32 27.0 48807 2,26 
1971 23416.2 23,30 0.576 13.42 26.8 52705 2.25 
1972 24 952.8 22.89 0.571 13.07 27.5 56113 u.~_ 
1973 27907.9 22.47 0.563 12.65 28.5 66837 2,39 
1974 30891.4 22.42 0.560 12.56 28.1 90269 2.92 
1975 34 231.7 22.21 0.567 12.59 28,6 138592 4,05 
1976 37257.4 21 .87 0.579 12.66 28.4 200761 5,39 
1977 37505.6 21 78 0.576 12.55 28.1 233229 6.22 
1978 39589.5 21.61 0.574 12.44 28 ,9 263880 6,67 
J979 43264.9 21.22 0.580 12 .33 29,2 301 273 6,96 
1980 46755,0 21.34 0,568 12,16 29.6 379942 8,12 
1981 53903,7 21.25 0,563 12,01 30,0 523663 9.11 
1982 55198.4 2139 0.551 11 ,82 30,5 648550 11.15 
TABLE 4:16 Oper ating Costs for Escom, 1982 
. . ' 
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Total 
Total power stations output power station Average 
million kW.h sent out capacity power station 
assigned plant 
sent-out load 
Cenls! Diesel Total rating factor 
kW.h Coal· Hydro- Pump- and gas power MW sent-out 
sent fired electric storage turbine slation as al basis 
out stations stations stations stations • output 31 December % 
0.0729 7276 7 - 4 7287 1 290 64,7 
0.0840 7797 6 - 3 7806 1 361 66.1 
0,1037 8220 6 - 1 8227 1 454 66,9 
0,111 6 8838 7 - - 8845 1635 65.5 
0.1136 9971 6 - - 9977 1 846 66,4 
0,1201 11 419 6 - - 11 425 2145 65,9 
0.1236 12663 7 - - 12670 2498 61,2 
0,1266 13634 6 - - 13640 2555 61,1 
0, 131 2 14511 5 - - 14516 2748 62.0 
0.1329 15774 3 - - 15777 2983 62,6 
014" 6 17 306 ' 2 - - 17308 3091 65,2 
., U,1::>l 6 18282 2 - - 18284 3226 66.2 
.0.1507 19401 3 - - 19404 3406 65,8 
0.1492 20789 4 
- -
20793 3788 65,7 
0.1430 22634 5 - - 22639 4077 65.2 
0,1423 24583 - - - 24583 4181 67,4 
0.1486 25504 - - - 25504 4377 67,1 
0.1482 28371 
- - -
28371 5328 66.8 
0.1446 30843 
- - -
30843 5800 62,9 
0,141 2 33598 - - - 33598 6441 62,1 
0,1308 37321 
- - -
37321 7060 62,9 
0,1297 40645 94 
- -
40739 8373 61,3 
0,1285 43662 813 
- -
44475 8849 59,6 
0,1348 49570 189 
- -
49759 9482 62,S 
0,1637 55141 1 110 
- -
56251 10002 66,3 
0.2295 60400 1 098 - - 61 498 10522 68,6 
0.3122 64309 1 853 - 26 66188 11 688 ' 66.8 
0.3582 65114 1 924 - 12 67050 12756 . 61,9 
0,3824 69004 1 887 - 11 70902 13595 60.7 
OA04 5 74485 1 144 
-
14 75643 15056 60,9 
OA61 4 82342 992 - 28 . 83362 17339 57,8 
0,5473 95675 1 653 415 81 97824 18989 62.2 
0,6471 100217 1 016 1519 17 102769 20523 59.3 
TABLE 4:16 (Conti nued) 
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cents/kWh sent out in 1912. This trend can be attributed to the rather 
slow rate of increase in the average price of coal from R2,03 per ton 
in 1960 to R2, 25 per ton in 1912, and in the substantial improvement 
in tt.e efficiency of coal use in electricity generation which is 
indicated by the increase in weight of coal per kWh sent out from 
0,123 kg/kWh in 1960 to 0,511 kg/kWh in 19720 The improved efficiency 
in coal consumption by Escom power stati.ons resulted from the shift 
from small scattered power stations in the various undertakings tc the 
s,-,pply of electricity from the large staticns located on the Transvaal 
ccalfields. This had two major effects on the cost of coal consumption: 
(i) the amount of coal c: onsumed per kWh sent out of the larger 
stations is substantially lower than that for smaller 
staticns due to economies of scale and improved technique. 
For example, in 1982, the giant Arnot, Duvha, Kriel and 
Matla power stations consumed 0,498 kg/kWh, 0,459 kg/kWh, 
0, 5l'9 kg/kWh and 0,569 kg/kWh, respectively, whereas the 
small. Klip and Vaal power stations consumed 1 ,171 kg/kWh 
and ~ ,071 kg/kWh respectively. It is only on an inter-
connected power grid that the economies of scale of large 
power stations can be used for the benefit of the whole 
sy stem; al'd 
(ii) with the increased use of a national network stations located 
far from the coalfields can be used teo a lesser extent, with 
the result that savings in the costs of coa.l railage to these 
stations can be achieved. 
After 1912, however, the cost of coal consumed per unit of electricity 
sent out rose from 0,1348 cents per kWh in 1973 to 0,6471 cents per 
kWh in 1982. This cal' be partly attributed to the dramatic increase 
in the average price of coal from R2, 39 per ton in 1913 to R11 ,15 per 
ton in 19820 It is also significar.t that during the period 1973 to 1919 
the efficiency of Goal consumption by Escom actually decreased, which 
is indicated by the increase in the weight of coal used per kWh from 
0,563 kg/kWh in 1913 to 0,58 kg/kWh in 1979, although coal consumption 
appears to have become more efficient during the last three ye8.rs with 
H.e weig·ht of coa.l used per kWh sent out being 0,551 kg in 1982. The 
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slight decrease in the efficiency of cor,l use during the mid-1970s 
can probably be attributed to tLe following factors: 
(i) the scale benefits associated with an integrated power grid 
may have largely been exhausted; 
(ii) there has been a slight decrease in the quality of coal used 
witlt its calorific value falling from 23,47 MJjkg in 1973 to 
21 ,22 MJ j!cg in i 979; and 
(iii) the shortage of external finance during the mid-1970s 
appears to have caused Escom to fall behind in its capital 
development programme, with the result that there has 
been a greater use of th.e capacity of nation2.l power grid. 
This is indicated by the fall on the reserve I'lant margins 
during this period as shown in Table 4:1 T belo,,-. 
TABLE 4:17 
RESERVE PLANT MARGIN PERCENT AGES 1970 TO 1982 
Year % 
1970 25 , 6 
1971 3 6 , 9 
1972 33,4 
1973 29, 0 
1974 17 , 0 
1975 14 , 6 
1976 15 , 9 
1977 18 , 8 
1978 18 , 3 
1979 17 ,1 
1980 26 , 8 
1981 29 , 4 
1982 32 ,1 
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According to Escom policy the reserve plant margin should not be 
allowed to fall below 17 per cent. It can be seen that from 1 974 to 
1979 the reserve plant margin either fell below or remained fairly 
close to this minimum, indicating that the utilization of capacity must 
have fairly high during this period. The resultant greater use made 
of smaller power stations must have contributed to the decline in 
the efficiency of coal consumption during this period. It is signi-
ficant that the easing of the capacity bottleneck during the last three 
years has been accompanied by an improver.1ent in coal efficiency. 
There appears to be a fairly close correlation between the average 
s81ling price of electricity and the average coal cost during the 
period 1960 to 1982. From 1960 to 1972, Escom was able to cause 
the average selling price of electricity to actually decrease in real 
terms tt.rough economies in coal consumption. Since then, however, 
the average price of electricity has risen since, on the one hand, tt.e 
requiremer:t to raise revenue to finance future capital expansion has 
substantially risen while, on the other hand, it has become increasingly 
difficult to improve the efficiency of coal consumptior,. 
Having looked at the nature of the revenue constraint facing Escom 
and how it ha.s changed over time, it is llOW neces:;ary to examine 
the actual structure of the tariffs which Escom sets to raise the revenue 
to meet this constraint. 
4:4:2:2 ESCOM'S TARIFF STRCCTl' RE 
Escorr. ' s tariff policy is based on the following principles: 
(i) the tariffs set for each regional undertaking should be 
based on the costs incurred in supplying electricity by 
the particular underteJ<ing. No cross-subsidization 
between the different undertakings is therefore permitted. 
(ii) the, tariffs charged tc the different groups of consurrers 
supplied by each undertaking should be cased on the 
different costs involved in supplying eac~l. group. One 
consumer group should tr.erefore not subsidize another. 
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(iii) the structure of tariffs should reflect the different fUllctional 
relationships affecting' the various categories of cost 
incurred by the undertaking; 
(iY) no undertaking should earn a surplus above or a deficit 
below its total all ocated c cst. Each undertaking is 
therofore permitt"I\ to adjust its tariffs to eliminatE' any 
such surplus or deficit; 
(v) the tariffs charged may depart from the standard schedule 
of tariffs to take account of special. cost considerations in 
particular cases. 
Table 4:18 reflects how these principles are actually applied by Escom. 
The application of principle (i) is indicated by the fact that a 
separate sehedule of t"riffs is set for each regional undert,~king. 
A schedule of standard tariffs is specified in the licenc e, of each 
undertaking'. An amendl!lent of the licence is required to change the 
stanC:ard tariffs a"ti the procedure for such ar;lendment i.s p,',,'scribed 
in section 3:3 of the Act. As will be explained, below, it is not necessary 
t c undertake this procedure in order tc effect a periodic revision of 
tariffs in accordance with changes in cost levels. The effE'ctive 
sched ule of tariffs prevailing at any point in time 'may t:1US differ 
from the schedule of standard tariffs. This is clearly shown in the 
o;cheC:ule ir. Table 4:18 which al'plies to the first quarter of 1983. 
Tal:le 4:18 'elso shows how in each undertaking tadffs are differen-
tiated between different consumer groups in Hcco!'dance with principle 
(ii). Escom has fcur classes of consumer tariffs; 
Tariff A - large user tal'Hfs, generally applicable to loads in excc;o;s 
of 100 kWor kVA; 
Tariff B - small user tariff;;, generally applicable to cnr:sumers 
other than farmers with loads not exceeding 100 kW 
or kVA; 
Tariff C - domestic tariffs, applicable to consumers res iding within 
a proclaimed townshiJO or within an area c or,sidered by 
Escom to be similar to such a township; and 
Tariff D - small user tariffs, generally applicable to farmers with 
loads not exceeding 100 kW or kV A. 
~-
TABLE 4:18 SCHE D L' L E OF ESCOM' S STANDARJl AND EFFECTIVE TARIFFS (First Quarter 1983) 
Border Orange Hiver Cape Northern Cape Western 
Surcha.rge 
Discount 3% disc o unt 4% surcharge 1 % discount NIL 
St, ndard Effective Standard Effective Standard Effective Standard Effective 
TARIFF A 
Basic Charge 25 , 00 24 , 25 25 , 00 26 ,00 25 , 00 24 , 75 25, 00 25 , 00 
Demand Charge 
Above 380 V 12 , 35 11 , 91' 12 ,00 12 , 48 9 , 75 9, 65 9,90 9,90 
380/220 V 12 , 60 12 , 22 12 , 25 12 , 74 10 , 00 9 ,90 10,1 5 10 ,15 
132 K.V. 
Energy Charge 1 , 72 1 , 752 1 , 67 1 , (; 20 1 ,40 1, 469 1,44 , 1,524 
(C/kWh) '-' 
00 
~ 
P> 
TAHIFF 1\ ~ 
Basic Char€;'e 12 , 00 11 , 64 12 , 00 12 , 48 12 ,00 11, 88 12 , 00 12 , 00 
First 500 kWh 
C/kWh 8 , '15 8 , 56 8 , 96 7 , 10 7 , 10 7 , 70 7, 70 7,78 
Balance of kWh 
C/kWh 5,45 r :z.'" :J , .. :)L" j , 25 5 , 53 4 , 40 4 , 43 4, 40 4, 48 
TARIFF C 
Basic Charge 6 , 00 j , 82 6 , 00 6 , 24 6 , 00 5 , 94 4 , 00 4 , 00 
First :; 00 kWh 8 , 75 8 ,56 8 , 55 8 , 96 7 , 10 7 , 10 7 , 20 7 , 28 
Balance kWh 5 , 45 5 ,36 5 , 25 5 , ;'3 4 , 40 4 , 43 4 , 40 4 ,48 
TARIFF D 
Bask Charge 12 , 00 11 , 64 12 , 00 12 , 48 12 ,00 11 , 88 12 , 00 12 ,00 
First 800 kWh 8 , 75 8 , 56 8 , 55 8 , 96 7 , 10 7 , 10 7 , 70 7 , 78 
BalanC E; kWh 5 ,45 ) , 36 5 , 25 5 , 53 If , 40 4 , if 3 4 , 40 4 , 48 
TABLE 5:18 (Continued) 
Easter n Transvaal Natal Rand and O. F . S . (e stbl) Rand and O. F .S. (Extn) 
Surcharge 
13,5 % discount 33,5% surcharge 36% surcharge 47,5 % surcharge 
Standard Effective Standard Effective Standr .. r d Effective 
TARIFF A 
Basic Charge 25 , 00 34 , 00 35 , 00 30,27 25 , 00 33 , 37 25 , 00 33 ,31 
Demand Cha.rge 
7 , 82 8 , 99 7 , 00 9 , 34/Kw 7 , 00/Kw 9 , 34/Kw Above 380 V 5 , 75 10 , 10 
380/220 Y 5 ,90 8 , 02 10 , 95 9 , 47 7 , 00/KW 9 , 34/kW 7 , 00/Kw 9 , 34/Kw 
132K .V. 10 , 40 9, 25 .,. 
Energy Charge 1 , 03 1 , 484 1, 62 1 , 259 1 , 114 1,614 1 , 114 1 , 614 
6 (C/kWh) 
ex> 
~ 
'" TARIFF B 
Basic Charge 10 , 00 13, 60 12 ,00 10 , 3& 12 ,00 16 , 02 12 , 00 16 , 02 
First 500 kWh 4,95 6, 80 8 , 00 6, 77 5 ,35 7 , 21 5, 35 7 , 21 C/kWh 
Balance of kWh 2 , 95 4 , 08 4 , 70 3,92 2 , 45 1+ , 00 2 , 95 4 , 09 C/kWh ., 
TARIFF C 
Basic Charge 5 , 00 6, 80 6, 00 5 ,1 9 6 , 00 8 , 01 6, 00 8 , 01 
First 300 kWh 4 , 95 6 , 80 - 8 ,00 6; '17 5 , 35 7 ; 21 5 ,35 2 , 21 Balance kWh 2 , 95 4, 08 4 , 70 3 , 92 2 , ·95 4 , 00 2 , 95 4 ,00 
TARIF F D 
Basic Charge 10 , 00 13 , 60 12 , 00 16 ; 38 12 , 00 16 , 02 15 , 00 16 , 02 
First 800 kWh 4 , 95 6 , 80 8 , 00 6 , '17 5 , 35 7 , 21 5 , 35 7 , 21 
Balance kWh 2 , 95 4 , 08 4 , '70 3 , 92 2 , 95 4 , 00 2 , 95 4 , 00 
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In practical terms the application of principle (iii), that tariffs should 
be structured according' to the variables functionally related to cost, 
means that the total cost allocated to each undertaking is divided 
into consumer, demand and energy-related costs. 
A. CONSUMEH-RELATED COSTS constitute the portion of total 
cests which vary with the num.ber of consumers, for example, the 
cost of meters, meter reading, billing and connect:"n . Since these 
costs are incurred for each consumer supplied by the undertc.king, they 
are recovered by means of a basic or service charge which is levied 
on each consumer. 
B. DEMAND-RELATED COSTS are the fixed costs related to the 
capacity constructed to provide for the derr:and, for example, interest 
and depreciation. Demand related cos1.s also include those operating 
and maintenance expenses which do not vary with the quantity of 
service supplied in kWh or with the number of consumers, as well as 
part of the adrc.inistrative and general expenses. The der.land charge 
is that component cf the tariff in whicil these cost.s are recovered. 
It can be seen from Table 4:18 that for consum,,;rs charged according 
tc Tariff 1>" the fixed demand charge is based on the r.taximum demand 
in a particular month to cove r the main portion of the demand-related 
ccsL:;. Escom's undertakings have, howevE·r, adopted a policy of 
including part of the demand. related costs in the energy charge per 
kWh, referred t " telow, to "obtain a more equitable application of 
the- tariff to consumers with either abnormally high or abnormally 
low load factors." The Board of Trade and Indus tries also found 
that "the re appears to ~·e a considerable measure of subjE>ctivitJ 
in calculating the transfer" and that "the magnitude of the transfer 
o •• differs between undertakings 0 ,,-3.0 
30. Republic of South Africa, Board of Trade and Industries, 
op.cit " p. 21. 
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Cor.sumers who fall withi" tariff classes B, C and D are not levied 
a specific demand charge in their standard tariffs, sincH where the 
expenditure on distribution and transmission in supplying a group 
of such consumers exceeds the amount covered in the standard 
tariffs, they are required to pay exte:lsicn charges. In the case 
of a farming scheme, common extension charges are applied based 
on consideration of the grcup as a whole. These charges are 
related to the den:and which the consumers require and are subject 
to increase if the limit is exceeded, In calculating the costs of 
supplying these users, Escom distinguishes between the cost cf 
"personal II and "common" equipment. "Personal" equipment is the 
terminal equipment provided at each consumer's point of supply. 
The cost of this equipment is charged directly to each conSumer and 
is therefore deducted from the total eGst of extension to determine 
tl:.e cost of "common" equipment, which is allocated to consumers 
according to the maximum derr.and to be supplied. The excess of 
estimated monthly expenditure 0'1(>::' revenue has to be recovered 
through exter.sion charges which are quoted to potential users. 
If a reasonable number, say 75 to 80 per cent, are prepared to sign 
agreements, the extension charges are fixed and the scheme proceeds. 
New consumers are requirec to pay either the standard extensior. 
charge for their level of use or , if the cost of connecting them is 
above the standard IE,vel, a higher charge based on actual cost. 
Each undertaking' differentiates its demand and extension charges 
according to the voltage at which electricity is supplied. This is 
because an additional cost is in curred to provide the equipment 
required to transform e lectricity from one voltage to another. It 
can be seen from Table 4:18 that in each undertaking, other than the 
Rand a!:d Orange Free State (O.F.S.) undertaking, a lower demand 
charge is levied when the supply is furnished at a nominal voltage 
above 380/220 volts than when it is ft:rnished at the nominal v oltage 
of 380 volts "between phases. and 220 volts between phase and neutral." 31 
31. Electricity Supply Commission, Sta.tement of Changes for 
"!.2~ Megawatt Park, Sandton, p. 2. 
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In the Natal undertaking a further reduction in the demand charge is 
made when the supply is furnished "at a nominal voltage of 132 000 
volts between phases.,,:l2 The setting of the demand charge by the 
Rand 2.nd O. F • S. undertaking, however, differs from that applied 
by the other undertakings in that there is no differentiation of the 
demand charge according to voltage, and a demand charge of 
R7,00 per month per kilowatt of the p.laximum simultaneous demand 
supplied in the month at all the points of supply is levied. The 
reason for this difference is histcrical and this undertaking has not 
cr.ange3. to the system d 6emand charges applied by the ott.er uL.der-
takings, since it is believed that the administrative ccsts of effecting 
the change will outweigh any benefits that may be derived. 
C. ENERGY-RELATED COSTS constitute that part of cost which 
varies proporti.onally with energy supplies, for example, costs of 
coal, fuel, fuel handling and water. These coStS are recovered by 
means of an energy related charge per kWh of consumptit,r... It can be 
seen from Table 4:18 that the e'lt'rgy cr.arge is expressed a.s a 
constant rate per kWh consumed for Tariff A users, whereas for Tariff 
B, C and D users a high rate is cr.arged for the first block of 500, 
300 and 800 kWh, respec::ively, and the balance of consumption is 
cr.arged at a constant rate. Tbe aim of charging a decreasing block 
rate to this latter group of users seems to be to encourage users to 
increase their loads alld thereby obtain a greater utiliz~tion of the 
capacity individually connected to ther.,. 
In summary, then, it can be seen that the application of principle 
(iii) re sults in Escom charging a three-part tariff which generally 
er.c ourages users to ir crease their load factors, since with this 
tnriff structLre tl:.e ratio of fixed to total charges <lecreases if 
kWh consumption increases and di.scourages consumers with small 
loads from applying for an Escom connection at all. 
32. Ibid., .00305, p. 2. 
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Principle (iv), that each undertaking shodd adjust its tariffs to 
eliminate surpluses or deficits, is applied according to section 14(2) 
of the Electricity Act which states that " ••• the commi~sion shall 
decrease or increase its prices for all classes of consumers in 
equal proportions when making any adjustment of prices in accordance 
with tbe JOrovisions of this section. II Esc om interprets this section 
as indicating that each undertaking can apply surcharges or discounts 
in equal proportions for all classes of consumers, in order to adjust 
revenue to cover the total cost incurred by the undertakir'g without 
having to amend the schedulEl of standard tariffs contair ·ed in its 
, 
licence in accordance with section 33 of t he Act. Table 5:18 
indicates how the surcharges 'or discounts levied by each undertaking 
cause the effective tariffs tc differ from the standard tariffs. In 
addition to these surcr.arges and discount. , a coal price adjustment 
is applied exclusively to the energy charges of the tariffs. The cost 
of coal is calculated quarterly and compared with a fl' .anda,,'d price 
stated in the licence of the undertakings . Any difference result •. in 
a change in the kWh rates in the following quarter. This adjustme nt 
forrr.s part of the standard ta.riff and is therefore subject to any 
surcharge or discount applied to the standaxd prices. As explained 
in the last section, the average price of coal has risen sharply in 
recent years, so that the effect of this adjustment can be significant. 
P.ccording to principle (v) the tariffs set by Escom' s undertakings 
are modified in certain cases to take account of spedal cost 
considerations: 
(a) Although the sta.ndard schedule of tariffs dce s make 
provision fcor the differentiation of demand charges 
according to voltage, Escom also has special arrange-
ments to charge additional voltage transfcrmation costs 
to certain large municipalilies such as Johannesburg, 
Pretoria, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London 
and Durban. 
(b) A minimum annual payment is calculated for the annual 
demand charge to municipalities which generate a portion 
of their consumption themselves according t o the formula: 
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Purchases from Escom in overall annual maximum demand 
month 
Overall monthly maximum demand (purchased and ge:lerated) 
A :i... Monthly maximum demand (purchased and generated) 
If a municipality purchases, say, two-thirds of its maximum 
monthly consumption from Escom, then, according to this 
formula, it should buy in total two-thirds of its annual 
consumption from Escom. The minimum al'.nHal payment 
is thl1s aimed at a sharing of the generating municipality IS 
summer load between the municipality and Escom in the 
same proportion as that in which the winter load is sllared. 
(c) To obtain optimum utilization of its standloy plant, Escom 
has entered into standby agreements with generatill~ 
nlLnicipali1:ies in terms of which, at all times except during 
the peak months of June, July and August, " ••• these 
municipalities are allowed to increase their maximum 
d~mand without paying additional demand charges, to the 
extent of largest set on their system, ••• provided Escom 
has adequate reserve plant. ,,33 If Escom does not have 
sufficient reserve plant, this concession is withdrawn and 
the municipalities can also be requested to reduce their 
load by reducing their standby plant. The municipalities 
benefit from these agreeme:tts in that they are induced to 
use power at a charge below the coal cost, while Escom 
benefits by using its' spare capacity to sell power at a 
rate above marginal cost a,nd by being able to call for 
assista.nce if it is short of generatintl' capacity. 
(d) In addition, the tariff policy of the Rand and O. F • S. 
undertaking differs from that adopted by the other 
undertakings in the following respects: 
33. Board of Trade and Industries, !2£'cit., p. 20. 
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the demand charge is set per kilowatt of electricity 
supplied, rather than per kiln'TI>lt as in the Q(her 
undertakings; 
(ii) the maximl'm demand is 60 minutes ani not 30 minutes; 
(iii) rather than differentiab lg' the demand charge according 
to voltage, this ullderta.kins· cffers a discount of 10 per cent 
of the amount by which the total mOI'.thly electricity charge 
exceeds R1 500; 
(iv) a hig'her surcha.rge is levied on consumers located in the 
extension area of this undertaking; 
(v) where electricity is furrished at more than cne point of 
supply to consumers in this undertaking, an additional 
charge calculated on the difference between the sum of 
the non-simultaneous maxirrlum demands tari:e~ in the month 
at each point of supply, aI!ll the maximum simultaneous 
demand is levied at the rate of R1 ,10 per montt per 
kilowatt; and 
(vi) only in this undertaking is S. A. T • S. charged at a straig'ht 
rate per ], Wh without any service' and derr.and charges. 
~,:4:2:3 AD~Hi\TSTRATIVE ASPEC' ,'S OF ELECTRImTY TARIFFS 
The responsibility for the formulation of tariffs is vested in the 
Commercial Departrreltt at Escom Head Office. This department is 
concerned with the calculation of staDdard tariffs, discounts or 
silrcharges and with research illto tariffs. It bases its tariff calculation 
on estimates of cost and revenue fc,r the distribution undertakings. 
Changes in tariffs may be effected in the fcllowing ways: 
(i) by changes in the Electricity P.ct; 
(ii) by changes in standard tariffs; or 
(ii.i) by changes in surcharges or discounts. 
It is thus possible for ESCOlll ' s tariffs to be changed via an amendme:1t 
to til" Electricity Act. To apply for such a change Escom would need 
to channel its proposal through the Department of Mineral and energy Affairs. An 
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example of this occurred in 1977 wher. the maximum cont~rib ution to 
the Capital DevelopmeJ,t Fund was raised. from 3 to 6 per cent of 
unredeemed loans, on the basis of a claim by Escom that it needed. to 
increa.se its internal funds to finance its expansion plans, since it was 
having problems in obtaining overseas loa,,-s" 
Escorn can also change its standard te.riffs with the approval of the 
Electricity Control Board. To obtain tt. is approval the proposed 
cr.anges must be published in a number of prescribed newspapers, a 
pre~eribed time period must elapse during' which the public is given 
the Opp():::'tunity to lodge obje(;~.ions to the ta.riff increase '.,·ith the 
Boa"d, a public hearing of objections received must be arranged by 
the Control Board and the Eoard must determine whether or not 
teo grant its approval. 
Escom can, how(,Y"r, change its tariff s .. " ithot.;t obta.ining the approval 
of the Contlol Board by adjusting' the surcharges and di:;counts for the 
different undert.akings. Although it has been Escom practice to change 
tt.e surcharges as its own disc 1',,£ion, tile Board of Trade and Industries 
reported that: 
"The Electricity C0nt:col Board, however, feels that it should a lso 
approve changes in surcharges 0 One of the rea8 ~ns foX' t.hi~ attitude 
is that tee Electricity Control Board should af'p:cove cf new capital 
invest'nent~ :..., the eve' (Central GE'nerating Unit) ••• and such 
ir:vestments directly affect tariffs. It came to the attention of 1.he Board 
that in the case of the !(oeberg nuclear power station "p);lication for 
a.r-: provp: l wa::; IT:ade &fter Escom had been fully CulT,IT itted on the main 
plant contract •. < and also the associated fuel fabrication contract. ,,34 
34. Ibid., p. 33. 
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4:4 :2:4 COST ALLOCATION 
The process of cost allo"ation illyolves two steps: 
A. 
B. 
the allocation of cost.s to the different regional undertakings; 
and 
the allocation of costs within the undertaking to cons umer 
groups. 
A. ALLQCATIO~' OF COSTS TO UNDERTAKlt'-GS 
The Electricity Supply Account for 1 982, showr, in T<.ble 4:19, which 
is directly reproduced from the Escom Annual Report for that year, 
indicates that the totd costs of any undertaking consist of the 
following items: 
(i) the operating expenditure actually incurred by the 
undertaking; 
(ii) the loan cc,arges of the undertaking whict. are linked tc 
its assets in commercial operation; 
(iii) contributions to the CapitalD.evelcpment Fund which are I 
allocated in proportion to the kWh sales of the under-
taking; 
(iv) a share of the corporate burden or head office expense 
which is determined in proportion to the capital in 
corr,mercial operation in the_t:.ndertaking at the end of 
the year; 
(v) credits to the undertaking in respect of transmission 
ci:ccuits used by the Cent!'uJ Generating' Unit (C. G. U .) 
fer interconnecting purposes; 
(vi) credit" and debits in respect of the use of trar..smission 
circuits for reciprocal assistance between undertakings; 
(vii) credits and debits in respect of electricity supplied by 
an undertaking te- a consumer in another undertaking; and 
(viii) allocated C. G. U. costs 0 
It can be seen from Table 4:19 that for each undertakin i'" by far the 
largest item of cost is tiw a.llocated C.G. U. cost. In an interconnected 
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Electricity supply account 
for Ihe year ended 31 December 1982 
ROOD 
1981 1982 
Central /' Distribution Corporate . Gene-
Tolal Total Services raling Cape C,ap e Orange 
Total Western Northern Bortler River 
2 140 689 EleClricity sold 2 695 422 2695422 253513 102 910 44128 48038 
110 025 Industri al 814582 814582 83648 12 484 6090 3942 
680 031 Bulk 908 289 - 908 289 109341 18315 36281 43815 
563 983 Mining 695 392 695 392 56089 
139261 Traction 161 893 161 893 21 208 15680 
41389 Domestic and lighting 55266 55266 33316 402 2351 221 
1 06 1 05 1 Operating expenditure 1 400 636 34189 1145912 219815 39516 13016 8425 1686 
645 210 Operations 193 381 1 084 189 466 2831 346 284 88 88 
131919 Maintenance i/22 286 810 164461 51015 8393 2895 2221 2092 
4106 Electricity purchased 3615 3615 
213 156 Administration and general expenses 381 348 32895 188 430 160 023 30111 9 831 6 116 5506 
120634 ~Dan charges 816 106 i3269) 636 888 243081 31 319 19 154 5040 9223 
603 546 Interest and finance charges 77' q4B (3948) 506 456 219440 28936 11 644 4656 1805 
10493 Redemption of local loans IUb i ... 619 82538 23491 2443 1510 384 1 418 
46 5~5 Repayment of foreign loans 48044 41894 150 
900 Contribution 10 Reserve Fund 26000 26000 
Oisllibution of costs (31 520) (1 808 860) 1 840 380 156 161 63506 23693 25 525 
Corporate burden (31 520) 23153 1761 1 012 684 189 205 
Interconnetlors 2821 12821) (1 118) 
Use 01 circuits 118 91 (91) 
Transmission costs (38 292) 38292 11 324 1 508 1 180 · .1 824 
Pooled generation (1191142) 1191142 131111 55 136 22233 24165 
I 782 585 Total charges against revenue 2 303 342 2 303 342 221062 95616 31 158 42434 
358 104 Openting surplus for the yur 392 080 392 080 26451 1 294 1 570 5604 
435418 Amount set aside to C.pital Development Fund 450 000 450 000 32836 12486 4843 6461 
111 314) Surplus/ IDeficitl for the year (57 920) (51920) (6385) (5 192) 2121 1863) 
118 365) Accumulated surplus/(deficit) at beginning of year (95 139) 195139) (14 012) 164 2 126 (1 919) 
195 139) Accumulated surplus/(deficit) II end of yelr (153659) (153659) (20451) 14428) 4 85~ (8182 ) 
TABLE <il':19 Escom Electricity :::;upply Account 
Undertakings 
Eastern Rand 
Natal Transvaal and OJ.S. 
435 154 
149 980 
2 I 9 437 
10938 
47 750 
7 049 
37 120 
283 
9310 
27 527 
27 101 
24715 
2 236 
ISO 
308 385 
949 
9 826 
297610 
372606 
62 548 
)4 )68 
1122201 
113931 
(14613) 
388 255 I 422 )64 
238 540 379 898 
47241 433793 
80 332 548 033 
20 649 50 606 
I 493 10434 
31 436 
486 
11 720 
19 230 
38 3J 8 
35421 
2 897 
82676 
I 262 
20384 
61 030 
112872 
roo 263 
12 609 
25·2543 I DID 561 
I 223 
1171 I 
(2231 
84 
25 I 630 
322297 
65958 
65 )8 1 
177 
1153481 
(151711. 
3445 
(1 472 1 
45 
546 
I 00 ) 99) 
1206109 
216655 
252819 
(36 1641 
(5889)1 
(950611 
Central 
Corporate Gene-
Services 
14419 
782 
712 
rating 
879 750 
642 225 
96436 
4 106 
12925 136983 
8 738 494 800 
7 869 399 834 
869 48 522 
46444 
900 
Total 
2 140689 
710015 
680031 
563 983 
139261 
4) 389 
166 882 
2263 
40771 
123848 
217 096 
195843 
21 102 
151 
(231571 (13754501 1398607 
(23 1571 17051 6106 
2 970 (2 9701 
(35254) 35254 
(136021711360217 
1 782585 
358 104 
435478 
(77 3)41 
(183651 
(95 739) 
TABLE 4:19 (Continued) 
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ROOD 
Cape 
Western 
19) 005 
66708 
)9 21 I 
22913 
28 173 
30727 
233 
6637 
23857 
28475 
25558 
2917 
115 933 
854 
IS 408 
99 6)1 
175 135 
21 870 
30986 
(9 1161 
149561 
(140721 
1981 
Cape 
Northern 
9163) 
9370 
14 149 
51 189 
16 ) 1) 
I 212 
10991 
199 
2378 
8414 
19938 
18014 
1 924 
51 807 
565 
296 
7451 
43495 
82736 
9901 
12 667 
(27661 
3530 
764 
Distribution Undertakings 
Border 
35277 
4 )54 
28 )29 
I 794 
6 191 
74 
1 606 
4511 
5744 
5261 
483 
17 739 
1.58 
91 
101 I 
16479 
29674 
5603 
450) 
I 096 
I 030 
2 126 
• 
Orange 
River 
38 )40 
3478 
35045 
217 
5484 
74 
1 363 
4047 
5 714 
5 168 
546 
19 715 
169 
(1 2021 
1911 
1 813 
19026 
30913 
) 827 
6346 
1481 
19400) 
(7 919) 
Eastern Rand 
Natal Transvaal and O.F.S. 
315615 
11 I 001 
161 621 
9003 
37921 
6068 
29950 
416 
6261 
23273 
27 727 
24938 
2638 
lSI 
229 079 
757 
8951 
219371 
286 )56 
38859 
690)3 
1302 141 
27821 
(2 3931 
316915 I 134500 
205 032 309 68 I 
32314 328962 
62 020 44 I 771 
16369 45341 
11808745 
22699 
355 
7 973 
14371 
35277 
31 700 
3577 
199078 
933 
(1821 
33 
198 294 
257054 
19861 
67678 
(7817) 
(7 5311 
(153481 
60840 
912 
14 553 
45375 
94221 
85204 
9017 
765 256 
2670 
(I 586) 
(2961 
58) 
763 88 I 
92031 ) 
214 183 
244 22 I 
1300381 
(28 859) 
(58897) 
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system of electri.city generation and transrr,ission such as Escom, 
the total cost incurred by the central generating undertaking is a 
comeon cost which is jointly incurred toy all the distribution 
undertakin ,,;s . Since it is not possible to deter:lIine what proportion 
of this common cost is- directly attributable to each individual 
undertaking, ESCOr,l has accepted that the fairest rr.ethod of allocation 
of C.G.U. costs is to pool them between the different undertakings in 
proportion to their electricity requirements. It so happened, however, 
that when the different undertakings were connected to the national 
transmission system. ESt'om had to take over the Salt River and 
Hex River stations operateJ by the Cape Western Undertaking; the 
Colenso, Congella, Ingagene and Umgeni stations operated by the 
Natal Und"lrtaking; and the West Bank Station operated by the Border 
Cndert.aking. The generating costs per kW capability and per kWh of 
all these power stations "'as higher than t h at of t.1", C. G. U ., and the 
basic principle was then established that the excess generating cost 
cf these power stations must continue to be carried by the undertakings 
concerned. 
Although the criginal permit, which applied from 26 January 1972 to 
4 August 1976, stated that the total excess generating cost should be 
allocated to the above coastal undertakings, thi.s was amended firstly, 
on 4 August 1976, to exclude the excess ger:e ration costs of coastal 
power stations with annual load factors of more than 20 per cent and 
again, on 19 January 1977, to limit the excess generation costs to the 
interest and redemption charges of these power stations. The burden 
of excess generation costs borne by the coastal undertakings has thus 
declined cor.siderably since 1972. 
The basis for allocating contributions to the Capital Development Fund 
to the undertaking was cr.anged in 1977 from the average monthly 
maximum demand of the undertakings to their kWh _ sales.. This had 
the effect of reducing the burden on newer undertakings where the 
historical cost of assets in service is higher in relation to sales than 
in the older undertakings. The Board of Trade and Industries reported 
that "the change in the allocation methods was to the benefit of all 
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undertakings except the Rand and O.F .S. undertaking.,,35 
The loan charges for each undertaking are based on the capital in 
commercial operation in the undertaking. In undertakings where the 
loans used to finance assets still in service have been redeemed, the 
historical cost of assets in service will exceed the unredeemed loans 
in respect cf these assets. The loan costs of undertakings will 
tt.erefore be determined by the costs of servicillg these out~;tanding 
loans. Since there has been an upward trend in interest rates, it 
follows that the overall average interest rates applicable to the unre~· 
deemed loans of older undertakings will be lower than those of the 
younger undertakings. There will be no such regional difference in 
the allocated cost of overseas loans, however, since these loans have 
been mainly used to finance C. G. U. assets and are therefore allocated 
in the same "equitable" proportion as other C.-G. U. costs. 
In allocating transmission costs to tt.e undertakings, it has been 
necessary to distinguish between the cost of interconnectors which 
are required by the C. G. U. for the optimum utilization of the power 
resources available to it, and the cost of transmission lines which 
are required mainly for the 'transmission of electricity to specific 
undertakings. A C. G. U. interconnector circuit contributes to the 
reliability and ecoI'.omy of supply of all undertakings and its cost 
is therefore included in the total C. G. U. costs, which are pooled in 
an equal proportional manner between all undert"kings. The cost of 
a transmission circuit, however, can be attributed to a particular 
undertaking since the outage of such a circuit would only affect the 
transmission of power to a particular distribution undertaking. It 
follows that the undertakings are required to bear tt.e transmission 
costs specifically attributable to them. 
35. R.S.A., Board of Trade and Industries, '2E..-cit., p. 50. 
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B. COST ALLOCATION TO CONSUMERS 
Once costs have been allocated to the distribution undertakings, the 
next step in the tariff formulation process is for each undertaking 
to allocate costs to its consumers according to their tariff class. 
Escom tends to have a comparative advantage in the bulk supply of 
electricity, so that the main part of Escom' s sales is to Tariff A 
consumers. The following procedure has been adopted to allocate 
costs to Tariff A consumers: 
(i) establish the total costs of the undertaking; 
(ti) deduct income receivable from Tariff B, C and D 
consumers, as well as extension charges payable by 
Tariff A consumers; 
(iii) deduct service charge revenue receivablE> from Tariff A 
consumers; and 
(iv) divide the balance of total cost remaining between demand 
related cost {including consumer related cost) and energy 
related cost, 
As was mentioned in the previous section, the demand-re lated cost is 
not completely recov:ered by means of demand charges, since a portion 
of it is transferred to the energy-related cost to be recovered through 
the energy charge. The object of the transfer is to prevent the 
overcharging of low load factor consumers who malee a larger contri-
bution to diversity. The Board of Trade and Industries Report found 
that this transfer" ••• is determined subjectively for each undertaking 
to result in an acceptable relationship between undertakings." 36 
The following factors seer.. to affect the magnitude of the transfer: 
(i) the load factor of the und€,rtaking since the higher the 
load factor, the lower is the diversity, and, therefore, 
the lower should be the transfer; 
36 • Ibid., p. 61. 
(ii) 
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the similarity of the cost structure and the regional 
proximity of undertakings. It is, for example, considered 
desirable by Escom "to set the tariffs of two adjoining 
undertakings with similar cost structures but with different 
load and diversity factors ••• on such a level that average 
costs per kWh are the same; ,,37 
(iii) the generating cost of municipalities which are generating 
electricity themselves seems to set a ceiling on the extent 
to which the energy charge can be raised by transferred 
demand cost; 
(iv) the extent of the incentive which Escom wants to give its 
consumers to improve load factors, since this must b e 
traded off against the benefits of the transfE,r; and 
(v) the combined effect of the coal prices adjustrr.ent and the 
periodic adjustment of the overall surcharge. 
A similar method is used to allocate costs to consumers in te.riff 
classes B, D and D. This can be illustrated with reference to the 
domestic conSUI!lers falling within Tariff class C. Since domestic 
consumers are generally supplied by municipalities, Escom detE,rmines 
the tariffs of the domestic consumers it supplies in lieu of certain 
municipalities, by considering H .e costs of distribution and reticulation 
which would have been borne by a typical municipal area if it had 
undertaken the responsibility to supply lhese consumers. Thus the 
rate for the second block of Tariff C iE " ••• designed to cover the 
average cost pey kWh sold of electricity purchased in bulk at Tariff A 
by the hypothetical municipality, i.e. the maximum demand charge expressed 
per kWh at the after diversity load factor plus the energy charge." No 
ex,,-ct calculation is performed in respect of the first block and the 
general practicE' adopted by Escom 1 s undertakings has been to set this 
rate at double tbe rate of the second block. The estimated shortfall 
of tt_e revenue expected from the first and second blocks from the 
37. Ibid.,p.63. 
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estimated cost of domestic supply, is shared on a pro rata basis 
between consumers as a service charge. The difference between the 
first and second blocks also contributes to the recovery of costs 
incurred in the distribution and reticulation of electricity from bulk input 
points onwards. 
4:4:3 EV ALUATION OF ESCOM' S TARIFF POLICY 
4:4:J:1 THE REVENUE CONST RAINT 
In section 4.2.2, Escom' s financial rec ord and the composition and 
method of formulation of some of the important charges against revenue 
were examined . It was found that although Escom purports to set its 
tariffs to earn sufficient revenue t o just cover its costs, its tariff 
policy has in fact resulted in substantial rrofits being earned in 
recent years. This has occurred despite the fact that public enter-
prises are not usually permitted to use their monopoly powers to earn 
profits, but are required to pursue pricing policies which maximize 
net social benefits. However, as was explained in Chapter Three, 
the pricing policies adopted by public enterprises are often constrained 
by a requirement to generate sufficient revenue t o cause the enterprise 
to remain financia lly viable and independent of Treasury support 
through subsidization of losses. In evaluating the effect that Escom' s 
pricing has had on its profitability, it is necessary to consider the 
following questions: 
A. Is it possible to justify the actual level of profitability 
which has r esulted from Escom' s pricing policy? and 
B. Are there adequate controls to prevent Escom from using 
its monopoly powers in a socially suboptimal manner? 
A. THE JUSTIFIABILITY OF THE LEVEL OF INTERNAL 
FINANCING PC RSUED BY ESCOM 
The profits earned by Escom from its tariff revenue cannot be distri-
buted but must be ploughed back into the·lunding of the Commission's 
operations. In considering whether the level of profits recently 
earned by Escom can be justified, it is therefore necessary t o 
evaluate Escom' s internal financing requirements. 
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It is important to recognize that Escom does not view its financial 
viability in the sense of just breaking even in the short term, but 
rather assesses its viability according to its ability to meet the long 
term financing requirements of its capital development programme. 
Escom I s forms of financing are external borrowing and statutory 
funds, reserves and provisions. External borrowings consist of 
four sources: 
(i) Esc6m stock issued less Escom stock held internally; 
(ii) import financing facilities; 
(iii) short term loans; and 
(iv) net current liabilities. 
Statutory funds, reserves and provisions consist of: 
(a) funding comparable to accumulated depreciation in a 
manufacturing concern, namely the following items which 
appear in Escom I s financial statements: 
(i) Redemption Fund; 
(ii) Provision for Repayment of Foreign Loans; and 
(iii) Capital Reserve; and 
(b) financing comparable to equity in a manufacturing concern, 
namely: 
(i) Capital Development Fund; 
(ii) Reserve Fund; 
(iii) unrealized surplus on Escom stock held internally; 
and 
(iv ) Surplus/Deficit. 
Table 4:20 shows the equity/total asset ratio for Escom during the 
period 1967 to 1982. To calculate this rati6 , the funds comparable 
to accumulated depreciation have been deducted from total assets. 
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TABLE 4:20 
ESCOM: EQUITY/TOTAL ASSET RATIOS, 1967 TO 1982 
Year 
19 67 
1968 
196 9 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1 98 1 
1982 
Per cent 
11, 8 
10 ,9 
10 ,9 
11 , 2 
11 , 0 
11 , 6 
12 , 3 
12 , 8 
13,1 
13, 1 
17 , 5 
22 , 2 
24 , 4 
26, 8 
28 , 1 
27 ,4 
Now, the optimal capital structure in any undertaking will be determined 
by the business and financial risks associatec with its operations. 
Business r i sk will be affected by the type of assets employed, the 
type of industry and the demand f or the product (s). Natural mono-
polies such as Escom are generally characterized by low business risk, 
due to the stable demand f<.r their services and their stable earnings 
pattern. In the long term, Escom is characterized by a particularly 
low business risk due to tte following factors: 
(i) electricity has a particularly stable demand since it is a 
small input into a large number of business undertakings; 
(ii) the price elasticity of demand for electricity is low; 
(iii) the Electricity Act permits Escom to s e t its tariffs in 
orde r to cover the items included in "total cost"; and 
(iv) as a public enterprise, Escom is effectively underwritten 
by the State. 
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Financial risk is inversely related to the equity/total asset ratio 
since the smaller the proportion of total assets financed by equity 
capital, the larger the financial risk of the undertaking defaulting 
on its interest and redemption payments. An enterprise with a low 
business risk such as Escom will, in the long run, be able to bear a 
high financial risk by having a capital structure characterized by 
a low equity/total asset ratio. In the short run, however, the ratio 
between equity and borrowed capital will depend on the availability 
of loan capital, interest rates, the stage of the business cycle and 
the monetary growth rate of fixed assets. It follows that this ratio 
may fluctuate from year to year. For example during an economic 
upswing, the bulk of funds required might be generated internally 
by raising tariffs, while dUFing a recession prices may not be 
increased and a greater use be made of loan capital which, in any 
case, should be readily available during this phase, Furthermore, 
if there is a sharp increase in the growth rate of fixed assets, a 
large proportion of the financing requirements will have to be me t by 
raising loans, since it would be undesirable to implement a massive 
increase in tariffs. 
Table 4:20 indicates that during the period 1967 to 1976, Escom ':!ad 
an average equity/total asset ratio of 11 ,9 per cent which is low in 
comparison to the widely accepted "normal" ratio for a manufactc.ring 
concern of 50 pel' cent. As mentioned above, this capital structure 
results from the low business risk characterizing Escom' s operations. 
In 1970 the Franzsen Commission recommended that public enterprises 
in South Africa should make greater use of internal financing for 
the fOllowing reasons: 
"(i) to red uce the burden of interest payments; 
(ii) to reduce the claims made by public enterprises on the 
capital market; 
(iii) to provide the additional funds necessary to finance the 
massive capital development programmes required loy 
developing countries; and 
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(iv) to provide for the rising cost of replacing fixed assets 
" "fl" t " " 37 In In atlonary Iffies. 
To this end, the Franzsen Commission recommended that the tariffs of 
public enterprises be " ••• adjusted so that (1) provision for depre-
ciation can be made on the basis of replacement instead of original 
costs of assets and (2) 40 per cent, or such a percentage as may be 
determined by the Cabinet Committee for Finance, of the net or new 
investment, i.e. the difference between the gross capital expenditure 
and the provision for depreciation, can be provided from current 
revenue.:?'8. "The Franzsen Commission thus recommended that the ratio 
of equity to loans be determined on a marginal basis. The problem 
with this marginal approach is that the debt/equity ratio will be 
generally affected by short term economic fluctuations 0 This 
conflicts with the principle that this ratio should be determined on 
the basis of a long term view of the relationship between business and 
financial risk in the enterprise. 
Escom introduced the Capital Development Fund in 1972 as a result of 
the recommendations of the Franzsen Commission. However, during 
the period 1972-1976, the contributions to this fund out of r evenue 
were below the lega l maximim and there was thus no significant increase 
in the equity/total asset ratio. From 1977 to 1980, however, these 
contributions were stepped up to their legal limit , the effect of which 
is indicated by the increase in equity/total asset ratio from 13,1 
37. 
38. 
It should be noted that an increase in internal financing 
by Escom may not significantly reduce the t otal interest 
charge, since the investments associated with Escom' s 
internal funds are held in Escom stock, the interest of 
which is still chargeable to revenue. 
R. S. A., Third Report of the Commi:;-.sion of Enqui ry 
into Fiscal and Monetary Policy in South Africa, 
R.P. 87/1970, p. 50. 
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per cent in 1976 to 26,8 per cent in 1980. It was on the basis of 
this apparent change in policy with respect to internal financing that 
the Board of Trade and Industries predicted that the equity/total 
asset ratio would increase in the manner shown in Table 4:21 below. 
TABLE 4:21 
Year Projected % Actual % 
1978 20 , 2 22 ,1 
1979 23 , 2 24 , 4 
1980 27 , 2 26 , 8 
1981 31 ,9 28 ,1 
1982 37 , 4 27 , 4 
1983 43 ,9 
1984 51 ,3 
1985 57 , 2 
It can be seen from Table 4:21 that from 1978 to 1980, the equity/ 
total asset ratio increased at approximately the rate predicted in 
the Board Report, but that in 1981 .and 1982 the actual ratio was 
significantly below the projected ratio. This may indicate that the 
substantial increase in financing from tariff revenue during the 
period. 1977 to 1980 was the result of Ehort term factors, such as 
the need to rapidly expand the investment base of the Capital 
Development Fund, and not indicative of a deliberate policy to 
increase Escom' s equity/total asset ratio to a level similar to that 
in manufacturing. The Board of Trade and Industries I conclusion 
that the degree of internal financing planned by Escom is excessive 
may not be completely justified, since it appears that EEcom may 
allow its equity/total asset ratio to stabilize at approximately 30 
per cent. According to the Board Report, this level broadly 
reflects the minimum degree of financial risk which can be borne by 
Escom o In 1981 and 1982, the contributions to the Capital Development 
Fund fell below the legal limits. This indicates that a certain amount 
of "slack" may have arisen i r· Escom' s internal fi.nancing, which can 
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be used when it is necessary for Escom to once again increase its 
reliance on funds generated from revenue sources. This raises the 
question of whether the current legal framework provides adequate 
control over Escom, which will be examined in part (b) of this 
section. 
It c<.n be concluded that the level of profit retention by Escom in 
recent years may have been justified, if it is accepted that the equity / 
total asset ratio needed to be raised to reduce the financial risk 
associated with Escom' s overdependence on borrowed funds. The 
proportion of debt to equity has, however, now reached an apparently 
accept"ble level, and further tariff adjustments to increase the share 
of internal financing may therefore be unnecessary. 
B. THE ADEQUACY _OF THE SYSTEM OF CONTRCL 
OVER ESCO~I 
Esccm is, in effect, a monopoly supplying a service with a low price 
elasticity of demand. It is not difficult, therefore, for Escom to 
increase its revenue by r<.ising its tariffs. To prevent Escom from 
setting prices exce~.sively higher than social opportunity cost and 
from tolerating IIX_inefficiency ll39 in its own organization, it is 
necessary that there be some control OVEr its tariff policy. As 
was explained in Chapter Two, it is preferable that control be 
exercised in a decentralized rather than a cer:tralized manner, to 
avoid excessive administrative costs and the duplication of decision 
making. This decentralized type of control is normally exercised through 
the basic constitution of the entE'rprise " ,-hich delineates its duties, 
responsibilities and privileges, and thrcugh the pricing and invest-
ment rules which H:e enterprise is required to observe in its 
decision making. 
39. The concept of X-inefficiency is discussed in Chapter One, 
section 1:3:1. 
, 
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In the case of Escom, the Electricity Act clearly defines the costs 
which must be covered by its tariff revenue and stipulates that 
Escom should neither earn a surplus above, nor incur a deficit 
below, these costs. The question still remains as to whether it is 
possible for Escom to still exercise a certain amount of discretion, 
within these legal constraints, as to 
(ii) 
the level of internal financing it is g'oing to generate 
through its tariffs, and 
the amount of X-inefficiency it is going to tolerate within 
the organization. 
In section 4:4:2:3 it was explained how Escom could raise its tariffs 
by adjusting the surcharges or discounts applied with respect to 
the distribution undertakings witbout the approval of some outside 
body. The purpose of these adjustments in the surcharges and 
discounts is to cause each distribution undertaking to cover its costs. 
There-is thus clearly a limit to the extent to which tariffs can be 
raised by an adjustment in the surcharges, since the undertakings are 
required to make neither a surplus nor a deficit. The real issue, then, 
in evduating the degree of control over Escom' s monopolistic power 
to overcharge its users in terms of marginal cost pricing principles 
is whether there is any constraint on Escom to contain increases in 
some of the items included in "total cost", since if costs rise, Escom 
is obliged to raise its tariffs to generate the additional revenue 
needed t o cover these costs. In tbis respect the method of fund 
accounting employed by Escom can result in a persistent upward drift 
in costs and prices. This arises fro!!] the fact that the incor'le earned 
on tr.e investments held by Escom' s internal funds is generally rein-
vestE·d in the internal stock of Escom. Thus, although the contributions 
to the Capital Development Fund are limited to 6 per cent of the value 
of unredeemed loans, these unredeemed loans include the internal 
stock held by Escom, so that each annual contribution not only adds 
to the accumulated amount of the fund but is iI ,vested in Escom stock 
and therefore also adds to the amount of unredeemed loa.ns , and thereby 
pushes up the ceiling on further annual contributions. Furthermore, 
as the acclimulated amount of this fund rises, the interest earned on the 
Escom stock held by the fund places an increasing burden on tbe users 
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of electricity, since they must pay higher tariffs to cover these 
rising interest costs. Tables 4:8 and 4:9 indicate the escalating 
nature of the interest charge on the Escom stock held by the Capital 
Development Fund, which rose from R33, 1 million and 14,8 per cent 
of Escom's total interest charge in 1977 to R350,2 million and 48,5 
per cent of the total interest charge in 1982. In section 4:4:2:1 it 
was suggested that both cor..tributions to funds and the interest ear ned 
on internal stock were r etained profits rather than cost~:. It follows 
that since the method of fund accounting used by Escom allows this 
undertaking to retain an increasing amount of its profits, there is scope 
for Escom to exercise its monopoly powers to both raise the price of 
its services above their opportunity costs and to shift the bt:rden of 
its X-inefficiency on to its consumers. 
Another important area of decision making on the part of Escom 
management, not subject to exte rnal approval or control, is 
investnent. Esccm' s management a.ppears tc adhere very strongly 
to the view that its function is to ensure that the supply of electricity 
is adequate t o meet the economy's e lectricity requirements, and that 
management should be responsible for determining the nature and 
volume of the capital expenditure required to fulfil this function. 
The following comment by Dr. Straszacker, a past chairman of 
Escom., clearly expresses this attitude: 
40. 
"It is important for Esccm to be independent from 
controls that have nothing to do with power demand 
••• Escom is so much a pillar of economic develop-
ment that it must not I:e diverted from it:;. main 
purpos e .,. If the de·mand for electricity grows 
well, the economy creates what is necessary to 
produce that growth ••• There is a circular effect. 
If you start curbing the supply of electl'icity, not 
only do you create unemployment but you make it 
difficult for the economy to get going again for 
lack of power. ,,40 
Financial Mail, April 6, 1979, p. 24. 
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He comments further: 
"The worst thing that could happen to South Africa 
now, I believe, would come about if Escom was 
prevented from safeguarding electricity supply 
for the future." 41 
Since the capital relatE·d charges to revenue, which in most years 
constitute more than half of total costs, are directly related to the 
volume of capital expenditure required for Escom I s capital develop-
ment programme, it follows that the discretion given to EscGm IS 
management in making investment decisions may affect the price 
charged for electricity, if there are factors which motivate the 
management to inC'>lr capital expenditure in excess of the minimum 
amount necessary to meet the forecasted demand for electricity'. 
In other words, is it in the managerEent I s interest to pursue an 
investment policy which minimizes cost? To ans.ver this question, 
it may be helpful to considerthe "managerial" theories of Williamson42 
and Marris43 , which seek to explain decisionmaking ir enterprises 
where there is a separation hetweer. ownership and management. 
AccGrding to these theories, the main factor which constrains ' 
the management to take aCCGunt of the interests of the owners of 
the enterprises is the fact that they are accountable to these owners 
and may be dismissed by them. In the case of Escom, its management 
is accountable to a Minister who evaluates tteir overall performance 
in terms of their ability to ensure that Escom fulfils its basic 
fLnction to "provide a cheap and abundant supply of elc·ctricity 
wherever required. ,,44 Escom I s management'is therefore constrained 
41 • 
42. 
-43. 
44. 
Financial Mail, July 27,1979, p. 322. 
Marris, R., "A Model of the Managerial Enterprise", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1963. 
Williamson, 0., "Managerial Discretion and Business 
Behaviour", American Economic Review, 1963 . 
Electricity Act., 54(b). 
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both to contain the cost and to safeguard the supply of electricity. 
Often, however, there is a trade-off between these two functions. 
An example of this occurs in the reserve plant margin decision. 
As has been explained, it is the policy of most electricity undertakings 
to provide capacity in excess of the amount required to meet fore-
casted peak demand, to avoid posGible power cuts as a result of 
unplanned increases in demand or breakdown in generating capacit) 0 
In deciding on the amount to invest in reserve capacity, the under-
taking has to balance the cost of the capital investment in reserve 
plant against the benefits of reducing the risk of power failure. It 
is possible that Escom' s management might attach a greater weight 
to the benefits obtainable from reducing the risk of power failure 
than would be the case in an independent cost-benefit analysis of the 
reserve plant investment decision o The reason for this is that the 
provision of an adequate supply of electricity is a direct responsibi-, 
lity of Escom' s management, so that any power failures would 
adversely reflect on their planning ability whereas it is much more 
difficult tc hold the management directly responsible for tariff 
increases caused by excessive capital expenditure. Consumer 
resistance to such a tariff incl'ease is likely to be l'elatively weak 
at present due to the fcllowing facters: 
(i) 
(ii) 
the price of electricity in South Africa is still relatiYely 
low by international standards; 
in an inflationary period consumers become conditioned 
to expect regular increases in the prices of most goods 
and servicE.·s; 
(iii) the cost of electricity normally forms a small part of the 
(iv) 
total expenditure of most consumers; and 
the establishment of a national transrdssion network by 
Escom has meant that there is a substantial gap between 
the ccst of power supplied by Escom and that which could 
be supplied by municipal generating stations, 
An indication of this relative weakness of consumer resistance to 
tariff increase is provided by the fact that in 1977 Escom was able 
to "get away with" an increase in the average price of electricity of 
48 per cent. Finally, it can be suggested that the high preference 
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which the Escom management may well have for minimizing the risk 
of power failure is likely to be reflected in a bias toward overin-
vestment in capacity, which is in turn likely to place an upward 
pressure on costs and tariffs. 
This view was expressed by the Board of Trade and Industries Report, 
which pointed out that the investment by Escom in reserve plant may 
have been excessive. Table 4:22 sets out the reserve plant margins 
attained by Escom dt:ring the period 1970 to 1982. When one con.siders 
that it is Escom policy to aim at a reserve plant margin of 17 per cent, 
then it can be seen that, during the periods 1970 to 1973 and 1980 to 
1982, the actual margin waf; significantly greater than this target. 
TABLE 4:22 
ESCOM: RESERVE PLANT rvIARGIN , 1970 TO 1982 
Year Percent 
1970 25,6 
1971 36 , 9 
1972 33 ,4 
1973 29,0 
1974 17 , 0 
1975 14 , 6 
1976 15 ,9 
1977 18 , 8 
1972- 18,3 
1979 17 , 1 
1980 26, 8 
1981 29,4 
1982 32 , 1 
The Board's RGport :;tuted that "a projected reserve of thirty 
per cent appears relatively high in the light of the burden imposed 
upon the country's capital resources as well as the impact on n .e 
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economy by way of higher tariffs" 45 and suggested that "careful cost 
benefit analysis should be undertaken by Escom to determine whether 
enlargement of the maintenance staff, the introduction of maintenance 
shifts and/or carrying on of maintenance work in both summer and 
winter would not be less costly and more productive than substantial 
enlargement of the reserve margin as a means of overtaking main-
46 tenance backlogs." 
However, if it is accepted that Escom management has too high a risk 
aversion to investigate such cost-reducing possibilities, a greater 
control over capital expenditure may be effected if the authority to 
approve investment decisions is vested in a body "possessing both 
the overall insight into the prese nt and probable future internal and 
e>:ternal economic situation of the Republic and also the analytical 
capability necessary to make sound, considered judgements upon the 
merits of such capital expenditure from the national point of view. ,,47 
Acceptance of the Board of Trade and Industries' recommendation 
that a "Capital Projects Evaluation Group" should be appointed in 
the Department of Finance to evaluate the investment merits and 
monitor the financing of the capital expenditure plans of Escom and 
other state co:~poratiDns, might therefore play an important role in 
containing the Escom' s capital expenditure and the escalating cost of 
electricity. 
4:4:3:2 EVALUATION OF ESCOM'S TARIFF STRUCTURE AND 
RATE MAKING PRINCIPLES 
In this section the tariff structure and rate making principles of 
Escom will be evaluated according to three basic criteria: 
45. 
46. 
47. 
R. S. A., Board of Trade and Industries, Report No. 1889, 
Q.P..cit., p. 153. 
Ibid., p. 1 53. 
Ibid., p. 1 53 • 
A. 
B. 
C. 
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The "eguity" criterion according to which it is fair or 
equitable for electricity prices to be set equal to the 
accounting costs attributable to particular groups of 
consumers, so that no group of consumers should 
subsidize any other group; 
the "efficiency" criterion according to which electricity 
tariffs should reflect the opportunity costs of supplying 
electricity, so that they act as signals to induce the 
most efficient allocation of resources to the electricity 
sector; and 
the "eguality" criterion according to which it is considered 
proper for all consumers to pay the same rate per kWh for 
electricity, regardless of the costs incurred in supplying 
them. In particular the effects of removing regional 
differences in the average selling price of electricity will 
be examined. 
It is clear that conflicts will often arise between these criteria, 
so that the rate maker will have to decide which criterion should be 
preferred in the formulation of electricity tariffs. In all cases, how-
ever, his choice will be constrained by the costs of implementing a 
tariff policy on the basis of H.e principles implied by any particular 
criterion. 
A. THE EQUITY C RIT E RION 
It is clear from section 4:4:2:2, that Escom' s tariff policy is largely 
based on the equity criterion. Before the effect of Escom' s tariff 
policy on efficiency and regional inequality can be evaluated, it is 
first necessary to evaluate this policy on its own terms according 
to the equity criterion. In other words, it is necessary to consider 
whether historical accounting costs have been "fairly" allocated to 
the different distribution undertakings and the consumer groups within 
each undertaking. In general, Escom' s practice of identifying the 
CostE attributable to each distribution undertaking and then allocating 
these costs to consumers according to whether the costs are related 
to the number of consumers, their maximum demand for capacity or 
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their energy consurr.ption appears to be fair according to this criterion. 
It is necessary, however, to examine in more detail the equity of the 
allocation of individual cost items. 
The costs incurred by the Central Generating Undertaking are in the 
nature of joint costs and cannot be easily attributed to the individual 
distribution undertakings 0 It is therefore equitable that these costs 
are pooled between the different undertakings according to their 
electricity requirements. It is also acceptable according to the 
equity criterion, that the coastal undertakings are allocated the 
exc€·ss cll-pital costs of their generating stations which were taken 
over by Escom, since such costs can definitely be attributed to these 
particular undertakings. 
Escom has also adhered to the equity principle by charging the costs 
of transmission to the receiving unde·rtakings, since the out8.ge of a 
transmission circuit would only affect the power input of a specific 
distribution undertaking and the cost of the circuit is thus specifically 
attributable to it. 
Escom's policy of linking loans to the commercial assets in operation 
at an unc.ertaking, appears to be an effective means of attributing the 
finance charges on these loans to the undertaking concerned. 
With respect to the fairness of the method of allocation of the Capital 
Development Fund (C.D. F. ) contribution, the Board of Trade and 
Industries made the following criticism: 
"The initial objective of the C.D.F. contributions was to provide for 
expansion (growth). One would have expected that the calculation of 
the contributions would be linked to a measure of growth. If not, the 
high growth consumer could make too small a contribution to the 
expansion needs of Escom compared to the lew growth c onsumer. ,,48 
48. Ibid., p. 146. 
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A further criticism of the method of allocation of C.D.F. contributions 
is that, although they are essentially demand-related costs, they are 
treated in .the same manner as energy related costs since they are 
allocated on the basis of kWh sales. This method of allecation is to 
the disadvantage of high load factor undertakings. 
Another problem with Escom' s method of cost allocation arises from 
the fact that t.he boundaries of the undertakings have developed over 
the years with the development of Escom' s system, so that in some 
cases the djfference between the costs allocated to adjacent under-
takings may be the result of historical rather than economic factors. 
This may give rise to certain inequities in cost allocation. For 
example, Bloemfontein, which is not very much more favourably ill 
terms of distance from the C. G. U. situated than Durban, has the 
benefit of the Rand and O. F • S. undertakings tariff. Furthermore, 
since Port Elizabeth municipality is served by the Orange River 
undertaking it pays a lower demand charge than customers served by 
the adjacent Border t:.ndertaking. It has become particularly important 
for Escom to reass&s!; the boundaries of its undertakings now that 
regional development policy in South Africa. is being pursued within the 
. 49 
fraD JeVlork of the eight regions set out by the "Good Hope" plan. 
With rE,spect to Escom I s method of allocating costs to consumers, it 
may be inferred that it is acceptable that each undertaking apportions 
its total costs to consumer classes rather than individual consumers 
due to the very large number of consumers who are supplied. If the 
allocation of costs to consumer classes is to satisfy the equity 
criterion, then these classes must consist of consumers with basically 
similar consumption patterns, so that the deviation from the norm in the 
averaging process is minimized. It is however, submitted that Escoffi IS 
Tariff A class is too large since it accounts for approximately 97 per cent 
49. Department cf Foreign Affairs and Information, 9..!?.cit. 
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of total sales, and that Escom I s tariff structure should be revised to 
make provision for more consumer groups in respect of Tariff A. 
It can be argued I for instance, that 2. c OI'.sumer who has a maximum 
demand of 800 Megawatt (MW) obtains it at the same tariff as the 
consumer with one of 0,1 MW, and that the saving due to economies of 
scale is therefore ignored, especially in respect of lower voltage 
distribution cost. 
With respect to tte demand charges levied on Tariff A consumers, it is 
further submitted that the existing differentiation of these charges 
according to voltage is equitable, since the additional cost of voltage 
transformation should be borne by the low voltage consumers on whose 
behalf this cost is incurred. 
It is also equitable for Escom to transfer a portion of the demand-
related costs to the costs recoverable by energy ctarges, in orjer 
to compensate small consumers fer their contribution to diversity 
in the maximum demand for system power. The method of deter-
mination cf this transfer is largely arbitrary and it is submitted that 
a more accurate recovery of these demand related cost~ by energy 
charges is recovered under marginal cost pricing. This issue will 
be examined in more detail in tte next section. 
Tariff classes B, C and D are not levied a specific demand charge, but 
derr.and-relatE-d costs are recovered from these consumers by means 
of block tariffs. For example, it can be see-n from Table 4 :18 that 
in the Border undertaking, Tariff B consumers are charged a basic 
levy of R12, 00 per month to recover consumer-related costs and that 
the first 500 kWh of consumption is charged ttt 8,75 cents per kWh 
while the second block of consumption is charged at 5,45 cents per 
kWh. For any consumer using more than 500 kWh the effect of this 
tariff is tbe same as demand charge of R16, 50 per month plus all 
consumption charged at 5,45 cents per kWh. It may be argued that this 
type of tariff is discriminatory in its effect on any consumer using less 
than 500 kWh. In other words, it will cause larger consumers to be 
subsidized by snoaller ones who pay higher marginal and averag-e 
prices. This argument, however, overlooks the fact that such a 
tariff is similar in effect to a fixed demand charge and accomplishes 
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the similar purpose of inducing consumers to improve their load 
factors. Furthermore if, for example, a consumer charged on the 
basis of this tariff uses only 200 kWh he would pay a marginal price 
of 8,75 cents per kWh and would have a total monthly bill of R29, 50 
out of which only R6, 60 of the allocated fixed demand costs of R16, 50 
would be recovered. There is consequently an under-recovery of 
allocated average fixed demand costs which may neces~itate the 
recovery of disproportionately larger amounts from tr.e larger 
consumer, to the extent that the decreased consumption of the smaller 
consumer does not also result in a corresponding decrease in capacity 
ccst responsibility. It is therefore possible that under the block 
tariff system the larger consumer may be subsidizing the srr:a.ller, 
and r. ot the reverse. 
Moreover, if the relationship between demand and energy related 
char5'es established by the standard tariff is considered fair, then 
the effect of Escom' s practice of adjusting the overall surcharge 
or disc ount applied by each distribution undertaking to cove" the 
total costs actually incurred by the undertaking and to adjust the 
energy charge for increase in the coal price, would be ~o distort 
the equitable pattern of relationships embodied in the standard tariff 
structure. As the Board of Trade and Industries noted: 
liThe magnitudes of the transfer from demand-·reld!ld tc- energy related 
charges vary considerably from what Escom evaluated as being fair 
during the last restructuring of tariffs. 11 50 There is also a distortion 
of the regional differences in the energy charge, whee. one compares 
the standard and the effective electricity tariffs. This is illustrated 
in Table 4:23 which is derived from Table 4:18. 
The Board of Trade and Industries submitted that the fairness of the 
relationship between tbe different components of the electricity tariff 
50. Ibid., p. 27. 
\ 
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could be better maintained, if Escom followed the practice adopted in 
countries such as England, France and Germany of requiring a complete 
annual revision of the tariff structure to effect any necessary adjustment 
of tariff revenue. The unwillingness by Escom to pursue such a policy, 
is perhaps an indication that it does not consider there to be significant 
benefits to be obtained from the extension of the equity principle. This 
view is reflected in the following arguments whicr. were raised by Escom 
against a complete annual revision of the tariff structure: 
"(i) The imbalance between the component:,; of a tariff does not 
affect the overall total revenue as defined in section 14 
of the Electricity Act. 
(ii) Tt,e subdivision of total costs into demand-related, energy-
related and consumer-related categorie,s involves many 
uncertain areas and cannot be in principle totally I correct I. 
(iii) A la.rge majority of consumers having load factors near the 
average of ELll Tariff A consumers in an undertaking are not 
significa.ntly affected by the ratio bet .. ' een energy related 
and demand related charges ••• " 51 
TABLE 4:23 
ENERGY CHARGES EXPRE~SED AS PERCEI\TAGE OF' RAND AND 
O.F.S. CHARGE(FIRST QUARTER 1983) 
Undertaking Standa.rd Effective 
-----
Borde r 151 109 
Orange River 146 113 
Cape Northern 123 91 
Cape Western 126 94 
Eastern Transvaal 90 92 
l'!atal 142 78 
Rand and O. F • S • 100 100 
51. Ibid., p. 27. 
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Despite its various drawbacks, it can be concluded that if Escom' s 
tariff policy is evaluated on its own terms according to the equity 
criterion, ther.. one must concur with the conclusion reached by the 
Board of Trade and Industries that" ••• generally, Escom' s methods 
of allocating costs ••• are acceptable." However, it is clear from 
the discussion of Escom' s tariff policy that it depa.rts to some extent 
from marginal cost pricing principles. It is therefore a lso necessary 
to consider the effects on economic efficiency of the failure by Escom to 
explicitly incorporate aspects of !T.arginal cost pricir,g in its tariff 
policy. 
B. THE EFFICIEI\CY CRITERION 
Although Escom' s policy of structuring its tariffs accordir 'g to volta ge 
leve l and region appears to be consistent with the principle that it is 
economically efficient for consumers to be charged the costs of 
supplying their partic ular region at their particular voltage, there are 
a number of respects in which Escom fails to apply the efficiency 
criterion in structuring it" tariffs in the manner indicated in the 
discussion of a marginal cost based tariff structure in section 4:3. 
This (Gatter is now discussed under the three headings that follow. 
(i) THE USE OF ACCOUI\'TII\G RATHER Tl- AN ECOI\Ofl,lIC 
COSTS 
In setting its tariffs, Escom follows the traditiunal accounting 
approach which is concerned with the n ,c overy of ~, unk costs 
rather than the resourc es used or saved by consume r 
d~cisions. Since pric e s are the amounts paid for unit 
increH.,ents of consumption, they generally reflect the extra 
cost incurred as a result of these increments of cons:..mption. 
Such increments to cost will oc'Cur if either existing consumers 
increase their demand or if new consumers are connected to the 
system. It follows that if prices are to act a,s signals ir ,ducing 
consumers to make decisions which ultimately lead tc ar. 
efficient allocation of resources, then present fOrices should also 
be related to the economic value of the r e sources to be used in 
the future to meet such consumption changes. The accounting' 
approach may therefore be inefficient since it rneasures costs 
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in terr:.s or'the histcrical value of assets and thus in 'plies 
tbat future economic reo·ources will be as cheap or as 
expensive as in the past. Furthermore, the deviation of 
accounting costs from economic resource costs is likely 
to be exacerbated by the fact that the accounting approach 
will make no adjustment for distortions in input prices caused 
by taxes, subsidies, import duties or monopolistic practices, 
in the manner suggested in the discussion of shadow pricing 
in section 4:3:1 
(ii) THE FAILURE TO APPLY A PEAK/OFF-PEAK DIFFER-
ENTIA TION OF THE ENERGY CHARGE 
In the discussion of a marginal cost based tariff structure 
it was established that the energy charge by a distribution 
undertaking should be based OD. the running cost of the 
generating plant to be used last in merit order in a given 
period, adjusted for the marginal cost cf transmission to 
the undertaking. The application of this principle necessarily 
leads to some peak/off-peak differentiation of the energy charges 
since the generating units used last in a peak period will 
clearly have a higher operating cost then those used last in 
an off-peak period. By basir.g its energy charge on the 
average energy costs, Escom is probably setting this energy 
compol?ent of its tariff below the opportunity cost of meeting 
an increment in consumption in the peak period and above that 
for the off-peak period. The effect of this is illustreted in 
Figure 4:10. The SRMC of energy used in generation is 
depicted as a stepped fUl?ction to indicate that five generating 
units are used in merit order. If the energy component of 
the tariff is set at P A which is equal to the average energy 
cost in both peak and off-peak periods, it can be seen that in 
the off-peak period qAo will be consumed and teat the value 
of the last unit consumed will be greater than its opportunity 
cost. There is therefore a net economic le.ss <equivalent to 
the area of the triangle abc which results from the failure 
to 'set the off-peak energy charge equal to the short run 
marginal cost of energy. The diagram also indicates that 
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the failure to differentiate charges between periods leads to 
underutilization of base load capacity. Figure 4.10 shows 
that in the peak period, if the energy charge was set a.t Pmp, 
the generating plant would be fully utilized. However a 
policy of setting the energy charge equal to unit energy 
costs, P A, would clearly result in an excess demand and 
place pressure on the elEctricity utility to expand its capacity 
by advancing the installation of new plant in terms of its 
investrr.ent programme. The economic loss associated with 
the failure to set a peak period energy charge can then,fore 
be established by calculating the difference between the present 
value of the investment programme under an average and a 
peak-load pricing policy, and setting off against this amount 
the r e duction in operating costs resulting from bringing 
forward the installation of more e fficient generating units and 
the gain in consumers r surplus resulting from charging a 
lower price in peak periods under the average cost pricing 
policy. It is clear, therefore, that Escom r s failure to 
differentiate its energy c!1arge results in losses in economic 
efficiency in both peak and off-peak periods. 
A further 1051; in economic efficiency may be caused by the fact 
that Escom treats transmission costs allocated to receiying 
undertakings as a demand-related cost and does not a.djust 
the energy charge for the power losses which occur along 
the transmission lines. The energy charges of undertakings 
located further from t he central generating undertaking may 
therefore be understated since they are not adjusted for the se 
transmission losses. 
(iii) THE EFFECT OF THE TRANSFER FROl\\ DEMA ND TO 
ENERGY-RELATED COSTS ON THE INCENTIVE FOR 
CONSUl\\ERS TO IMPROVE THEIR LOAD FACTORS 
Both Escom and the Electricite de France provide for a 
transfer from demand to energy related costs. Th e transfer 
provided for by Escom, however, is likely to result in a 
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lesser inducement for consumers to improve their load. factors, 
since it is not limited to peak and full-use periods and therefore 
does not give consumers the opportunity to shift their consump-
tion to off-peak periods. Furthermore there is no differentiation 
ill the proportion of the transfer between consumers with high 
utilization factors and those with lower utilization factors. As 
it was explained in section 4:3, this differentiation is necessary 
since high-utilization consumers have little opportunity to 
alter the daily distribution of their load as a result of having 
to pay higher energy charges in peak periods, whereas low-
utilization consumers often have much greater :;-.cope for 
shifting tteir loads to off-peak periods. It appears, therefore, 
that Escom could improve its overc.ll system load factor by 
adopting the French practice of transferring den,and-related 
costs to the energy-related portion of the tariff in pe"k periods 
according to the utilization factors of the consumer groups 
served by the di:;-.tribution undertakings. The determination 
of the amount of the transfer by Escom is currently rather 
arbitrary in nature and it would seem that a more efficient 
utilization of its facilities could be obtained if this transfer 
was usee! as an instrument to encourage ccnsumers to improve 
their loa.d factors. 
In sumr 'ary therefore, it seems that Escom c ould promote 
gTeater economic efficiency by changing its tariff structure 
"long the lines followed by the Electricite' de France. It 
would be necessary, however, to compare this gain in economic 
efficiency with the bigher consumer-related costs which would 
be associated with introducing this more complicated tariff 
structure. 
C. THE EQUALITY CRITERION 
The applicaticn by Escom of the equity criterion according to which 
ea.ch distribution undertaking sets its tariffs to cover the costs 
specifically attributable to it, results in significant regional 
differer.ces in the average selling price of electricity, as shown in 
Table 4:24. It can be seen from this table that the average selling 
r-
'" 
"" 
TABLE 4:24 
UEGIONAL DIFF ERENCES IN AVERAGE ~;El.LIj\G PUICE OF ELECTRIC ITY BY CONSUMER 
CATE(;OHY, 1982 
Undertaking 
Border 
Cape Northern 
Cape Western 
Eastern 
Tra.nsvaal 
Natal 
Orange RiYer 
Rand and 
O.F .S. 
Total 
Bulk 
4 , 01 3 
3 , 446 
2 , 804 
2 , 754 
2 , 591 
3 ,3 10 
2 , 798 
2 , 808 
Domestic 
street lighting 
Cents Per kWh 
7 , 151 
5 , 887 
5 , 846 
4,840 
4 , 743 
9 , 248 
4,564 
5 , 418 
Ind.ustrial Mining Traction 
6 , 256 
5 , 059 3 , 645 4 , 562 
4 , 308 4 , 505 
2 , 79'Jl 2 , 731 3 , 683 
2 , 647 3,274 3 , 524 
7 , 356 
2 , 685 2 , 430 3,650 
2 , 825 2 , 541 3,650 
Total 
4 , 323 
3,860 
3,614 
2 , 763 
2 , 724 
3,477 
2 , 804 
2 , 804 
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price of electricity in the Border undertaking is, for example, 1 ,6 
times as much as the price charged in the Rand and O. F. S. under-
taking. These regional differences are more accentuated when they 
are examined on an intersect oral basis. Thus, the average selHng 
price of electricity used for industrial pruposes in the Border 
undertaking is 2,3 times as great as for that used in tt.e Rand and 
O.F. S. undertaking. 
There exist various reasons for these regional differences in elec.tricity 
prices, among which are the following: 
(i) EXCESS CAPACITY COSTS 
As was explained in the discussion of Escom I s tariff policy, 
the finance charges in respect of the excess generating 
capacity of the Natal, Cape Western and Border undertakings 
are added to the costs which must be reccvered by means of 
tariffs calculated for these undertakings, and this clearly 
inflates the average selliLg price of these coastal under-
takings in relation to the ot.her undertakings which are only 
supplied by the Central Generating Unit (C.G.U.). 
(ii) TRANSMISSION COSTS 
Escom I S practice of allocatiLg the expenditure incurred in 
the transmission of electricity to the undertakings conc(,rned 
will obviously place a relatively greater cost burden on 
undertakings located a greater distance from the C. G. U . 
Table 4:25 compares the regional differences in transmission 
cost per kWh. 
According to Table '~:25 the undertakings with the highest 
transmission cost per kWh in 1982 were Border, Cape Western, 
Cape Northern and Ora.nge River. It should be noted that 
these figures are influenced by the load factors of the under 
takings. 
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TABLE 4:25 
TRANSMISSION COST PER KWH, 1982 
Undertaking Cents per kWh 
Border 
Cape Western 
Cape Northern 
OraEge River 
Natal 
0,11 
0, 25 
0, 28 
0,13 
0 , 06 
0,001 
0 , 001 
Eastern Transvaal 
Rand and O.F.S. 
(iii) AGE OF UNI,ERTAKINGS 
Escom's practice of allocating loan charges in r elation to 
the assets in commercial operation, burdens the llewer 
und€,rtakings where the historical cost of assets in service 
is higher ir: relation to sales than in the older undertakings. 
(iv) OPERATING EXPEl\SES 
There are significant d.ifferences in the nature and charac-
teristics of the demand for electricity imposed by consumers 
ilJ the different distribution undertakings. Distribution, 
reticulation, and administration costs are unders tandably 
higher in sparsely popL, lated regions and when a large part 
of the total supply is to a large number of small consumers. 
This is illustrated in Table 4:26 w[:ere it can be seen that 
in 1982 the combined ope rations, maintenance and administration 
expenditure per kWh was significantly higher in the Cape 
Western, Border, Cape Northern and Orange River undertakings 
than in the Natal, Ea.stern Transvaal a.nd Rand and O. F • S • 
undertakings. 
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TABLE 4:26 
OPERATING EXPENDITURE IN CENTS PER KWH IN 1982 
Border 0 ,81 
Cape Northern 0 ,49 
Cape Western 0 , 56 
Orange River 0 , 56 
Eastern Transvaal 0 , 23 
Natal 0 , 23 
Rand and O.F.S. C, 15 
(v) MIX OF CONSUMERS 
The costs of an undertaking are affected by whether sales are 
predomi nantly to a few large consumers or to a large number 
of smaller consumers. The costs per unit consumption in 
the Border and Cape Western undertakings are detrimentally 
affected by the fact tr.at these undertakings have a far 
lower consumption per consumer than in the Orange River, 
Rand and O. F. S. and Eastern Transvaal undertakings . 
The figures for the Cape Northern and Natal undertakings 
are near the average for Escom as a whole. 
(vi) LOAD FACTOR 
If thE! largest part of the total sales. of a regional undertaking 
is to large consumers operating at a high load factor, the 
average selling price will necessarily be lower than in 
an undertaking supplyinr; a large number of small consumers 
with low load factors , The average consumer's load factor 
has an important bearing on the undertaking system lcad 
factor. The 1982 systew l oad factors of the different 
undertakir gs are shown in Table 4:27. 
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TABLE 4:27 
Ur-:'DERTAKING'S SYSTEM LOAD FACTORS IN 1982 
Undertaking Annual System Load Factor 
Border 
Cape Northern 
Cape Western 
Orange River 
Natal 
58, 8 
69 ,4 
71 , 9 
71 , 9 
73 ,1 
71 ,8 
71, 2 
Eastern Transvaal 
Rand and O. F . S . 
The relatively high system load factors in Rand and O. F . S. , 
Easte'rn Transvaal and Natal undertakings can be ascribed 
to the large, 24 hour, steady loads taken by large rr.ining 
consumers and industrial consumers. The system 'load 
factors of Cape WestE·rn and Orange River undertakings are 
favourably influenced by the relatively large and sustained 
partial bulk supplies talcen by the municipalities of 
Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, to augment the outputs from 
the municipal power stations ir; these cities. In contrast,. 
there are DO mining loads and fe w large, 24 hour industrial 
loc.ds in the Border undertaking and the s ystem load factor 
of this undertaking is significantly lower. 
Despite the fac~ that there are currently significant regior.al differences 
in the average selling price of e lectricity, there has been a sustained 
trend over the past deca.de in narrowing the difference between the 
price levels of the separate und€.rtakings. This is illustrated in 
Figure 4.11. A major factor underlying this narrowing of regional 
price diffE,rentials has been the development of the national transmission 
system which now interconnects all major power resourc e s in South 
Africa. With the interconnection of all Escom' s power stations, the 
placing of new power stations is no longer primarily dete rmined by 
regional power requireme nts b d rather by the av,dlability and cost 
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of the required natural resources. Witt the pooling of generation 
costs between the distribution undertakings in an equal manner, 
proportional to their respective electricity requirements, regional 
differences in tariffs are no longer caused by regional differences in 
electricity cost. Furthermore tbe amount of excess capacity costs 
allocated to the coastal undertakings has shown a declining trend, 
not only due to the 1977 amendment to the licences of these under-
t~kings which limited the apportionment of the~e cests to interest 
and redec'ption charges, but also because the loans tied to the 
generating plant of these undertakings are not being renewed so 
that the amount of these excess eapital costs is continually diminishing 
over time. 
The Board of Trade and Industries investi/i,-ated the effects of a 
further equalization of cost allocation between the undertakings. 
It was fc-und that if the interest cha.rges to the undertakings were 
based on an average interest, there would be cost per unit decreases 
in the Border (- 1 ,3 per cent), Cape Western (- 0,1 per cent) and 
Orange River (- 2,8 per cent) unde rtakings, and increases in the 
Cape Eastern (+ 1 ,1 per cent), Cape Northern (+ 0,2 per eent), 
Eastern Transvaal (+ 0,4 per cent) and Natal undertakings, while 
there· would be no change in the Rand and O. F • S. und ertakin g. 
Furthermore, it was reported that the full pooling of C. G. U. eosts would 
result in an increase in the cost per unit in the Cape EastE>rn (+ 3,2 
per cECnt) , Eastern Transvaal (+ 1,3 per cent), Orange River (+ 1,5 
per cent) and Rand and O. F. S. undertakings while the cost per unit 
in the Border (- 7,5 per cent), Natal (- 3,6 lOer cent) and Cape Western 
(- 3,1 per cent) undertaking would decrease. The marginal effect of 
pooling· transmission costs were, however, found to be much smaller 
with the Eastern Transvaal and Rand and O.F.S. undertakings 
experiencing increases in the cost of electricity per unit, while all 
the other undertakings would be liable to lower unit costs. It was thus 
found that there were considerable opportunities to achieve greater 
equalization of tc riffs by altering the Clethod. of allocation for certain 
tariffs. 
It is now necessary to consider the economic effects of such measures 
to promote the regional equalization of tariffs. It is clear that in 
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those understanding where there is a relative decrease in tariffs there 
will be an upward shift in the forecast for future electricity demand 
and an increase in the present value of the investment programme 
plallEf,d to meet this demand, while in those undertakings where there 
is a relative increase in tsriffs there will be a downward shift in 
the forecast for future e lectricity demand and a decrease in the present 
value of the investment programme planned to meet this demand. The 
revised investment programme is likely t u depart further from optirr ality 
than the existing progrp.mme, sinc e there is likely to be excessive 
investment to meet the shift in demand towar'Cls those regions which are 
characterized by relatively higher costs of transmission, distribution 
and reticulation. If the costs and benefits of such a revision in the 
investment programme are to be correctly evaluated, then or..e must 
offset the present value of the future gain in consumer's surplus 
against the increased investment cost in those undertakings where 
tariffs are reduc ed, and the loss in consumers' surplus against the 
reduction in investment c ost in those undertakings where tariffs are 
raised. Furthermore, these costs and benefits should be weighted 
by an area need indicator, in the manner suggested by MCGuire 
and Garn. 52 
It was not possible to quantify the costs and benefits mentioned above, 
since Escom has no information on the sensitivity of regional load 
forecasts and the capital development programme to the equalization 
of tariffs, In July 1983 I interviewed officials in the Escom Statistics 
Department. They expressed the view that the equalization of tariffs 
would not have much effect on Escom' s load forecasts for the different 
undertakings, due to the low elasticity of electricity demand. They also 
indicated tl.tat the price of electricity was not explicitly taken into account 
in the load forecasts which are used by Escom in planning its future capital 
expenditure. They did not perceive there t c be a conflict between efficiency 
and equality, but saw the main trade-off as being between equity and 
equality. The equity criterion has been embodied in the provisions. of the 
EIE·ctricity Act and Escom has been required to accept it as the basis 
for formulating its tariffs, It can be argued that the adoption of the 
equality criterion in its place would create a conflict between the 
objectives of Escom management similar to that which has been 
52. This was discussed in Chapter Three, Section 3:5. 
365 
sugg'ested to affect S. A. T . S., since en the one hand Escom would be 
required to operate according to commercial principlE>s, while on the 
other hand it would be required to sacrifice t.hese commerical principles 
to the interests of regional policy. If regional differences in the price 
of electricity are considered to be a significant fG.ctor discouraging 
industrial decentralization, then it would seem preferable for the State 
to directly compensate the electricity users affected, rather than to 
require Escom to ignore regional differences in He average cost of 
electricity per kWh and equalize its tariffs. 
In fact, this approach appears to have been accepted by the South African 
Government in its latE'st industrial decentralization policy tc assist 
the Board for the Decentralization of Industries in its determination 
of subsidies. Escom calculates the e lectricity tariffs of its consumers 
at industrial decentralization points according to the tariff schedule 
applied by the Eastern Transve.al undertaking, a.nd then subtracts 
this from its current electricity charge to detern,.ine the amount of the 
subsidy whicb f;hould be paid. 
4.4 CONCLU~;ION AND RECOMMEl\-DATIONS 
In conclusion, the following recommendations may be made on the basis 
of th.e preceding analysis with a view to promot.ing the objective of 
economic efficiency: 
(a) Provision shouk be madE' in the E lectricity Act for the 
earning of Frofits by Escom. This would obviate the need 
to treat transfErs to reserve s a s costs chargeable against 
revenue, wher: they actually constitute C.n internal retention 
of profits. The recommendations by the Boa.rd of Trade. and 
Industries that" ••• the Redec.ption Fund, the Provisien for 
Redemption of Foreib'n Loans and the Capital Reserve should 
be abolished and the amounts concerned transferred to 
Accumulated Depreciation" and that "the system of Fund 
Accounting should be discontinued and outstanding E scom 
loans should be recuced by the amount of the transfers 
53 
referred te", should therefore be implemented. 
53. Board of Trade and Industries, QP.cit., p. 157. 
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(b) Escom I s profitability, and therefore the general level of 
tariffs, should be subject to control by an independent body, 
such as the Department of Industries, which would set profit 
targets on the basis of its evaluation of the internal financing 
requirements of Escom. 
(c) The establishment of e. Capital Project Evaluation Group along 
the lines proposed by tbe Board of Trade and Industries would 
provide a measure of control over the tender.cy towards 
excessive investment and growth of capital-. related costs, which 
can arise where Escom management has full responsibility for 
investment decisions. 
(d) If Escom decides to adjust its tariffs, then it should only be 
able to do this through a complete revision of its tariff 
structure, approved by the Electricity Control Board, and 
should no longer have the option of being to change its tariffs 
without Board a.pproval by merely adjusting its surcharges and 
discounts. 
(e) The basic principle that tariffs should reflect costs so that 
there is no cross-subsidization between any undertaking or 
consumer-group should be retained, but Escom should investi-
gate methods of relating costs more closely to the economic 
value of resources used, such as "shadow pricing" and 
replacemer.t ,~ost accounting. 
(f) Escom should investigate the possibility of structuring the 
tariffs charged to large power users according to marginal 
cost principlt1s, in the way which has been implemented by 
Electricite'de Frar.ce. 
(g) To the extent that the rngional differential in the pric e of 
electricity conflicts with industrial decentralization policy, 
this problem should continue to be dealt with according t.o 
the current policy of State compensation to consumers at 
industrial development points, rather than by requiring Escom 
to adjust its methods of cost allocation in a manner whioh 
leads te. a greater reg'ional equalization of tariffs. Certain 
inequities in the regional price differential could, however, 
be removed if a more functional definition of the boundaries 
of the electicity undertakings was applied. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WATER 
5:1 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF WATER SUPPLY 
5: 1 : 1 WATER IN MODERN SOCIETY 
An adequate supply of water is an essential requirement for most uf 
_ the activities carried on in a modern economy. Practically every 
modern household has a basic requirement of running water although 
this is often exceeded as water is consumed for less essential uses 
such as lawnsprinkling. In the industrial sector water is an important 
input in many production processes such as electricity generation 
while in the agricultural sector water is needed for stockwatering 
and crop irrigation. There has been a rapid growth ir. water 
consumption in the agricultural sector, in particular, as a result of 
the introduction of cultivation practices that are aimed at achieving 
better crops by retaining as much as possible of the rain that falls 
on the ground and the sharp increase in the use of supplementary 
irrigation t o raise crop yields even i n areas where normally a 
reasonable harvest can be expec t ed without irrigation. 
If a modern economy is to sustain its develc-pment and economic 
grcwth, water has to be provided in rising _quantities for all these 
purposes. Furthermore water has a profound effect on the overall 
quality of life ir. a society. It has provided the setting-, in many 
cases for gratification of aesthetic and recreational needs and in 
a modern society this must be recognized as a legitimate water use. 
5: 1 :2 WATER RESOURCE::' 
Many countries frequently face the prGblerr. that the pattern of derr.and 
for water does not coincide with the pattern of availabilit y of water 
resources. For example, the seasonal distribution of precipitation 
may not coincide with seasonal water requirements. While little 
precipitation may occur in the summer months when there is the 
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heaviest demand for water because crops are growing, a heavy runoff 
in winter and early spring may produce floodE. . Furtherrr.ore, 
irregularity in prec'ipitation may not only be seasonal but may also 
be cyclical with a country or region experiencing periodic droughts. 
!<iverflow may thus be highly erratic in contrast to the "steadily 
increasing demand for water. Finally, tr.e geographic distribution 
of water resources may not match the spatial distribution of activities. 
In many countries there are some regions with a more than adequate 
water supply whereas in other regions there is a prospect that economic 
advancement will be affected by water shortage. 
When a country is plagued with this problem of a maldistribution of 
water resources - seasonally, annually and geographically - it is 
necessary to eng'age in water developrr.ent <Ictivities which are directed 
at adapting and utilizing water resources to meet the water requiremer.ts 
of the economy. 
5:1 :3 WATE1't RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
From a historical point of view the process of water resource develop-
ment usually goes through three di~tinct phases in a region or country. 
(a) 
(b) 
PRIVATE, SMALL-SCALE DEVELOPMENT 
In the early period of settlement, water resource develop-
ment usually takes the form of stream diversions to 
irrigatE' fertile knd which is within reach of the main 
rivers. These diversion structures were usually 
constructed by the settlers individually, with an expendi-· 
ture of time a.nd effcrt, but without the need to raise funds 
from financial ma.rkets. 
LOCA L DEVELOl' tvIEl\T P lWGRAMMES 
As the process of regional settlement continues, comrr,unities 
start to grow up with diverse water need". . It no w be comes 
necessary to supplant the crude diversion structure s with 
c e ntral water supplies, developed by impounding surplus 
(c) 
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flow s in retention basins for re lease during the dry season. 
Furthermore the distribution of water may be extended to 
areas having no access to surfa.ce sources Df supply, by 
building a. system of large rese rvoirs and canals t o convey 
increased supplies of water to these areas. The most 
suitable institution for promoting local water r e source 
developme nt usually turns to out to be the public district 
authority, endoweC: with quasi-g0vernmental powers to 
le·vy assessme nts on residents for recovery of financial 
expenditure. 
As water requirements expand, loce.! water resource 
devElopment programmes may start to have substantial 
external effects on water supplie.s ir, other districts. 
For example, the growing usage of water in one district 
may r educe downstream flows and thereby increase the 
concentration of pollution and salinity in these water 
supplies. Al,:o pumping from subsurface aquifers may 
reduce water tables in some a.reas at an alarming rate. 
As the process of water resource development reaches 
this Etage, it becomes necessary to adopt an integrated 
approach transcending local levels of jurisdiction. 
I NTEGt<ATED WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT BY 
A PUBLIC AGENCY 
An integrated approach to water resource development would 
ha v e to be plc.nned at either the national or regional as 
opposEd to the dif:trict level. An integrated development 
prograr~.me might involve the f ollowing features: 
(i) long distance transfers of water from surplus to 
deficit area; 
(ii) the capture of flood flows during wet seasons to 
replenish subsurface storage depleted during dry 
sc;asons; 
(iii) co-ordinated releases from surface storage to 
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Ir.aintain flows in established stream beds for abating 
pollution and repelling the intrusion of salinity into 
river mouths; and 
(iv) the multiple purpose exploitation of storage reser-
voirs. For example, a large dam may not only be a 
storage reservoir but can also be used for hydro-
electric power, and to provide recreational facilities; 
An integrated plan such as this would differ in a number of si€;nificant 
respects from locally sponsored development programmes: 
from a technical point of view, it represents a higher order 
of interdependent system. Whereas local supply and distri-
bution syst6ms are limited to explciting water resources 
in a particular district, an integrated system which pools 
a network of streams and combines ground and surface 
water management, would add a great deal to the technical 
potential of water resource development and utilization; and 
large scale economies may be realized by the integration 
of water resource development into a single system since 
storage facilities required to accomplish anyone of a 
nUlT.ber of separate purposes can be used to achieve 
equally well other common purposes. 
A public agency endowed with powers of planning, co-ordinating and 
controlling water /Orojects at the national level and with access to 
funds from general tax rever:ue or with the power to levy assessments 
upon its beneficiaries would seem to be the most suitable institutional 
instrument for promoting this i ntegrated progra..mme of water resource 
development. Such an institution would be able to "internalize" tte 
externalities wtich would othervlise plague local water resource 
development. 
A highly successful example of such an int.,grated system is the national 
water grid which was developed in Israel and which interconnects the 
country I s major water resources and reg'ulative storage facilities and 
caters to practically all the :1lajor water needs of the country. This 
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system is characterized by both spatial and inter temporal interdepen-
dence of water projects. There is thus a hierarchical layout pattern 
of projects where each project generation integrated the projects of 
the preceding generation and was, in turn, recombined into larger 
project units by the subsequent project generations. Furthermore, 
improved utilization of Isru'l' s water resources has not or.ly been 
achieved loy connecting local resources to the n2,tiocal grid but also 
by a nationally conceived pattern of "atEr management. In humid 
years, surface '."ater is used to the maximum possible extent while the 
exploitation of groundwater resources is low. t<eduction of groundwater 
use and concurrently conducted recharge ojOeraticns will, in such years, 
increase the undergroL:nd storage and cause a rise in g.roundwater 
levels. In dry periods on the other hand, when surface flows aTe 
scarce, the groundwater accumulated in previous years is dr2.wn upon. 
Wiener has r,;ade the following comment on Israel's progress in the 
field cf water resource development: 
1 • 
"Between 1 948 and 1 966, the utilization of the 
country 1 s proven watE·r resources rose from 
17 per cent (reprf,senting mainly the use of 
shallow local groundwater farnations ) te. 
alooost 90 per cent (ir,cluding the utilization 
of Israel's only two rivEOrs, the Yarquan ancl 
the Jordan) •••••• The high rate of agricul-
tural productivity and the extremely high 
overall plar:t factor of water project c2.pacity 
that were achieved in spite of the lack of 
experience of the new farmers 'were due 
mainly to the close co-or<.~ination between 
water resource de.velopment and the provision 
of complerrentary inputs - material human 
2.nd organizational,,1 
.. 
A.I\'iener; The Role of Water in Development, McGraw-Hill, 
New ·York, 1972, p. 405. 
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In subsequent years, however Israel Las increasingly found itself 
in the position of having developed and used most of its natural water 
resources so that it has [,ad to deper,d on new methods of wat€T-
resources management for future economic growth. It thus shares 
tte problem, with many arid countries that although water supply 
lirr..itc..tions are not absolute, they have become economic. Wiener 
describes this problem of aridity as follows: 
" .. .. limitations in national water resources 
will •••• no longer constitute an absolute 
(Malthusian) barrier to growth; the develop-
ment of man-made fresh water will have become 
technologically feasible, alb~it at still 
relatively high costs. Supplementing natural 
water by man-made supplies will, however, 
steeply i ncrease the cost of marginal quantities 
of water and thereby, to a marked extent, the 
average water costs; the limitations imposed 
by the lack of furthermore accessible natural 
resources will thus be of a n economic (or 
Ricardian) nature It 2. 
As will be discusseci, in the next section, the econorric growth trends 
predicted for South Africa, indicates that it may have to face a 
growi ng problem of aridity, in the economic sense defined above, 
towards the close of the twentie th century. 
5:1 :4 THE EFFECT OF ARIDITY ON PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY 
POLICY 
Conventional problem solving in the field of water supply policy 
usually assumes tr.e dema.nd for water to be an exogenous variable. 
According to this approach, the aim of v/ater resource development 
and rcanagement is to harness water resoUrc€,s with a view to 
complying with the requirements of such a demand. In situa.tions of 
aridity, this problem solving path will be blocked since avaihtble 
2. Ibid., p. 408. 
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resources will not be sufficient to comply with the requirements of an 
exogenous demand. Conditions of aridity therefore result in greater 
emphasis being placed on the following elements of a water resource 
development policy: 
(a) 
(c) 
the available natural water resources a re no longer treated 
as a constraint upon meeting the g-rowing water requirements 
of the econoIrY, since it is technologically possible to 
incorporate man-made water into a water supply syster:l 
tt.rough desalination of sea-water, although this process 
is at present costly. Furthermore, the natural hydro-
logica l cycle may be modified eitt.er by increasing the 
conservation of runoff once precipitation has occurred, 
or by attemptir.g to increase precipitation by means of 
cloud-seeding; 
an emphasis may be pla.ced on maximizing water conservation 
subject t o the constraint that marginal costs of the water 
conserved does not exceed ·pre-determined cost ceilings 
Industrial and agricultural processes may thus have to be 
modified to economize on the use of scarce W8.ter through, 
for example, recirculation and reclamation techniques. 
Pollution control also becomes important; and 
in most countries water, and particularly water supplied for 
agricultural purposes, is seri ously underpriced. S ince the 
marginal cost of water to consumers is generally below its 
marginal opportunity cost to society, it tends to be wasted 
by being employed in a number of uses where it has a low 
marginal value relative tc its marginal social cost. 1t is 
clear, therefore, that greater conservation of water 
resources can be attained by a realistic pricing policy 
which equates the price paid by consumers to the marginal 
social cost of supplying water. Before a marginal cost 
based pricir.g policy for water can be examined however, 
it is necessary to consider a number of the special 
characteristics of water supply wt.ich would complicate 
the application of such a rule. 
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5:1 :5 SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WATER SUPPLY 
In a number of ways the production and cost conditions facing a water 
utility differ from those assumed in the perfectly competitive model. 
Fig'ure 5:1 illustrates the folle-wing characteristics of the cost 
conditions which typically face a water utility: 
.due to plant i Ldivisibilities the water utility can only 
choose between a finite number of plant sizes. In the 
figure five scales of plant, A, B, C, D and E are 
represente,d; 
there, is likely to be a long run risir..g trend in unit costs 
due to the fact that, in meeting local water requirements, 
a water utility will first. make use of the most readily 
available water sources and then go on tc develop the 
more, distant 'LOd expensive supplemer;,tary supplies; 
(iii) once pla.nt of a particular scale has been installed, the 
short run marginal cost (SMC) of an output increment is 
likely to be substantially below unit cost if plant capacity 
is not fully utilized; as a result the short run averq.ge ·cost 
(~'AC) curve associated with each plant size declines until 
the capacity output level of the plant is reached; and the 
SMC curve will be horizontal at those levels of output over 
which capacity is underutilized and vertical at full capacity 
if it is assumed that unit variable costs are constant and 
that there are tE>chnica.l limitations to plant capacity. It 
is often the case, thou€,'h that unit variable costs tend to 
increase as designed "capacity" is approached and that 
it may be possible to operate, beyond this "capacity" at 
high but not ir.cfinite cost. 
These special features of the cost fL.nctior..s confronting water utilities 
have a significant effect on the applieatior. by water utilities of the 
marginal cost based pricing and investment rules discussed in Chapter 
Two _ as will be shown in a later section. 
It is also often the case that ttere are a number of e;cternalities which 
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are associated with the supply of water. These may be of the nature 
of technologic".l external economies re~ulting fr om physical interde-
pendence in resource use such as would occur when irri€;ation leads 
te the recharging of subsurface aquifE'rs and thereby reduces the 
costs of pumping grcundwater. They may also arise because benefits 
such as flood prevention, salinity control, pollution abatement, and 
recreation arise from water schemes which are not direc tly paid 
for by water consumers. Krutilla and Eckstein have described the 
economic effects of these externalities as follows: 
"At any stage in a river! s sea.ward. movement, 
its conversion into wat.er derivative" may 
entail gains (external Economies) for 
complementary uses, or inflict losses 
(exterr.al diseconomies) for competitive 
uses, outside the intermediary of the 
market. lI.loreover, the gains or losses 
for complementary or competitive uses 
downstream are lJ ot independent of the 
product mix at upstream plants during 
lc.w-flow seasons or adverse hydrolof,"ic 
periods, when common storage must be 
used oubide tr.e rang'e of complementary 
production. Acc ordingly, rather extreme, 
direct intE·rdependence prevails among the 
complementary facilities representing a 
multiple purpose river basin development. "3 
The effect of this interdependence is. to result in a divergence between 
the private and ~ocial valuation of the facters employed in water resource 
development. It wodd therefore be suboptimal to strictly apply a 
marginal cost priCing rule which failed to take acco"nt of extercalities 
Such externalities would have to be incorporated into a pricing rule 
which IE ads to the closest posf;ible approximation between mnrginal 
social benefit and marginal social COst. 
3. Krutilla, J. V. aEd Eckstein, 0., vlultiple purpose river 
basin developmcnt , John Hopkins Press, 1958, p. 70. 
5:1 :6 
378 
~IARKET IMPERFECTIONS ACTIVITIES RELATED TO 
IRRIGATION 
An irrigation project will obviously r esult in a substantial increase 
in the value of the irrigated land. The enterprise, whether public 
or private, whicr. is responsible for tr.e employment of water on 
reclamation farms may fail t o appropriate the returns associated 
witi-. its inveEtment, for the following reas ons: 
(a) 
(c) 
the agricultural processing industries "ho purchase the 
outp ut cf tr.e irrigation farcls are often in a monopsonistic 
market position because of: 
(i) the interrela.tion of resource uses combined with 
indivisibility in production which contribute t o 
internal economies of large scale so that the supply 
area is often not bilS enough to accommodate a large 
number of these enterprises; 
(ii) the conversion of raw materials into processed 
output is ofter. accompanied by substantial weight 
losses so that the supply area is limited to a short 
radius around the processing pla.nt and can there-
fore only accomodate one processor. 
Consequently, the increase in physical yields per acre with 
irrigation, may become a processor's surplus rather than 
a higher financial return to the water enterprise providing 
the advantage. 
When an area is opened up to irrigation, public utilities 
such as the railways which serve the area will benefit 
from a higher volume of freight. Freight rates, however, 
are unlikely to be reduced since they are generally set for 
areas wider tha" that under irrigation, so that these 
"pecuniary external economies tl will accrue to the railways 
and not the water enterprise. 
Irrigation farmers are often in a superior bargaining 
position vis-a-vis the irrigation enterprise due to their 
political power. During agricultural depression periods, 
5:2 
5 :2:1 
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they may therefore rely on the political process to scale 
down water charges while during prosperous periods 
their improved incomes are often capitalized in the value 
of the land and associated investments when oWEerships 
are transfered. This accounts for the fact that irrigation 
water is underpriced in most countries of the world. 
WATER PROVISION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The historical evolution of water resource development in South Africa 
tended to follow the typical path described in the previous secticn witt. 
the scale and regional impact of Vlater projects growing over time. 
There bas also be(m a trend towards the increasing involvement of the 
State in water resource development which has been accommodated 
by a number of changes in the underlying legal framework: 
(ii) 
before Union, the State played a minor role in water 
resource development and the :riparian principle of Roman 
Dutch Law was applied in terms of which the rights to 
the use of water flowing in a public stream are vested 
primarily in the owners of the land adjoining the banks 
of the river. This systerr: usually operates satisfactorily 
in an agrarian economy but becomes increasingly untenable 
once secondary al'd tertiary uses of water become significant; 
at Union, the rr.achinery was created which enabled the 
State to extend its involverr,ent in water resource deyelopment 
by the merging of the irrir;ation activities of the cliffere!:t 
provinces in the Department of Irrig'aticn in terms of the 
Irrigation and Conservation of ,Waters Act No 8 of 1912. 
Although this IE gislation wa,s largely concerned with the 
development of water resources for agrict.ltural purposes, 
it c'id take account of the external effects of water use in 
a partict.lar area by making it an offence to rer.der water 
unfit for irrigation or industrial purposes but the relevant 
penalty clauses were so vague that prosecution was virtually 
irrpossible; 
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(iii) with the South African economy growing rapidly after the 
Second World War, the competition for water supplies 
among ir.dustrial municipal and agricultural interests 
developed to such an extent that periodic ammendments 
t o the Irrigation Act proved to be quite inadequate te 
cope with the chanGing circumstances while tt.e applic-
ation of the riparian principle began to exercise 
increasir,gly detrimental effects. Accordingly the Water 
Act No 54 of 1956 was introduced to modify the ripar-ian 
principle by grantir.g the S tate power t o intervene at any 
time to exercise control over pt.:blic water although it 
still stipulated that ~ as a general principle, the rights to 
use "ater are vested in th e riparian owners. This meant 
that the State ceuld assume responsibility for planning, 
developing ar.d apportioning water in the integratt·d 
manner required during the advanced stage of water 
resource development. 
During the 1960' s there were fears that with the rapid rate of industrial 
development and economic growth in soun. AfricB., the dema.nd for water 
would eventually outstrip available water resources so that South Africa 
wauld be faced with an increasing problem of aridity. Accordingly the 
Viljoen Corr.mission was appointed to investigate ways of preserving a 
balance between wat"r supply and water demand in South Africa. 
5:2:2 THE FINDINGS OF THE VILJOEN COMtviIS::;IC'N 
An important finding of the Commission was tbat: 
"The indications are that about 40 per cent of the Republic's 
potentially usable wa.ter is already in use an.d, if the rate of increase 
of consumption over the 35 years persists, all will have beer, 
committed by the end of the century. ,,4 
4. Republic of South Afric;;., Report of the Comr:.i~sion of 
Enquiry int" Water Matters , R. P. 34/1970, Pretoria, p. 26. 
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In examining the distribution of water resources in South Africa, the 
Commissicn noted that this was highly irregular in a number of 
different respects: 
(a) regional irregularity: water resources are clearly "not 
uniforrr.ly distributed geographically over the Republic. 
About 85 % of the surface runoff originates from 36% of 
the area, located rrainly within a 250 rr.ile wide strip 
along the east coast and a narrew strip along the south 
coast of the subcontinent"; 5 
(b) annual irregubr!!J : droughts occur repeatedly in Soutt, 
Africa and, as a result, riverflow is highly erratic 
compaTed to other countries. The Viljoen Report notes 
that: 
" variability of streamflow, and the fact 
that prolonged droughts cal' occur in many 
regions, means that water must often be 
held _over for a number of years in storage 
reservc:.\ir~. . Evaporation loss can then 
become so high that an increase in storage 
capacity is no longer acccmpanied I::y an 
improvement in the assured yield. To 
secure maximum water yield during drou ght 
the ratio of magnitude of storage provision 
to mean runoff at a darr. site depends on 
climatic c oeditions ai.c.d shape of storage 
basin: for South African rivl';'s this ratio 
usually lies between 1 ~ a!Cd 3,,6; and 
(0) se,;.sonal irregularity: although there is a variety of 
climatic conditions in South Africa, nearly all areas 
experience wet and dry seasons, with the result that 
riverflow varies seasonally and that the construction 
of ~torage reservoirs is therefore essential. 
5 • 
6. 
Ibid., p. 29. 
Ibid., pp. 27-29. 
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Unlike other arid countries ::iouth Africa does not benefit from 
appreciable sources of groundwater since the rock formations in 
South Africa are generally highly impermeable. Furthermore the 
outflow of groundwater would not be available to sustain riverflow 
if it was extracted in large quantities from boreholes. 
With respect to the growth of water consumption, the Viljoen Commission 
fOLCnd that although the annual rate of increase in the use of water 
for irrigation had remained practically constant since 1910, "the 
quantity of water used for industrial and municipal purposes rose 
gradually till about 1933 but since then growth rate has been very 
rapid. ,,7 If this rapid rate of grc~th continues in the future then 
this would "mean that even before the end of the century all available 
water resources will already have beer. committed to meet our total 
8 !leeds." Furthermore although on an aggregate bacis it appears that 
tnere is a real danger of water shortage in ::iouth Afrina, the 
problem is largely regional since tnere are parts of the country 
when: future development is never likely to b" hindered by water 
shortage, while in other areas economic growth is already being 
adversely affected on account of limited water. 
To obviate this problem of future aridity the Viljoen Commission 
emphasizes the necessity of improving the efficiency of water 
management and utilization in the country. The Heport reflects 
an awareness that the problem of aridity is an economic one, and 
that its solution requires an approach based on sound economic 
principles. For example, while the Commission stresses "the need 
for realistic action by the authorities to provide adequate funds 
for the deve.lopment of our water resources,,9 it also recognizes 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Ibid •. , p. 29. 
Ibid., p. 29. 
Ibid., p. 27. 
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that" •.•• due care must nevertheless be exercised to ensure that 
maximum possible benefits accrue from water schemes, that expen-
diture on water development can be justified in the face of demands on 
funds for other purposes and that the necessary balance among the 
industrial domestic and agricultural sectors is achieved and 
maintained. " 1 0 
In examining the various measures to avert the possibility of a water 
crisis in South Africa which were recommended by the Viljoen : .: 
Commission, it is interesting to note that they reflect the various 
characteristics of a water supply policy in an arid country described 
in section 5:1:4 above. For example, although the Commission 
recommends conventional measures to balance water supply and 
demand such as "raising the potentially useable component of surface 
runoff" ,1 1 developing groundwater sources, improving the efficiency 
of water application in irrigation and eliminating "the numerous small 
shallow storage works in which practically all the water evaporates 
and almost no beneficial use is made of the stored water" 1 2, they 
also consider further measures which are particularly applicable 
to arid countries, such as: 
(a) boosting available natural water r esources through 
desalination processes and artificial stimulation of rain; 
(b) maximizing water conservation through variable draft 
operation techniques, reduction of evaporation by providing 
a protective chemical layer on water surfaces and cons-
truction of larger, deeper storage dams; and recirculation 
and reuse of water in production processes; 
10. Ibid.,p.27. 
11. Ibid., p. 32. 
1 2 • Ibid., p. 33. 
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(c) implementing "a realistic water price policy" based on 
5:2:3 
marginal cost pricing principles. This last recommen-
dation is particularly interesting since it reflects a 
recognition that water scarcity is simply an instance of 
the general economic: problem of scarcity, and that the 
price system provides an efficient means of balancing 
supply and demand. It is encouraging to note that the 
Commission reflects a trend to move away from a 
technocratic or "engineering" approach to the problem 
of "meeting water requirements" towards a more market 
orientated approach. 
THE PLANNING OF WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The planning of water resource development is of particular importance 
to the State since, not only may water ",hortages limit overall e c onomic 
growth, but the sectoral or "patial misallocation of water resources 
may prevent economic growth from proceeding in a balanced mar.ner. 
Furthermore as the guardian of the people's' health and recreational 
facilities, it is interested in the intangible benefits that accrue from 
the pla.nned promotion of water resources while as the custodian of 
the country's natural r esources, it is interested in the conservation 
and unimpaired transmission to future generations of the country's 
water resources. 
The Viljoen Report noted a number of deficiencies in the planning of 
water resource development in South Africa: 
('a) The planning of new projects tended to be initiated in an 
ad hoc manner: " ••••• the comprehensive planning of 
the country's water resources development to meet 
growing needs, was neglected. Instead of ascertaining 
for itself which were the most urgent needs and planning 
objectively to meet them, the Department t ended to tackle 
schemes under pressure from outside and frequently only 
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13 
when these had actually become urgent." 
(b) There appears to have been insufficient coordination of 
the functions of the water authority with those of the 
other Government authorities concerned with comprehensive 
economic and physical Planning and with water conservation 
and related use: "As the Department concentrated mainly 
on the provision of water for irrigation, the only departments 
that were regularly consulted •••• were the Departments of 
14 Agriculture and the then Department of Land." 
(c) New projects were generally not evaluated on a sound 
economic basis: "As agriculture was regarded as providing 
social services that to some extent transcended economic 
values, prior cost - benefit studies were seldom undertaken 
to justify new irrigation schemes, although as a matter of 
course sophisticated unit cost analyses were carried out 
for the fixing of tariffs for water from regional water 
1 5 
supply schemes." 
The Viljoen Report therefore made a number of recon, mendations to 
correct these deficiencies: 
(a) Water development proposals should be ictegrated with the 
National Economic Development Programme since "these 
schemes can be effectively pla.nned only after the national 
frarr.ework into which they are to fit has taken shape.,,16 
In tr.is way they "w.ould find their logical place in a 
programmed sequence of priorities. ,,17 
1 3. Ibid. , p. 156. 
14. Ibid. , p. 156. 
1 5 • Ibid. , p. 156. 
16. Ibid. , p. 157. 
17. Ibid., p. 157. 
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(b) Since the cGmprehensive planning of the country's physical 
resources is the task of the Prime Minister's Planning 
Advisory Council, the Viljoen Commission recommended 
that "the Department of Water Affairs should in future 
liaise closely with the Council in regard to all new 
individual projects, on pla.ns for the development of 
river basins and in the regional planning of the country's 
water resources, and that there should be regular consul-
tations between the two bodies with a view to ensuring 
co-ordination of water resource planning with overall 
planning. ,, 18 The Viljoen Commission also recommended 
that to achieve a closer co-ordination of water development 
proposals with national planning objectives a Standing 
Committee for Water Affairs should be set up from among 
its own members, with co-opted members representing 
other official organisations interested in water develop-
ment. The proposed junctions of this Committee were: 
" (i) to co-ordinate the plans of the Department of Water 
Affairs with the overall economic and physical 
planning of the country and to fix general priorities; 
(ii) to promote clc se liasion and co-operation among the 
departments and other organisations concerned with 
the conservation and utilisation of the country's 
water and affiliated resources and with research in 
these fields; 
(iii) to give advice on the implementation of a suitable 
price policy for water. ,,19 This committee would 
thus functions as an effective instrument for the control 
of water resource development and planning. 
18. Ibid., p. 158. 
19. Ibid.,p.158. 
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(c) The Viljoen Commission also came out strongly in favour of 
cost-benefit analysis of proposed water schemes: 
" ••••• economic analyses for the justification of water 
projects should not be based solely on the monetary income 
that could be expected from a scheme but should take into 
account the total socio-economic value of the benefits flowing 
from the scheme, irrespective of whether such benefits are 
paid for directly or not. ••••• no scheme for which the 
benefit - cost ratio is less than unity should be undertaken. 
1n general, a scheme with a high-ratio should enjoy priority 
over one with a low ratio. Such a policy would ensure 
that only economically sound schemes that will be to the 
ultimate advar.tage of the country and yield a positive 
contribution to national development would be constructed. ,,20 
The machinery for detailed cost-benefit analyses of proposed water 
schemes already existed, iL that the 1956 Water Act required that a 
Whito Paper should be tabled before Parliall'ent to obtain its approval 
for any prc'posal in excess of R500 000. 
5:2:4 ADMINISTRATIOl\' OF WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The central role of the State in water resource development in 
South Africa arises from the following factors: 
(a) the peculiar characteristics of water which lend an over-
riding national interest to itE. development and utilization: 
(i) it is a resource that is sc&rce in relation to national 
needs; 
(ii) it is very unevenly distributed bet't!een different 
areas and in relation to different potential users, 
which often requires transraission over long distances; 
20. Ibid., pp. 139-140. 
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(iii) it can normally be effectively stored and distri-
buted only on a very large scale; 
(iv) its storage and distribution necessitates the purchase 
ar.d expropriation of considerable areas of land; and 
(v) its exploitation by one user often has considerable 
external effects on other users; and 
(b) the stage of water resource development wt.ich has been 
reached in South Africa where individual projects often have 
considerable exte-rnal effects so that centralization of authority 
is required to plan, operate and utilize water resources 
in an integrated manner. 
The private sector therefore tends to playa subsidiary role in the 
supply of water services and is mainly involved at the technical level 
of design and construction. The role of local and regional authorities 
is largely restricted to meeting the water needs of urban areas and 
in water distribution. 
The Water- Act No. 54 of 1956 defined the functions of the Department 
of Water Affairs "to provide, build, extend or control water works; 
te obtain water from underground' sources; to assemble information 
about occurrences of water in the _ Republic; to make investigations 
int,. irrigation possibilitie8 and the extent of irrigable land; to 
generate hydroelectric power; to give advice to farmers, irrigation 
boa:::ds, local authorities and others on water works and to aE-si~- t 
with the establishment of works; to take such other steps as may 
be deemed necessary fer the development, control and use o~ water; 
and to give effect to the terms of the Water Act, No 54 of 1956 as 
detailed in section 2 and other sections of the Water Act. ,,21 
21. Ibid., p. 158. 
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It is clear, therefore, that the Department is concerned with both 
professional, scientific and technical work and with administrative 
legal and financial duties. The organizational structure of the 
Department is reflected in Figure 5: 2. As can be seen, the ;:;ecretary 
of Water Affairs directs the affairs of the Department which is divided 
into four branches: the Investigation Branch; the Works Branch; 
the Water Supply Branch and the Administration Branch; with each 
branch being required to fulfil the following duties and responsibilities: 
the Investigation Branch is required to carry out investi-
gations into surface water sources thl:1ough its Hydrological 
Division and into underground water sources through its 
Geohydrology Division, plan water schemes on a national 
basis through its Planning Division and test and control 
the quality of water through its Water Quality Control 
Division; 
(ii) the Works Branch has three division dealing with the civil 
design, the mechanical and electrical design and the 
construction of water works; 
(iii) the Water Supply Branch operates and controls water scheme 
with its Logistics Division compiling data in respect of 
operating factors with a view to the optimization of the 
operation of water schemes, its Production Division 
operating water schemes and controlling consumption and 
its Maintenance Di'lision maintaining operating equipment; and 
(iv) the Administration Branch provides adrr.inistrative auxiliary 
and training services through its General Services, Law 
Administration, Personnel and Functional Training Divisions. 
It is interesting to contrast the organizational structure of the Department 
of Water Affairs with the public transport and electricity undertakings 
described in Chapters 3 and 4, since unlike these undertakings, the 
water authority does not pre,vide the division of authority on a regional 
basis. This is because local water needs are usually met by municipal 
and regional authorities, so that the Department of Water Affairs is 
responsible for the co-ordination of these bodies at a national level as 
well as the supplementary provision of water supplies where they are 
not provided by these bodies. 
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5:3 WATER PRICE POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
5:3:1 SYSTEM OF SUBSIDIZATION 
Although water prices are generally kept artificially low in 
South Africa there is a considerable difference in the degree of 
subsidization of water rates between the agricultural and non-
agricultural sector and also within the agricultural sector 
itself • 
The Viljoen Report found that for government irrigation schemes 
"the revenue from water rates and sales of water covered less than 
one-third of the annual operating expenses.',,22 In effect this 
amounted to a subsidy of 100 per cent on capital costs while operating 
and maintenance costs were subsidized to an average extent of 
about 69 per cent. 
The Viljoen Report also found that "about 29% of the irriga ted area 
in the country was controlled by irrigation boards and taking into 
account loans written-off, these boards in effect e njoyed a 60.2 
per cent subsidy on capital costs from the State but paid in full 
their own running costs. ,,23 
Although the max imum subsidy payable by the Government to private 
irrigators is 331/3% of the capital cost, many private schemes have 
been constructed without subsidy aid so that the subsidization of 
approximately 40% of the irrigable land which is under private 
irrigation, in all probability amounted to less than 30 per cent 
of the capital cost. Furthermore there were no subsidies on 
operating cost. 
22. Ibid., p. 1 44. 
23. Ibid., p. 10. 
391 
It follows that although the policy for irrigation water supply means 
that the irrigation sector of agriculture enjoys a hidden subsidy 
in the form of exceptionally low prices for water, "there is also 
anomalously extreme discrimination against private irrigators 
and those controlled by irrigation boards in favour of irrigators 
under Government water schemes. ,,24 Although the irrigation board 
schen;es and private irrigation works in general embraced the more 
favourable schemes this did not appear to justify the extent of the 
preferential treatment accorded to irrigators on Government water 
schemes in comparison witt. those who have, on their own or through 
irrigation boards, brought their land 'under irrigation. 
In the case of regional water schemes supplying municipal and 
industrial areas the full operating costs were generally covered 
as well as a substantial proportion of interest on capital. The 
Viljoen Commission thus found that revenue from sales of water on 
9 schemes an;ounted on average to about 379% of the running expenses 
incurred on these schemes. Furthermore after deduction of operating 
expenses, the revenue available for meeting interest on capital and 
redemption expressed as a percentage of total capital E,xpenditure 
was 3,88%. It was noted, however, that "in view of the fact that 
not all these schen;e s were yet in full operation and as revenue 
tends to rise with increasinl> consumption,,25, the actual recovery 
of capital and interest was in all probability even more favourable 
than this figure of 3,8 per cent. 
The Viljoen Report accepted this water pricing policy and local 
authorities have continued to e,et their tariffs on the basis of the 
full cost recovery principle. 
24. Ibid., p. 145. 
25. Ibid.,p.144. 
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The Government accepted and the Department of Water Affairs has 
implemented as far as practicable the following recommer.dation by 
the V iljoen Report that, " ••••• in principle, water from Government 
water schemes should be supplied to all consumers, whether for . 
consumption or processing, at a tariff such that after taking account 
of all direct, indirect and intangible benefits, as well as assurance 
of supply, is sufficient to cover capital and operating costs. This 
presupposes that unit prices will be scheme-related as is currently 
the practice, i.e. that a unit price will continue to be recommended 
26 for each scheme." 
In calculating the unit price for each scheme the Department of Water 
Affairs takes into consideration the following factors: 
(i) c·apital cost must be redeemed over the useful life of the 
works; 
(ii) interest on outstanding capital should be charged at the 
r2.te that it costs the State to provide the capital, and 
(iii) the amount of water used does not remain constant from 
year to year, but normally increases as the demand rises. 
It is therefore considered "unreasonable that, while the demand for 
water is low, the initial users should have to pay very high tariffs 
for water to coyer the full annual interest on and redemption of 
capital for facilities that are really intended for enjoyment at a 
later stage when the full yield of the scheme is required. ,,27 The 
Department of Water Affairs has therefore worked out a method of 
calculation of the unit cost of water, according to which a uniform 
cost per unit of water is calculated for the full useful life of the 
26. Ibid., p. 23. 
27. Department of Water Affairs, Annual Report, 1977-1978, 
Pretoria, 19"(8, p. 165. 
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scheme by allowing initial annual deficits, when consumption is low, 
to accumulate for redemption when revenue increases due to increased 
use. The unit cost is then so determined that all expenditure will be 
redeemed by the estimated end of tt.e useful life of the scheme. Witt. 
rising operation costs and extensions to the scherr.e the unit cost 
figure is revised from time te time to conform to the actual demand for 
water and the actual expenditure. The tariffs that must be paid for 
water are based on this calculated unit cost. 
It should be borne in mind when evaluating the profitability of ar.y 
scheme that, according to this system, a scheme may during its 
initial years accumulate large deficits and yet still be in a funda-
mentally sound position. On the other hand a scheme which has 
been operating for many years may appear to be highly profitable 
on the basis of only the annual expenditure on operation and mainten-
ance; whereas it is in fact falling into arrear with the· payment 
. of interest and redemption. 
As far as the practical implementation of a realistic water price· 
policy for Government weter schemes was conce·rned, the Departrr.ent 
of Water Affairs accepted the following recomrrQlldations by the 
Viljoen Commission: 
"(i) that, for each specific scheme of the Department of 
(ii) 
Water Affairs, water inter.ded for domestic or industrial 
use be supplied e.t a price that covers the full cost and 
that the aO'tificial lowering of prices to industries and 
other urban consumers be not permitted by the Department, 
local authorities or other distributors; 
th<..t water rates on r..ew irrigation schemes cover the full 
running cost as well as a percentage of the interest and 
redemption costs .•... 
(iii) that in so far as is consistent with socioeconomic condi-
tions, the water rates on existing Government irrigation 
schemes be gradually raised to c over at least the operating 
costs. 
(iv) that water rates for each irrigation scheme De determined 
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by tr.e Department of Water Affairs after investigation by 
and consultation with the Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Marketing; 
(v) that an annual financial reviews for each Government 
water sC!leme be published. ,,28 
In calculatir.g the cost of Government water schemes there are, 
• 
however, a number of factors which make it impracticable to 
redeem in full all past expenditure. Furthermore in the case of 
Government irrigation schemes it is also considered to be unfeasible 
to redeem current capital and operating costs. Firstly, the 
Department of WateT Affairs considers that the st:.bsidy granted to 
thes(' schemes should not be less than that granted to irrigation 
boards and private schemes ir. terms of the Water Act. This means 
that there shot:.ld be a write-off of at least one-third of ce.pital cost. 
It is also ccnsidered reasonable that the subsidy on capital cost 
should be in broad ag-reement with that applicable to local authorities. 
Apart from these amounts, the Department also considers it unfair 
to recover in full the following costs: 
(i) deficits which accumulated before the e.dopticn of the 
recommendations of the Viljoen Commissior.. on 1 April 
1970 since dt:ring, this period the State had fixed 
tariffs that were too low to recover the full cost. 
Consequently only the actual unredeemed capital 
expenditure of older schemes is carried forward as a 
liability after 1 April 1 970 and all accumulated deficits 
up to and including 31 March 1970 are regarded as 
irrec oV8rable; 
28. R.P. 34/1970, op.cit., p. 23. 
395 
(ii) deficits incurred after 1 April 1970 which arose in 
circumstances where irrigation tariffs could not be 
raised sufficiently to cover operating costs and annual 
interest; and 
(iii) interest accrued on the c2.pital outstanding on the 
completion of each major unit of a large scale project 
such as the Orange River Project, where water is not 
yet being fully used consumptively, is regarded by the 
Department as a contribution to the general development 
of the country and is accepted as irrecoverable. 
The recent performance of Government water schemes is reflected in 
Table 5:1 and Figure 5:3 which set out the operating results for the 
period 1976 to 1981. It should be pointed out that any trer.d analysis 
based on these results will not be wholly correct since revenue is 
not always received in the same year that financial disbursements 
are made. 
With respect to irrigation schemes it can be seen that some progress 
has beer. made towards meeting the recommendation of the Viljoen 
Commission that "water rates on existing Government irrigation 
schemes should be gradually raised to cover at least the operating 
cosU'. ,,29 The percentage of operating costs covered by revenue 
earned on water used for irrigation purposes rose from 20 per cent 
for the year ended 31 st lViarch 1977 to 40 per cent for 1980-1. The 
me.in improvement in the operating performance of irrigation schemes 
OCClJrred during the years 1977-8 and 1978-9, particularly during the 
latter year when revem;e increased by 83,4 per cent and tLe operating 
deficit fell by 29,7 per cent compared to the previous year. The Annual 
Report for 1978-9 of the DepaTtment of Water Affairs attributed this 
29. Departrr.ent of Water Affairs, or .cit., p. 169. 
TABLE 5:1 
SUMMA RY OF OP E RATING COSTS AND REVENUE F O R GOVEf,'NMENT WATER SCHEME S 
OPERATING COSTS REVENUE OPE RA TING SURP L US (DEFICIT 
Ind ustria l Irr i gation Tota l Indus trial Irri gation Total Ind us tria l Ir rigation Tot.al 
& Domestic & Domestic & Domestic 
R10DD R1000 R1000 R1000 R100C R.l000 R l 000 R1000 R1000 
1 976-77 11 043 , 3 8929 , 0 19972 , 3 18481 ,1 1800 , 9 20282 8877 , 3 (7127 , 7) 1749 , 6 
% Increase 
1 977-78 15228 ,3 9610 , 6 24838 , 9 24765 , 6 2429 , 5 27195 , 1 11399 , 0 • (7099 , 1) 4299 , 9 
% Inc r e a.se 37 , 9 7 , 6 24 , 4 34 , 0 34 , 9 34 , 1 28 , 4 0 , 4 145 , 7 
'" 
1 978-79 1860 9 , 8 9723 , 5 28333, 3 33834 , 3 445 6 , 2 38290 , 5 17428 , 4 (4992 , 5 ) 12435 , 9 
'" <'"I % Inc rease 14 ,1 36 , 6 22 , 2 1 , 2 83 , 4 40 , 8 52 , 9 29 , 7 189 , 2 
1 979-80 17275 , 8 10891 , 8 28 167 , 6 37266 , 8 4933 , 8 42200 , 6 19991 (5958 ) 14033 
% Inc reas e 7, 2 12 , 0 0 , 5 10 , 1 10 , 7 10 , 2 14 , 7 19 , 3 12 , 8 
1 980-81 19333 , 3 12922 , 8 32256 , 6 53896 , 6 5486 , 3 59382 , 9 34563 , 3 (7436 , 5 ) 27126 , 8 
"/~ Inc r e ase 11, 9 18 , 6 14 , 5 44 , 6 11 , 2 40 , 7 72 , 9 24 , 8 93 , 3 
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this improvement . 'to the fact that scheduling' waS made more complete, 
that collection of various amot:nts was more strictly controlled a.nd 
that water rates and tariffs were raised. ·However, during the 
ye2>rs 1979-80 and 1980-1 revenue iDcreased at the much slcwer 
rate of about 11 per cent per annum, while the operati.ng deficit 
actually increased dt:ring both these years. This may be an indica-
tion of a return by the Department to the view that irrigation 
farmers merit special treatment in the forrr. of beiDg charged artificially 
low prices fcr water. In a recent investigation of water tariff policy, 
. 30 
the Clc.assen Committee reco!Tl.r-ended that the Department should 
discontinue its practice of gradually reducing the gap between revenue 
and running ccsts on irriJation s(;henes since it was considered that 
this would place an undesirable burden on i=igation farmers. It can 
be seen that this represents something of a reaction again~t the trend 
towards a more cost _. orientated t~riff policy ",hich was supported by 
the Viljoen Comp ·ission. 
Table 5:2 indicates the revenue/operating cost ratio for eacr. individual 
irrigation scherr.e which generated revenue during the year 1980-1 . 
It thus excludes all schemes which did "ot generate any revenue 
dt:rir g this year. It can clearly be see·n from this t.able that there 
are cop.siderable variations around the average revenue/operating 
cost ratio of 42 per c€,nt. For example the van der Kloof Canals 
have a ratio of 206,5 per cer.t whereas it is only 4,7 per CEnt for 
Doorn River. This i:; also demonstrated by the fact that even if 
one exclude" ~.he particularly high vall.e for Krokociilpoort, the 
star.da.rd deviation still obtains the very high value of 41 ,9. The 
fact that the application of the Viljoer. Commission' s reCOPlmen 
dations to schemes built after 1970 had led to an improvement in 
30. Departement van Omgewing, Verslag va" die Komitee 
van Ondersoek na die Prlsbeleid met betrekking tot die 
Bepaling van Watertariewe , Pretoria, Maart 1982. 
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their operating performance is reflected by the fact that the average 
revor:ue operating cost ratio fO'r schemes built after 1970 is 68,8 
per cent while that for schemes built before 1970 is 36,1 per cent. 
FurtLermore 9,5 per cent of the schemes built before 1970 earn 
operating surpluses as compared to 23,5 per cent of schemes built 
after 1970. The improved results of the newer schemes have occurred 
despite the fa,ct that a number of these schemes are not yet being 
used to ft'll capacity and can therefore be expected to incur large 
deficits acc ording tc tr.e method of unit cost oalculation employed by 
the Department. There should thus be a greater variation in the 
operating results of the newer schemes and this is borne out by the 
fact that the standard deviation of the ratios for scbemes built after 
1970 is 56,1 whereas it is 28,3 for schemes built before 1970 
(excluding Krokodilpoort). 
With re"pect to water used for industrial and domestic purpose" it 
can be seen from Table 5:1 and Figure 5:<1 that the revenue earned 
on Government water schemes has been making an increasing 
contribution towards the recov,n'y of capital costs. Thi" is in line 
with the Department's policy that the rate :set for each scheme should 
cOover tte unit cost of the scheme. There was a particularly impressive 
improvement in the performance of industrial and domestic water 
schemes during the year 1980-1 when revenue increased by 44,6 
per cent compared to t he prE'vious year while the operating surplus rose 
by 72,9 per cent from , R2 million to R34, 6 million. 
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TABLE 5:2 
REVENUE/OPERATING COST PERCENTILES ON IRRIGATION 
SCHEMES 1980-81 
A. IRRIGATION SCHEMES BUILT PRIOR TO 1970 WHICH 
SHOULD RECOVER AT LEAST MAINTENANCE AND 
OPERATING COSTS 
% 
1 . Albasini Dam 26 , 4 
2. Blood River 2 1, 5 
3. Bushmans River 8 , 6 
4. Buffeljachts River 65 , 8 
5. Buffalo River 13, 5 
6. Doorn River 4, 7 
7. Duivenhoks River Dam 40 , 3 
8. Elands River (Lindleyspoort Dam) 12 , 2 
9. Ele.nds River (Rust de Winter Dam) 24 , 0 
10. Gamka River 49 , 4 
11 • Hluhluwe Rive r 155 ,1 
12. Kaffe rkuils Rive r 9 , 7 
1 3 • Kat River 65 , 0 
14. Kingna River 68 , 3 
1 5 • Klein Marico River 1 1 , 3 
16. Klippaat i<iver 58 , 6 
17. Konings River 56 , 25 
1 8. K orente il.iver 35 , 0 
19. Koste i<ivE'r 19 , 6 
20. K rokodilpoort 1330 , 5 
21 • Crocodile River (Hartebeespoort Dam) 37 , 5 
22. Leeu River 27 , 5 
23. Leeu Gamka Dam 113 , 7 
24. Magalakwin Rive r 47 , 0 
25. Mapochsgronde 15 , 7 
26. lvlnyamvubu River 5 , 1 
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TABLE 5:2 (Continued) 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31, 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41 0 
42 . 
B. 
43. 
44. 
Mooi River 
Njelele River 
Ohrigstad River 
OUfants River (Loskop Dam) 
Orange River (Buchuberg Dam) 
Orange River (Vioo1sdrift) 
Por..go1a River 
Rhenoster River (Koppies Dam) 
Riet River 
Sand River 
Sane-Vet River 
Schoonspruit 
Sterk River 
Tarka River 
Va".l River 
Vaalharts Irrigation Scheme 
IRRIGATION SCHEMES BUILT AFTER 1970 
Brand River 
Gamtoos River (Paul Sauer Dam) 
Great Letaba (Fanie Botha Dam) 
Crocodile River (Bushveld) 
Modder and Low e r Riet P..iver 
Nwanedzi River 
OUfants H.iver (Stompdrift Dam) 
46,3 
143 , 2 
26,8 
52 ,6 
21 ,5 
54 ,9 
95 ,5 
13 , 9 
19 ,8 
12 , 9 
38 , 2 
32 , 2 
19 ,6 
8 ,6 
45 ,3 
58 , 9 
9 , 9 
45,0 
52 ,5 
27 , 4 
8 ,0 
68 , 7 
48 ,6 
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Orange River (Kakamas) 
Orange River (Upington Islands) 
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Sanddrift River 
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Witwaters River 
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Schemes, 1975-76 to 1980-81 
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5:3:2 WATER RATES ON GOVERNMENT IRRIGATION SCHEMES 
The prices of water for agricultural purposes on Government irrigation 
schemes are fixed in various ways for different agricultural purposes 
and may fluctuate not only from scheme to scheme, but -.also from 
year to year at the same scheme. An indica.tive water price in the 
form of a basic water lE'vy is normally stated in the relevant White 
Paper. These prices normally vary cons;derably from scheme to 
scheme according to the potential yield of the irrigated land. The 
highest 'Water levies are normally indicated for those schemes which 
are expected to have the greate.st potE,ntial yield. 
Section 66 of the Water Act endows the Minister with the power to 
levy water rates and to increase or decrease them from time to 
time. These levies are announced, as necessary, by proclamation 
in the Governr, er.t Gazette. The water rates are usually adjusted 
downwards during difficult drought periods as a measure of relief 
for irrigation farmers. 
Table '5:3 below is reproduced from the Viljoen Report. 31 It 
presents data on water rates on three irrigation sche .o.les which 
typify the structure of water prices prev&ilin& on government schemes 
in South Africa. 
31 • R. P. 34/1 970, op. cit., p. 149. 
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TABLE 5:3 DATA ON IRRIGATION SCHJ;;MES, 1966-7 
SCHEME 
Vaalharts Hartbeespoort Pongola 
Average water rate paid, R 1 ,91 R 1,83 R 4,70 
per morgen, 1966-7 
Operating and maintenance 
costs per morgen, 32 
R 1,30 R 6,73 R 4, 85 
1966-7 
Interest on capital per R 29 , 0 R 28,40 R 21,80 
morgen 
Average water rate as 26,2% 27,1% 
percent£.ge of annual 
operating and maintenance 
costs 
Gras s return per rr:orgen R296 R 395 R 366 
Cost of frod uction R162 R 237 R 218 
(excluding interest) 
Net return R134 R 158 R 148 
Avera/;'e water rates as 0,65% 0 , 46% 1 , 18% 
percentage of gross 
return 
Operating and mainter.ance 2 , 46% 1 ,70% 1,33% 
costs as percentage of 
g-ross return 
Net inc aree per predomi- R402 R1896 R0460 
nent size plot. 
32. 1 marger, is equivalent to 0,857 hectares. 
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Table 5:3 indicates that the st:::-ucture of rates between the different 
schemes failed to reflect their relative costs. For example, 
although the Pongola scheme had the lowest operating and maintenance 
costs, the farmers involved in this scheme are, at the same time, 
charged the highest water rates. 
In a survey of the tariff schedules proposed in the White Papers 
which were published in respect of government irrigation schemes 
proposed during the period 1979-83, the following was found: 
In most schemes the fa,rmer is limited to a fixed annual 
quota of water consumption; 
(ii) In about half the schemes the ta.riff is charged as a flat 
rate per hectare; 
(iii) In the other schemes the tariff is set acc ording to a sliding 
sCRle with a minimum quota being charged at a flat rate per 
hectare and additional units of consumption being charged 
at a rate per unit of water supplied. Three examples of 
thi~. sliding sca1e, viz., Upington Islands, Elands River 
ane. Vaalharts, are given ir· TablE. 5:4 below. 
TAB,!-E 5:4 
UPIKGTON ISLANDS 
Total annual quota 
Fixed rate up to 500 m3 
Variable rate for 501 m3 to 1000 n? 
Variable rate for 1001 m3 to 1500 m3 
ELANDS RIVEJ-{ 
Tot.al annual quota 
Fixed rate up to 2500 m3 
Variable rate 2501 - 5000 m3 
Variable rate 5001 - 6200 m3 
1500 m3/ha 
R20/ha 
2c/m3 
4c/m3 
6200 [03/ha 
R6,50/ha 
O,35c/m3 
0,45c/m3 
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:fABLE 5:4 (continued) 
VAALHARTS 
Total annual quota 
Fixed rate up to 3800 m3 
V&riable rate 3801-5800 m3 
Variable rate 5801 m3 _ 7700 IT,3 
7700 m3/ha 
R17,00/ha 
0,49c/m3 
0,65c/m3 
Although the Viljoen Commission indicated its approval of this type 
of sliding scale and recommended its extension to other schemes 
on the grounds that it encouraged ",ore efficient use of water by 
acting as a disirccentive against overirrib'ation, the Claassen 
Committee33 criticized this incremental block rate pricing policy 
on the grounds that it discriminated against those users who 
consume their full quota of water. It considered that if users do 
not consume ·their full quotas, the surplus water has no alternative 
uses and is therefore ' :imply wasted. 
5:3:3 WATE1~ RJ,TES ON MUmCIFAL AND INDUSTRIAL WATEF~ 
SCHEMES 
An average cost pricing policy appears to have bee n adopted for 
municipal and industrial water sc hemes. The following factors are 
usually taken into account in cdculating unit costs: 
(a) interest on ar..d r.,uemption of capit.al over the useful life 
of the scheme; 
(b) annt:almaintenance costs; 
33. Departement van Omgewing, op.cit., p. 6. 
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(c) supervision and labour e xpenses; 
(d) costs of chemicals for water treatme,.,t and power supplies 
r"r pumping water; 
(e) contributions to contingency and replacement funds; and 
(f) anticipated demand for water; this is an important aspect 
of unit cost computation since during the first few years 
of a scheme the proportion of delivery capacity used is 
relatively small since it rises gradually over a number 
of years to full demand. 
If the full annual costs of a water supply scheme are required to 
be paid off over a number of years this means that during the initial 
years, the tariff should be relatively high when water demand is 
comparatively low, but that it diminishes to a much lower figure as 
water consumption rises. To obviate such undesirable fluctuations 
in water rates, the Department of Water Affairs normally computes 
a more or less constant tariff over the life span of the sche me. 
Effectively this means that losses accumulate during the initial 
years when water consumption is low but that they :are "liquidated il!.later 
years when water consumption is at a higher level. Consequently, 
during the early years it is necessary to have additional working 
capital over and above that required for tr.e construction and 
operation of the scheme, in order to finance the accumulated losses. 
In view of tl",is, the Viljoen Commission recommended that instead of 
subsidizing water rates charged on regional water schemes the 
government should grant the local authorities loans to provide 
working capital during the early years of their water scheme s. 
The basic water rate is calculated for each scheme separately taking 
account of anticipated consumption, capital costs , extent of the 
water distribution system, degree of purification, pumping costs, 
and Elstimated costs of administration and maintenance according to 
the type of schelT.e. Where only relatively small quantities of water 
are drawn from an irrigation scheme for industrial or other purposes, 
a uniform basic rate based on costs averaged over a large number 
of schemes is universally applied. 
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The Viljoen Commission34 compared the water rates charged in the 
different cities and towns in South Africa and found that while there 
were not substantial differences in the water rates charged in the 
main urban centres of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria, Port 
Elizabeth and Bloemfontein, there are also a few smaller towns 
such as Calvinia, Ugie, Louis Trichardt, Carolina, Brand vlei 
and Springbok where tariffs are much higher. 
The Viljoen Commission alE.o predicted that: 
" ••.• water tariffs in most urban areas will 
haye to rise with increasing costs of water 
supply as water has to be brought in over 
greater and greater distances .••• Rising 
prices must however, be recognized as a 
normal developrr.ent and at the present 
stage are by no means so high that general 
subsidisation can be justified as a means 
of maintaining reasonable health and living 
standards. "35 
The regulations of the Departrr.ent cio, however, make provision for 
a subsidy on capital cost according to a sliding scale if the unit cost 
. 3 
of water exceeds 22c/m for towns with a popUlation of more than 
5000 white inhabitants. 
It is important to note that the price charged for water supplied to 
ir ,dustrial and domestic consumers is based on the accounting costs 
of the individual scheme . No provision is made for inflation although 
the unit cost of water is revised from time to time to t~ke account of 
cost increases above t.he levels estimated. The interest charge for 
each scherr.e is, howeyer, calculated by applying the Treasury interest 
rate to the historical c<.pital cost of the scheme and will only rise 
during the life of the scheme if there are increasE's in the Treasury rate. 
34. Ibid., p . 152. 
35. !bid., p. 152. 
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Since the capital costs of wa.ter scheme s tend to rise over time the 
unit capital cost of older scherr.es will tend to be lower than that for 
newer schemes and this is likely to cause the price of water to vary 
from scheme to scheme. In cases where one consumer such as the 
Rand Water Board is supplied by a number of schemes of varying 
ages, any increment in consumption will not be charged with the unit 
cost of the newest scheme but the price of water will be set to cover 
a weighted average of the unit costs of all the schemes. The Claassen 
Committee, however, has recommended. that users should be charged 
the incremental average cost of the most recently constructed scheme. 
The implementation of this recommendation would imply that the water 
authorities devise some IT.en.od of attributing the costs of new schemes 
to the users "responsible" for their construction. 
5:4 
5:4: 1 
A. 
EVALUATION OF EXISTING WATER PRICE POLICY 
GOVERNMENT IRRIGATION SCHEMES 
DEGREE OF SUBSIDIZATIO~ 
According to the basic principles of economic efficiency 
discussed in the first two chapters of this thesis, an 
optimal pricing policy will cause the cost to a consumer 
of an additional unit of consumption to reflect the cost 
to society of supplying that extra unit. Now, if this 
marginalist principle is applied to water pricing it 
r.leans that, in the absence of externalities, the price 
should not be set below the l evel of running costs, since 
even when capacity is underutilized, these expenses must 
still be incurred to provide an additional unit of consumption, 
In South Africa there is c lear evidence that the water 
supplied from goverment irrigation schemes is substan-
tially underpriced as, on average, water rate,s do not 
cover running costs. This artificially low water price 
tei1ds to encourage excessive wa.ter consumption in the 
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sense that water is put to uses with a value to society 
below the opportunity cost of the resources committed 
to these uses. 
Not only is the artificial underpricing of water I:ot 
conducive to the efficient utilization of this scarce 
commodity, but it leads also to the overpricing of the 
complementary production factor, namely the soil. This 
is a clear hindrance to efficiency in irrigation farming 
since it hampers H.e .optimum combination of these two 
production factors. The Viljoen Cornmission was aware 
of this proble·m as can be seer. from its sta.tement that: 
" ••.• in the opinion of the commission, the 
position can be rectified only by establishing 
realistic prices H.at recognize the inherent 
scarcity of goth fact ors in the national 
economy. ,,3 
If water is underpriced, it follows that water requirements 
will grow at a. faster rat., H.an if water prices were set 
according to marginal cost pricing principles, with the 
result that the need to invest in new capacity will arise 
sooner. The cost of bringing forward investment projects 
in this sector represents another loss to soc iety of a 
sub-economic pricing. policy. 
Where external economies are associated with the supply 
of water fc·r irri gation purposes, it may be optirr al to s e t 
pricE:, below unit running costs when capacity is under-
utilized, since price may not reflec t all the marginal 
net social benefit obtained from an additional unit of 
36. Ibid., p. 11. 
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consumption. This may often be the case where an 
irrigation scheme serves a number of other uses which 
are not explicitly charged for, such as flood control, 
pollution abatement or recreation. There is little to 
suggest, however, that the subsidization of water rates 
in South Africa is in any way directed at causing prices 
to reflect marginal social benefits. The pattern of 
subsidization varies -from scheme to scheme a;-.d is charac-
terized by extreme discrimination against irrigation boards 
and private irrigators in fa.vour of farmers on g-overnment 
irrigation scheme~ ,which is ur.likely to be related in any 
way to the external benefits associated with water use or. 
these different schemes. In fact the degree of subsidi-
zation appears to be related to an evaluation of the merit 
of the irrigation fa.rmers on a scheme in terms of their 
need for statE, assistance. Subsidization therefore serves 
the redistributive rather than efficiency objective of 
economic policy. 
The Viljoen Commission was highly critical of the fact that 
the subsidization of the irrigation sect.or by charging 
subec onomic water rates is largely hidden from the public 
"under the current budgeting system, whereby the revenue 
fI-om sales of water is credited to general rever.ue and no 
separate record is kept of interest and ce_pital redemption 
for individual schemes ,,37 and that no attempt was being made 
to conduct intersectoral investi,;ations of the effects of this 
subsidization on the national economy . There is therefore 
notting to suggest that the policy of water price discrimi-
nation in the irrigation sector was being harmonized with 
regional policy objective s . The Commission therefore 
• 
37 • Ibid., p. 1 46 • 
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recommended that in motivating the schemes, there should 
be a shift in emphasis from "a political-agricultural-
economic orientation to a national-economic orientation 
(since) ••• application of a policy of price discrimination 
or of subsidization of certain sectors of the national 
economy has, apart from socio-political implications, 
an economic functicn requiring consultation with the 
relevant departments such as the three Departments of 
Agrict;lture and the Departments of Industries and of 
Financ e . ,,38 
Although the Department has accepted the recommendations 
of the Viljoen Commission that for irrigation schemes 
constructed before 1970, water tariffs should be raised 
until revenue coyers operating costs, and that tt.e revenue 
generated from wzter supplied by schemes ccnstructed 
after 1970 should al.o make some cc·ntribution to capital 
cost.s, Table 5:2 indicates that. operating deficits are 
still incurred on the majority of water schemes. It is 
clear, then, that there still existE a substantial degeree 
of over-subsidization and that the policy of raising tariffs 
to rec!uce operating deficits should be continued in the 
interests of economic efficiency. The Claassen Committee, 
howevE'r, ha,' recommended that the objective of economic 
efficiency should be subordinated to the socio-political 
objective of er,couraging the development of the agricultural 
sector by granting special assistanCE> to irrigation farmers 
in the form of low wat.er prices. If this recommendation is 
is accepted by the Department it should be borne in mind 
that any special treat,-"cnt of irrigation farmers in this 
manner does have a cost to the economy in the form of a loss 
of economic efficiency. 
• 
38. Ibid., p. 146. 
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It is now necessary to evaluate the manner in which rates 
are actually charged to individual farmers on government 
irrigation schemes. 
B. STRUCTURE OF WATER RATES 
In section 5:3 it was shown that there are basically two 
types of tariff schedule used for pricing irrigation water 
in South Africa: 
(i) a flat rate charged for a fixed quota of water 
consumption; and 
(ii) a flat rate charged for a minimum quantity of 
water demanded followed by unit price increases 
as consumption increases over discrete ranges. 
On water schemes where only a flat rate is charged, the 
marginal price of water is effectively zero. The price of 
water cannot therefore be used as an instrument to induce 
irrigators to economize on water consumption. The 
charging of a flat rate may thus be viewed as a means of 
generating revenue rather than as a tool for regulating 
demand. 
On w2ter schemes where a flat rate policy (F RP) is pursued, 
water consumption is usually limited to the capacity of the 
schemes by the specification of a maxima quota for each 
individual irrigator. The effect of a FRP and the imposition 
of quotas on the efficiency of production call be illustrated 
by means of insoquant analysis as in Figure 5:5. It is 
assumed that tt.ere are only two irrigators A and B . The 
quantities required by A and B of all factor inputs other 
than water are denoted by ya and yb respectively. The 
quantities of water required by A and B are denotEd by xa 
and xb respectively. If a F RP is pursued then the isocost 
lines for consumers A and B will be the lines Ca and Cb 
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which are horizontal since the price of x is zero. After 
paying the water levy, it is assumed that the farmers 
will spend the rest of their incomes on the other factor 
inputs, in this case buying ya1 and yb1 respectively. If 
no quotas are imposed the irrigators will demand the 
quantities xa1 and xb1 wbich are related to the equilibrium 
points ea1 and eb1 at whict the isoquants Qa1 and Qb1 are 
tangential to the respective isocost lines. The imposition 
of quotas, however, results in both farmers reducing their 
water requirements to the specified maximum levels xar 
and xbr respectively. It is assumed that the sum of these 
two quotas is equal to the maximum capacity of the water 
scheme •. 
Now, instead of rationing demand to capacity by means of 
quotas the water authority could set its water rates such 
that demand could rationed to the level of maximum capacity. 
In Figure 5:5 the isocost line change to Ca I and Cb' as a 
result oj' the abandonment of the flat rate and the charging 
of a positive unit price for water, with the result that new 
equilibrium positions are attained at ea3 and eb3 with the 
quantities of water demanded by A and B, xa2 and xb2 , 
being such that their sum equals the maximum capacity of 
the water scheme, in cther words, 
xa2 + xb2 = xar + xbr 
It can be seen that if watEr is rationed by price rather than 
by quotas, the quantities required by individual farmers 
will vary according to their willingness and ability 
to pay for water. In this case farmer A will USE an amount 
greater than the fixed quota while consumer B will use 
an amount less than the fixed ·quota. According to the 
condition for Paretian efficiency in production discussed 
in Chapter 1 , the quota system is likely to be inefficient 
since it is unlikely to cause water to be allocated between 
irrigators such that the marg·inal rates of technical 
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substitution between water and other commodities will be 
equalized. If the rates at which the irrigators are prepared 
to substitute water for other commodities differ, then the 
reallocation of water between them could result in a net 
gain for one of them arrd no loss to the other provided 
the gainer fully compensated the loser for any loss he might 
suffer. Under a quota system, however, this mutually 
berreficial exchange could not take place. It therefore 
appears that the non-price method of rationing used by 
some water schemes may be inefficier.t. 
The validity of this conclusion can be shown to depend :)0 the assumption 
that viater is continuously substitutatle for other factor inputs. It 
rr.ay, however, be the case that irrigators can only use a single 
production process which combines water with other inputs in fixed 
proportions for each level of output. The implications of fixed factor 
I'roportions for water pricir.g policy can be analysed in terms of the 
simple model illustrated in Figure 5 ::6. The slope of the process ray 
JR indicates the fixed proportion in which water can be combir,ed with 
other inputs to produce any given output level. If the quota is set 
equal to the fixed water requirerr:ent, oxr, for the output level indic ated 
by the isoquarrt ~r, then it can be seen that even if water is rationed 
by price rather than by quota, the sar.1e quantity of water will still te 
required. It follows that in this fixed proportions case a marginal. 
c ost-based water pricing policy will proYide no greater incentive 
for irrigators to increase the efficiency of their water uti:lization than 
a s yste m of flat water rates and quotE..s • 
. The problem of whett.er irrigation farme rs can c·hoose tetweer, irrigation 
techniques involving different ir.tensities of water r.se was discussed 
with Departr.lent officials who conceded that there may be a limited 
number of irrigation processes available although they were sceptical 
that changes in the price of water relative to the prices of other illPuts 
could induce irrigators to adopt less water-intensive techniques. 
eigure 5: 7 whicr. represents an intermediate case between the extremes 
of perfect factor Eubstitutatility illustrated in Figure 5: 5 and fixed 
factor proportions shaWl; in Figure 5:6, may thus be the closest 
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approximation to the actual set of technical opportunities facing a 
typical irrigation farmer. It can be seen in this figure that there 
are three processes available to the irrigator which combine water 
with the other inputs in the proportions indicated by the slopes of 
the procHss rays OR, OS and OT. If a flat rate is charged· for the 
fixed quota of water Oxr, the process OS will be used. However, 
even if the price of water is allowed to rise to Px to ration demand 
to the capacity of the scheme this will not be sufficient to change 
I · f . h' Px1 t' h h .. . re ahve actor prlces to t e ratlO Py - at w !lC t e 1rrlgator 15 
induced to switch to the less water-intensive irrigation process 
indicated by the ray OR. Thus althougt ·it is possible for process 
substitution to ta.!ce place it takHS significant shifts in relative 
input prices to bring this about. 
A greater degree of flexibility has been introduced ir·to the quota 
system of allocating water Of> those schemes where the supply of 
water has bHen charged according to a sliding scale as described 
in the previous section. Table 5:4 indicates how this sliding 
scale has been applied by the Departrr.ent for the Upington Islands, 
Elancls River and Vaalharts Governme nt irrigation scher.1es. It can 
ce seen that a total annual quota has beer. fixed for each scher.1e. 
Thus the maximum level of water consumption is limited to 1500 m3/Ha., 
6200 ",3/Ha and 7700 m3/Ba for the Upington Islands, Elands River 
and Vaalt.arts schemes respectively. It is therefore evident that 
the Department uses these maximum quotas, rather than pricirg 
policies, as tr.e means to ration weter consumption to the level of 
existing c&.pacity. It follows that there is still likely to be a certain 
measure of inefficiency with respect to the allocaticn of water between 
diffe rent consumers. 
The sliding scale of water tariffs does, however, act. to er:ccur:J.g'e 
water conservation by irrigation farmers in a manner which varies 
between each individual irrigating farmer according tc the quantity 
of water he demands. As showr; in Table 5:4, for e2.ch water scherr.e, 
the total annual quota. is divided into three blocks which are each 
charged for at a different r~te: 
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(i) The first block is charged out at a flat rate per hectare. 
(ii) The second block is charged at a. rate per cubic metre 
of water consumption. 
(iii) The third block is charged at a rate per cubic metre of water 
Consu!Ilption which is higher than that charged in (ii). 
If the quantity d., :,· landed by an irrigation farmer falls within the 
first block, then he will pay for his water at a. flat rate so that the 
marginal price of " ... ter will be zero a.nd tt.ere will be no incer.tive 
for hirr. to take measures which conserve water. If, however, the 
level of consumption by an irrigation farmer falls within either the 
second or third block, then he will be charged for each unit of 
w"ter consumed so that there will be a.n incentive for him to introduce 
water saving measures. This incentive will cle,trly be greater for 
irrigators charged at the third block rate rather than the second 
block rate. 
This can be illustrated by comparing tbe percentage savings in the 
cost of water per hectare for each scheme which result,-, when water 
consumption is reduced by ten per cent from the upper limits of the 
first, second and third blocks of the total annual quota for the 
following types of water pricing policy: 
(i) a flat rate (FR) policy under which a flat n .te i~. charged 
per hectare; 
(ii) a const"nt rate (CR.) policy aceore'ing to which a constant 
unit price is charged per c ubic metre of water consumption; 
ar.d 
(ii i) an increasing t10ck rate (IER) policy accorC:ing to which 
water is currently being charged on these schemes. 
To make this compari" ,,:n it is a.ssumed that on ea.ch of the schemes 
the tetal cost of purchasing the total annual quota will be the 
same re gar(ll~, ss of which pricing policy is adopted. The alternative 
t •. riff schedules for the same three schemes as selected before 
are set out in TablE' ~:5 below. 
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TABLE 5:5 
UPINGTON ISLANDS ELANDS RIVER VAALHARTS 
Total Annual Quota 1500 m3/Ha 6200 m3/Ha 7700 m3/Ha 
Flat Rate R50,00/Ha R20,65/Ha R39,80/Ha 
Constant RatE/m3 3,33c/m3 0,33c/rr? 0,52c/m3 
Increasing block rate 
First block 20 6,50 17,00 
Second block 10 8,75 9,80 
Third block 20 R50,00/Ha 5,40 R20,65/Ha 13,00 R39,80/Ha 
The results of the comparbon are set out in Table 5:6 
TABLE 5:6 
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CON;3EEVATION INCENTIVES OF 
DIFFERENT PRICING POLICIES 
PERCENTAGE DECREASE IN COST/HECTARE 
FIRST B L OC K ~~C»ND BLOC K THIRD B LO CK 
CR FR IBR CR Fi{ IE R C li. F R IBR 
U pington Islands 
Elands River 
Vaalharts 
10 
10 
10 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
10 0 
10 0 
10 0 
6, 7 
11, 5 
10 , 6 
10 
10 
10 
o 
o 
o 
12 , 0 
13 , 5 
14 , 2 
The following observations can be made about the results of the above 
the table: 
(i) a,: irrigation farmer will experieGce no savings in the cost 
of water per hectare if he introduces conservation measures 
when water is charged at a flat rate per hectare. For 
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example, if a flat rate of R20, 65/Ha is charged on the 
Elands River scheme, farmers will continue to pay this 
amount to the water authority regardless of how for they 
are able to reduce their consumption below the total 
annual quota. of 6200 m3/Ha; 
(ii) if an irrigation farmer introduces a measure whict. results 
in the reduction of his water consumption when water is 
charged out at a constant unit price per cubic metre of 
consumption ther. he will be a ble to reduce the cost per 
hectare of water consl1mption in equal proportion to the 
quantitative water saving. This can be seen in Table 
5:6 where in all cases a ten per cent reduction in watEr 
consl1mption results in a ten per cent saving in water 
costs; and 
(iii) the conservation incentives unc.er an IBR policy clearly 
vary according to tte block into which the quantity 
demanded by the individual irrigator falls. For example 
if an irrigation farmer on the ElaEds River scheme reduces 
his water consumption by ten pe r cent from 2500 m3/Ha to 
2250 m3/Ha he will continue to pay the flat rate of R6,50/Ha 
and thus will enjoy no savir: g in water costs. If t.e reduces 
his consurr.ption level from 5000 m3/Ha to 4500 m3/Ha the 
cost of water per hectare will fall by 11,5 per cent froer. 
R15,25 to R13 ,50/Ha although the incentive to conserve 
watpr will be greater if consumption is reduced from 
6200 m3/Ha to 5580 m3/Ha since in this case the cost of 
water per Hectare will fall by 13,5 per cent fI ·om R20, 65 
to R17 , 86 per hec tare . 
It may thus be concluded that the incrementa.l block rate policy 
currently being adopted on some water schemes may be an effective 
means of curbing excessive consumption and encouraging water 
conservation. Whether this leads to an improvement in economic 
efficiency, however, depends very much on whether the water saved 
a.s a result of this pricing policy has alternative uses. It may actually 
be economica.lly inefficient to encourage farmers to reducH their 
consumption below their maximum quotas if this water saved simply 
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flows off to the sea. If this is the case then, as the Claas"n Committee 
has pointed out, an IBR policy would discriminate a.gainst la.rge users 
wt,o consume their full quotas. If such discrirdnation is to be avcided 
i.t must be possible for the surplus water to be either resold to 
irrigation farmers or reallocatE.-d to industrial or domestic uses. 
Where the surplus water has alternative uses, it follows that since 
water is becoming an increasing1y scarce resource in South Africa 
it may be desirable to extend the applicatic.n of the IBR policy to 
government water schemes where water is currently being charged 
out at a flat rate. In conclusion though it should be noted that ratio-
ning water through price is a prieri more efficient than the quota 
system currently being used although there are a number of practical 
problems which must be considered before an optimal pricing policy 
is introduced. These will be discussed in section 5:5. 
C. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS 
As was explained in Chapter Two no evaluation of a pricing policy 
according to the principles of welfare economics is complete if it 
is only evaluated from the viewpoint of economic efficiency. It is 
also necessary to consider the effect of the policy on the distri-
bution of income in the country. It is obvious that the construction of 
an irrigation scheme will substantially raise the value of the land 
settled under irrigation. Table 5:7 is reproduced from the Viljoen 
Report 39 and shows how the average cost per morgen of irrigated 
l a nd can be deduced. 
39. Ibid.,p.150. 
TABLE 5:7 
A. Cost of unirrigated 
land, say 
B. Cost of irrigation 
scheme per morgen 
C. Preparation, debushing 
and levelling of land 
D. Interest on investment 
f or period until 
income is earned 
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Schemes corr.prising 
diversion we~rs 
and canals without 
storage 
R 50 
R750 
R1 00 
R 50 
R950 
Schemes with water 
supply secured by 
storage 
R 50 
R120 0 
R 100 
R 75 
R1425 
At the time this report was published, the prices paid for developed 
irrigated land varied from R800 to R1500 per morgen depending on 
the locality and crops that were grown. This implies that the higher 
price of the irrigation land is mainly attributable to the cost of the 
irrigation scheme that supplies the wetter. If society has no preference 
bet,,' een the ·.lsers and suppliers of irrigation water, then it would 
clearly be equitable if the increase in land value were to accrue to the 
water supplier . The water rates charged on these schemes are too 
low, however, to appropriate the increase in land value to the water 
supplier and this means that this appreciation in value accrues to the 
farmers who owned the land at the time the scheme was introduced. 
They realize this value as a capital gain when they sell the land. 
Unless the original landowners are regarded as a particularly 
deserving section of the community, it would seem ttat the current 
pricing policy results in an arbitrary distribution of income which 
cannot be conClusively justified on the grounds of equity. 
• 
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It may be cencluded that the pricing pelicy fer irrigatien water 
which existed at the tirne .of Viljeen Repert suffered frem seme 
serieus deficiencies accerding te beth efficiency and equity criteria. 
The Viljeen Cemmissien IS recommendatien that this pricing pelicy be 
changed to take account of the relative scarcity of water and soil 
resources in South Africa can thus be considered t.o be justified. 
5:4:2 MUNICIPAL AND INDUSTRIAL WATER SCHEMES 
As described in the previous section an average cost pricing policy 
has generally been adopted by municipal and industrial water schemes. 
Table 5:8 is repreduced frem the Viljoen Report40 except fer the 
last two columns which have been calculated from the other figures. 
It contains figures calculated for a scheme comprising treatment 
works, a pumping installation, a pipeline delivering an average 
.of 1 million gallens per day (m.g.d.) to a reservoir of one million 
gallons capacity, The capital cost was R600 000 and the useful 
life was estirr_ated at )0 years fer the pipeline and reserveir and 
at 15 years for the pumping unit which cost R25 000. Demand was 
ferecast to be initially 0,4 m.g.d. rising at 10t% to 1 m.g,d. over 
the first ten years and remaining constant thereafter. Any subse-
quent increase in demand will have to be met by an extensien of the 
scheme. Ne provision was rr.ade for centirgency or replacement 
funds. 
As discussed in the previous section, a tariff calculated according 
tc strict average cost pricing principles will be high during the 
initial years of the preject where annual consumption has net risen 
to full capacity but will fall during later years as censumption 
rises. This pattern of price fluctuation is in cemplete contrast 
40. Ibid., p. 1 33 • 
• 
TABLE 5:8 
ANNUAL COSTS 
Year Water Interest at Supervisior. Costs of Total cost Average Adjusted 
Consumption 6*% and and chemicals cost-cents marginal 
m.g.d. redemption maintenance and power per thousand running 
on capital gallons ' cost 
---
f{ R R R cents cents 
1 0 . 40 47880 11 400 7300 66580 45. 7 
2 0 . 44 47880 11400 8050 67330 42.0 6, 8 .j>. IV 
--l 
3 0 . 49 47880 11400 8940 68220 38.2 7 , 0 
4 0 . 54 47880 14400 9850 72130 36.7 7,1 
5 0 . 60 47880 14400 10950 73230 33.5 6,2 
6 0 . 67 47880 14400 12200 74280 30.4 6,2 
7 0 .74 47880 14400 13500 75780 28.1 6,4 
8 0 . 82 47880 19900 14970 82750 27.6 6,6 
9 0 . 90 47880 19900 16400 84180 25.7 4 , 9 
10- 30 1.00 47880 19900 18250 86030 23.6 5,1 
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to that which would arise if marginal cost pricing principles are 
applied. During the early years when water consumption is below 
full capacity, the most efficient utilization of the capacity can be 
attained, in the absence of externalities, by charging a price equal 
to marginal running cost. In Table 5:8 marginal running cost has 
been calcul~,ted as the sum of the increase in the unit cost of 
chemicals and power, which are variable expenses and of the 
average cost of supervision and maintenance, which is a semi-
variable e>: pense. It can be seen that the difference between 
the price calculated to cover marginal running costs is substantial 
during the first few years when there is excess capacity. This 
implies that if the marginal cost pricir g principle is adopted, water 
consumption should rise much more rapidly to full capacity than the 
ten years it tal,es to do so when average cost pricing is applif!d. 
It can thus be seen that average cost pricing will prolong the period 
of llnclerutilization of capacity since water will be overpriced when 
there is exces.s capacity and the opportunity cost of watE,r is conse-
quently low. 
Once wate,.. consumption has risen to the level where it equals the 
capacity of the water scheme, then, according to marginalist 
principles,given lumpy inputs,price should rise to ration demand to 
existing capacity and make a contribution to unit capital costs until 
it becomes economically desirable to extend the scheme. Thus, 
under marginal cost pricing, water prices will be relatively higher in 
later years while under the average cost method of pricing they are 
relatively lower. It can happen then that the price required to limit 
demand to capa.city is higher than the price determined according to 
average cost pricing principles so that the former price will mal,e a 
c0ntribution not only to the capital costs allocated to the current 
year but also to those capital costs which were not recovered in 
previous years. If this is the case then average cost pricing may 
not be consistent with the fullest possible recovery of capital costs 
in each years when capacity is fully utilized and may therefore 
prolong the period of utilization of existing capacity. 
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In section 5:3 it was expldned how most Provincial Administrations 
obviate the probl"m of price fluctuations which arise under an 
average cost pricing policy by charging a more or less constant 
tariff over the life span of the scheme. The problem of price 
fluctuations is likely to be particularly acute under a marginalist 
policy, as explained in the next section, although these fluctuations 
will occur in an opposite direction to those under a strict average 
cost pricing policy, with low prices during early years and . high 
prices during the later years of the scheme. Consequently if marginal 
cost pricing is regarded as the standard of efficiency, the policy 
of setting a constant tariff will result in water being overpriced 
and the water scheme underutilized during the early years of the 
scheme, and in water being underpriced and ca.pital costs underre-
c overed during the la.ter years of the scheme. 
In setting the prices to be charged for water supplied !~y industrial 
and domestic scl,.olIies the Department is clearly more concerned with 
the recovery of accounti.ng costs than with signalling to consumers the 
economic value of the resources used or saved a8 a result of their 
decisions. The present departmental practice of calculating the 
i.cterest charge by applying' the Treasury rate to the historical 
capital cost of each particula.r sct.eme means that the d.ifference 
between the revenue derived from water tariffs and the variablE' costs 
of the scheme will not COVEO'r the current replacement cost of the 
capital works of the scheme. This also means that the consumers of 
water supplied from more recently construc~ed schemes are like ly 
to be discriminated against in favour of conSUlT!ers supplied from 
older schemes. Furthermore the practice of setting the price for 
consumers supplied by a number of schemes of different ages on the 
basis of a weighted average of their unit costs implies that consumers 
are not beir g charged the incremental costs"incurred a,s a .. re.sult of. tl:1eir 
increments in consumption with the result that water is likely to be over-
consumed in relation to its relative scarcity. In this respect .the 
reccmmendation by the Claassen Committee that users should be 
charged the incremental average cost of the newest scheme is 
likely to improve allocative effici.,ncy by leading to savings in the 
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resources required for the provision of water. 
The implications of the pricing policy for industrial and domestic water 
schemes on the Government's policy of industrial decentralization 
will be considered in the next :;-.ection. 
5:4:3 THE IMPACT ON INDUSTRIAL DECEl\'TRALIZATION 
POLICY OF THE WATER PRICING POLICY FOR 
INI::USTRIAL AND DOMESTIC CONSUMERS 
The departmental practice of e.ett.ing the price of water supplied 
to indClstrial and domestic consumers to recover the full costs 
of each scheme over its useful life can lead to significant 
differences in the price of water from scheme to scheme as shown 
in Table 5:9 
TABLE 5:9 
AVERAGE PRICE OF WATER ON GOVERNMENT WATER SCHEMES 
IN REGIONS A TO H IN 1980-81 
REGION A 
Berg River - Saldanha Water Project 
Berg River (Swartland Region) 
Berg River (Voelvlei Dam) 
Gamka River (Beaufort West Dam) 
Hex Piver (Bospoort Dam) 
REGION B 
Upper Molopo 
REGION C 
Caledon - Bloemfontein Pipeline 
Lesaka Regional Water Supply 
REGION D 
Buffalo River (Rooikrantz Dam) 
Kubusi River (Gubu Dam) 
cents/m3 
43 ,5 
48 ,3 
2 , 0 
6,1 
3,3 
10,4 
16, 2 
15,5 
4,3 
11 ,6 
431 
T AB LE 5:9 (continued) 
REGIOND 
Middle Buffalo River (Laing Dam) 
Nahoon River 
~EGION E 
Ngagane River 
Sterkspruit (Hammarsdale) 
Umgeni River (Midmar and Albert Falls Dam) 
REGION F 
Blyde River Poort 
Duiwelskloof Regional Water Supply 
Komati River (Nooitgedacht and Vygeboom Dams) 
Usutu River 
REGION G 
Mogol River (Hans Strijdom Dam) 
Pieters burg Regional Water Supply 
Potgietersrus Regional Water Supply 
Springbok Regional Water Supply 
REGION H 
Pienaars River - Hammanskraal (Temba) 
Pienaars River (Roodeplaat Dam) 
U sutu - Vaal (Grootdraai Dam) 
Vaal River and Tugela - Vaal Conduicit 
REGIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
A: Western Cape 
B: Western. Transvaal/Northen Cape 
C: OFS /Que Que / Bophuthatswana 
D: Eastern Cape / Ciskei / Transkei (South) 
E: Natal/ Kwazulu / Transkei (North) 
19 , 2 
14 , 2 
3,8 
27 ,6 
2 , 2 
1 ,8 
29 , 0 
1 , 8 
10 , 8 
7 ,9 
19 , 9 
24 ,6 
44 ,3 
13 , 2 
19 ,5 
8 , 1 
1,8 
F: Eastern Transvaal / KaNgwane / Parts of Lebowa / Gazankulu 
G: Northern Transvaal/Venda / Parts of Lebowa and Gazankulu 
H: PWV area 
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The following factors appear to cause the price of water to differ 
from scheme to scheme: 
(i) AGE OF THE SCHEME 
Since the Second World War there has been a consistent 
upward pressure on the costs of dam construction with 
the result that, other things being equal, the price 
charged for water supplied from more recently completed 
water schemes tends to be higher than that charged in 
respect of older schemes. For example the unit cost of 
water supplied from the original Vaal Dam was estimated 
at 0,04 cents / m3 whereas the average unit cost of the 
water supplied from the more recent extensions to the 
project was calculated as 3,0 cents / m3 in 1982. It is 
apparent, therefore, that if a policy of industrial decentra-
lization results in the water requirements at industrial 
development points growing beyond the capacity of existing 
schemes so that new schemes have to be constructed, 
then there is likely to be a substantial increase in the price 
of water in these areas. 
(ii) EXPECTED LEVEL OF CONSUMPTION 
The unit cost of water will clearly decline as the fixed 
capital costs of ~L scheme are spread over a greater 
level of consumption. It follows, therefore, that the 
price of water will be lower for thoSE: schemes supplying 
a greater volume of water. An inspectiQn of the Department IS 
annual report for 1980-1 reveals that those schemes which 
are indicated as havifig a low water charge in Table 5:9 
such as the Voelvlei Dam in Region A, the lv'.i.dmar and 
Albert Falls Dams in Region E, the Nooitgedacht and 
Vygeboom Dams in Region F and the Vaal River and Tugela-
Vaal Conduit' in Region H have all had to supply a relatively 
higher annual volume of water. The importance of this 
factor is particularly evident when one compares the price 
of 2,2 cents / m3 for the 64,5 million m3 supplied by the 
Midrr.ar Dam with the 27,6 cents / m3 charged for the 4,6 
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million m3 supplied by the Sterkspruit scheme which is 
also in Region E. 
(iii) THE LOCAL BALANCE BETWEEN THE SUPPLY AND 
DEMAND OF WATER 
Even if differences between the age and consumption levels 
of schemes are taken into account, the price charged to 
industrial and domestic consumers may still vary from 
scheme to scheme due to differences in the input require-
ments for dam construction, water districution, pumping 
or water purification. Generally higher unit capital costs 
are incurred when there are insufficient readily available 
water resources to meet local water requirements. For 
example, in Region A (Western Cape) the unit capital cost 
of water supplied by the Berg River - Saldanha Water 
Project was R18, 28 / m3 in 1980-81 which was significantly 
higher than the RO,28 / m3 incurrec. for the Vo!!lvlei Dam. 
This is reflected by the fact that the price of water supplied 
by the Saldanha Water Project was 43,5 cer.ts / m3 whereas 
that supplied by the Vo!!lvlei Dam only cost 2 cents / m3 • 
It is usually due to a combination of these factors that the. price of water 
at industrial development points is ofter. higher than that charged to 
industrial and domestic consumerl; in the main metropolitan areas. 
For example, Table 5: 9 iI tdicates that the average selling price of 
water supplied by the · Laing Dam which serves consumers at the 
. industrial development points of East London, Berlin and 
King WilliamsTown in Region D is 19,2 cents / m3 whereas the charge 
for water supplied by the Vaal - Tugela River Project which serves 
the Witwatersrand area is 1 ,8 cents / m3 • Although the Department 
does provide for a subsidy on a sliding scale of the unit cost of water 
exceeds 22c / rn3 fe·r towns with a population of more than 5000 
White inhabitants, it appears to be the case that many industrial 
development points do not qualify for this subsidy. In the last two 
chapte rs it VIas shown that the Decentralization Board comper.sates 
firms located at industrial development points for the long term 
locational disadvantage they suffer as a result of having to pay higher 
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costs for electricity and railage than would be incurred if they were 
located in the main urban areas. No such subsidy is, however, 
available to such firms in respect of higher water costs. This is 
probably due to the fact that the cost of water usually forms a snlall 
percentage of the sale value of prcducts even for industries tltat 
use relatively large quantities of water. This is indicated in Table 
5:10 which shows the cost of water as a percentage of the market value 
of product for a number of water intensive industries. 
TABLE 5:10 
COST Ole-WATER AS A PERCENTAGE OF MARKET VALUE OF 
Pl,C'DUCT 
PRODUCT 
Steel 
Paper Pulp 
Cotton Textiles 
Electricity 
Oil from Coal 
PERCENTAGE 
0,6 
3,0 
1 ,16 
3,0 
1 ,61 
It is apparent, therefore, that a relatively higher charge for water 
is not likely to result in a serious locational disadvantage for firms 
located at industrial development points and there is probably not a 
strong case for an industrial decentralization policy package to make 
use of a water subsidy. 
The availability of adequate supplies of water at industrial development 
ppints is, however, likely to be an important consideration in the 
formulation of an industrial decentralization policy since inadequate 
supplies may be a limiting factor to industrial development. It is 
for this reason that the areas chosen as decentralized growth points 
usually have an establishecl water supply system . If industrial 
growth takes off at these points then it is likel], that water requirements 
will grow beyond the capacity of existing schemes. It is for this 
reason that the water authorities must ellsure that their pr ogramme 
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of water resource development takes account of the expected effects 
of industrial decentralization policy. 
In the next section some of the practical difficulties associated wit!: 
marginal cost pricing will be discussed as well as the methods by 
which tariff schedules can be structured to approximate optimal 
pricing principles. 
5:5 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OPTIMAL WATER PRICIKG 
POLICIES 
5: 5:1 METERING WATER CCNSUMPTION 
If a water authority decides to use the price of water as ... n instrument 
to adjust consumption to the level necessary to preserve a balance 
between water supply and demand this means that it must be able 
to charge consumers for each unit uf water consumed. To do this, 
a system for metering water consumption must be installed. The 
main benefit to be derivt'd by the water authority fror:; met.ering arises 
from the fact that when there is excess demand under a flat rate 
pricing policy, the introduction of metering and the raising of unit 
prices to ration demand to the level of existing capacity may be 
viewed as an alternative measure to implementing an inve s tment 
programme to expand capacity to lTeet the requirements of water users. 
Once it is accepted that water is (ln ec onomic good which may be sold 
at a price per unit i.n the same way as other commodities, there are 
usua.lly t wo main objections to the installation of metf, ring: 
(a) '.fhe quantity of water demanded is unlikely tc be markedly 
r educed by the introduction of a commodity charge since 
the demand for water is highly price-inela.stic; 
(b) the installation of metering results in a temporary fdl in 
consumption, followed by a fairly rapid return to the original 
le'leL 
The argument that metering will have a. negligible impact on water 
consumption is essentially an empirical matter which appears to be 
436 
contradicted by the rBsults of a number of studies conduct.ed over-
seas, particularly in the United States. 41 ,42,43 
It appears, then, that metering is likely to result in a substantial 
reduction in the level of water consumption although the extent to 
which this occurs will depend on the elasticity of demand for the 
different uses of water. Certainly there is nothing to suggest that 
water consumption is perfectly price inelastic and will not be affectec 
at all by metering. 
Empirical evider.ce also appears to centra.dict the "generally accepted 
hypothesis ••• that water meters will initially reduce the quantity 
of water cOl'.sumed, but that their criginal inpact will gradu2.lly wear 
off and consumers will begin consuming more water until a new 
equilibrium is reached at a level that approaches the original flat 
rate use. ,,44 Hanke has surmised that the misconception that metering 
has no long-term effect on water consuml'tion might be based on a 
confusion between the demand for water as 2. functional relation at a 
point in time anc as a trend over tirr·e. This is illustrated in 
Figure· 5:8. The demand for water for re~idential uses in 1980 is 
represented by D 1980. If flat rates exist the quantity of water 
derrlanded will be Qfr. The installaticn of meters il l 1980 will 
reduce the quantity demanded from Ofr to Qm when the r.letE>red rate 
is Pm. By 1983, the demand function has shifted to the right as 
41 • Hanke, SoH 0, "Demand for Water Under Dynamic Cor,ditions", 
Water Resources Re:;:.earch, 1970, pp. 1255-1261. 
42. Cloonan, E. To, "Meters Save Water" in Moder" Water Rates, 
New York, Battenheirr. Publishing Company, 1965. 
43. Howe, C. W 0, and Linaweaver, F.F., "The Impact of Frice 
on Residential Water De mand and Its Relation to Systenl 
Design", '!later Resources R.esearch, No.1, 1965. 
44. Hanke,SoH., ~p.cit., p. 1254. 
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FIGURE 5:8 The Change in Water Demand Over Time 
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represented by D 1983. This shift could have been caused by changing 
tastes, increased ir.comes, population increases, alterations in 
habits, or changes in other parameters of the demand fu.nction. If 
metered rates are maintained at Po: the c;uantity of water demallded 
will ir.crease from Qm to Qfr. 
The increase in water used from 1980 to 1983 should not be regarded 
as evidence that rr,etering is ineffective after three years. If flat 
rates were again imposed ir 1983, the quantity of water demanded would 
equal Ofr which is consid€·rably greater tban the 1983 use under 
metered rates. Hanke thus attributes the "rgument that metering has 
only a temporary effect on water consumption to a failure to recognize 
the elementary economic principle that price char.ges induce movements 
alcng a c.emand function, whel'eas other factors' cause the locus of 
tre demand function to change. 
If the water authorities accept that n,etE,ring will be an effective tool 
for restraining water consumption, they should then carry out a 
cost-benefit analysis to <ktermine whetLer there will be 2·, ne t 
E,conomic benefit te be obtained from the installation of meters. The 
mair. ber.efit to be obtained from metering is that by encouraging 
e conomy in water US" it dc,lays the impleme ntation of investment 
programmes designed to expand the capacity of the water supply 
system. This is shown in Figure 5:9 in which the growth of consum-
pt; on in the absence of metering is represented by curve C1 , while C2 
sj; ·,·ws the consumption growth path if metering alreac.y exists and 
an optimal pricicg and investment policy is being pursued in which 
capacity is adjusted to its optimal lev,,·l in each period so that price 
is always equal to long run marginal cost. Now if metering is 
introduced at tirr.e te, at which. time it is assumed that existing capacity 
ca.n supply no f"lore tr.a" OA units of consumption, price will be raised 
from zero to a levd equal to short run marginal cest and cor.-sumpticn 
will faJl from OA to OB. Cons urnpti on will not fa.ll to OC since if 
metering is installed and cor,su.mption falls, there will tempor<.rily 
be excess ca.pacity. The only opportunity costs now involved are 
running cost so 'chat a.ccording to optimal pricing principles price 
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will be set equal to short run marginal cost which is less than long 
run ffiarginal cost. Price will thus be lower, and consumption higher, 
than if metering had always been in operation. The dotted line in 
Figure 5:9 represents the r:ew consumption path. As demand grows 
oyer tiIT.e, consumption is shown to increase from OB, until at t5 
consumption returns to the level OA and capacity is again being 
fully utilized. Investrr.ent in new capacity will not t8.ke place until 
the price consumers are willing,to pay covers bott short run and 
longrun margiI ,al cost. Thiswillocc...,rat t 15 since curve C2 
shows the level of CGDSumption if an optimal pricing and investment . 
policy is being followed. Consumption will then continue to follow C2 
U1:til t20 which denotes the end of the meter~. life. If the meters are 
not replaced at t20 consumption will returL to the original unmetered 
growth path. 
At time te" existing c8.pacity cculd supply EO more than 01, units of 
consumption, so the effect of metering in this example is tc defE,r 
tt.e necessity for additional investnent to t1 O. What actually happens 
is that a series of investment projects ' which would have been 
undertaken in the a.hsence of metering are now delayed for a r,umber 
of years. The economic benefit to be obtained from this deferment can 
be measured as the difference between the present worth of the series 
in the absence cf metering and the preser:t worth of the ,series if it is 
delayed. by the introduction of metering. This benefit should l::e 
cc,mpared with the costs of rr.etering which can be measured as the 
sum of: 
the costs of installing, maintairillb' End operating the 
meters themselves; and 
(ii) the loss of consumer's 5urplr,s resulting from the redt:ction 
of consumption below its flat-rate leyel. 
The :recommendation by the Viljoen Commission that "steps be taken 
te, have all domestic and industrial consumers individually metered 
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and charges levied according to the quantity used,,45 is not strictly 
eccnomically va.lid since the metering decision should according to 
widely accepted economic principles, be based on 2 . cost-benefit 
analysis and there may clearly be situations where it is uneconorric 
to introduce metering. However, as Warford46 points out: 
"A df!cision not to install meters at time 
tc does not prE,clude doing so at a later 
date; thus it lliay be tetter to dHer 
metering a number of years, while 
buildiLg up extra capacity for the 
intervenin g period. " 
At present industrial and domestic water consumption is metf!red 
throcghout South Africa. Ho,,'ever, iL the case of flatdwellers, the 
usual practice is for the apartment l:ouse owner to pay for water 
so that there is no incentive f,:,r flatdwellers to cOJ::serve water. 
It is therefore suggested that a cost-benefit analysis should be 
undertaken to determine whether it is economically desirable for 
meters to be fitted tc inc:ividual apartmer,ts so that each flatdweller 
is responsible for his own water rEters. Water supplied for agri-. 
cultura.l uses is not metered since as has been explained, it is 
largely rationed by means of the quota system. 
5:5 : 2 THE PROBLElvlS ASSOCIATED WITH lviARGINA L COST 
PRICIj\ G 
Once ", system of DlE,tering water consumption has been installed, the 
water authority must deciLi,.' en the pricing poIicy on which it will 
base its charges per unit of water used. The main problems associated 
45. R.S.A., op.cit., p . 22. 
46 . Warford,J.J., op.cit., p.l05. Intheappendixtohis 
paper Warford condccts a fermal analysis of the timing 
of the introduction of meters . 
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with 'the application of marginal cost pricing and investmer.t rules 
arise because investment in water supply projects can usually 
only be undertaken in large indivisible lumps and that running costs 
are often a very small proportion of fixed capital costs for most 
water schemes. If water consumption is expected to grow at a 
steady rate then the application of marginal cost pricing in the 
presence of indivisibilities and a low running to capital cost ratio is 
likely to result in dramatic price fluctuations as shown iT. Figure 5:10 
It is assumed in this · figure that there are constant returns to scale 
and fixed capacity which can only be, increased in an indivisible 
lump froJ!'. qo to q1 • 
The demand curves for the period from to to t10 are represented by 
Do tc D10. It can be seen that during the period to to t2, tt:ere i~, 
excess capacity and opportunity cost is equal to running costs, r. 
According to optimal pricing principles price is set equal to short 
run marginal cost which in this case is equivalent to unit running 
costs. From period t2 to t4 price is allowed to rise from ps to pI 
to limit demand tc the fixed capacitj out!,ut qo. It can be seen tt.at 
where there are indivisibilities price is allowed to rise higher than 
unit running and capital costs, since where there are indivisibilities 
the ur..dertaking will not always expand capacity on.ce it has sta.rted 
to earn a surplus since there is likely tc be excess capacity after 
the ne,,' investment is completed. It is assumed that after period 
t4 there is a net economic benefit to be obtained from the expansior. 
of capacity from qo to q1. During the period t4 to t9 tbere is thus 
once again excess capacity and it can be seen tbat if the short--run 
marginal cost pric:ng rule is applied, price should be dropped from 
pl tack to ps where it is equal to running cost. It can thus be seen 
that where there are indivisibi.lities and running costs are a small 
proportion of tote.! costs, a marginal ccst pricing policy is likely to 
result in dramatic cyclical fluctuatior:s in the price of water according 
to the degree of utilization. of the water scheme. 
Fluctuations in the price of a public utility such as a water authority 
which supplies a broad range of us&rs are usually considered 
undesirable for the following re~l sons: 
PRICE,COST 
Fl;=r SRMC 
I 
I O~ ______ ~D~O ___ ~ __ ~~_~~~D=4 __ ~D~5~D~6~_D_7 ____ ~:D_9 __ 
cp ~ 
OUANTITY 
PRICE 
pt --------------
O~---r,tO~--·t~1--·t~2---t~3--~--~t5--~t5--~t7--~t-B~tg----t-10 
TIME 
F IG URE 5:10 
(i) 
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an additional element of uncertainty is introduced into the 
plans of water users; 
(ii) water· users may have to consider making periodic adjust-
ments to changing water prices which, in certain cases, 
may be costly. For example, Triebel has pointed out that 
"higher irrigation water tariffs would either lead to higher 
food prices or force irrigation farmers out of the market. 
Neither is acceptable as tt.e former will hit the poor, 
wheree.s the latter would remove that sector of agriculture 
47 
which stabilizes food production during periods of drought" ; 
(iii) large deficits will be incurred during periods when there 
is excess capacity and the water authority sets price equal 
to running· costs. These deficits will need to be finaI'ced 
by short term loans which will be repaid once capacity is 
fully utilized and price rises to ration demand to capacity. 
Given the low· proportion of the total unit costs of a w,,-ter 
scheme which are r.sually made up of running' ccsts, it 
follows that thE'> short term financing requirerr.ents will 
be substc.ntial, 
A furtlwr problerfl in implementing marginal cost pricing involves the 
accurate determination of the marginal cost and 'Jf the cost increment 
to be lised. There are likely to be differences in the marginal cost 
of supplying the different groups of users served by a sir.gle water 
scter.>e and these differences should be reflected in the tariff 
structure of the scheme. If, for example, a uniform rate is charged 
te· all the lisers of a scheme then as Baumann and Dworkin point cut 
"customers "ho reside if. high-density areas closest to the wat€·r 
scheme subsidize those who reside in low-density arE'as f<.rthest 
47. Triebel, C., "Water resources", Financial Yail, April 1 
1983,p.19. 
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from load centers. This is the result of the costs of extra pumping 
d . . . d ,,48 an plplng requlre to serve remote areas. 
Although it may be impractical to implement a water pricing policy 
whereby each user is charged exactly the marginal cost of 
supplying him, it is nonethele·ss possible fcr marginal cost pricing' 
principles to be reflected in the tariff policy of water authorities. 
If it is assumed that there is a steady growth io water consumpti.on 
over time as reflected in Figure 5:10tl,en the price charged fc·r water 
should be allowed to change as the degree of capacity utilization 
changes over the life of a wate!' scheme: 
(i) .during the early stages of a scheme when demand has not 
yet grown tc the level where capacity is fully utilized 
price should be set at a relatively lower level to promote 
wate'r consunptioo since the cost of supplying' additional 
consumption is likely to be relatively low; while 
once capacity is fully utilized price should be allewed 
to rise to induce greater wate,r conservation and delay 
the necessity for further investment. 
Genera.lly, then, price should be allowed to folle,,,' an upwarc~ trend 
ever the life of a water scheme, in order to encourage the most 
efficient use of the given watE.r resources. 
In setting the charge pe:.:- unit tc be levied on metered users, a water 
authority also has to conside.r how the charge per unit should be 
varied a.s tl:.e user increases his cor.sumption. There are basically 
four types of F,rice schedules· which can bE> used when water consumption 
is me tered. 
48. Baumann,D., a.nd Dworkin,D., "Water Resources for our 
Cities", Reso':!E£~Pal?ers For College Geogra£!:!.y, 
Illinois, 1 978, p. 
(a) 
(b) 
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Declining block rate or promotional pricing 
This schedule uses a minimum charge for a small initial 
quantity f"ll,)',-ed by lower unit prices as the volume 
of water purchased increases in discrete ranges. 
This is the most common type of pricing policy applied in 
the United Sta.tes although it is not used in South Africa. 
Declining block rates may be introduced to increase the 
revenue a water supplier derives from a given quantity 
of water sold. The increase in producer revenue is 
extracted from consumer surplus with this pricing 
policy since the price a consumer pays for each block 
of consumption will bear a closer relation to his 
willingness to pay than would be the case if a constant 
unit price was charged. 
The main problem with declining block rate pricing is 
that it may encourage wasteful pa.tte-rns of water use 
since the average cost of water to the consumer will 
decrease with increasing consumption. In the long 
term the growth of water consumption may be greater 
under a declining block rate schedule then if a constant 
unit price is charged. This type of price schedule 
should only be introduced in areas where there are 
potential a.bundant water resources and it is expected 
that there will be a low probability of water shortages 
occuring in the future. 
Constant unit price schedule 
Under this method of pricing, a constant rate is charged 
for each unit of consumption, With this price schedule, 
then, no attempt is made to influence the consumption 
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behaviour of individual users although, quite cl8arly, the 
constant price can be varied upwards or downwards to 
accomplish tr_e pricing objectives of the water authority. 
(c) Incremental block pricing 
This is tile opposite of declining block rate pricing since 
it is characterized t:y succeedi.ll!)y higher unit prices 
in discrete ranges of cuantities cc;nstlmed as the amount 
of water purchasE:d increases. Incremental block pricing 
is principally intended t o encourage water conservation 
as was shown in section 5:4:1 where tbe aFplication of 
this policy t.y certain irrigation schemes in South Africa 
was evaluated. The fact that the average cost of water 
to the individual user rises witt:. ircreasing consumption 
may induce users to adopt economical patterns of water 
use which, in the long texm, lead tc a slower growth of 
water consumpti.on than would be the case with the other 
pricing policies. Incremental block pricing may thus be 
a partiCularly useful pricing policy for a water authority 
to adopt arE.,as suffering from the proble, m of aridity in 
the senSE: described in secticn 5:1 :4. 
(d) Peak period c.ifferential rates 
Peak peri ad differentiation may be introduc£·d into the water 
pricin g scr.edule whe:.:-e there is a seasonal irregularity 
in water. For Example, if the deme.nd for water for lawn 
sprinkling is higher ill summer then winter, a higher rate 
may be charged for water in summer in order te,.lessen peak 
demands. Summer differential rates may be used in conjunction 
with incremeuta.l block pricing te, er.courage water conservation. 
In choosing between the different types of water price schedules, a water 
at::thority should also consider their distributi cnal effects. The constant 
price policy may se8m to meet the test of complete fairness since under 
this policy alJ usors pay the same price at all times. Incremente.! 
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block pricing is more progressive, however, since with this policy 
!C,W use (and probably low income) consumers will be charged a lower 
average unit price than high use consumers. This seems to reflect 
the payment by ability-to-pay criterion of distributional policy and 
may thus be considered fairer than either a constant price policy or 
the regressive declining hlock rate pricing policy under which low 
use consumers are charged a higher average rate than high use 
consumers. 
49 Gysi and Loucks have compared the long run effectr. of these 
IOricing policies in t"rms of consumer benefits and system costs. 
They have assumed that both the declining blcck lCate and increasing 
block rate pricing policies have three block rateE, and that the final 
block rate in both cases is tl',e sanle as that charged under a constant 
price policy. Furthermore they assumed that prices were so low 
that all consumers bought tbeir water in the third price range of the 
increasing and decreasing block rate policies which equalled the 
constant rate charged under the constant price policy. As a r esult 
the optimal expansion path s and rationing figures remained identical 
fc.r c.o:rrespOl2Cling runs of all three policies, so that Gysi and Loucks 
could base their compa.rison on the 2.verage price paid by consumers 
unde r the three different ' policies. It can be .seel) that tlie increasing 
block rate policy resulte'd in higher average , and' minifI!um 
percentage of summe. demand received and lower long run avera'ge 
unit cost and present value of capital consturp.ction cost 
for the same long run average price ther. the constant price policy. 
Conversely the declining tlc,ck rate policy ha!3 the opposite effects. 
Gysi and Loucks thus conclude: 
49. Gysi,M., and Loucks,D.P., "Some Long Run Effe'cts of 
Water Pricing Policies", Water Resources Researcl:!, 
Vol. 7, N06, Dec. 1971. 
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"For comparable long run average prices the 
increasing block rate policy appeared 
superior to the constant price policy which 
in turn appeared superior to the dec-reasing 
block rate polic y ." 5 0 
It can thus be concluded that there are both distributional and conser-
vational advantages to be obtdned from a tariff structure characterized 
by increasing block rates and a seasonal rate differential. 
5:6 CONCLUSION AND Rl-XOMMENDATIONS 
The recommenda.tions fer Ib' pricil!g of water in South Africa which 
emerge fl'c·m tbe analysis in this chapter may now be summarizec.: 
(i) since there is evidence that water resources are tecoming 
increasingly scarce it Sot!th Africa, there is a need to 
use pricir g policy not only as an illstrument to rai~e 
revenue but also as a tecl for restraining water demand. 
This however, makes it necessary for the metering of 
water cGnsumption to be ;!sed as widely as is fe asible 
in tt.is country; 
(ii) the recommendation by the Viljoen Comrr:ission that water 
tariffs should be raised to at least cover tt.e operating 
costs of irrigation schemes should continue t o be imple-
mented since although there is evid.ence of improvement, 
the water suppli.,c: by governmer:t irrigation is still 
substantially unde rpriced in South Africa; 
(iii) a more .. efficient utilization of water capacity may be 
achieved i.f the unit price cf water is allowed to increase 
over the life of a water scheme than unde,r the currer.t 
policy of charging a ccnstant tariff; 
(iv) the prccti.ce cf charging individual users on an i ncrea.sing 
block rate basis which is applied by some government 
50 Ibid., p. 1 381 • 
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irrigation scher:tes should be extended not or.ly to other 
irrigation schemes but also to the water supplied for 
industrial and domestic uses, since this type of pricing 
policy tends to encourage water conservation by cc,nsumers. 
The possibility of introducing sE:asonal price differentiation 
should also be inve~tigatE>d since tbis l11ay be an effective 
way of curl:ing demand iL peak perioc.s; 
\v) the possibility of extending the departmental practice of 
providing a subsidy on ce.pital cost according to a sliding 
scale if the unit cost of water supplied by a schen;e 
exceeds a certain specif:' "d limit should be investigated, 
since this may be a way iL which water pridng policy 
can be made cor.sistent with industrial decentralization 
policy; and 
\vi) a.lthough the price of water at indt.:.strial deve.·lopment points 
is of to: ', tigher than that charged to illdt;,strial and don-,estic 
consurr.ers in the main metropolite,n areas, this is not likely 
to result in a serious locational disadvantage for firms 
located at these poircts so that there is not a strong' case 
for an indust.rial decentralization policy packa ge to make 
use of a water subsidy. The avdlability of adequate 
supplies of water may, however, be a limiting fact.or to 
industrial deyeloprr:e nt so tha t it is important for the 
water authorities to ensure that their programme of 
water resource,s development takes accouct of the c'xpected 
effects of ind:Jstrial d ecentralization policy. 
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CONCLUSION 
In Chapters One and Two a theoretical framework for public utility 
pricing was formulated in fairly Reneral terms, with the object of 
applying a common set of principles to the deterrr:ination of efficient 
pricing policies for rail transport, electricity and water services. 
Having examined both preser.t and proposed certain alternative pricing 
policies for these services, the thesis can now be concluded by pointing 
to some of the differences and similarities which er:;erged from the 
preceding analysis. 
Unlike electricity and rail transport, water services cannot be provided 
by public enterprises operating on a national scale. The pricing 
policies of the various local water suppliers are, however, controlled 
by the Directorate of Water Affairs. Despite certain institutional 
similarity between S.A. T. S. and Escom, the pricing policies followed 
1::y these two public enterprises differ substantially because they are 
r equired to promote different o1::jectives. Whereas Escom sets its 
tariffs to generate sufficient revenue to cover the items of total 
"c ost" specified in the Electricity Act, S. A . T . S. i" not only required 
to attain financial equilibrium as an organization but also to provide 
various uneconomic social services. S.A. T . S. is therefore obliged 
to depart from the principle cf full cost recovery in charging for some 
of its remunerative services in order to cross-subsidize its unremun-
erative social services. Although the users of electricity are liable to 
such cross-subsidization, Escom does set its tariffs at a level sufficient 
t o ensure that its users make a contribution to future capital development 
since the total "costs" which must 1::e covered by tariff revenue ir.elude 
items which would be regardec! as retained profits is an ordinary 
commercial undertaking. The users of water supplied by individua l 
schemes also do not have to cross- subsidize other schemes since the 
price charged for water supplied to industrial and domestic consumers 
is set to recover the full accounting costs of a scheme over its useful 
life, while the c.eficits incurred by irrigation schemes are directly 
subsidized by the State. 
Esccm also differs fro", S. A. T . S. in that, in formulating its tariffs, it 
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follows a procedure of allocating its costs first to different regions, 
and then to different classes of consumers within each region. 
Electricity tariffs are thus structured primarily according to differences 
in tte cost of supplying different classes of consumers. In the Eame 
way the price of water varies from area to area according to the 
differences between the unit costs incurred by the local water schemes. 
S.A.T.S., on the other hand, applies the "collective principle" 
according to which the same rate pel' tonne kilometer is charged for a 
commodity regardless of the route on which it is carried. This 
effectively implies that remunerative routes cross-subsidize unremun-
erative routes. 
Furthermore, the structure of tariffs for different commodities is 
determined not only accordir.g to differences between their costs of 
conveyance but also takes into account differences in their value per 
unit of weight. This impliee. that the revenue earned on commodities 
with a high vhlue is used to cross-subsidize, commodities with a low 
value. As was explained in Chapter Three this policy of cross-
subsidiz,,-tion between different services, routes and commodities largely 
arose because S. A • T . S. is required to reconcile diffe:cent policy 
objectives. 
It might, at first, seem that if the pricing policies of the different public 
utilities were required to promote the objective of eCGnomic efficiency 
by following the optimal rules discussed in Chapter Two, then the 
differences between them would largely disappear. However, as was 
explained in Chapter Two, these pricing rules substitute for the 
ftnctions normally performed by a competitive market process and the 
way in which they should be applied will depend upon the competitive 
pressures facing the different utilitie's, Although S. A . T . S. can be 
regarded as a monopolistic supplier of rail services, it does face 
ccmpetition from other modes of transport, It currently enjoys a 
measure of I'rotection from such intermodal competition through the 
permit system. As was explained in Chapter Three, the permit system 
interferes with users' freedom of IT.odal choice and may be causing a 
misallocation of resources within the transport sector. The objective 
of economic efficiency could therefore by promoted if the transport 
sector were deregulated. This would, however, probably necessitate 
some relaxation of the controls over the pricing and investment policy 
of S.A. T • S. to enable it to compete on ec;ual terms with other roodes 
of transport by, for example, being able to negotiate rates with users 
below the published scale.s and to discontinue unremunerative services. 
The Railways could apply marginal cost principles by negotiating lower 
rates to improve the utilization of capacity which is underutilized in off-
peak periods anc on low density routes, and higher rates to ration 
demand tc capacity in peak periods and on hib"h density routes. The 
combined effects of c.ereg·ulation, rate negotiation and a flexiUe 
investment policy by S. A. T.::'. should then improve the allocation of 
resources within tte transport sector. 
The suppliers of electricity and water are not suhject t(. the s&.me degree 
of competitive pressure as that whict. fa.ces the Railways. The optimal 
pricing rule·s can thereforE be used as instruments of decentralized 
control to ensure that resources are efficiently allocated to these 
sectors. The adoption of these rulE s would actually required a tightening 
of control over Escom' s pricin g and investment policies. An independent 
external body would have to control the r a tes of return and the level 
of investment undertaken by Esccm since there might be a tendency 
for Escom' s IEc..nagement to be excessively risk averse and to over-
invest ir reserve plant capacity . Furthermore the ambt of external 
control over Escom' s tariff policy would have to be extended so that 
E£com could no longe r impose sur c harges and disc ou nts at its own 
discre tion. Esc Oil'. 's tariffs could also be structured according to 
marginal cost principles in the same manner as has been applied 
in France, In the case d water s ervices, there already exist,; 
an adequate syster. , of external control over pricing and investme nt 
d ecis i ons ... There d c·e :::, hc"vever, exist ~cope fe r structuring wa.ter 
tariffs according to ll'.arginalist principles by extending the application 
of mcr.emental bleck rates and generally raising the price of water on 
irrigation schemes to more economic levels. 
Finally , it appears that ind us t r ial d e oentralization would be ",are 
aff e cted by regional differenc es i n tte availability than in the cost of 
public utility services. This is particularly the case with eiectricity 
and water since inadequate supplies of these servies is likely to I::e 
a factor limiting industrial devel opment at any point. Although an 
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adequate transport system is also necessary for industrial development 
to take place, regional transport needs can be r.tet by road as well as 
Fail transport. It is for this reason that it has been proposed that 
Regional Transport Authorities (RTA) should be established to monitor 
regional transport needs where the pursuit of an efficient investment 
policy by S.A. T. S. would result in the closure of unremunerative 
lines. The R. T.A. could determine, in such cases, whether there 
might be a net economic benefit to be obtained from s ubsidizin g the 
continued operation of rail ::.erviceE. 
It is likely that the pricing policies recommended for electricity, wG.ter 
and rail services would lead to regional differences in the cost of 
these services. In cases vlhere this would cause a long terrr. cost 
disadvantage for firms locating at industrial developmer:t points 
they cculd be comper:sated in the manner currently followed by the 
00ard for the Decentralization of Industries. This approach reduces 
tt.e conflict between industrial decentralization policy and the promotion 
of efficient pricing policies by public utilities in South Africa, since 
it recognizes the general principle that instruments and objectives 
should balance in the application of economic policy. 
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